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भर्तृहरिविरचितायां

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां षष्ठमाह्निकम्

(उत्तरार्धम्)

ABBREVIATIONS

AL	= Abhyankar and Limaye
Bhar.	= Bhartṛhari
Dīp.	= *Dīpikā*
Kaiy.	= Kaiyaṭa
Kāś.	= *Kāśikā*
Kāt.	= Kātyāyana
Mbh.	= *Mahābhāṣya*
MS.	= Manuscript
Nāg.	= Nāgeśa, Nāgojibhaṭṭa
NS	= *Nyāya-Sūtra*
om.	= omit(s)
P.	= Pāṇini
Padam.	= *Padamañjarī*
P. Dh.	= Pāṇinīya Dhātupāṭha
Pari.	= Paribhāṣā
Pat.	= Patañjali
Prad.	= *Pradīpa*
Sid-Kau.	= *Siddhānta-Kaumudī*
Sw	= Swaminathan
Vākyap.	= *Vākyapadīya*
Vār.	= *Vārttika*
कै.	= कैयट
ना.	= नागेश, नागोजिभट्ट
सि. कौ.	= सिद्धान्तकौमुदी

Other abbreviations, which occur only occasionally, are self-explanatory, e. g. *TaittSaṁh.* (= *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā*).

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां षष्ठमाह्निकम् : उत्तरार्धम्

स्वरादि[निपातमव्ययम्] ॥ १. १. ३७ ॥

[१] प्रकारचतुष्टयमिह — चादिषु स्वरादीनां पाठः, स्वरादिषु वा चादीनाम्। तथा निपातसंज्ञैव वा कर्तव्या, अव्ययसंज्ञैव वा। एकपाठे चैकैव संज्ञा कर्तव्या। यदि वा निपातसंज्ञा, यदि वाव्ययसंज्ञा। अव्यये त्वेतन्निश्चितम् — 'इह किंचिदव्ययं क्रियाप्रधानं, किंचिद्विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानम्। न चैतस्यार्थस्य लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यामस्ति योगः' इति। स्वरादयोऽपि विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानत्वादसत्त्ववचना एव। एष खलु विशेषो वाचकाः स्वरादयो द्योतकाश्चादय इति। सर्वथा चासत्त्ववचनत्वमस्ति स्वरादीनामिति पृथक्पाठं पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते। प्रतिवचनं त्वसमर्थं दृश्यते — **चादीनां वा असत्त्ववचनानामिति।**

[२.१] संप्रत्यन्यतरा संज्ञा किमिति न कृतेति पृच्छति — **अथ किमर्थमुभे संज्ञे इति।** 'प्राग्रीश्वरान्निपाताः' (पा. १. ४. ५६) इति पठित्वा तत इदं पठितव्यं 'स्वरादिं' (पा. १. १. ३७), 'तद्धितश्चासर्वविभक्तिः' (पा. १. १. ३८), ततश् 'चादयोऽसत्त्वे' (पा. १. ४. ५७) इति। पुष्कलं प्रयोजनमाचष्टे — **स्वरादीनामपि प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्रसज्येतेति।** क्वात्र — 'किमोऽत्' (पा. ५. ३. १२) इत्यकारस्तद्धितस्तस्य प्रगृह्याश्रयः [प्रकृतिभावः] स्यात्।

[२.२] चादिषु यथा 'चादिलोपे विभाषा' (पा. ८. १. ६३) इति। **तच्च न।** अनाङिति प्रतिषेधवचनं लिङ्गं, न चत्वारो गृह्यन्त इति।

[२.३] **एवं तर्ह्यव्ययसंज्ञेति।** अत्राप्यनुषक्तः पूर्वो दोषः। अव्ययसंज्ञा चेदेवैका, तत्सूत्रमेवं पठितव्यम् — अव्ययमेकाजनाङिति। अनुषक्ताः स्वरादयः।

[२.४] यस्तु दोष उच्यते **तद्गरीयसा न्यासेनेति।** अयं च शक्यप्रतिविधानः। एवं पठिष्यते — अव्यये नञ्कुचादीनामिति। चतुर्ष्वेव संप्रत्ययः प्राप्नोति। क्त्वायां वा प्रतिषेधात् निपातनाच्च स्नात्वाकालकादिष्वप्रसङ्ग इति नार्थः परिगणनेनेति।

तद्धितश्चासर्वविभक्तिः ॥ १. १. ३८ ॥

[१.१] किमियमव्ययसंज्ञा तद्धितान्तस्याहोस्वित्तद्धितमात्रस्येति ? समुदायस्येति विज्ञायते। कुतः ? प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात्स विहितस्तदादेरिति।

[१.२] ननु च संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिः प्रतिषिद्धः। एवं तर्ह्यौपसंख्यानिकः प्राकरणिकस्तदन्तविधिरस्ति — 'प्रयोजनं सर्वनामाव्ययसंज्ञायाम्' इति। यथा परमोच्चैः परमनीचैरिति।

[१.३] कः पुनर्विशेषः समुदायस्यावयवस्य वाव्ययसंज्ञायाम् ? अवयवस्याव्ययसंज्ञायां सत्यां तत्र यत्रेति लुकोऽभावः। न हि प्रत्ययात्सुब्विहित इति।

[१.४] उच्यते। वचनप्रामाण्यादत्र परत्वमात्रमाश्रित्य लुक्करिष्यते। अकजर्थं स्याद्वचनम्। तस्मात्समुदायस्यैवाव्ययसंज्ञायां सत्यामव्ययविहितायाश्च सुपो लुगन्यगन्यात्व(?)विधौ नास्ति दोषः।

[१.५] अथ समुदाय आश्रीयमाणे कथमिदं संबध्यते तेन, असर्वविभक्तिरिति ? न हि समुदायस्योत्पत्तौ निमित्तं विभक्तिः, अनुमेयत्वात्समुदायानाम्। प्रत्यया एव हि विधीयन्ते।

[१.६] अत्रापि समुदायेऽसंभवादवयवाश्रयो व्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते। तद्धितान्तः शब्दोऽव्ययसंज्ञः स चेदसर्वविभक्त्यवयवो भवतीति। नास्ति विशेषः प्रत्यये संज्ञिनि तदन्ते वा।

[२.१] असर्वविभक्तिरिति। विग्रहभेदाद् भेदं प्रतिपन्नाः वृत्तिकाराः। केषांचिद्विग्रहो 'नास्य सर्वा विभक्तय उत्पत्तौ निमित्तम्' इति। न त्वीदृशानाम् असमानाधिकरणपदानामस्ति बहुव्रीहिरित्यर्थोपप्रदर्शनमेतत्, विभक्तयः कारणं प्रत्ययः कार्यमित्यस्यार्थस्य। वर्तिपदे तु असर्वा विभक्तयोऽस्येति। अन्येषामयं विग्रहः — असर्वा विभक्तिरस्मादिति। तेषामपि मत्वर्थे 'वा पूर्वस्य विधानात्' पञ्चम्यर्थबहुव्रीहेरभाव इति तद्धितस्य कारणत्वं, कार्यत्वं च विभक्तेरिति। पञ्चम्या प्रदर्शनमेव केवलम्, इयमेव तु कल्पना — असर्वा विभक्तिरस्येति।

[२.२] तत्र य एवं वर्णयन्ति न सर्वा विभक्तय उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्येति ते प्रत्युदाहरन्ति — तद्धित इति किमर्थम् ? उपसरजः मन्दुरज इति। यश्च विभक्तेरनन्तरः

प्रत्ययो यश्च व्यवहितः सर्वः सर्वस्य विभक्तिनिमित्तत्वेन प्रवर्तते। अयं च 'सप्तम्यां जनेर्डः' इति सप्तमीमाश्रित्य विधीयते। तद्धितस्तु न भवति।

[२.३] असर्वविभक्तिग्रहणस्य प्रत्युदाहरणमौपगवः कापटवः इति। कथमिदं प्रत्युदाहरणम्? यावता च क्रियमाणेऽप्यसर्वविभक्तिग्रहणेऽव्ययसंज्ञा प्राप्नोत्येव। कथम्? यदि तावदेवमाश्रीयते यस्य शब्दरूपेणमि[?इ]दंविभक्तिराश्रीयते यथा 'प्रतियोगे पञ्चम्यास्तसिः' (पा. ५. ४. ४४), '....अकर्तरि तृतीयायाः' (पा. ५. ४. ४६) इति, सोऽयमसर्वविभक्तिरिति। अणश्च 'तस्यापत्यम्' (पा. ४. १. ९२) इति षष्ठी अर्थरूपेणाश्रिता न शब्दरूपेणेति। इह दोषः 'प्रकारवचने थाल्' (पा. ५. ३. २३) इति। न ह्यत्र काचिद्विभक्तिः शब्दवती अस्ति।

[२.४] अथाप्येवं कल्प्यते। अणयं सर्वा विभक्तीराश्रित्य विहितः। 'तस्यापत्यम्', 'तत्र भवः', 'तत आगतः' इति। एवमपि न संभवति चतुर्थ्यनुपादानादिति। साप्यस्ति। 'भक्तादणन्यतरस्याम्' (पा. ४. ४. ६८) इति भक्तमस्मै दीयते भाक्त इति। किं तु दाक्षिरिति इञ् अपत्य एव विहित इत्यसर्वविभक्तित्वमव्यावृत्तमेव।

[२.५] तत्र दर्शनं वृत्तिकारस्य लक्ष्यते 'प्रातिपदिकात्तद्धित उत्पद्यते' इति। यच्च विग्रहपदं भेदविषयं तदन्त्यं वृत्तिविषयं न भवतीत्यन्वाख्यानकाले प्रत्ययोत्पत्तौ चिकीर्षितायां यच्च विभक्त्यन्तं यच्च प्रातिपदिकमुभयमपि तदप्रयोगार्हमिति विभक्त्यन्तापि प्रकृतिः संभवति प्रातिपदिकमपीति सर्वविभक्तित्वमवसीयते। अस्मिंस्तु यो दोषः स वार्त्तिक एव दर्शितो विना नानेति।

[२.६] असर्वविभक्तौ। असर्वविभक्तिः निमित्तमिति अस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तो यद्ययं बहुव्रीहिराश्रीयते अविभक्तिरित्युपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम्। तत्राविभक्तिनिमित्तमिति कथमाश्रीयते? यदि तावदविद्यमानविभक्तिः शब्दः प्रातिपदिकं निमित्तमस्येत्येवं वर्ण्यत औपगवादिषु दोषः। अथाश्रूयमाणविभक्तिरविभक्तिर्निमित्तमस्येति एवमपि नित्य इति दोषः। अयं हि त्वयश्रूयमाणविभक्तेर्निशब्दाद्विहित इति। अनाश्रितविभक्तिविशेषः अविभक्तिः, एवमपि विशंकटादिषु दोषः। तस्मान्नायं पाठः। किं तर्हि? प्रदर्शनमेतत्। कस्य? गणपाठस्य। ये गणे उपसंख्याता, अर्हन्ति तेऽस्मिन्सूत्रार्थ उपसंख्यानमिति। सूत्रार्थान्तरे तु न त उपसंख्यातव्याः।

[२.७] ननु वाचा प्रकरणमुपसंख्यानमुच्यते। नैष दोषः। पाठमप्युपसंख्यान-

शब्देनाचष्टे । तद्यथा । द्व्यादिषु प्रतिषेधात् किम उपासंख्यानम् (तु. पा. ५. ३. २, वा. २) इति ।

[२.८] तत्रैतत्स्यात् । सति गणपाठे [किं] सूत्रेणेति । लक्षणप्रपञ्चाभ्यां कथं निर्दिष्टाः स्युरिति ।

[२.९] अथ वा पूर्वकारणे सत्येवं प्रवर्तते अविभक्तिनिमित्तस्येति । येषामनेन लक्षणेनाविभक्तिनिमित्तस्य न प्राप्नोतीष्यते च, तेषामुपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यमित्यनाश्रित्य गणपाठमुच्यते विना नानेति । विभक्तिविशेषस्य तद्धितेऽनुपादानात् ' अविशेषेणैवोत्पद्यन्ते उत्पन्नानां नियमः ' इति सर्वविभक्तित्वमवसितम् । विशंकटादयोऽप्येवं प्रसक्ताः । तेषां तु पूर्वेण क्रमेणाप्रसङ्ग उक्तः ।

[२.१०] किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति ? सूत्रार्थान्तरे सिद्धिं यस्य ष्टथि(?) ।

[२.११] सर्वविभक्तिर्ह्येष भवति । किं कारणम् ? अविशेषेण .... असर्वविभक्तेरन्यः को भवितुमर्हति ? यस्य वा सर्वा विभक्तय उत्पत्तौ निमित्तं, यस्य वा नैव काचित् सोऽपि तस्मादन्य एव भवति । अथ वा अविशेषेण विहितत्वात् इति । ते वर्णयन्ति—विभक्तिविशेषमनाश्रित्य विहितत्वात्, अथ वा सुपामविशेषविहितत्वात् अव्ययात्सर्वविभक्त्यन्तादुत्पत्तिरिति ।

[२.१२] त्रलादीनां चोपसंख्यानम् । आदिशब्दः प्रकारे द्रष्टव्यः । तसिलोऽप्युपादानात् भाष्ये ।

[२.१३] ननु च विशेषेणैते इति । अभिप्रायः । अभवदादियोगे पञ्चमीसप्तम्यावेव निमित्तमिति । इतरो भवदादियोगे साधुत्वाभ्यनुज्ञानादेतस्मिन्विषये सर्वविभक्तित्वमस्ति । ततश्चाप्राप्तिरितीदमाह — वक्ष्यत्येतदिति ।

[२.१४] यदि पुनरविभक्तिः शब्द इति । अश्रूयमाणविभक्तिरिति । यद्येवं राजपुरुषादिषु राजशब्दोऽविभक्तित्वादव्ययं भवति, पूर्वपदप्रकृतिस्वरत्वं कस्मान्न प्रतिपद्यते ? समासान्तोदात्तत्त्वमलुक्समासेषु भविष्यति दास्याःपुत्रादिषु । परिगणनादप्येतत्सिद्धम् — ' अव्यये नञ्कुनिपातानाम् ' इति ।

[२.१५] इदं तर्हि दधि मध्विति। अव्ययलक्षणोऽकच् स्यात् दधकीति। दधिकमिति चेष्यते। एवं तर्हि शब्दाकृतिराश्रीयते। न चेयमाकृतिरविभक्तिः। वचनान्तरे सविभक्तिरपि दधिनी दधीनीति। शब्दाकृतिग्रहणे चार्थाकृतिरप्याश्रीयते। तेन तुल्यायामितिशब्दाकृतावर्थाकृतेर्भेदादव्ययत्वं न भविष्यति यथा इतिः शकटमिति।

[२.१६] कथं पुनरयमितरेतराश्रयदोषो न भविष्यति? एवं मन्यते। लौकिकीं प्रतिपत्तिमाश्रित्याव्ययसंज्ञायामविभक्तित्वमुपादीयते। प्रयोगे चात्यन्तमेतेऽविभक्तिकाः। तस्माच्छास्त्रप्रतिपत्तिमनाश्रित्य प्रवर्तिष्यामह इति।

[२.१७] अविभक्तावितरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिः। शास्त्रप्रतिपत्तिमाश्रित्य दोष उपादीयते। शास्त्रेण हि प्रातिपदिकात्स्वादयः प्रतिपादिता अविशेषेण। तद्यथा बभ्रुमण्डुलमकानामप्रत्यायकानामपत्येऽसाधुत्वमेवमेषामपि नानाविनादीनाम्। तत्र निवर्तकं शास्त्रमविभक्तेः साधुत्वस्य प्रतिपादकमारब्धव्यम् 'अव्ययादाप्सुपः' इति। अव्ययेभ्यः स्वादयो नोत्पद्यन्ते नोच्चार्यन्त इत्येतमर्थं लुका व्याचष्टे प्रत्ययलक्षणं प्रार्थयमानः। यानि पदसंज्ञादीनि सति प्रत्यये दृष्टानि तानीहात्यन्तं प्रत्ययस्यासंभवे भवन्तीत्येवमर्थम्। एवं च सत्यविभक्तित्वमयं प्रतिपत्ता शास्त्रात्प्रतिपद्यते। अविभक्तित्वं च लुकि सति, लुक् चायं यत्नप्रतिबद्ध इत्येवंभूतलक्षणं नार्थक्रियायाः करणे समर्थं भवतीति।

[२.१८] अलिङ्गमसंख्यमिति वा। पूर्वस्यानवस्थितत्वाद्विकल्पानुपपत्तिः। वाक्यस्य वाक्येन संबन्धाददोषः। इदमेवं संबन्धमुपनीयते — 'अविभक्तावितरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिः, अलिङ्गमसंख्यमिति वा' इतरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिरित्येव। एवं चाश्रीयमाणेऽनिवृत्तमितरेतराश्रयत्वमिति।

[२.१९] अथ वैवं संबन्धः क्रियते। यदुक्तमविभक्तिः शब्द इत्यत्र विभक्तिशब्दः स्वादिषु वा वृत्तोऽथ वा विभागो विभक्तिरिति भेदवचन आश्रीयते। एतावन्तश्च नाम्नो विभागा यदुत लिङ्गसंख्याकर्मादयः। तत्रालिङ्गसंख्योपादानात्कर्मादयो निरस्ताः प्रतिपत्तव्याः। तस्मादेतत्प्रतिपादयति — लुप्तविभक्तिर्वा अविभक्तिः। अथ वा भेदानप्राप्तोऽयं सोऽविभक्तिरिति।

[२.२०] अर्थस्य च व्याकरणेऽत्यन्तमनुपदेशादितरेतराश्रयदोषमपश्यन्निदमुपन्यस्यति — अथ वा अलिङ्गमसंख्यमव्ययमिति।

[२.२१] एवमपीतरेतराश्रयमेव भवति। व्युत्पित्सुः अर्थमयं क्वचिच्छास्त्रादेव प्रतिपद्यते। यथा कर्त्रभिप्रायं क्रियाफलमस्य धातोः संभवति, अस्य न संभवतीति प्रतिपद्यते स्वरितेत्त्वात् ञित्त्वाच्च। यस्तु विद्वानसावसत्यपि लिङ्गे प्रतिपद्यते यथा प्रत्याख्यातं स्वरितञित्ग्रहणम्। एवं च कृत्वा त एवाचार्येण पठिता उभयवन्त इति। अतोऽयमपि शास्त्रात्प्रतिपद्यमानो लिङ्गसंख्यावत्त्वमपि शास्त्रात्प्रतिपद्यत इति इतरेतराश्रयदोषमाह।

[२.२२] नेदं वाचनिकमसंख्यतालिङ्गता वा। किं तर्हि? स्वाभाविकमेतत्। सर्वमेव स्वाभाविकम्, [किं]चित्तु दृष्टव्यभिचारं यथाक्षीणि मे दर्शनीयानि, पादा मे सुकुमारतरा इति (म. भा. १. ३२२. ५, ६)। व्यभिचारनिवृत्त्यर्थं यत्नो यत्राश्रीयते तद्वाचनिकमित्युच्यते। यत्त्वदृष्टव्यभिचारं न तत्रानिष्टं दृश्यत इति यत्नो न क्रियते। तथा चोक्तं — 'न वानिष्टादर्शनादि'ति (वार्त्तिक २. २. ३०. २)। न हि राजपुरुषे पुरुषराज इति अस्ति प्रयोगः। न च प्रपचतीति प्रयोक्तव्ये पचतिप्रेति। तत्र शब्देष्वेव तावद् दृष्टव्यभिचारेष्वयं वृत्तान्तः, किं पुनरर्थेषु? तस्मात् प्रतिज्ञानादेषा अलिङ्गता असंख्यता वा दृष्टादृष्टव्यभिचारा। एवं सति नास्ति इतरेतराश्रयदोषः।

[२.२३] सिद्धं तु पाठात्। यावता वाक्यकारस्य स्थित एवेतरेतराश्रयदोष इति पाठोपन्यासः। अन्ये तु वार्थे तुशब्दं वर्णयन्ति — सिद्धं वा पाठादिति। तेषामपि न संभवति सर्वस्य प्रत्याख्यातत्वात्।

[२.२४] तसिलादयः प्राक् पाशपः। यावदेधाच्च। गणेऽप्येवं पठ्यते। तसिलादिस्तद्धित एधाच्पर्यन्त इति। शस्प्रभृतयः प्राक् समासान्तेभ्य इति। 'बह्वल्पार्थाच्छस्' इत्यतः प्रभृति यावन् 'मद्रात्परिवापणे' ङाच् इति। थाल् 'विश्वेमात् थाल्' इति। अयं वार्त्तिके नोपसंगृहीतः। यत्नस्तु क्रियते। य एवं 'प्रकारवचने थाल्' (५. ३. २३) छन्दसि स एव प्रत्नादिभ्यः (५. ३. १११) स्वार्थे भवतीति। मान्तः अम् आम्। वार्त्तिके तु तद्धिताः प्रकृता इति आमिर्न पठितः। कृत्वोर्थः कृत्वसुच् सुच् धा। तसिवती। नानाञौ। तथा तेनैकदिक् तसिश्च। वतिः 'तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वतिः' (पा. ५. १. ११५) इति। गणे पाठ एतावतामिति पठितम्॥

[२.२५] अथ वा पुनरस्त्विति। अर्थाश्रये परिहृत्येतरेतराश्रयं संप्रति शब्दाश्रये परिहरति। यो ह्यर्थः शास्त्रात् प्रतिपद्यते [स लौकिकादपि प्रतिपद्यते]। यदि

अविभक्तिकानां शास्त्रात् प्रयोगो व्यवतिष्ठते न तेऽभिज्ञवदशास्त्रज्ञा अविभक्तिकान्प्रयुञ्जीरन्। प्रयुञ्जते च। तस्मात् लौकिकीमेव प्रतिपत्तिमाश्रित्याव्ययसंज्ञा प्रवर्तिष्यते। न शास्त्रप्रतिपत्तिमिति। सैव प्रतिपत्तिरिदानीं विस्पष्टमाज्ञायते। **अभिज्ञाश्च पुनर्लौकिका** इति। अनेनार्थावधारणाश्रयं समाधिमाह। लौकिका ह्येकत्वद्वित्वबहुत्ववतोऽर्थान् निःसंदिग्धानवधारयन्ति। प्रदर्शनार्थमिदमुपादीयते—**अन्येन हि वस्नेनैकं गामिति।** न त्वयं शब्दप्र[वृ]त्तावुपयुज्यते। मूढोऽपि हि क्रयविक्रये प्रवर्तमान एवमेव प्रवर्तते। तस्मादर्थावधारणप्रतिपादनपरमेतत्। यथैव चार्थव्यवहारेऽवधारिता अर्थाः, एवमेव शब्दप्रयोगेऽपीति तदुपादानेष्वर्थेष्वेकान्तावधारिता अर्था अत्यन्तमेव एकत्वादियोगिनोऽर्थान्प्रति। कुत एते? यथापभ्रंशोच्चारणेऽपि वृक्षादिष्वेकवचनबहुवचने न व्यतिकरेणोच्चारयन्ति। संख्याशब्दांश्च तत्समानाधिकरणान्प्रयुञ्जते। न च नानादिशब्दान् प्रायः प्रयुञ्जते। इदं च नाख्यातमस्यैकादिष्वर्थेषु वचनानीति। तत्राविभक्तिः शब्दोऽव्ययमित्येतावत्युक्ते येष्वेकत्वादयो न सन्ति ते नामाविभक्तिकाश्चेति पठ्यत इति युक्तम्।

[२.२६] **तच्चाप्येवमनुमानगम्यं दृश्यतामिति।** संप्रत्युपपत्तिमाह। उपपत्त्याप्ययमर्थो ज्ञायते। यद्यपि विभाग उपपद्येत प्रायोक्तिरेवेयमिति ग्रहीतव्यम्। **किंचिदव्ययं विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानम्।** अव्ययानां हि द्विविधो धर्म आख्यायते। तत्रापि त्विदं ग्रहीतव्यम्। किंचिदव्ययं नैव विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं नापि क्रियाप्रधानमिति कस्यचिच्च धर्मस्य प्राप्तिराच्छाद्यते एतेन धर्म आनाय्योनुत्यक्तव्यो यस्तत्र विन्यासः एतदकथितेनाचष्टे (?)।

[२.२७] **उच्चैर्नीचैरिति विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानमिति।** सप्तम्यर्थप्रधानं द्वयमित्येष निर्णयो भाष्ये। एवं ह्युक्तं — 'उच्चैः कटानां स्रष्टा' (म. भा. १. ४६७. ९) इति। अधिकरणमत्राव्ययमिति शक्तिश्च विभक्त्यर्थः। स चासत्त्वः। तत्कृतो ह्यस्ति लिङ्गसंख्यासंयोगाभावः।

[२.२८] **हिरुक् पृथगिति क्रियाप्रधानमिति।** यथैव प्रादयः क्रियागतं विशेषमेव द्योतयन्तः क्रियाप्रधानाः, एवं हिरुगादयोऽपि क्रियाप्रधाना इत्युच्यन्ते। यद्येवं क्रियाशब्दमन्तरेण प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः — पृथग् देवदत्त इति। न हि भवति प्रदेवदत्त इति। साधनस्याक्षेपात्प्रयोगो भविष्यति, यथा निष्कौशाम्बिरिति। समासे युक्तमिति चेदसमासेऽपि दृष्ट आक्षेपः। 'प्रादेशं प्रादेशं विपरिलिखति' (म. भा. १. ३४६. २४) इति क्रियान्तरप्रयोगं चान्तरेण प्रयोगो भाष्ये। प्रादेशेनासौ विमाय

लिखतीति । यद्येवं पृथग्भूत इति साधनप्रयोगोऽनुपपन्नः । नैष दोषः । प्रपतितपर्णः प्रपर्णः इति यथा प्रयुज्यते, एवमिहापि प्रयोक्ष्यते । निमित्तान्तरविधानाच्च सर्वदा क्रियाधर्ममजहत् प्रवर्तते इति नास्ति लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां योग इति सूत्रं प्रत्याख्यातं तद्धितश्चासर्वविभक्तिरिति ।

5 [२.२९] अत्र चोद्यते । स्वरादिषु कथम् ? यदि ते सत्त्वमर्थं ब्रुवन्ति विरुद्धमिदमिह किंचिदव्ययमिति । लिङ्गसंख्यायोगश्च सत्त्ववचने न व्यावर्तत इति अविभक्तिरव्ययमित्यनुपसंग्रहः स्वरादीनाम् । एवं पीलुमूलीत इति यदि नियतम् अन्यपदार्थः सत्त्ववचनता । अथ तृतीयार्थेऽर्थोऽसत्वे तद् वर्तते इति ।

[२.३०] अत्र तु स्वरादीनां चादितः पृथक्पाठो यः समर्थितो भाष्ये स
10 निरूप्यते । इहापि पीलुमूलतः इति अन्यपदार्थोपलक्षिते तृतीयार्थे तसिः, पीलुमूली विभक्त्यर्थोपलक्षिते अन्यपदार्थ इत्येवं वर्णयन्ति । यथा कर्तरीति चोदना प्रधाने गुणभूते च कर्तरि प्रवर्तते पचति पाचयतीति ।

[२.३१] इदं चाप्यद्यत्वेऽतिबहु क्रियते । अद्यत्व इति सूत्रारम्भविशिष्टो वर्तमानकाल आश्रीयते । अनारभ्यमाणे अस्मिन्योगेऽतिबहु क्रियते । कर्तरीति (?)
15 वचनविधान एकग्रहणे(?वचन)मित्येतावदुच्येत, द्वयोर्द्विवचनं बहुषु बहुवचनमित्येकवचनमनाश्रितार्थविशेषमसंख्याविशेषमिति चोत्सृष्टं द्विबहुत्वयोरर्थयोर्द्विवचनबहुवचनाभ्यां बाधिष्यते । तेनासंख्येषु चावस्थास्यते एकसंख्येषु चेति ।

[२.३२] ननु चाविशेषेण प्रातिपदिकादुत्पन्नानां नियमोऽयम् । तत्र पञ्चके प्रातिपदिकार्थे वचननियमे अर्थस्यानियमोऽर्थनियमे वचनस्यानियम इति कथं बाधोप-
20 पद्यते ? अथ त्रिके प्रातिपदिकार्थ एकवचनस्य बाह्येऽर्थेऽनुपादीयमाने कथं तदर्थाभिधायित्वम् ? अथानुपात्तोऽप्यर्थः परिगृह्यते द्वयोरपि प्राप्नोति । तस्मात्परिभाषापक्षमाश्रित्येदमुक्तम् — **एकवचनमुत्सर्गः करिष्यते ।**

[२.३३] यत्र द्विवचनमिति ब्रूयात् तत्र द्वयोरित्येतदुपस्थितं द्रष्टव्यमिति । द्विवचनसंज्ञिनोऽपि विधानकाले द्वयोरित्यस्योपस्थानादित्येवंभूतं विधानं वृत्तम् —
25 ङ्याप्प्रातिपदिकादौभ्यामोस् द्वयोः, एवं जसादयो बहुष्विति । अस्यां च कल्पनायां नाप्राप्त एकवचन इदमारभ्यत इति बाधके कल्प्येते । तयोश्च विशेषविधानादेकस्मिन्नप्रसङ्ग इति ।

[२.३४] न चाप्येवं विग्रहः करिष्यते । न सर्वा असर्वा इति । किं च भोः, अस्मिन् विग्रहे दोषोपन्यासः न सर्वा विभक्तयोऽस्मादिति ? नेत्याह । किं तर्हि ? न सर्वा विभक्तयः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्येति । उच्यते । अस्मिन् विग्रहे क्रियमाणे सूत्रे यो दोषः स उक्तः । इदानीं वृत्तिकारान्तर[मत]मुपन्यस्यति यस्मिन् पक्षे क्रियमाणे सूत्रे तु न कश्चित् दोषो भवति । स तु केन दर्शनेन ? असर्वा विभक्तय इति । एतदुत्सृज्य एवमाश्रयति अयमसर्वा विभक्तिरस्मादिति । 5

[२.३५] [अत्र] उच्यते । अव्ययेषु विभक्त्युत्पत्तौ चत्वारः प्रकाराः । अविशेषेणोत्पद्यन्त उत्पन्नानां नियम इत्येतस्मिन् दर्शनेऽनाश्रितार्थोपनिबन्धनाः केवलं संस्कारायैवोत्पद्यन्ते । तत्र यद्यपि असर्वा विभक्तिरित्ययं विग्रहस्तथापि....क्षतिः, सर्वस्या विभक्तेरुत्पन्नत्वात् । सर्वस्याश्चोत्पत्तौ लिङ्गम् — 'नाव्ययीभावादतोऽम्त्वपञ्चम्याः' (पा. २. ४. ८३), 'तृतीयासप्तम्योर्बहुलम्' (पा. २. ४. ८४) इति । एकार्थायां प्रवृत्तावर्थात्तथाव्ययात् यथाव्ययीभावात् । 10

[२.३६] अथाप्येवं कल्प्यते, केनचिदेव वचनेन संस्कर्तुं शक्यते । कुतः स्वादीनि तदाश्रितानि च प्रवर्तिष्यन्ते ? क्रमव्यतिक्रमे च प्रयोजनं नास्ति । तस्मात्प्रथमाया एव केवलमेकवचनमिति । एवमपि तथा विग्रहः क्रियते यथा सिध्यति । 15

[२.३७] अथ तु प्रातिपदिकग्रहणस्य प्रयोजनमुक्तम् । अव्ययेभ्यः कथं प्रथमा सपूर्वायाः प्रथमाया विभाषेत्येवमर्थमित्येतस्मिन् विग्रहे सिध्यति न सर्वा विभक्तयोऽस्मादिति । अस्मिंस्तु न सिध्यति न सर्वा विभक्तिरस्मादिति । सर्वा हि विभक्तिस्तूत्पन्ना व्यवसीयते ।

[२.३८] तत्र यदनन्तरमुपन्यस्तं स पक्ष आश्रीयते । इदं चानन्तरमेकवचनमुत्सर्गतः, सर्वाण्येकवचनानि अव्ययेभ्यः प्रवर्तन्त इति एतस्मिन् दर्शने । सर्वशब्दश्च प्रकारकात्स्न्र्येऽपि वर्तते । सर्वाण्यन्नानि भुक्तानि, सर्वाणि चरणानि दृष्टानीति । एकदेशेऽपि प्रवर्तमाने सुशब्दे वाम्शब्दे वा उत्पन्नाः सर्वा विभक्तय इति व्यपदेशः स्यात् । तस्मात्साकल्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं विग्रह आश्रीयत असर्वा विभक्तिरिति । 20

[२.३९] यच्च लिङ्गं सर्वविभक्त्युत्पत्तौ तदव्ययीभावस्यैव भेदवत्त्वमित्यस्य प्रतिपादकं च । यथा समासकाण्डे एकवद्भावकाण्डे चैकार्थीभावस्य समाहारव्यवस्थाविषयं वचनम् । 'सपूर्वाया....विभाषा' (पा. ८. १. २६) इति व्यवस्थितविभाषेत्येवं 25

समर्थयितव्यम्। क्रमव्यतिक्रमेऽपि शास्त्रे द्वितीयैव पूर्वा न प्रथमेति प्रयोगेऽप्यनुक्रमाभाव इति।

[२.४०] अथोपकुञ्जमिति मान्तस्य कथं प्रयोगः? सत्त्वे चायं प्रयोक्तव्यो ऽन्वाख्यातत्वात्। प्रतिपन्ने साधुत्वे प्रयोगेऽनुज्ञानं, क्रियापदप्रयोगात्तु विशेषाभिव्यक्तिः।

[२.४१] **एवं गते कृत्यपि तुल्यमेतत्।** एवमवस्थिते विग्रहे न सर्वा असर्वेत्यसर्वविभक्तिरित्येतावत्तु पठितव्यम्। ततश्च कृत्यपि तुल्यमेतत् असर्वविभक्तित्वमिति। 'कृन्मेजन्तः' (पा. १. १. ३९) इत्येतन्न पठितव्यम्। **मान्तस्य कार्यं ग्रहणं न तत्रेति।** मान्तस्य ग्रहणेन सूत्रमुपलक्षयति। **ततः परे चाभिमता न कार्याः।** परे इत्युत्तरे इत्यर्थः। **त्रयः कृदर्था** इति क्त्वातोसुन्कसुनां निर्देशः। एते कृदर्था **ग्रहणेन पाठेन न कार्याः।** ततो **योगाः।** योगाश्च न कार्याः, 'स्वरादिनिपातम्' (पा. १. १. ३७) इत्येवमादयः।

[२.४२] अथान्ये च वर्णयन्ति। तेनान्ये च न कर्तव्या इति। अत्र त्वव्यवस्थावाचित्वात् शीभावो दुर्लभः। इयाडियाजीकाराश्चेति एवमेके वर्णयन्ति। 'त्रयः कृदर्थाग्रहणेन योगाः' — कृदर्थमग्रहणं यस्मिन् हेतौ स कृदर्थाग्रहणः। यस्मिन् हेतावाश्रीयमाणे कृदर्थाग्रहणमारभ्यते। कश्चासौ हेतुः? न सर्वा विभक्तिरिति विग्रहः। तद्धित इति चाग्रहणम्। तत्र यथैव च 'कृन्मेजन्तः' इत्येतन्न पठ्यते एवमस्मादपि ये त्रयो योगाः, तेऽपि न कर्तव्याः 'स्वरादिनिपातमव्यम्' (पा. १. १. ३७), 'क्त्वातोसुन्कसुनः' (पा. १. १. ४०), 'अव्ययीभावश्च' (पा. १. १. ४१) इति।

[२.४३] इदानीमेवमवस्थिते संख्याविशेषं ये चाश्रिताः, तेषां प्राप्नोत्यव्ययसंज्ञा असर्वविभक्तित्वात् एको द्वौ बहव इति। अत एषां व्यावृत्त्यर्थं कुणिनापि तद्धितग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। क्रियमाणेऽपि तद्धितग्रहणे णमुलादीनामप्राप्तिरिति 'कृन्मेजन्तः' इत्येतद्वक्तव्यम्, स्वरादयश्च न कृतो न तद्धिताः। इदानीमाह — तस्मात्स्वरादिग्रहणं च कार्यमिति। एवमपि विंशत्यादिषु दोषः। विंशतिशब्द एकवचनान्तस्तद्धितश्च। अपरे वर्णयन्ति। एवमपि वरणादिषु दोषो भवति। वरणशब्दोऽपि बहुवचनान्तस्तद्धितश्च। एवमुभयशब्दोऽपि कदाचिन्न द्विवचनविषय इत्यव्ययसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति। अतो गणपाठ एव ज्यायानस्यापि वृत्तिकारस्येत्येतदनेन प्रतिपादयति। **कृत्तद्धितानां ग्रहणम्।** गणपाठ

एव। कृतश्च तद्धिताश्च गण एव पठितव्या इति। तस्मिंश्च सतीदं सूचकमुक्तं सूत्रकारवृत्तिकारयोर्लक्षणभावेन प्रवृत्तमित्येतदवस्थितम्।

[३.१] पाठेन च समस्तमव्ययसंज्ञमिदं पठन्त्वित्युक्तम्—पाठेनेयमव्ययसंज्ञा क्रियत इति। सेह न प्राप्नोति परमोच्चैः परमनीचैरिति। संज्ञाविधौ प्रदेशे श्रुतिप्रकरणसामर्थ्यानामभावात् नास्ति तदन्तस्य प्राप्तिरित्युक्तपरिमाणानामेव संज्ञया भवितव्यमिति तदन्तविधिना भविष्यति। औपसंख्यानिकेन च तदन्तविधिना प्रयोजनं च सर्वनामाव्ययसंज्ञायामिति।

[३.२] इहापि तर्हि प्राप्नोति [अत्युच्चैः] अत्युच्चैसौ अत्युच्चैस इति। कथमत्र समासो यावता उच्चैःशब्दोऽधिकरण[शक्ति]प्रधानः, न च तस्यातिक्रमणेन संबन्धः। यथा 'तत्र पश्ये'ति न दृशिनाधिकरणस्य संबन्धः। कस्य तर्हि ? तत्रस्थस्य। अथैवं परिकल्प्यते उच्चाधिकरणसहचरितत्वात् उच्चैर्व्यपदेश इति। एवमपि अव्ययत्वं दुर्लभम्। अर्थापेतं विधानं कल्प्यते विना नाना इति यथा। एवमपि द्वितीयस्या अभावः। इदं चोक्तम्— अत्यादयः क्रान्ताद्यर्थे द्वितीयया सह समस्यन्त इति। तस्मादेवं कल्प्यते 'भवति वै कस्यचित् अर्थात् प्रकरणाद्वापेक्ष्यं निर्ज्ञातम्'। यथा 'ब्राह्मणस्य शुक्लाः' इति। न च सौनागं दर्शनमाश्रीयते। किं तर्हि ? सिद्धं तु 'काङ्क्षतिदुर्गति-वचनात्', 'प्रादयः क्तार्थे' इति।

[३.३] उपसर्जनस्य नेति प्रतिषेधो भविष्यति। समुदायस्यानुपसर्जनत्वात् कथं प्रतिषेधः स्यादिति। उच्यते। उपसर्जनावयवत्वादुपसर्जनव्यपदेशो भविष्यति। उपसर्जनावयवस्य न भवत्यव्ययसंज्ञेति। सर्वनामसंज्ञायां प्रकृतः पठ्यते तत्र प्रतिषेधः। तस्मिंश्च स्वरितचिह्नमासङ्क्तव्यमिति। स वै तत्र प्रत्याख्यायते च। अनुच्चार्यमाणे अशक्यः स्वरितासङ्गोऽपेक्ष्यो वा।

[३.४] अन्वर्थसंज्ञा यथा विज्ञायेत। ननु चान्वर्थसंज्ञायां कल्प्यमानायामर्थे पारतन्त्र्यमापद्यमाना स्वरूपाधिष्ठाना न भवतीति संज्ञात्वं दुर्लभम्। अथार्थनिरपेक्षा स्वरूपमात्रनिबन्धना, अर्थोपादानमलभ्यम्। उच्यते। लोके द्विप्रकारा संज्ञा। सति च निमित्ते निमित्तप्रसक्ता न तु निमित्तमभिदधती प्रवर्तते। यथा वासुदेवस्य श्रीकृष्ण इति नामधेयं सति कृष्णगुणे कृतम्, न तु कृष्णशब्दः कृष्णयोगं प्रत्याययन् प्रवर्तते। कदाचित् गौरस्यैव कृष्ण इति संज्ञा क्रियते। एवमियमव्ययसंज्ञा निमित्तेन अनाना-

गमनेन प्रयुक्ता अनभिदधती अनागमनं प्रवृत्तेति। अस्यानुमानं महत्त्वकरणं यस्यानागमनमस्ति तस्येयं संज्ञेति। यस्य तु नागमनमस्ति न तस्य। अत्युच्चैःशब्दश्च नागच्छतीति अनव्ययत्वम्।

[३.५] अथ वा यथैव प्रसारणसंज्ञायां विभक्तिविशेषो लिङ्गमावृत्तेरेवमिहापि निबन्धनवाक्यमेतदुपन्यस्तम्। एतदुपग्रहं तु विनियोगवाक्यमावृत्तमित्यस्य वा लिङ्गं महत्त्वं तेनाव्ययमित्यावर्ति शब्दरूपमवसीयते। तन्त्रेण वैकक्रियया द्वौ शब्दौ उच्चारितावित्यस्य वा महत्त्वं लिङ्गमिति।

[३.६] न व्येति इत्यव्ययमिति। क्व पुनर्न व्येति? श्लोके सप्तम्या निर्देश इति इहापि तथैव सप्तमीनिर्दिष्टम्। स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकानि सत्त्वगुणाः एकत्वद्वित्वबहुत्वानि। गुणानां रूपादीनां प्रवृत्तेरर्थे ये स्थित्याविर्भावतिरोभावास्ते लिङ्गत्वेन परिगृह्यन्ते। अविगमनं च विशेषाभिधानशक्त्यभावात् सामान्यशक्त्यभिधानमेव यथा पञ्चकेष्विति। चरितार्थत्वाद्वा प्रकृत्याभिहितमेकत्वमिति तद्वचनो न प्रवर्तते यथाग्निचिदिति।

[३.७] अथ वा, न सामान्याभिधानशक्तिर्न विशेषाभिधानशक्तिर्यत्र तत्रेति। एतमेवार्थं श्लोकेनाचष्टे। सदृशं त्रिषु लिङ्गेषु। सादृश्यं हि सामान्योपादानात् अत्यन्तमभावात् भेदत्यागाद्वा रूपसादृश्यात् भवति। सर्वासु च विभक्तिषु इति कर्मादीनां ग्रहणम्। वचनेषु च सर्वेषु इति संख्याया ग्रहणम्। सर्वेष्वेतेषु नामभागेषु यन्न व्येति तदव्ययं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। स्वरादिषु सत्त्ववचनेषु कथम्? तत्रापि द्रव्यवचनत्वम्। तत्तु किंलिङ्गम् किंसंख्यमित्येतन्नास्ति, सामान्यसंख्याप्राप्तम् उच्यते। अभेदैकत्वसंख्यायाः संख्यावानयमिति एतावन्मात्रम्। किम् एको द्वौ बहव इत्येतन्नास्ति।

कृन्मेजन्तः ॥ १. १. ३९ ॥

[१.१] उभयनिमित्तसंभवे अन्यतरोपादानेऽन्यतरस्याभावे उभयत्र च दोषदर्शनं वचनं यत्रास्ति तत्र प्रश्नः कथमिदं विज्ञायत इति।

[१.२] कृद्यो मान्त इत्ययं पक्ष एवमुपपद्यते। यदि त्वेषा संज्ञा तेषु संज्ञिष्वप्राप्तसंज्ञाभावेषु प्रवर्तते ततस्ते संज्ञिनः पारार्थ्यमप्राप्ता विशेषणसंबन्धार्हा कृन्मेज् इति संबध्यन्ते इत्यस्य पक्षस्य प्रवृत्तिः।

[१.३] अथ तु प्रथमं संज्ञया गृहीताः कृतः, संज्ञान्तरस्य प्रत्यायनाय प्रवृत्तास्तेषां तदन्तभावे संज्ञाभावं प्रतिपन्नानामप्रधानानां संज्ञाद्वारविशेषाणां [तदन्तविधिः] कृदन्तस्य मेचो विशेषणमित्ययं पक्षः [अ]कृदन्तं यन्मान्तमिति ।

[१.४] न चात्र तदन्तविधिरशक्यः संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहण इति । कुतः ? प्रयोजनं सर्वनामाव्ययसंज्ञायामित्यारम्भात् । अन्वर्थनिर्देशाद्वा न व्येतीत्यव्ययमिति । न हि नानागमनमगमनं वा प्रत्ययमात्रस्य विद्यत इत्यसत्येवान्तग्रहण इदं द्वैतं दृश्यते ।

[१.५] ये त्वनादृत्यौपसंख्यानिकं तदन्तविधिमन्वर्थसंज्ञां चान्तग्रहणादस्य पक्षस्य संभवं कल्पयन्ति त एवं पर्यनुयोक्तव्याः — किं प्राप्तम् ? तदन्तविधिसंयोगः, मेजन्तं कृत तस्य संज्ञा कल्प्यते, आहोस्वित् मेचोऽत्र प्रधानं तद्विशेषणं कृदिति । यदि प्राप्तः तदन्तसंयोगो यदर्थमस्य पक्षस्योपादानं तदेव न सिध्यति कारयांचकारेति । न ह्यत्र कृन्मान्त इति ।

[१.६] अथैवं कल्प्यते मेचोऽव्ययसंज्ञा स चेत् कृदिति वचनात् केवलो मकारो नास्ति इति स्यात् मान्तस्याव्ययत्वम् । एच् तु शुद्धोऽस्ति ' दृश ' इति । तदन्तस्य न स्यात् ' कर्तवे ' इति । तस्मादनर्थकमन्तग्रहणं दृश्यते ।

[१.७] न्यासे तु प्रयोजनमन्तग्रहणस्योक्तं स्वभावैजन्तप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम् । इह मा भूत् कुम्भकारेभ्य इति ।

[१.८] अथ वा, यथेष्टं विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धाश्रयेण न्यायप्राप्त इह वचनेन निर्दिश्यते कृदत्र प्रधानं मेचो विशेषणमिति ।

[१.९] अथ वा, इदं ग्रहणकवाक्यम् । एतन्निबन्धनं तु यत्प्रयोगसंस्कारसमवायि तदेवंभूतं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ' कृदन्तो मेजव्ययम् ' इति ।

[२.१] यदि विज्ञायते कृद्यो मान्त इति कारयांचकारेति । न ह्यत्र कृन्मान्तो लकारः, इति अत्राप्राप्तिरव्ययसंज्ञायाः । कृदन्तं यन्मान्तमित्याश्रीयमाणे भवत्येतत् प्रत्ययलक्षणेन कृदन्तं, श्रुत्या च मान्तमिति । एवं तु विज्ञायमाने प्रतामौ प्रताम इत्यत्रापि प्राप्नोति । एतदपि किपा कृदन्तं मान्तं च श्रुत्येति ' अव्ययाद् ' (पा. २. ४. ८२) इति लुक् ।

[२.२] ननु चैकवचनस्याम उत्तरस्य हल्ङ्यादिलोपेनैव निवृत्तिः सिद्धा। किं लुका प्रयोजनम्? अयमभिप्रायः। यथैवानुप्रयोगे साधनभेदात् द्विवचनबहुवचने, एवमाम्प्रकृताविति। लिट् द्वयोर्बहुषु च कर्तृषु कर्मसु चोत्पद्यते। तेनामन्तादपि द्विवचनबहुवचने प्रवर्तेते कारयांचक्रतुः, कारयांचक्रुरिति। अकच् तु नोदाह्रियते, अपरिसमाप्तार्थत्वात् अज्ञातादिभिर्योगाभाव इति।

[२.३] इष्यत एव प्रत्ययमात्रस्य इति। एतत् प्रतिपादयति — न हि तद्धितः कश्चिदस्ति य आमो लुप्यते। कथम्? यदि तावदनभिव्यक्ता आमन्तेन कुत्साप्रशंसाप्रकर्षा इति प्रत्यया वर्तन्ते तेषां लुका भवितव्यं लुक्यनभिव्यक्तेरनवस्थितत्वात्। अथानुप्रयोगादुत्पन्नाः कुत्सादीनभिव्यञ्जन्ति....आमन्तस्य, एवमपि नोत्पत्तव्यमामन्तादिति।

[२.४] उपपत्त्या प्रतिपाद्यानुत्पत्तिं शास्त्रेणापि प्रतिपादयति — आतश्चेष्यते। एवं ह्याह — कृञ् चानुप्रयुज्यते लिटि इति। अत्र आमित्यनुवर्तते, आमोऽनुप्रयुज्यते, आमोऽनन्तरमित्यर्थः। यदि च तरबादिः स्यात्, कृञादिर्नानन्तरं प्रयुज्येत इति। एवं च कृत्वा 'व्यवहितनिवृत्त्यर्थम्' इति। किं च। स्वादयो यदि लुप्येरन्, वचनमप्यभिव्यक्तमिति तत्र यथैव कृत्स्नपदान्तरात् पुरुषोपग्रहादिरेवमामन्तेष्वपि प्रयुज्यत इति अनुप्रयोगो यः सर्वार्थाभिव्यक्तय आश्रितः स न स्यादिति।

[२.५] यदयं प्रशान्-शब्दं [स्वरादिषु] पठति। अत्र हि 'मो नो धातोः' (पा. ८. २. ६४) नत्वस्यासिद्धत्वात् सिद्धमव्ययत्वम्। न च 'शान तेजने' इत्यस्यैतत् रूपं संभवति। तस्य नित्यं सन्नन्तत्वात्। यदि प्रत्ययलक्षणमत्र न भवति कथं कारयांचकारेति। तुल्यजातीयत्वस्य ज्ञापकं धातोर्मकारान्तस्य न भवतीत्येतदाश्रीयते। सोपसर्गत्वं तु नाश्रीयते। इह मा भूत् प्रताम इति। अस्मिंस्तु पक्षे लावयतेर्लौरित्यत्र प्राप्नोति। भवत्ययं कृदन्त एजन्तश्चेति। अनन्यप्रकृतिपरिहारः। अथ वा, परिभाषया पर्युदास इति दोष एवायं लौरिति।

[२.६] अनिकारोकारप्रकृतिपरिहारे एचः संभवतीकारोकारप्रकृतित्वं न मकारस्य। आधये। इदमत्र संप्रधार्यं—गुणे कृते किमव्ययसंज्ञया भवितव्यमयादिभिरिति। परत्वादयादयः। अन्तरङ्गत्वादव्ययसंज्ञा। कृतायामव्ययसंज्ञायां लुका भवितव्यम्। अनित्यत्वं चोभयोरपि। लुकि सति अयादीनामभावः। अयादिषु सत्सु विहतनिमित्ता-

व्ययसंज्ञेति लुकोऽभावः। अन्तरङ्गानपि विधीन् बहिरङ्गो लुक् बाधते इति लुक् स्यात्। तस्माद्वक्तव्यमेतदत्र।

[२.७] कुम्भकारेभ्य इति। शक्यं तत्र प्रतिषेधो विधातुं लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैवेति। यो हि नित्यं तद्रूपः प्रत्यक्षः अन्तरङ्गश्च तस्य ग्रहणमुक्तम्। अयं तु अनुमातव्यः अनित्यो बहिरङ्गश्चेति। एतत्तु नोक्तम्, परिभाषान्तरप्रयोजनानि विचारयिष्यामीति।

[३.१] संनिपातः संश्लेषः सम्पर्कः आनन्तर्यमित्यनर्थान्तरम्। एतल्लक्षणो यो विधिरिति तदर्थः। सोऽनिमित्तम्। कस्य? तद्विघातस्य। तं विहन्तीति तद्विघातः, विघातकस्य विध्यन्तरस्यानिमित्तम्। विघातं च प्रयोजनेष्वेव प्रदर्शयिष्यामि यस्य यस्य विघातो भवति।

[३.२] ह्रस्वत्वं तुग्विधेः ग्रामणिकुलम्। 'इको ह्रस्वोऽङ्यो गालवस्य' (पा. ६.३.६१) इति पूर्वपदोत्तरपदाश्रयं ह्रस्वत्वं संनिपातविधिः, स तद्विघातस्यानिमित्तम्। कस्य पुनरत्र विघातः? ईकारस्तावत् संनिपाती ह्रस्वेनैव विहतः। नात्र तुक् संनिपातिनो विघातकः। किं तर्हि? संनिपातस्य। यत् पूर्वोत्तरपदयोरानन्तर्यं तस्य तुक् विघातको वर्तते। अयं च तुक् यदि अवयवभक्तो न चावयवावयवोऽवयवग्रहणेन गृह्यते, तत इदं प्रयोजनमुपपद्यते। अथ तु समुदायभक्तोऽवयवावयवोऽवयवो वा भवति, नैवानन्तर्यं विहन्यत इति अप्रयोजनमिदं परिभाषायाः।

[३.३] बहिरङ्गं ह्रस्वत्वम् अन्तरङ्गस्तुक्। द्विपदाश्रयत्वात् ह्रस्वो बहिरङ्गः, एकपदाश्रयत्वात् अन्तरङ्गस्तुगिति। अथ ग्रामं नयति कुलं ग्रामणि कुलमिति कथम्, यत्रौत्तरपदिकं ह्रस्वत्वं न भवति? अत्रापि 'ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य' (पा. १.२.४७) समुदायाश्रयं ह्रस्वत्वं वर्णाश्रयस्तुक् इत्युपपद्यते बहिरङ्गत्वम्। संनिपातपरिभाषायां तु सत्यां ग्रामणिच्छत्रमिति दोषः। अत्र हि ग्रामण्यः छत्रमिति ह्रस्वत्वे कृते किञ्चलक्षणस्तुक् अन्तरङ्गत्वान्नास्ति, छलक्षणोऽपि संनिपातलक्षणत्वादित्यतुकस्य श्रवणं प्राप्नोति ग्रामणिछत्रमिति। बहिरङ्गपरिभाषायां तु सत्यां छलक्षणः समानाश्रयत्वात् प्रवर्तते।

[३.४] नलोपो वृत्रहभिः। विभक्तिप्रातिपदिकाश्रयो नलोपः संनिपातलक्षणः इत्यनिमित्तं तुको भवति। अथ 'अतो लोपः' किपि कस्मान्न भवति? उक्तमेतद् 'आर्धधातुकोपदेशे यदकारान्तम्' इति। असिद्धो नलोप इति। द्विविधमप्यसिद्धत्वमत्रोप-

पद्यते पूर्वत्रासिद्धत्वं बहिरङ्गासिद्धत्वं च। विभक्त्याश्रयत्वान्नलोपो बहिरङ्गो भवति।

[३.५] उदुपधत्वमकित्त्वस्य निकुचिते। नलोपो यः 'अनिदिताम्...' (पा. ६. ४. २४) इति स कित्प्रत्ययाश्रयः। तदनन्तरं चोदुपधत्वमुपजायमानं संनिपातिनः प्रत्ययस्य कित्त्वव्यपदेशं निहन्तीत्यनया परिभाषयाकित्त्वव्यपदेशस्य निमित्तं न भवतीतिकल्प्यते। नात्र संनिपातिनोऽसत्यपि कित्त्वे कश्चिदानन्तर्यस्य विघातः।

[३.६] नाभावो यञि दीर्घत्वस्यामुना। ने कर्तव्ये मुभावः सिद्धः। ने तु यत् प्राप्नोति तत्प्रत्यसिद्धत्वम् इत्यर्थं परिकल्प्य प्रयोजनोपन्यासः। सूत्रीयमुकारमात्रमाश्रित्य नाभावः प्रवर्तमानः संनिपातलक्षणो विघातस्यानिमित्तम्। कस्यात्र विघातः यावता परः संनिपाती नाभावेनैव विहतः? आनन्तर्यमस्त्येव। तत्रेदं कल्प्यते। स च संनिपाती दीर्घत्वे क्रियमाणे आकारेण विहन्यते। तस्मात्पूर्वस्य संनिपातिनो रूपविघातस्यानिमित्तं भवति।

[३.७] न मु टादेश इति। सर्वविभक्त्यन्तः समास इत्येवं वक्ष्यति। सर्वविभक्त्या च संबन्धसामान्याश्रयादेव स्थास्यते।

[३.८] आत्वं कित्त्वस्योपादास्त। लुङि सिचि परे भूते गुणे कृते उत्तरकालमात्वमितीमां प्रक्रियामाश्रित्य संनिपातलक्षणत्वमात्वस्य। तदात्वं घुसंज्ञाप्रतिबद्धस्य कित्त्वस्यानिमित्तम्। अत्रापि व्यपदेशनिमित्तं कित्त्वमिति। एवं च कृते ह्रस्वादङ्गादिति परस्य संनिपातिनो रूपमप्यत्र विहन्यते।

[३.९] तिसृचतसृत्वं ङीब्विधेः। त्रिचतुरौ च विभक्तिं चाश्रित्यादेशः संनिपातलक्षणः। स ईकारस्यानिमित्तम्। ईकारो हि प्रवर्तमानः संनिपातिनोरानन्तर्यं विहन्ति पूर्वस्य च यणादेशेन रूपमिति।

[३.१०] यदयं 'न तिसृचतसृ' इति। इदमलिङ्गम्। कुतः। उपसमस्तार्थमेतत् स्यात् प्रियतिसृणां ब्राह्मणानामिति। अथ तु छन्दस्युक्तं, तत्रोपन्यस्तम्। एतौ हि तिसृचतसृशब्दौ स्वस्रादिषु पठ्येते इति।

[३.११] शतानि सहस्राणि। अङ्गं सर्वनामस्थानं चाश्रित्य नुम् संनिपातलक्षणः। परस्य संनिपातिनो लक्षणस्य लुकि कृते रूपविघातः। ततश्चानन्तर्यविघातोऽपि। अत्राप्युपदेशवचनमस्तीति, एतदप्यप्रयोजनं दृश्यते ष्णान्तेत्यन्तवचनाच्च।

[३.१२] शकटौ पद्धतौ। अच घेः (पा. ७. ३. ११९)। औदारभ्यते। तनौकारेण परस्य विकृतं रूपमत्वेन पूर्वस्य, तन्निमित्तस्तु टाप् प्रवर्तमानः अङ्गप्रत्यययोरानन्तर्यं विहन्यात्। तच्चाशक्यं विहन्तुम्। एकादेशस्यान्तवद्भावात्। अथ त्वेवं विहन्येत—कार्ये ह्यन्तवद्भावः, न चानन्तर्यं नाम शास्त्रकार्यम्। लौकिकमेतदिति स्याद्व्यवधानम्। टापि सति याडाम्भावयोः कृतयोः शकटायामित्यनिष्टं रूपं स्यात्। अथापि औदच्च घेरिति तपरत्वस्य इदमेव प्रयोजनं वर्णयन्ति तन्माभूदिति।

[३.१३] इयेष उवोष। गुणे कृते .... आम् प्राप्नोति। अत्र इयङि विहिते प्राग्लादेशात् धात्वधिकार इत्यन्तरङ्गत्वात् लादेशे कृते द्विर्वचनात् परत्वात् 'पुगन्त ....' (पा. ७. ३. ८६) इति च गुणे कृत एकारः संनिपातलक्षणः स निमित्तमामो न भवति। आमि सति संनिपातिनः प्रत्ययस्य रूपविरोधो विघात इति। उवोषेति कथमुपन्यस्तं यावता 'उषविदजागृभ्य ....' (पा. ३. १. ३८) इति विभाषित एवाम्—प्रत्ययः। एवं मन्यते—विभाषा किति कृतार्था ऊषांचक्रतुः ऊषांचक्रुरिति। इह तु पिति गुणे कृते लक्षणान्तरेणाम् प्रत्ययः प्रवर्तेतेति। अत्रापि मतुपोऽयमर्थो वर्ण्यते नित्ययोगे मतुविति। तेन नित्यं यो गुरुमान् तस्यायमाम्। अयं ह्यनित्य इति इदमप्यप्रयोजनम्।

[३.१४] तस्य दोषो वर्णाश्रयः ....। कथम[त्र] व्यवस्थितं संनिपातलक्षणत्वं यावता प्रकृतिरेवावस्थितस्य प्रत्ययस्य निमित्तम्। एवं मन्यते—स्वभावतोऽवस्थितस्य 'अत इञ्' (पा. ४. १. ९५) इत्यनेन प्रत्ययत्वसंज्ञा उपादीयते। समुदायस्य वा साधुत्वं तस्यैव वा परस्य सतः साधुत्वमिति। संज्ञाया वा संनिपातलक्षणायाः साधुत्वम्।

[३.१५] न प्रत्ययः संनिपातलक्षणः। अस्याभिप्रायः। भवति वै किंचिदाचार्याणां कार्यवत्। 'बुद्धौ कृत्वे'ति प्रकृतितोऽजात एव प्रत्यय उपलभ्यते। अयं च पक्षः 'परश्च' (पा. ३. १. २) इति सूत्रे वर्णितः। 'एतदेव तत् परस्य कार्यं यदसौ परः स्यादिति'। किं च न साधुत्वं संज्ञा वा वर्णविचालस्य निमित्तं स्यात्। संज्ञा पारंपर्येणैव निमित्तम्। न चैवंभूतं निमित्तं भवतीत्येतदाचष्टे न प्रत्ययः संनिपातलक्षण इति।

[३.१६] अङ्गसंज्ञा तर्हि [अ]निमित्तं स्यात्। अङ्गसंज्ञा हि प्रकृतिप्रत्ययसंनिपातलक्षणा। सा वर्णविचालस्यानिमित्तं स्यात्। संनिपाती हि रूपेण क्रियते इति। एतस्मिन् इदमसमर्थितमवर्णाश्रयः प्रत्ययोऽवर्णविचालस्येति। अविशेषेणाङ्गसंज्ञायाः संनिपातलक्षणत्वात् सर्वाण्येवाङ्गानि कार्याणि पर्यवसन्नानि भवन्ति।

[३.१७] केचिदिदमुदाहरणमुपन्यस्यन्ति । अधुक्षत्, अलिक्षत् इति । अयं हि क्सः शलन्तां प्रकृतिम् अनिटं च्लिं चाश्रित्य प्रवर्तमानः संनिपातलक्षणो भवति । अयमनिमित्तं घत्वढत्वकुत्वानाम् । न चात्रासिद्धत्वमस्ति । अदेशत्वादस्याः परिभाषायाः । विधिदेशा चेयमिति पूर्वेति अशक्या व्यपदेष्टुम् । भाष्यकारेण त्ववर्णाश्रयः प्रत्यय इतीममेव वाक्यपाठमाश्रित्य दाक्षिरित्युपन्यस्तम् ।

[३.१८] आत्त्वं पुग्विधेः । क्रापयति । णौ परभूते वृद्धौ कृतायामात्त्वमित्यस्यां प्रक्रियायामात्त्वं संनिपातलक्षणं, तत् पुको निमित्तम् । आनन्तर्यं हि पुक् संनिपातिनोर्निहन्ति । अङ्गस्य य आकारस्तस्य पुगिति अवयवभक्तं पुकं मत्वा दोष उक्तः ।

[३.१९] अदीदपदिति । पुका चानन्तर्यं विहतम् । पूर्वस्य तु संनिपातिनो विघात इति अनिमित्तं स्यात् ।

[३.२०] त्यदाद्यकारष्टाब्विधेः । अत्वमङ्गविभक्त्योः संनिपातकृतं टापोऽनिमित्तं स्यात् । टापि हि सति परस्य संनिपातिनोऽभाव इति ।

[३.२१] पपिवानित्यत्र पूर्वस्य संनिपातिनो निवृत्तेरनिमित्तमिट् स्यात् ।

[३.२२] अग्निमानित्यत्र उदात्तपूर्वं मतुपं चाश्रित्य मतुप उदात्तत्वं संनिपातलक्षणम् । तत् पूर्वस्य 'अनुदात्तं पदमेक[वर्जम्]' (पा. ६. १. १५८) इति निघाते कर्तव्ये न निमित्तं स्यात् । अनुदात्तत्वे सति पूर्वस्य संनिपातिनः श्रुतिर्निहन्यत इति ।

[३.२३] ब्राह्मणि ब्रह्मबन्धु । अत्र हि ह्रस्वत्वम् 'अम्बार्थनद्योर्ह्रस्वः' (पा. ७. ३. १०७) इति संबुद्धौ विधीयमानं संनिपातलक्षणं परस्य संनिपातिनो विनाशे न निमित्तं स्यादिति । मा भूदेवं ङ्यन्तादित्येवं भविष्यति — 'हल्ङ्याप्' (पा. ६. १. ६८) इति दीर्घग्रहणे असति स्थानिवद्भावो नास्ति प्रतिषेधात् । एवं ह्युक्तं 'ङ्याब्ग्रहणे दीर्घ' इति । इयं च विचारणा ब्राह्मणिशब्द उपपद्यते, न ब्रह्मबन्धुशब्दे, अङ्यन्तत्वादिति । नित्यः संबुद्धिलोप इति । न संबुद्धिसंज्ञब्दनेन यो लोप इत्येवं, किं तर्हि ? येन केन लक्षणेन संबुद्धेर्यो लोप इति उभयोश्चानित्ययोः परत्वात् ह्रस्वत्वे कृते लोपो न प्राप्नोति । कोऽवकाश इति चेत्, देवदत्त यज्ञदत्तेति ।

[३.२४] एते दोषाः समा भूयांसो वा । लौकिकीयं वाचोयुक्तिः । लोके बहुषु चोपकारेषु कृतेषु कस्मिंश्चिदेव प्रतिबध्यमानो ब्रवीति — बहुतरोऽनर्थः कृत इति । एवमिहापि सदोषत्वात्परिभाषाया एवमुच्यते ।

[३.२५] ननु च सर्वादिषु समशब्दस्य पठितत्वात् सम इति भवितव्यम्। निपातनात् सिद्धमिति चेत् 'यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानाम्' (पा. १. ३. १०) इत्यादिषु पाठानर्थक्यम्। तत्रैवं व्याचक्षते। सर्वशब्दपर्यायवाची यः समशब्दः स सर्वादिषु पठितो न तुल्यार्थ इति। अस्ति पुनः समशब्दः सर्वादिषु पठितः सर्वशब्दस्यार्थे प्रयुक्तः? अस्तीत्याह। क? लोके वेदे च। लोके तावत् राजन्यविद्यमाने प्रयोक्तारो भवन्ति 'समराज्यमिदानीम्'। सर्वेषां राज्यमित्यर्थः। वेदे—'मा नः समस्य दूढ्यः' (ऋ. ८. ७५. ९) इति प्रयोगः। एतस्य निरुक्तकारो (५. २३) व्याख्यानं करोति—'मा नः सर्वस्य दुर्धियः पापधियः' इति। अन्येषां पुनर्लक्षणम्—'समो युक्ते'। समशब्दो युक्तेऽर्थे न्याय्येऽर्थे वर्तते, स सर्वनामसंज्ञो भवति। इह तु न समशब्दो युक्तार्थे प्रयुक्त इति दोषाभावः।

[३.२६] तस्मान्नार्थोऽनया परिभाषया। कोऽभिप्रायः? यदि दोषाः भूयांसः अल्पानि प्रयोजनानि। तान्येवोपसंख्यातव्यानि। न कर्तव्या परिभाषा यस्या दोषा अनुज्ञायन्ते इति। **न हि दोषाः सन्तीति परिभाषा न कर्तव्या।** एतत् प्रतिपादयति—सर्वा वाक् सापराधा दोषानुषङ्गिणी यथा स्थानिवदादेश इत्यस्मिन्नल्विधिरपि प्रसक्त इति किं न कर्तव्या? दोषेषु तु प्रतिविदधाति। यच्च मन्यसे दोषा भूयांस इति तच्च न। कुतः? यस्मात् **दोषाः खल्वपि साकल्येन परिगणिताः। प्रयोजनानामुदाहरणमात्रम्।** कथम्? इह सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोर्गुणो भवतीति, अक्ङितीति विशेषेऽस्याभावात् एतद्वर्जमन्यस्मिन्विशेषे नासौ प्रवर्तत इत्यध्यवसीयते। एवमिह ये दोषा उपात्तास्तान् वर्जयित्वान्यत्रेदं प्रवृत्तं प्रयोजनोपसंग्राहि सामान्यविषयं शास्त्रमितीदमुच्यते — **तस्माद्यान्येतस्या** इति।

[३.२७] सर्वाण्येव तु भाष्ये उक्तानि प्रयोजनानि। न दोषाः साकल्येन परिगणिताः। दोषान्तरस्य भावात्। इह 'डेर्यः' इति यत्वं संनिपातलक्षणं तत् दीर्घस्यानिमित्तं प्राप्नोति। संनिपातिनो रूपान्तरप्रतिपत्तेः। यथा अमुना इति।

[३.२८] **प्रतिविधेयं दोषेष्विति।** न च प्रतिविधानमुक्तम्। तत्रैवं प्रतिविधीयते। अङ्गसंज्ञा चेदनिमित्तं स्यात्, अनवकाशा एव अङ्गविधयः संपद्यन्ते। ततश्चाङ्गसंज्ञाया अप्यानर्थक्यम्। क्रापयतीत्याकारान्तस्य विधानात् अर्थवतो ह्यागमस्तद्गुणीभूतो गृह्यत इति शास्त्रे यदानन्तर्यं न हि तद्विहन्यते। अदीदपदिति लिङ्गात् ह्रस्वत्वं यदयं 'मारणतोषणनिशामनेषु ज्ञा' जानातेर्मित्त्वं शास्ति। अत्र उपधाधिकारात् नाकृते

पुकि ह्रस्वत्वमस्तीति निर्देशादवसीयते 'आपूङ्भ्यूधामीत्' (पा. ७. ४. ५५) इति। या सा 'न यासयोः' (पा. ७. ३. ४५) इति निर्देशात्। अन्येषु त्वाकारलोपादिषु चिन्त्यं प्रतिविधानम्।

अव्ययीभावश्च ॥ १.१.४१ ॥

[१.१] यदि सूत्रमथ वा पाठः 'कृन्मकारसंध्यक्षरान्तोऽव्ययीभावश्च' इति अथाप्यनव्ययमव्ययं भवतीति अव्ययीभाव इति तद्वदतिदेशोऽथासर्वविभक्तिरथालिङ्ग संख्य इति वा। सर्वथैव तु लुग्मुखस्वरोपचाराः प्रयोजनम् (वा. १) इति।

[१.२] उपाग्नि प्रत्यग्नि इति क्रियाविशेषणे विभक्त्यर्थेऽसत्त्ववचनत्वे च सामान्यस्योपादानात् अलिङ्गसंख्यत्वमस्त्येवेति। 'पञ्चन्'शब्दस्य सत्त्ववचनत्वेऽपि लिङ्गविशेषोपादानसामर्थ्यं नास्ति। दास्याःपुत्रादिषु तु नैव संख्यार्थं विभक्तेरुपादानम्, किं तूपाधिराक्रोशस्य। वर्षासुजः गोषुचर इति संज्ञायाः अभिव्यक्त्यर्थम्। इह तु सुलुगिति संस्कारमात्रं विभक्त्या क्रियते, न संख्याविशेषगतिरिति।

[१.३] उपाग्निमुख इति मुखस्वरः स्यात्। उपपयस्कार इति च सत्वं स्यात्। एवं वक्तव्यम्—स्वरोपचारनिवृत्तिः प्रयोजनमिति। नैष दोषः। यथा मुखस्वर उपचारश्च। यथोत्सर्गः सापवादो व्यवस्थितो भवति तथैव तत्प्रयोजनमित्येतदाचष्टे।

[१.४] किं पुनरिदं परिगणनमाहोस्विदुदाहरणमात्रम्। ननु चोदाहरणमात्रे वाक्योपन्यास एव न प्रयुज्यते, सर्वप्रयोजनानामिष्टत्वात्। एषोऽभिप्रायः प्रश्ने। यद्युदाहरणमात्रम्, वाक्यमनर्थकमेव। परिगणने सूत्रानर्थक्यम्। शक्यन्ते हि लिङ्गादप्येतानि प्रतिपत्तुमिति।

[१.५] परिगणनमित्याह। अप्येवाचार्यं निर्दिशन्निति शब्दो लोकं वा। अपि खल्वप्याहुरिति। एवं खल्वप्याहुरित्यर्थः। परिगणनमेवानेन समर्थयन्ते। यस्मादन्योऽपि प्रतिषिध्यते, तस्मादेतान्येव प्रयोजनानि। अथ वा स्वरूपेण केनचिदेव प्रयोजनान्यन्वाख्यातानि। अन्ये पुनरनिष्टानि व्यावर्तयन्ति। तेषां यान्यव्यावर्तितानि प्रयोजनानि इत्येतत् भाष्यकारो व्याचष्टे।

[१.६] उच्चैरधीयानेति। आमन्त्रितकारकत्वात् पराङ्गवद्भावः प्रसक्तः। सोऽव्ययानां नेति प्रतिषिध्यते। तेन नानापदस्वर एव भवति। स इहापि स्यात्—उपाग्न्य-

धीयान इति । अग्नेः समीपेऽध्ययनाधिकरणे उपाग्निशब्दो वर्तते इत्यामन्त्रितकारकत्वादव्ययप्रतिषेधो नेष्यते। पराङ्गवद्भावादेकस्वर्यमेव भवति । अकृच्यव्ययग्रहणात् । यथैवाव्ययस्य प्रकर्षादयः क्रियाद्वारकाः, एवमिहापीत्यस्यकचा संबन्ध इत्युपाग्नकीत्यनिष्टं रूपं प्रसज्येत । उपकुम्भीभूतं कुम्भसमीपस्थीभूतमित्यर्थः ।

[१.७] आचार्यप्रवृत्तिर्ज्ञापयतीति । अत्र चोद्यते—यद्यस्माल्लिङ्गात् निवृत्तियोगस्य च क्रियते, तर्हि इदमपि नारब्धव्यं 'सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः' (पा. ७. ३. ८४) इति । किङति प्रतिषेधादस्ति विधिरिति शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् । तत्रैषोऽभिप्रायः । क्रियमाणेऽप्यस्मिन्योगे विशिष्टान्येव प्रयोजनानि स्मर्तव्यानि लुगादीनि, न तु पराङ्गवद्भावप्रतिषेधादीनि । एवं चेत् लिङ्गादेव तानि साधयितुं शक्यानि । किं सूत्रेणेति ।

[१.८] अनुत्तरपदस्थस्येति वर्तते । अवश्यं चात्रानुवृत्तिरभ्युपगन्तव्या । परमपयःकुम्भो गोपयःकुम्भ इत्येवमर्थम् । तस्मादुत्तरपदस्थत्वादिह न भविष्यति उपपयःकार इति ।

[१.९] नैकं प्रयोजनं योगारम्भं प्रयोजयति—संज्ञायोगं परिभाषायोगं वा । अन्यत्तु प्रयोजयति 'जागुरूकः' (पा. ३. २. १६५), 'अण् कुटिलिकायाः' (पा. ४. ४. १८) इति ।

[१.१०] यद्येतावत्प्रयोजनं स्यात् । अयमभिप्रायः । सूत्रे सामान्येनोच्चार्यमाणे विशेषकार्यस्यानुमानात्प्रतिपत्तिः । कार्ये एवं तूच्चार्यमाणे साक्षात्प्रतिपत्तिः । तत्र साक्षात्प्रतिपत्तेरनुमानप्रतिपत्तिर्गरीयसीति स्वरप्रकरण एव पठितव्यं 'नाव्ययीभावाव्ययदिक्शब्दगोमहत्' इति । न चैवं पठितम् । तस्मादिदमपि न प्रयोजनमिति सर्वव्याख्यानकारैरिदमवसितं मुखस्वरेणैव भवितव्यमुपाग्निमुख इति ।

[१.११] अन्ये वर्णयन्ति । इदमेकं प्रयोजनं मुखस्वरप्रतिषेधो, न चास्य ग्रहणं तत्रास्ति । 'नैकं प्रयोजनं योगारम्भं प्रयोजयति' इति यदुक्तम् अनव्ययमव्ययमध्यवसितं संभवतीति तेनेदं साध्यते । तस्मिन् प्रतिषेधे तेनाव्ययदिक्शब्देनाव्ययीभावस्याव्ययकार्यातिदेश इति ।

[१.१२] अथ वर्ण्यते भाष्ये—तत्रैवायं ब्रूयात् । न चोक्तम् । इदं च सूत्रमस्ति । तस्मादन्यदपि प्रयोजनमिहागमयितव्यम् । किं पुनस्तत्? षष्ठीसमासस्य प्रतिषेधो देवदत्तस्योपकुम्भमिति '.... सुहितार्थसदव्ययम्....' (पा. २. २. ११) इति ।

शि सर्वनामस्थानम् ॥ १. १. ४२ ॥

[१.१] शि सर्वनामस्थानं सुडनपुंसकस्येति चेत् जसि शिप्रतिषेधः । यद्येवं पठ्येत । अथ त्वेवं पठ्यते—स्त्रीपुंसयोः सुडिति । नैष दोषः स्यात् । अस्मिन् हि निर्देशेऽनपुंसकस्येति शक्यमर्थः कल्पयितुं नपुंसकस्येति न भवतीति ।

[१.२] अथ 'शि सर्वनामस्थानम्' इति किमर्थमस्योपादानम् ? उच्यते । विषय प्रदर्शनार्थम् । एवं हि विज्ञायमाने शिसर्वनामस्थानमिति या प्राप्तिः सा न प्राप्नोति । अपर एवं वर्णयन्ति । यदि यथा 'शिसर्वनामस्थानम्' इति स्वतन्त्रं लक्षणं संज्ञायामेवं वाक्यभेदेन सुट् सर्वनामस्थानं ततोऽनपुंसकस्येति प्रतिषेधवाक्ये अयं दोषः ।

[१.३] जसि शिप्रतिषेध इत्यधिकरणे विषयभावेनोपात्ते जस्विषयो यः शिः, अथ वा जसेः शिः जसिशिरिति । शिलक्षणस्यावकाशः शस्विषयः शिः कुण्डानि पश्येति ।

[१.४] असमर्थसमासश्चायं द्रष्टव्यः । यत्र वर्तिपदस्था क्रियाभिधीयमाना नित्यत्वाच्चावगतार्थाश्रूयमाणानुमीयमाना स्वभावनिवृत्ता नञा द्योत्यते, तत्र साक्षात् संबन्धात् समर्थसमासः । इह तु नपुंसकशब्दस्य नञोऽसंबन्धात् सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञाकर्तृकेण भवति नासंबन्धादिदमुच्यते 'असमर्थसमासश्चायं द्रष्टव्यः' इति ।

[१.५] असमर्थसमासे च सत्ययं दोषः । कुतः ? प्रतिषेधात् । यद्यपि प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधे पर्युदासे चोभयत्राप्राप्त्यनुमानम्, अयं तु विशेषः — प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधे विच्छेदोपक्रमा प्रवृत्तिः, पर्युदासे तु विशिष्टमेव प्रतिपद्यमानो विच्छेदोपक्रमं प्रतिपद्यते ।

[१.६] अस्मिंश्च निर्देशे शक्यमुपकल्पयितुम् । तत्रेष्टार्थत्वादेवं कल्पयिष्यामः — पर्युदासोऽयमिति । सति पर्युदासेऽनपुंसकमन्योपलक्षणार्थमुपादीयते । द्विप्रकारा हि प्रवृत्तिः स्वलक्षणेन परलक्षणाभावेन [च] । यथा क्षत्रियविट्शूद्रान् भोजयेति व्यपदेशः, अथ वाब्राह्मणान् भोजयेति । यदि चाद्यमेव विधानमिदं नान्यत्प्रतिपादकं किंचिदस्ति ब्राह्मणस्यैकान्तेनेति, न ब्राह्मणो भोज्यते । यत्र च नियमस्तत्राप्यप्रवृत्तिः । इह च नपुंसकाभावेन स्त्रीपुंसावुपलक्ष्यमाणाविति उपलक्षणस्य प्राधान्यात् प्रतिषेधो विधिर्वा तत्समवायीति नपुंसकं न स्पृशति, किं तु तदुपलक्षितौ स्त्रीपुंसौ इत्येतदाचष्टे **नपुंसके न व्यापार** इति ।

[१.७] अप्राप्तेर्वा । सत्यसमर्थसमासदर्शने प्रतिषेधस्याप्राप्तिः । कुतः ? अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा .... प्रतिषेधो वेति । आनन्तर्यं चेहार्थकृतं श्रुतिकृतं च । कथम् ? नपुंसकस्य नेति पृथक्प्रतिषेधे आश्रीयमाणे ' शि सर्वनामस्थानम् ' अशक्यमिदं प्रतिषेद्धुम् । कुतः ? आरम्भसामर्थ्यात् । नपुंसकविषय एव हि शिः । अतोऽर्थादियमनन्तरा प्राप्तिः सुडिति इयं प्रवृत्तिरूपेणाश्रिता । अशक्यास्त्येव प्रतिबद्धुम्, सुटो या काचित्प्राप्तिः सुडिति वा शिरिति वेति । किं तर्हि ? सुडित्येवं प्राप्तिः सा नपुंसकस्य नेति इदमुच्यते पूर्वा प्राप्तिरप्रतिषिद्धा तया भविष्यति ।

[१.८] ननु चेयं प्राप्तिः पूर्वां प्राप्तिं बाधत इति । विप्रतिषेधेनेत्यभिप्रायः । कयोः पुनरत्र विप्रतिषेधः ? समावेशः संज्ञानामिष्यतेऽतः स तयोर्नास्ति विप्रतिषेधः । लक्षणयोरपि न संभवत्येककार्यत्वात् । एकं कार्यं संज्ञा । उच्यते । प्रतिषेधाविशिष्टतद्विशिष्टयोरेव विप्रतिषेधो लक्षणयोर्वा । प्रतिषेधाच्चास्ति विरोधः । याश्च स्वभिन्नफला विरुद्धस्तासां समावेश इति । तत्र शिरित्यस्यावकाशः कुण्डानि पश्येति । सुडित्यस्यावकाशः राजानौ राजान इति । इहोभयं प्राप्नोति कुण्डानि तिष्ठन्ति इति । परत्वात् सुडित्यनया भवितव्यम् । परत्वं पूर्वस्या अनुवृत्तेरनुमानम् । परस्या अपि प्रतिषेधोऽनुमानमप्राप्तेः । न च देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्यास्ति प्रादुर्भावः । नोत्सहते प्रतिषिद्धा सती बाधितुम् ।

न वेति विभाषा ॥ १. १. ४४ ॥

[१] नवेतिविभाषायामर्थसंज्ञाकरणम् । उभयथाप्यनुपपन्नमेतत् । अर्थाभावादसत्त्वभूतत्वाच्चार्थस्य संज्ञासंबन्धानुपपत्तिः । नशब्दवाशब्दौ भिन्नौ उपादीयेते, अथाप्येकौ नवाशब्दौ यथा नकिर्माकिरिति, सर्वथा पदान्तरोपादानस्य प्रतिषेध्यस्य विकल्प्यस्य वा निवृत्तिः विकल्पो वावद्योत्यते । इह च ' न वेति विभाषे 'ति प्रतिषेध्यविकल्प्यवाचिनोः शब्दयोरप्रयोगादर्थ एव नास्ति । कस्य संज्ञा क्रियताम् ? अथाप्यस्त्यर्थः संनिहितः स्यात्, एवमपि न भवति, वा भवति, न वा भवत्येवंभूतः स्यात् । एवंभूतस्य चार्थस्यासत्त्वभावात् संज्ञाया अनभिसंबन्धः । संज्ञां प्रति हि संज्ञिनि षष्ठी प्रथमा वा व्याप्रियते । असत्त्वभूतस्य च न शेषभावापत्तिः । नापि इदं तदिति व्यपदिश्यत इति ।

[२] यत्तावदुच्यते अर्थाभावादित्येतदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? उपलक्षणभावेन सूत्रे प्रवर्तमानो नवाशब्दो द्रव्यशब्दसांनिध्ये प्रवर्तते क्रियाशब्दसांनिध्ये वा । क्रिया-

शब्दश्च गुणीभूतक्रियः प्रधानीभूतक्रियश्च। तत्र द्रव्यशब्दयोगे न स्तः प्रतिषेध-विकल्पौ। कुतः ? द्रव्यशब्दाः प्रवर्तमाना द्रव्येष्ववस्थिताकारामेव बुद्धिं प्रवर्तयन्ति, यद्यस्ति यदि नास्ति सोऽर्थः। तस्मादेवंभूतो योऽर्थः तस्य रूपमेवाशक्यं प्रतिषेद्धुं विकल्पयितुं वेति।

[३] योऽर्थो विधेयरूपः स एव निवार्यते विकल्प्यते वा। कः पुनरसौ ? क्रिया, सत्ता, प्रातिपदिकं वा आलम्भनं क्रियाशब्दप्रयोगे।

[४] कथम् अपाचक इति ? अत्र केचित् पचावेव नञः संनिपात इति प्रतिपन्नाः। केचित् पुनरेवं मन्यन्ते — पचिक्रियाकर्तुर्यः सत्ताविशेषस्तं स्वभावनिवृत्त-मवद्योतयतीति।

[५] इह कथं 'न पचती'ति ? अत्रापि केचित् पचिमेव सत्ताविशेषे प्रति-पन्नाः। केचित्पुनर्भवति पचतीति साध्यसाधनभावस्यादृष्टत्वात् पचेः सत्तासंबन्धमेव निवर्तयति नञिति।

[६] यथा मातुः स्मरतीत्यत्र भिन्ने दर्शने। केचिन्मन्यन्ते — योयं शेष-भावो मातुः स्मरणे, अयं यथा राज्ञः पुरुषो, वृक्षस्य शाखेति क्रियाव्यवेतो ददातिना-वस्थानेन च, इयं स्मरणक्रिया अपि। स्मरणं मातृविषयत्वात् तत्र प्रवर्तते तत्रावतिष्ठत इति प्रवृत्तिरवस्थानं वा शेषस्य निमित्तमिति। तत्र साध्यापि स्मृतिः साध्यरूपेणा-विवक्षिता संबन्धित्वेनोपक्रान्ता षष्ठ्या निमित्तं भवति। यदा साध्यरूपा विवक्ष्यते, तदा द्वितीयैव भवति मातरं स्मरतीति। यथा वृक्षस्य फलमिति, वृक्षात् फलं पततीति।

[७] केषांचिद्दर्शनम् — असत्येव क्रियान्तरे स्मरणमेव क्रिया शेषस्य निमित्तं भवति। क्रिया हि साध्यत्वेन संबन्धित्वेन वा शक्या द्रव्येणापेक्षितुम्।

[८] द्रव्याणां परस्परमुपकाराभावः। युक्तः क्रियाव्ययेतः संबन्ध इति। अतोऽर्थवान्नवाशब्दः।

[९] यदप्युच्यते असत्त्वभावादसंबन्धः इति। अत्र ब्रूमः। संज्ञाकरणकाले सत्त्वभूतस्य प्रत्यवमर्शात् युक्तः संज्ञायाः क्रियासंबन्धः। इह यदोपकारित्वेनाश्रितोऽर्थात्मा वस्तुरूपतया उपसंह्रियते, तदा प्रत्यवमृष्टः सर्वनाम्ना कार्ययोगी संपद्यते। यथा पचति यस्तस्यापत्यमिति। तथा सत्त्वभूतोऽयमर्थ इति। एवमिह संज्ञासंबन्धकाले सर्वनाम्ना प्रत्यवमृष्टः नञोर्थो वार्थश्च वस्तुभूतः। आश्रितशब्दव्यापारे तु प्रदेशेष्वसत्त्वभूत

एवेति युक्तः संबन्धः, न भवतीति योऽर्थो वा भवतीति योऽर्थस्तस्येयं विभाषेति संज्ञा प्रतिपत्तव्येति ।

[१०] कथं पुनरेकमेव वस्तु सत्त्वभूतमसत्त्वभूतं स्यात् इत्यत्र कैश्चित् वास्तवं सर्वशक्ति इति प्रपञ्चितम् । तस्य तु विशिष्टार्थभागोपनिपातिनः शब्दास्तां तां शक्तिमवच्छिन्दन्तीति प्रतिपन्नाः । अपरे पुनः — नैव वस्तु किंचिदस्ति, शब्दा एव तु प्रवर्तमानास्तं तमर्थं प्रकल्पयन्ति । सा च प्रकल्पनशक्तिः नियता 'गच्छ, हन्यते कंसः' इति । एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि कश्चित् पचतीति प्रयुङ्क्ते । कश्चित् शेषभावमापाद्य प्रयुङ्क्ते पचतेः कर्तेति । कश्चित् पाचकः । न तु करणादिरूपं, दात्रेण लुनाति, ग्रामादागच्छति, ब्राह्मणाय ददाति इति ।

[११] अथ कोऽयं निर्देशः नवेतिविभाषायामिति ? यावतार्थवत्समुदायानां प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा प्रतिषिद्धैव । उच्यते । अनुकरणशब्दत्वादत्र प्रातिपदिकत्वम् । ततश्चार्थवतां नायं समुदायः, एक एवायं शब्दः स्वेनार्थेनार्थवान् इति । ननु च प्रकृतिवदनुकरणमित्यनया परिभाषया प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाप्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । प्रकृतिद्वारिका या संज्ञातिदेशादुपलभ्यते सा शक्या प्रतिषेद्धुम् । या तु स्वाश्रया तस्या अप्रतिषेधः । एवमप्यटाबन्तत्वाद् याडाम्भावौ न प्राप्नुतः । आपः समुदायादविहितत्वात् । अयमप्यदोषः । आप् अन्ते यस्य श्रूयते स आबन्त इत्युच्यते । प्रत्ययग्रहणपरिभाषा हि प्रतिषिद्धा अस्त्रीप्रत्ययेनेति । एवं चैतत् । अथ वा एवं वर्ण्यते । न वेति उच्चार्य आश्रित्य या विभाषा, तस्यां विभाषायामिदमुच्यते — **अर्थसंज्ञाकरणमिति** ।

[१२] **किं प्रयोजनम्** ? किमेवं सति भवतः प्रयोजनमभिप्रेतमित्याह । **शब्दसंप्रत्यय** इति । अथ वा वैपरीत्येनापि निवर्तकभावेन प्रवर्तमानं प्रयोजनत्वेनोपदिश्यते । **यथान्यत्रेति** । हेतुद्वयमत्रान्तर्भूतं दृष्टान्ते । अन्यत्र हि संज्ञाकरणेऽर्थश्रुतेरभावात् । यथा दाधाश्रुतिः स्वार्थमनुपहितार्थप्रत्यायने व्यापृता संज्ञित्वेनाश्रीयते इति दाशतिप्रभृतीनां निवृत्त्यर्थम् । प्रदेशे च दाधारूपं प्रतीयमानम् । न च प्रतीयमाने शब्दे तदर्थस्य संनिधानं युक्तमनुमेयत्वादिति संज्ञाकाले नापि प्रदेशेऽर्थस्यास्ति संस्पर्शः । एवमिहाप्यर्थस्यासांनिध्यात् प्रदेशे चानुमीयमानत्वाच्च अर्थसंप्रत्ययो न युक्त इत्येतदाचष्टे — **यथान्यत्रेति** । तेन विभाषाप्रदेशेषु नवाशब्द आदेशः स्यात् प्रथमानिर्देशेऽपि, यथा विराग विरङ्गं चेति ।

[१३] तत् तर्हि कर्तव्यम् अर्थसंज्ञाकरणम। सामान्यकरोतेर्विशेषकरोतिः कर्म। अथ वा शास्त्रमर्थसंज्ञाकरणं कर्तव्यमिति। इतिकरणोऽर्थनिर्देशार्थः। इतिकरणः क्रियते। क्रियत इति करणः, इतिश्चासौ करणश्च इतिकरणः। अपि सामान्यविशेषभावात् साध्यसाधनसंबन्धः।

[१४] किं गतमेतत् इतिना आहोस्वित् शब्दाधिक्यादर्थाधिक्यम्? एतदुक्तं भवति। किमनुपपत्तिकमस्माभिर्ग्रहीतव्यम्, यस्मात् भवतेतिरुच्चारित इति यस्येयं काकवाशितस्यावस्था इति। अपरः प्रकारः। स्मृतिशास्त्रमिदम्। तत्र यथैव लेपो(?लोके) लोष्टादिभिः परिमाणं लौकिकात् स्मरन्ति, एवमव्ययमितिः स्मृतिहेतुरत्र, यथा विपरीतलिङ्गप्रवृत्तेस्तु शब्दो लिङ्गत्वेन प्रयुक्त इत्युक्तं बहुगुडो द्राक्षेति।

[१५] गतमित्याह। गतं प्रतीतमुपसंगृहीतमित्यर्थः। कुतः। किं लोकाद् अथ व्याकरणात् इति। केचिदर्थाः शास्त्राद् गम्यन्ते — यथाकारैकारौकारा वृद्धिरिति शास्त्रादेव समधिगमः। पशुरपत्यं देवतेति लोकात्। अथ वा कुत इति कुतो हेतोः, कुतो निमित्तादिति। व्याकरणे अपरिसाधितत्वात् लोकमेवोपादत्ते — लोकत इति।

[१६] तद्यथा लोके गौरित्ययमाहेति गोशब्दादितिकरणः परः प्रयुज्यमानः। गोशब्दप्रकृतिको गोशब्द इत्युच्यते प्रातिपदिकादितिशब्दस्य प्रयोगात्।

[१७] कथं पुनर्नित्ये शब्दार्थसंबन्धे 'शब्दे चार्थे चा'प्यत्यन्तमसंबद्ध एवार्थेन। अथ केचित् शब्दाः स्वरूपाधिष्ठाना एव। केचित् अर्थाधिष्ठाना एव। सर्वथा च स्वस्मात् अर्थात् प्रच्युतिर्नोपपद्यते।

[१८] तत्र यथैव 'स्वार्थमभिधाय शब्दो निरपेक्षः' इत्ययं क्रमः उपन्यस्तः, प्रतिपत्त्युपायार्थमनुष्ठानम्। न हि तत्र सकृदुच्चारितस्य शब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिरसकृदितीदमभिधायेदं ब्रवीतीति न युज्यते। समुच्चयेनाभिधानं नास्ति, अनेकशब्दाधिष्ठानत्वात् समुच्चयस्य। समुच्चयश्च — प्लक्षश्च न्यग्रोधश्च, वृक्षश्च वृक्षश्चेति। विकल्पोऽपि न संभवति। पर्यायेण श्रुतेरर्थानामनवगतेः। तस्मात् संसर्गवादिनः सर्वविशेषयुक्तार्थान संनिविष्टा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते। तस्मिन विशेषशब्द उच्चारिते स तु यथा पानकद्रव्य आस्वादिते गुडादीनपोद्धरति इदमस्ति इदमस्ति इति, एवं विशिष्टाकारायां बुद्धौ प्रवृत्तायां संभविनस्तद्विषयानर्थानपोद्धरति। अपोद्धरंश्च कश्चित् कार्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेतद्रूपां प्रतिपद्यमानो

नागृहीतविशेषणा विशेष्ये बुद्धिरित्येव पूर्वं जातीः प्रतिपद्यते। कश्चित्तु निरधिष्ठानस्थायिनोऽप्रवृत्तिरिति पूर्वं द्रव्यमेव प्रतिपद्यते।

[१९] एवमिहापि नैव पूर्वं शब्दे पश्चादर्थे किं तु यथा वृद्धिरूपतामापादितेषु आदैच्छु ताद्रूप्येण विपरिणतेषु सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धात् एकयोगक्षेमीभूतेषु मृजेर्वृद्धिरिति त एव वृद्धिरूपेणाभिधीयन्ते, एवं लोकेऽपि यो गोशब्दः सोऽयं पिण्ड इति गोशब्दो गोरूपतामापादितं पिण्डमभिदधतीति केवलं गोशब्दप्रयोगे किमयमर्थे प्रत्यस्त उत नेत्यविशेषः। इतिः प्रयुज्यमानोऽर्थे यास्याप्रत्यस्तरूपता तस्यामवस्थितस्य यः प्रयोगः तमभिव्यनक्ति इतिशब्दः। तत्रास्य योऽर्थस्तस्य शब्दभावेनाविपरिणामः। इयमत्र प्रच्युतिः।

[२०] यद्येवमिह कथं नवाशब्दादितिकरण इति। न ह्यत्रार्थासङ्गात् शब्दः स्वरूपे प्रवर्तत इति। सत्यम्, एवमेतत्। निर्ज्ञाते तु शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धे कदाचित् योऽयमर्थः स नवाशब्द इति विपरिणामः। इतिशब्दः प्रवर्तमानो नवाशब्दार्थस्य शब्देन यो विभागाभावस्तं व्यवच्छिनत्ति इत्येतावतैव प्रतिपादयन्ति। अन्ये वर्णयन्ति। शब्दार्थयोः कदाचित् शब्दः प्रधानम् अर्थ उपलक्षणम्, अर्थो वा प्रधानं शब्द उपलक्षणम्। गुणप्रधानभावस्य विपर्ययकृदितिशब्द इत्येतत् प्रच्यवनम्। अथ वा एक एव शब्दः सर्वशक्तिप्रचितः। तस्य इतिना शक्तिरपच्छिद्यते इत्येतत् प्रच्यवनम्। अथ वा भिन्ना एव शब्दाः, सारूप्यात् स एवायमिति तत्त्वबुद्ध्युत्पत्तौ निमित्तं भवन्ति इत्यन्य एव गोशब्दो योऽर्थे प्रयुज्यतेऽन्य एवायमिति परे। अस्मिन् दर्शने न प्रच्युतिरुपपद्यते। अथ वा शक्यमेवा[न]र्थवद्वर्णवत् पदान्यनर्थकान्येव। एवमेव च वाक्यात् एवार्थप्रतिपत्तिः गौरित्ययमाहेति। समुदायेऽर्थवति कुतो गोशब्दस्य शब्दपदार्थकत्वमिति प्रच्युतेरभावः। व्याकरणे तु शब्दव्यवहारे प्रसिद्धा लोकेऽर्था इति प्रसिद्धेः विपर्यासमुपद्योतयन्त इतिशब्दा इति स्थितमेतत् — इतिकरणोऽर्थनिर्देशार्थ इति।

[२१] अथ केयं वाचोयुक्तिः **यासावर्थपदार्थकता** इति। अर्थपदार्थकता हि संबन्ध उच्यते। संबन्धादयं प्रच्यवमानोऽर्थादपि प्रच्युतो भवति इति। किं च संबन्धाच्चायमर्थ उपात्त इति यदेव निमित्तमर्थाभिधाने तस्यैवोपादानं युक्तमिति।

[२२] **समानशब्दप्रतिषेधः**। समानः शब्दो वाचको येषामर्थानां ते समानशब्दाः। तेषां **समानशब्दानाम्** अर्थानां संज्ञित्वस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। नवाशब्दो

ह्यनेकार्थः । प्रतिषेधविकल्पत्वादिविशिष्टे प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ते चानाश्रीयमाणे सर्वस्य नवाशब्दवाच्यस्यार्थस्य संज्ञया भवितव्यम् । आश्रीयमाणे वा विशेषे कुत एतत् अयं विशेषो नेतर इति संदेहः । अतः सर्वप्रसङ्गः संदेहो वा इति समानशब्दप्रतिषेधश्चोद्यते। **नवा कुण्डिका, नवा घटिका** इति प्रत्यग्रवचनता निर्दिश्यते । युक्तं च यत् प्रत्यग्रवचनस्यैव स्यात् । प्रतिषेधविकल्पयोर्हि वाक्यैकदेशभूतयोर्नवाशब्दयोः श्रवणादनुमीयमानं वाक्यान्तरम् । इह तु साक्षात् प्रत्यग्रवाचित्वमिति ।

[२३] **किं च स्यात्** । संज्ञा हि न संस्कारः । किं तर्हि । तत्प्रयुक्तं कार्यमिति। **विभाषा दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहाविति** । कथं कृत्वेदमुच्यते यावता सर्वादयः शब्दाः, न च नवपुराणत्वं शब्दधर्मः । न च सर्वनामसंज्ञाया नवपुराणत्वेन संभवोऽस्ति । किं च दक्षिणपूर्वेति दिश एव तदभिधानम् । तस्याश्च नवपुराणत्वेनात्यन्तमसंभवः । सूत्रे 'विभाषा दिक्समास' इत्यनेन प्रत्यग्रार्थ इत्येतदुपस्थाप्यते । तत्र प्रत्यग्रार्थवृत्तौ यः तस्य सर्वनामसंज्ञा स्यात् इत्ययमर्थः प्रसज्यते । यदा च 'इतः इदम्' इत्येवंरूपा दिक् भागेषु न्यस्ता भवति तदा एष एवार्थोऽवधित्वेन प्रवर्तते — पूर्वो वृक्षो ग्रामादिति । एवमन्तरालमपि यदा भागे न्यस्तरूपं भवति तदा शालान्या वान्तरालत्वेनाश्रीयमाणा नवपुराणतया संभवतीति स्मायादिव्यङ्ग्यं प्रत्यग्रत्वमित्येतदन्वाख्यानात् प्रतिपद्यते, यथा वृक्षपर्णं स्वरादिव्यङ्ग्यं प्रतिपद्यते सुस्थण्डिलेष्विति ।

[२४] **न वा विधिपूर्वकत्वात् प्रतिषेधसंप्रत्ययो यथा लोके** । अर्थप्रकरणादिभिः शब्दार्थस्यावच्छेदे विशेषेऽवस्थानं दृष्टम् । सैन्धवशब्दस्य सैन्धवमानयेति भोजनप्रकरणे लवणेऽवस्थानं दृष्टम् । मृगयाप्रकरणेऽश्वेऽवस्थानम् । एवमिह प्रदेशानाभूय संज्ञाविधानात् यथाभूतः प्रदेशेऽर्थो, नवाशब्दस्य तथाभूतस्योपादानं युक्तम् । विधिपूर्वका विभाषाशब्दाः प्रदेशेषु । तस्मात् विधेयस्य चोद्यमानत्वात् प्रज्ञातत्वाद्वा प्रतिषेधार्थीय एव भविष्यति, न प्रत्यग्रार्थीयः । लोकेऽपि यत्र विषये प्रस्तुते नवाशब्दः प्रयुज्यते, प्रतिषेधार्थ एव तत्र गम्यते न प्रत्यग्रार्थ इति एतदुपादाय दृष्टान्तोपन्यासः ।

[२५] इतरो दृष्टान्तं व्यभिचारयति — **अस्ति कारणं येन लोक** इति । **विलिङ्गं हि भवान् निर्देशं करोति** । विलिङ्गमिति व्यधिकरणमित्यर्थः । विलिङ्गनिर्देशादेव प्रतिषेधसंप्रत्ययः, न तु विधिपूर्वकत्वादिति । एतमेवार्थं समर्थयते — **अङ्ग हि समानलिङ्गो निर्देशः क्रियतामिति** । **एतच्चैव न जानीमः क्वचिद्व्याकरण** इति । नैव व्याकरणे क्वचित्समाधिकरणेन निर्देशः । इहापि 'विभाषा सेनासुराच्छाया-

शालानिशानाम् (पा. २. ४. २५) इति। भवेत् समानलिङ्गो निर्देशो, न तु समानविभक्तिकः। तस्मान्नैव व्याकरणे विभाषाप्रदेशेषु शक्यं ज्ञातुं श्रुतिसंनिपातात् समानाधिकरणत्वं व्यधिकरणत्वं वा। यदा तु पौरुषेयेण व्यापारेण दक्षिणपूर्वादिषु कल्प्यते तदा स्याद्वा न वा प्रतिषेधवाचिनः श्रुतिसंनिपातात् संप्रत्ययो, न तु प्रत्यग्रवाचिन इत्येतदनेन प्रकारेण व्याचष्टे — **अपि च कामचार** इति। 5

[२६] अनेन यत्प्रागुक्तं 'अस्ति कारणम्' इति तद् व्यभिचारयति। समानलिङ्गेऽपि निर्देशे प्रतिषेधवाचिनः संप्रत्ययादयुक्तमिदमुच्यते विलिङ्गं हि भवान् निर्देशं करोति इति। प्रयुज्यमानोऽपि नवाशब्दो यदा विधेये संनिपतति तदात्यन्तं द्रव्येणासंबन्धात् प्रतिषेधवाची। यदा तु द्रव्यवाचिना समानाधिकरणस्तदात्यन्तं प्रत्यग्रवाचीति। न शक्यं वक्तुं स एव लिङ्गवानलिङ्गश्चेति। यदा च प्रसिद्धमिदं भवति यथा च 10 यवागूं नवामत्युष्णां नित्यं भुङ्क्ते इति तैत्तिरीयकाः। तस्मान्नवाशब्दो न प्रत्यग्रवाची संभवति इति प्रतिषेधवाच्येव प्रतीयते। यस्य तु नैवं यवागूभोजनं प्रसक्तम्, स पूर्वमेवोपदिश्यते तत्र प्रतिषेधवाचिनोऽनर्थकमुपादानमिति प्रत्यग्रार्थः प्रतीयते इति युक्तम्। **प्रयोक्तुः कामचार** इति। इह तु शास्त्रे यद्यपि कामचारः स्यात्, एवमपि न दोषः स्यात्। यतस्तु प्रयोक्तुरेकरसैव प्रवृत्तिः, तत इदमपि नास्ति कदाचित्प्रत्यग्र- 15 वाचिन इति।

[२७] एतत् समर्थयते — **न चेह .... विभाषाग्रहणेनेति**। कुतः? संज्ञाग्रहणस्य प्राधान्यात्। तत्र भवतिर्विधेयत्वेनोपात्तः प्रधानम्, तदङ्गानीतराणि इति। प्रधानमुत्सृज्य विधेयं न तदङ्गेषु सर्वादिषु संनिपतिष्यति विभाषाश्रुतिरिति पूर्व एव हेतुः प्रत्याग्रार्थाग्रहणस्य 'न वा विधिपूर्वकत्वात् प्रतिषेधसंप्रत्यय' इति। 20

[२८] **विध्यनित्यत्वमनुपपन्नं प्रतिषेधसंज्ञाकरणात्**। सूत्रे नवाशब्दौ एकनिपातो यथा नकिर्माकिरिति। प्रतिषेधार्थीयश्चायं यथानन्तरमेव प्रतिषेधे प्रयुक्ते वाक्ये 'न वा विधिपूर्वकत्वाद्....' इति। तेन विभाषेति नवाशब्दस्य योऽर्थः प्रतिषेधस्तस्य संज्ञा 'विभाषा श्वेः' इति। एवं च सति शुशाव शुशुवतुरिति न सिध्यति।

[२९] **सिद्धं तु प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधवचनात्**। लोकेऽपि प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधो दृष्टः। 25 ग्रामो भवता गन्तव्यो न वेति। न ह्यन्तरेण प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेधवाक्यस्य प्रवृत्तिर्युक्ता। अतः प्रतिषेधवाक्यादेव प्रसङ्गवाक्यमनुमीयते। **विप्रतिषिद्धं तु**। एकं लक्ष्यं बुद्धौ

कृत्वाह 'विभाषा श्वेः' इति। एकमिदं श्वयतिरूपम्। तत्रैकस्यैव रूपस्य भवति न भवतीति च विप्रतिषिद्धमापद्यते इत्येतदाचष्टे — **न ज्ञायते केनाभिप्रायेणेति।**

[३०] इतरः समधिगतप्रामाण्यत्वादाचार्यस्य 'विभाषा श्वेः' इत्येतदेवं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। बहव एते श्वयतयः लक्ष्यसमवायिनोऽनेन रूपेण गृहीताः। तेषु किंचिदेव रूपं निवृत्तिं परिगृह्यावस्थितं संप्रसारणस्य, किंचित् प्रसङ्गमिति। यथैव भिन्नान् धातून् समाश्रित्य केषुचित् प्रतिषेधः स्यादेवमपि द्रष्टव्यम्। कुतः? एकस्मिन्नत्यन्तं विप्रतिषेधात् विधिप्रतिषेधयोरिति। एवम् 'ऊर्णोर्विभाषा' इति। बहव ऊर्णोतयः, बहव इडादयः प्रत्यया ग्रहीतव्याः समुदायो वेत्येतदनेन प्रतिपादयति। **न वा प्रसङ्गसामर्थ्यादन्यत्र प्रतिषेधविषयात्** इति।

[३१] **तदेतत् क्व सिद्धं भवति?** या अप्राप्ते विभाषास्तासु हि द्वावपि प्रसङ्गप्रतिषेधौ अकृतार्थाविति युक्तं यत् प्रतिषेधो विकल्पार्थः स्यात्। प्राप्तिकरणस्य तुल्यत्वात्। **या हि प्राप्ते** विभाषा तस्यां पूर्वो विधिः सामान्ये उत्सृष्टः कृतार्थः। तस्य विशेषे अप्राप्त्यनुमानं बाधः प्राप्नोत्येव। तेन न विकल्पः। अत्र चोद्यते। यदि प्राप्तविभाषास्वेकान्तेन निवृत्तिः प्राप्नोति, 'विभाषा दिक्समासे' इत्यत्र विभाषाश्रुतिः नवाशब्दार्थस्य प्रतिषेधस्य वाचिकेति बहुव्रीहावित्येव वक्तव्यम्। 'न बहुव्रीहौ' इति प्रतिषेधोपादानमनर्थकम्। विभाषाग्रहणमेव तत्रानुवर्तिष्यते। तथा 'विभाषा विप्रलापे' इति 'व्यक्तवाचां समुच्चारणे' कृतार्थो विधिर्विप्रलापे बाध्येत।

[३२] **विभाषेति महतीयं संज्ञा क्रियते।** अन्यत्र महतीनां संज्ञानामन्वर्थत्वम्। इह च न महत्त्वमन्वर्थानुमानम्। किं तर्हि? संज्ञिभेदस्यैवानुमानम्। नायमेकनिपातः। निपातद्वयमेतत्। द्वयोश्चार्थयोः प्रतिषेधविकल्पयोरेषा संज्ञा। न च विभाषाशब्दस्य वाच्यं संज्ञिद्वित्वम्। किं तर्हि? प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमात्रम्। अत्र त्वेतदेव विचारयितव्यम् — किमियं संज्ञा प्रतिषेधविकल्पयोः प्रत्येकं यथा वृद्धिसंज्ञा, अथ समुदायस्य यथा संयोगसंज्ञेति। तत्र यदि प्रत्येकम्, इदं नास्ति प्रतिषेधविकल्पाभ्यामेकस्मिन् प्रवर्तितव्यमिति। तेन यथैव क्वचिदाकारो वृद्धिः क्वचिदौकार एवं क्वचित् प्रतिषेधः क्वचिद्विकल्पः स्यात्। क्रमश्च दुर्लभः, पूर्वं निवृत्तिः पश्चाद्विकल्प इति। अथ समुदायः संज्ञी, एवमपि यथा संयोगसंज्ञा समुदायस्यैव नावयवयोः एवमियमपीति इदं नोपपद्यते, अप्राप्तविभाषासु प्रतिषेध्यं नास्तीति कृत्वा वेत्यनेन विकल्पो भविष्यति इति, समुदायस्य चेत्कृतार्था संज्ञा सा कथमवयवप्रदेशं प्रतिपादयिष्यति? क्रमश्चात्यन्तमेव

दुर्लभः समुदायस्याक्रमत्वात्। अत इदमपि नोपपद्यते नेत्यनेन प्रतिषिद्धे वेत्यनेन विकल्पो भविष्यतीति। उच्यते। यथा अक्षा भज्यन्ताम्, भक्ष्यन्ताम्, दीव्यन्तामिति समुदायः क्रियाभिरभिसंबध्यमानोऽवयवसंस्पर्शात् क्रियाः प्रतिपद्यते केनचित्तत्रावयवेन किंचिदेव कर्तव्यं कश्चिद् भक्षयितव्यः, कश्चिद् भङ्क्तव्य इति भग्नेऽवयवे भग्नः समुदायः, भक्षिते भक्षितः समुदायः। एवमिहाप्यप्राप्तविभाषास्ववयवव्यापारे कस्मिंश्चिदानर्थक्यमिति नञोऽर्थो न व्याप्रियते। वेत्येतस्मिंस्तु व्याप्रियमाणे समुदाय एव व्याप्तो भवति इति।

[३३] एवमपि विधिप्रतिषेधयोः संज्ञा कृता। सावस्तुभूतयोरव्याप्तयोर्न हि सिध्यति। शक्यते हि विरुद्धावप्यर्थावुपादाय संज्ञा कर्तुम। जन्ममरणयोरियं संसारेति संज्ञेति। प्रदेशेषु तु संप्रसारणं विभाषेति विभाषाशब्दः सकृन्निवृत्तिप्रवृत्तिरूपेण तमर्थं प्रत्याययति। स चार्थः क्रिया इति। स एक एवाविशिष्टो नञा वाशब्देन वाभिव्यज्यमानधर्मा स्यात्। यथाभ्युद्धरति, उपसमाहरति इत्येक एवोद्धर्ताभिमुख्यविशिष्टो हरतीत्युपसर्गप्रयोगेऽभिव्यज्यते। एवंभूतस्तावदयमर्थात्मा न संभवति, विरोधात्। यथा ह्युद्धताभिमुख्यं चैकार्थविषयं संभवति, एवं तद्भवति न भवतीति भावाभावयोरत्यन्तविरोधादेका क्रिया एवंविशिष्टा न संभवति। अथ मन्यसे, द्वे एते क्रिये इति। द्वयोः क्रिययोरसंबन्धादेकवाक्यतायामसत्यां विभाषेत्येतत्पदं न शक्नोति संप्रसारणासंप्रसारणे उपसंहर्तुम्। तत्र संप्रसारणं न भवतीत्येतस्योपसंहारे द्वितीया प्रवृत्तिर्नास्ति विभाषाशब्दस्येति इदं नास्ति 'वा भवती'ति। अथ कल्पितो भवतिरध्याह्रियते निवृत्तिमतो भवतेरप्रवृत्तिरिति प्रदेशेषु नवतोऽर्थस्यानिरूपणाशङ्कार्थकरणे चात्यन्तमसामर्थ्यादिदमुच्यते भवतीति चेत् न प्रतिषेधः। यदि संप्रसारणं भवतीत्येतन्निरूप्यते प्रतिषेधो नास्ति। अथ न भवतीत्यभावरूपेणाश्रीयते, विधिर्नास्ति। कुतो विधिर्नास्ति? विधिप्रतिषेधयोरत्यन्तविरोधादिति।

[३४] सिद्धं तु पूर्वस्योत्तरेण बाधितत्वात्। पूर्वं विधिमुत्तरो विधिर्बाधते। एतदुक्तं भवति — प्रथमं प्रतिषेधेन समीकृते पश्माद्विकल्पः प्रवर्तते इति। यदि हि पूर्वं विकल्पः प्रवर्तेत पश्चात्प्रतिषेधः, विकल्पोऽनर्थकः स्यात्, अत्यन्तबाधितत्वात् इति। कथं पुनरयं क्रमो लभ्यः। उच्यते। अविच्छेदेनाश्रितावयवक्रमवृत्तेः समुदायस्याचार्येणेयं संज्ञा कृता नेति वेति चेति। यदि चेयमनेन व्यापारेण प्रदेशेषु कार्यं न विदध्यात्, संज्ञाकरणमेवानर्थकं स्यात्। भवति च लोकेऽवयवेषु दृष्टेषु समुदाये स्मृतिः। यो हि द्रष्टावयवं पृथक् शुक्लमुपलभते पृथक् कृष्णं, स्मरत्यसौ समुदायस्य — शबलोऽयं

समुदायः। ननु चोक्तं शब्द एवंभूतमर्थं न शक्नोति वक्तुमित्यशब्दोऽयं व्यापार आश्रितो भवति इति। उच्यते। अशब्द एवायं व्यापारः। संज्ञाकरणं तूपायभूतम्। एवंप्रकारस्य विकल्पस्योपसंग्रहः। त्रिप्रकारो हि शास्त्रे व्यापारः। विधिर्वानित्यताविभक्तः, यथा 'विभाषोर्णोः' इति। निवृत्तिर्वानित्यतायुक्ता, यथा 'विभाषा विप्रलापे' इति। न चैवमर्थं संज्ञाकरणमर्थवत्। लौकिक्या प्रवृत्त्या सिद्धत्वात्। याश्चैता उभयत्रविभाषाः 'विभाषा श्वेः' इत्येवमादयः, तासु लौकिको विभाषाशब्दः सकृत् संनिपतन् विधौ वा संनिपतेत् प्रतिषेधे वा। प्रतिषेधे संनिपतति प्रवृत्त्युत्तरमस्याभावात् विधिर्न प्रकल्पयेत्, विधौ वा संनिपतितः तदुपक्षयवत्त्वात् प्रतिषेधे न संनिपतेत्। एवमेव च कृत्वोक्तमिदं — 'किमिदं रलः क्त्वासनोः कित्त्वं विधीयते, आहोस्वित् प्रतिषिध्यते' इति। तस्यैवं प्रतिपद्यमानस्य संज्ञाकरणेनाचार्यो विच्छेदेनावयवयोः क्रमेण व्यापारं प्रदेशेषु प्रतिपादयति — अनेन क्रमेण भवता प्रदेशेषु अयमर्थः प्रतिपत्तव्यो विभाषाशब्दस्येति। यस्तु विद्वानेवं प्रतिपद्यते लक्षणमसकृत् प्रवर्तमानं प्रतिलक्ष्यं भिद्यते, श्वेरिति च सर्वः श्वयतिर्भेदेनोपात्तो लिड्विषयो विभाषाशब्दश्च तद्भेदाद्भिद्यमानोऽसकृत् प्रवर्तते इति तं प्रति संज्ञाकरणमेवानर्थकमित्यन्ते वक्ष्यति 'अशिष्यो वा विदितत्वात्' इति।

[३५] साध्वनुशासने .... यस्य विभाषा तस्य साधुत्वम्। इदमुक्तं पुरस्तात् 'विधिपूर्वकत्वात् प्रतिषेधसंप्रत्ययः' इति। शास्त्रं च साधुत्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमिति संज्ञादयः साधुत्वाङ्गभूताः। अतः साधुत्वस्य प्रकरणत्वे प्राधान्ये समधिगते साधुत्वभवनं विकल्प्यते इत्येतदापन्नम्। न हि प्रधाने संभवति, कार्यं तदङ्गे युक्तमिति 'विभाषा श्वेः' इत्येतदुक्तं भवति – श्वयतिः कृतसंप्रसारणरूपो विभाषा साधुर्भवति। कृतसमासरूपः साधुर्विभाषा भवति इति। एवं च कृत्वोक्तम् इह यत् प्रधानभूतं तत् प्रकृतम्। प्रकरणात् गुणविनियोग इति। सति चैवं साधुत्वं विभाषितं स्यात्। न तु द्वैतमिति। अपरः प्रकारः। शास्त्रोपस्थितमेतत्। भिन्नार्थयोर्वृत्तिवाक्ययोरितरेतररूपोपादानमशक्यम्। ततश्च वावचनमनर्थकम्। संज्ञायाश्च स्वस्मिन् विषये भावाभावयोरनिष्टत्वात् साधुत्वमेव विभाषया संबध्यते। एवमस्ति दोष इति।

[३६] असाधुः न प्रयोक्ष्यत इति। यथा भक्ष्याभक्ष्यसंनिधौ भक्ष्यमेवोपादीयते, एवमिहोभयसंनिधौ साध्वेव प्रयोक्ष्यत इति। न चैव हि कदाचित् राजपुरुष इत्यस्य शब्दस्य असाधुत्वमिष्यते। न हि शिष्टा एतं शब्दं कदाचिदपि न प्रयुञ्जते। न चात्र साधौ विशेषसमधिगमहेतुरस्ति येनेदं विज्ञायेत अयं साधुरयमसाधुरिति।

यान्यपि समासान्तोदात्तादीनि तेषामपि साधुत्व एवाङ्गत्वमिति कृतसमासान्तोदात्तो विभाषा साधुर्भवति इति।

[३७] अपि च द्वेधाप्रतिपत्तिः। यदर्थं च शास्त्रं विकल्पितस्य रूपस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं तथा चाप्रतिपत्तिः। साधुत्वे विकल्प्यमाने श्वयतिः कृतसंप्रसारणो विभाषा साधुरित्येतदापद्यते। तेन शिश्वाय शिश्वियतुरिति रूपस्यासिद्धिः।

[३८] यस्य पुनः कार्याः शब्दाः विभाषासौ समासं निर्वर्तयति। किंभूता पुनरनित्यता शब्दानाम्, किंभूता वा नित्यता? यद्याकृतेर्नित्यत्वात्, अथापि व्यक्तीनां नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यानां नित्यताश्रीयते, कः संबन्धो विभाषया? न ह्याचार्यप्रवृत्तिभेदात् संभवति, न वैषमस्त्यशास्त्रस्यैवं प्रवृत्तत्त्वात्। तस्माद्यदि पाणिनीयमथ व्याकरणान्तरं सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तृगत एष विचारः। कश्चित् प्रतिपत्ता इदमन्वाख्यानं विकारविकारिभावेन प्रतिपद्यते। 'इको यणची'ति दध्यत्रेति दधिशब्दस्यैवेयमवस्थेति प्रतिपद्यते। अन्यस्तदन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते, शब्दान्तरमेवेदं संहिताविषयमवस्थितं यणूरूपेण। शास्त्रं तु केवलमन्वाख्यायकमिति। अतो य एवं प्रतिपन्नः शास्त्रप्रवृत्ते राजन् अस् पुरुष स् इत्यस्याः प्रकृतेः द्वौ शब्दौ प्रवर्तेते राजपुरुषो राज्ञः पुरुष इति चेति तस्य समासो निर्वर्त्यत्वात् प्रधानम्। प्रधाने च विकल्प्यत्वमिति दोषाभावः।

[३९] यस्यापि नित्यस्तस्याप्येष न दोषो भवति। सत्यपि साधुत्वस्य प्राधान्ये विकल्पो न शक्यते कल्पयितुं साधुत्वस्याविकल्प्यत्वात्। कथं च तदविकल्प्यम्? अपौरुषेयत्वात्। तत्र यथैव ब्राह्मणशतेन भुक्तमिति संख्या प्राधान्येनापि चोद्यमानासंभवात् भुजिना न संबध्यते इति लक्षणत्वेन संख्येयस्य प्रवर्तते शतसंख्यैर्भुक्तमिति, एवमत्रापि यत् पौरुषेयं तत् शक्यं विकल्पयितुमिति संज्ञैव पौरुषेयी, सा विकल्प्यते, न साधुत्वमिति। तद्यथा। मेध्यः पशुर्विभाषित इति। पशुत्वानडुत्त्वयोरपौरुषेयत्वात् प्राकरणिकमालम्भनं विकल्प्यते। न त्वेतद्विचार्यते अनड्वान् नानड्वानिति। विचारयितुर्वा बुद्धिर्नैवं प्रवर्तते, अविचार्योऽर्थो, न विचरति भावाभावाभ्याम्।

[४०] ननु चेदमुक्तं 'न च संज्ञाया भावाभावाविष्येते' इति। सत्यम्, एवमेतत्। किं तु प्रतिपत्तिवशादेतदुच्यते। यस्तावदेवं प्रतिपद्यते उभयत्र वृत्तौ वाक्ये च तस्यैवानयनम्। श्रुतिश्च तुल्यरूपा यथा दास्याः पुत्रो दास्याःपुत्र इति, एकान्तेन वृत्तिः वाक्यस्य बाधिका प्राप्नोति। यथार्धधातुके भवति। सूत्रं त्वेकान्तेन बाधित्वेति

विभाषारभ्यते यथा 'वा लिटि' (पा. २. ४. ५५) इति। तं प्रति इदमुच्यते— 'किं तर्हि ? संज्ञा संबध्यते' इति। यस्तु भिन्नार्थतामेव प्रतिपन्नस्तं प्रति तदुक्तं 'न च संज्ञाया भावाभावाविष्येते' इति। 'न चैतन्मन्तव्यं स्वमनीषिकयोच्यते' इति। एवं हि 'समर्थानां प्रथमाद्वा' (पा. ४. १. ८२) इत्यत्रोक्तम्— 'न तर्हि वावचनं कर्तव्यम् ? कर्तव्यम् च। किं प्रयोजनम् ? नित्याः शब्दाः। तत्रानेन वाक्यस्य साधुत्वं क्रियते' इति।

[४१] कार्येषु युगपदन्वाचययोर्यौगपद्यम्। कोऽस्य वाक्यस्य संबन्धः ? इदमुपन्यस्तं भवता नित्यतादर्शिनो विभाषा साधुत्वं प्राप्नोति इति। तत् परिहृतम्। कार्यत्वे त्वभ्युपगम्यमाने साधुत्वस्य विभाषा दोषो नास्ति। किं त्वयं दोषो 'युगपदन्वाचययोर्यौगपद्यम्'। युगपत्कृतेषु युगपच्छब्दः प्रवर्त्यत्वात् प्रवृत्तो यथा यौगपद्यमिति भावप्रत्ययः। अन्वाचयश्चात्र समुदाय एवाभिप्रेतः। स त्वनुमीयमानः शब्दाधिकारादनुमितो 'ढक् च मण्डूकात्' (पा. ४. १. ११९) इति अन्वाचयशब्देनोक्तः। 'तव्यत्तव्यानीयरः' (पा. ३. १. ९६) 'ढक् च मण्डूकादि'ति। कः पूर्वः पक्षः ? एवं मन्यते। यस्य कार्याः शब्दाः प्रयोगनिरपेक्षः स शब्दानन्वाचष्टे। शास्त्रात् समधिगम्य शब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते इत्येकशब्दाश्च तव्यत्तव्यानीयर एकसाधनेषु चादिष्टाः। नान्तरीयकमनुषक्तमेव यथा निर्मथनेऽभ्यर्थमुपात्ते अग्निष्टोमोऽपि प्रथमः प्रवर्तते, एवं तव्यति प्रवृत्ते इतरयोरपि तव्यानीयरोः प्रवृत्त्या भवितव्यमिति। प्रवृत्तिवत् प्रयोगेऽपि यौगपद्येन भवितव्यम्। अथ वा शब्दवत् अर्थोऽपि तेषां कार्य इति प्रतिपन्नयौगपद्यानां समुच्चितानां चार्थो विधीयते। अतो यथाभूतानामर्थ उपात्तस्तथाभूतानामेव प्रयोगेण भवितव्यम्।

[४२] यस्य पुनर्नित्या इति। स हि लोके प्रयुक्तानां साधुत्वमात्रमन्वाचष्टे। न चैवंभूतस्यास्ति प्रयोग इति न युक्ता युगपद्वचनता।

[४३] प्रत्ययः परो भवतीति। ननु चैकसाधनत्वात् यथैव तव्ये नास्ति द्वित्वम्, तव्यत्तव्यानीयरामेकसाधनत्वात् एकत्वमेवेति स्यात् परत्वे संभवः। तथा व्यवहितेऽपि परशब्दः प्रयुक्तः— परं मथुरायाः पाटलिपुत्रमिति। अनेकस्य च परत्वमुक्तम्— 'एका प्रकृतिर्बहवश्च यत्नः' इति। नैष दोषः। अनेकत्वं तावदनेनादावेवाभ्युपगतम्। अनेकत्वे हि सति इदमुपपद्यते यौगपद्यमन्वाचयो वा। लिङ्गं चास्ति शास्त्रे ''सदव्ययतव्य°'' (पा. २. २. ११) इति। तस्माल्लाघवार्थं 'पृथक् विभक्तीर्मोचीचरम्'

इत्येकसाधनानामुपादानम्। व्यवहिते च परशब्दो निवर्तितः पञ्चमीनिर्देशेषु निर्दिष्टग्रहणेन। अनेकाश्च [यञ्व्यक्त]यः परत्वेन युक्ताः, यञः आकृतेः परत्वेनाभ्युपगमादाकृतिः परैव, व्यक्तयः कामं व्यवहिताः। तव्यादयश्चैकाकृतियुक्ता न संभवन्तीति न संभवत्याकृतिपरत्वम्।

[४४] नापि ब्रूमः प्रत्ययमाला प्राप्नोति। नैवमुच्यते एकस्याः प्रकृतेः परे भवन्त्विति एवं युगपदुच्चरतेति। किं तर्हि? अन्याभ्यः प्रकृतिभ्यः परे प्रयुज्यन्त एकस्मिन्काले इत्येवंभूता युगपद्वचनता चोद्यते। चोदनायामेवंभूतस्यार्थे विनियोगात्।

[४५] अर्थगत्यर्थः शब्दप्रयोग इति। प्रत्ययानामभ्युपगतोऽर्थश्च विधीयते इत्येतच्चेह नोपात्तम्। सत्यां चार्थस्य विधीयमानतायां भावकर्मणोस्तव्यत्तव्यानीयर इत्येतत् केवलमुपनिधानवाक्यं विनियोगवाक्यानां प्रतिपादकम्। तेभ्यश्च शब्दानर्थांश्च प्रतिपद्यते। तस्मादेतानि वाक्यान्युपप्लवन्ते — धातोस्तव्यत् भवति भावकर्मणोः। तव्यो भवति भावकर्मणोः। अनीयर् भवति भावकर्मणोः, इत्यनिष्टानुषङ्गश्च साधनप्रतिबद्धः शक्यः प्रतिहर्तुम्। चोदनाशब्देषु प्रयोक्त्रधीना प्रतिपत्तिरिति शक्यते यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धः कल्पयितुमिति।

[४६] आचार्यदेशशीलने च तद्विषयता। यच्छास्त्रे पुनः पुनः प्रदेशेषु आचार्यग्रहणमेतत् शीलनमित्युच्यते। तत्र यद्देशशीलनं तत् तद्विषयमिष्यते 'एङ् प्राचां देशे' (पा. १. १. ९५) इत्येवंप्रकारम्। यद्वाचार्याणां नामगोत्रेण दिक्संबन्धेन वा शीलनं तत्तद्विषयं प्राप्नोति इति चोद्यते। कुतः? एवं मन्यते। शास्त्रं कारणत्वेन यः प्रतिपद्यते, शास्त्रतन्त्रः प्रयोगो न प्रयोगतन्त्रं शास्त्रमिति, तस्यैतस्मिन् दर्शने अप्रसिद्धो लोके प्रयोगः शास्त्रेण प्रतिपद्यत इति 'इको ह्रस्वोऽङ्यः' (पा. ६. ३. ६१) इति एतत् प्रतिपादकम् — ह्रस्वाः प्रयोक्तव्याः। सर्वस्मिंश्च प्रयोक्तरि प्रसक्ते प्रयोक्तृनियमो 'गालवस्य' इति। एतमेवार्थं परिगृह्य दृष्टान्त उक्तः — पञ्चकृत्वो जमदग्निर्वा एतदिति।

[४७] ननु चार्थवादोऽयम्। तत्र विधिवाक्यशेषभूतत्वादर्थवादस्य, विधिर्गम्यते। स च विधिः 'चतुरवद्यन्ति'। 'पञ्चकृत्वो जामदग्न्यस्य' इति (मानवश्रौसू. १. ३. २. ५)। अलौकिकत्वादस्यार्थस्य शास्त्रादिदमवसीयते। तत्र यथैवास्यावृत्तिः सर्वकर्तृविषया 'चतुरवद्यन्ति' इति, एवं पञ्चकृत्व इति प्रसक्ता कर्तृविशेषेऽवदातरि जामदग्न्ये नियम्यत इति। नाजामदग्न्यः .... जुहोति। जमदग्निर्वा एतदिति।

केचित् सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धेनापत्यमेव पितृशब्देन व्यपदिशन्ति। अवाद्यदिति च छान्दसो लेट् वर्तमाने काले पञ्चमो लकारो बाहुलकात् श्यन् इति। अन्ये पुनः पितुराचरणात् पुत्रोऽप्यवद्यतीति एवं मन्यन्ते।

[४८] यस्य पुनर्नित्याः शब्दाः, तस्य प्रयोगतन्त्रत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, लोकप्रसिद्धप्रयोगाणां स्मर्तारः केवलं भवन्ति नाभिसंबन्धार इत्युत्तरपदह्रस्वत्वं विकल्पितम्, केवलं गालवः स्मर्तृत्वेनोपादीयते। गालवो ह्रस्वत्वं स्मरति। किंभूतम्? यथाभूतं लोके इति गालवस्य यत्प्रमाणीकरणं मेधापूजार्थ वा गालवो ह्रस्वत्वं स्मरत्येवमस्यागमोऽविच्छिन्नः। अन्ये तु दीर्घं स्मरन्ति। न च गालवेन स्मृतमन्यो न प्रयुङ्क्ते। गालवो वान्येन स्मृतं दीर्घमिति नास्ति तत्र तद्विषयत्वम्। देशग्रहणं कीर्त्यर्थमिति। कीर्तिः ख्यातिः संशब्दनम्, ख्यातिलिङ्गत्वाच्च प्रासादादयोऽपि कीर्तिरेवेति व्यपदिश्यन्ते। संशब्द्यमानाश्च केचित् संस्कारं प्रतिपद्यन्ते यथा इन्द्रद्युम्नादय इति। ननु च यस्यापि कार्या इति। शक्यते तत्रापि पूजा कल्पयितुम् — दृश्यते हि लोके आहोपुरुषिकयापि पूजा, गालवस्य यस्मात् ह्रस्वे प्रवृत्तिस्तस्मात्त्वमपि प्रयुङ्क्ष्वेति संभवति प्रमाणीकरणात् पूजा, द्विधा प्रतिपत्तिस्तु न भवतीत्याह — तत्कीर्तने च द्वैधाप्रतिपत्तिः। शास्त्रात् ह्रस्वमेव प्रतिपन्नो न दीर्घमिति।

[४९] अशिष्यो वा विदितत्वात्। वाशब्दो विकल्पे। शिष्यो वा इत्यर्थः। शब्दसंज्ञा स्वरूपाधिष्ठाना। या तस्यास्तद्रूपाया एव प्रदेशेषु प्रवृत्तिः शास्त्रे च तया संव्यवहारो यथा वृद्ध्यादिषु। इयं चैवंभूता न भवतीति एतदाचष्टे। येऽपि ह्येतां संज्ञां नारभन्त इति। सामान्येन दृष्टान्तमुपादायैकदेशमुदाहरणत्वेनोपन्यस्यति — याज्ञिकाः खल्वपीति। अथ वा लौकिकाः शास्त्रादागमय्य प्रतिपद्येरन्। याज्ञिकास्तु भिन्नतन्त्रत्वात् तस्मिन् शास्त्रे शास्त्रान्तरसंज्ञया न व्यवहरेयुरिति।

[५०] तत्र यदैवं प्रतिपत्तिः शास्त्राकृतिर्लक्ष्याकृतौ प्रवर्तत इति तदोभयत्रविभाषार्थं कर्तव्यो योगः। इतरथा हि 'विभाषा श्वेः' (पा. ६. १. ३०) इति विभाषाशब्द एकस्मिन् वाक्यशेषे उपक्षीणो न भवति, भवति वा, प्रवृत्त्यन्तरस्याभावात् उभयमसमर्थः कर्तुमिति। यदा त्वेवं मन्यसे लक्ष्यव्यक्तिषु शास्त्रव्यक्तय इति तदैतन्निबन्धनाद् 'विभाषा श्वेः' इति यावल्लक्ष्यं तत्समवायिनो बहून् योगान् प्रतिपद्यत इति नारब्धव्यो योगः। एतमेव चार्थं प्रदर्शयता आचार्येण प्रदेशेषु भिन्नलक्षणः शब्दव्यवहारः कृतः। एतत्प्रदर्शयति — आचार्यः खल्वपि संज्ञामारभमाण इति। कथं तदुक्तं 'भारद्वाजः

स्मात् मतात् प्रच्याव्यते' इति ? उच्यते। यथानेन स्मृत्योपनिबद्धं ततः प्रच्याव्यत इति।

[५१.१] अप्राप्ते त्रिसंशयाः। अप्राप्त इत्येतत्स्वर्यते। त्रिसंशया इति न 'त्रयः संशयाः यासु विभाषासु तास्त्रिसंशयाः'। कुत एतत् ? एकत्वात्संशयस्य। यथा स्थाणुः पुरुष इत्येक एव संशयो न द्वौ संशयौ। अतस्त्र्यधिष्ठानत्वात् त्रिसंशया इति उच्यते। 5

[५१.२] 'द्वन्द्वे च। विभाषा जसि' इति विभाषाप्रकरणोपलक्षणार्थमुपात्तम्। इह तु संशयः 'प्रथमचरमतये'ति [यदि 'सर्वादीनि' इत्यनुवर्तते ततः] प्राप्तेऽथ निवृत्तं पूर्वविप्रतिषेधश्चैवमप्राप्ते, तथा परविप्रतिषेध एवमुभयत्र। 'सर्वादीनि....' इत्यस्यावकाशो [जस्भिन्ने, द्वयादिषु च विकल्पो] यस्मात्सर्वादि न भवति द्वये द्वया इति। इहोभयं प्राप्नोति उभये इति। ध्यानग्रहकारेणोक्तम् — अप्राप्ते पूर्वविप्रतिषेधात् अन्तरङ्गत्वाद्वा। 10 अन्तरङ्गमित्येव कस्मात् ? प्रकृतिमात्राश्रयणात्। विभाषा तूभयजसिमाश्रित्य बहिरङ्गा। अयं तूभयमेतदनाश्रित्याप्राप्ते विभाषां वर्णयति — अप्राप्तेऽयच् प्रत्ययान्तरम् इति। यस्त्वयजादेशः परिगृह्यते, स ह्युभयशब्दात् प्रत्ययान्तरं विज्ञास्यते। तत्रैवं पाठः क्रियते— 'उभादवयवेऽयच्'। ततः 'संख्यायास्तयप्'। 'द्वित्रिभ्यां तयस्यायज्वे'ति। अथ वा 'संख्याया अवयवे तयप्'। 'उभादयच्'। 'द्वित्रिभ्यां वा'। तैलमात्रा .... अत्रापि 15 प्राप्नोति। ननु चाकारान्त एवायम्। नैष दोषः। नैवमुच्यते तैलमात्राशब्दात् प्राप्नोतीति। किं तर्हि ? 'हुयामाश्रुभसिभ्यस्त्रन्' (उणा° ६०७) इति यो मात्रशब्दस्तस्मात् प्राप्नोति। तेन तैलमात्रीति भवितव्यम् इति। सदृशस्याप्यसंनिविष्टस्येति। कथं चायं न संनिविष्ट इत्येतत् शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् ? उच्यते। अनुबन्धेऽसत्यपि अर्थ एवोपलक्षितो निमित्तं प्रत्यभिज्ञाने। एवं चेहार्थेनैव संनिविष्टो विज्ञास्यते, प्रमाणार्थवृत्तिः यः 20 स संनिविष्ट इति। यस्तु परिमाणार्थवृत्तिः स्यात् इयमस्य मात्रा इदमस्य परिमाणमिति तस्यासंनिवेशः। प्रातिपदिकात्परस्य प्रमाणवाचिनः संनिवेशात् यथोक्तं 'लुङि सिजादिदर्शनात्' इति।

[५१.३] ऊर्णोर्विभाषा। यद्यपरिसमाप्तक्रियमिदमविधायकं कस्यचिदासक्तस्वरितलिङ्गमुपादीयते, [यथा] 'समर्थानां प्रथमाद्वा' इति, अतः 'असंयोगाल्लिट् कित्' 25 इत्यत्र प्रतिलब्धक्रियं तस्मिन् नानावाक्यत्वेनैव प्रवर्तते। असंयोगाल्लिट् कित् भवति। ऊर्णोतेर्विभाषा भवतीति। नानावाक्यत्वं चासंयोगग्रहणादेवानुमीयते। असंयोगान्त एव हि ऊर्णोतिरिति। इह तु वचनमिडुपर्जावनार्थम्।

अथ विधायकमिदम्। एवं सति लिङ्विषयेऽनारम्भात् सावकाशावेताविति विप्रतिषेधे सति इह यदि परविप्रतिषेध एवं सति अप्राप्तेयम्। पूर्वविप्रतिषेध एवमुभयत्र। कथम्? इह पूर्वा विभाषा परो नित्यो विधिः। पूर्वत्र परा विभाषा पूर्वो विधिरिति।

अप्राप्ते। अन्यद्धि कित्त्वमन्यत् ङित्त्वम्। विभाषया ङित्त्वं, नित्ये विधौ कित्त्वम्। एतत् श्रुतिभेदादन्यत्वं संप्रसारणासंप्रसारणादिकार्यमेतयोर्भिन्नमिति।

एकं चेत् ङित्कितौ। कथमेकत्वम्? एवं मन्यते। नायं तद्वदतिदेशः। किं तर्हि? कार्यातिदेशः। यदतिदेशात्प्रवर्तते तत्कार्यम्। तञ्चोर्णोतेर्ङित्त्वे कित्त्वे चाविशिष्टम्। गुणप्रतिषेधोऽत्र कार्यम्। स तु किं नित्यः प्रतिषेध आहोस्वित् विभाषेति। एतदाह — 'एकं चेत्' इति। **यद्यपि नाना एवमपि संदेहः।** कथं पुनर् 'विभाषोर्णोः' इत्येतत् 'सार्वधातुकमपित्' (पा. १. २. ४) इत्यत्र वर्तते? इटश्चापित्त्वात् वाक्यभेदेन प्रवृत्तिरित्यनुमीयते। तत्र यदि सार्वधातुकं ङित् भवति ऊर्णोतेरिह सार्वधातुकं विभाषेति प्राप्ते। अथ न स्वर्यते विशेषेण। तत्र 'सार्वधातुकमपित्' इत्यस्यावकाशः — चिनुतः। 'विभाषोर्णोः' इत्यस्यापि प्रोर्णविता प्रोर्णुविता। इहोभयं प्राप्नोति — **प्रौर्णुवीति।** अत आह — **अप्राप्ते।** परविप्रतिषेधोऽयम् इति।

[५१.४] **विभाषोपयमने।** ननु च गन्धनोपयमनयोरत्यन्तभेदात् संदेहेन न भवितव्यम्। एवं मन्यते। गन्धनाङ्गमुपयमनं गन्धनमिति व्यपदिश्यते। यथा या योनौ विद्योतते, तस्या या बलाहकात् विद्योतत इति। अत्र पूर्वविप्रतिषेधाद्वाऽप्राप्ते विभाषा। अथ वोपयमनाश्रयं भवति। न च गन्धनाश्रयं भवति। कुतः? तस्याप्राधान्यात्। इत्येवं सेयमप्राप्ते विभाषा।

[५१.५] **अनुपसर्गाद्वा।** उपपराभ्यामित्यनेनारम्भाद्वा वृत्त्यादयो न संबध्यन्ते एव। उपपरापूर्वे न संभवन्ति वा वृत्त्यादयः। 'आङ उद्गमने' (पा. १. ३. ४०) इत्यर्थान्तरमेवोपादीयते वृत्त्यादिविरोधि। तथा 'वेः पादविहरणे' (४१)। 'प्रोपाभ्यां समर्थाभ्याम्' (४२) इति प्रारम्भे समानार्थत्वमेतयोर्न वृत्त्यादिषु इति।

[५१.६] **विभाषा वृक्षमृगादीनाम्।** येऽत्र मृगादयः प्राणिनस्ते न संबध्यन्ते 'जातिरप्राणिनाम्' (पा. २. ४. ६) इत्यनेन। वृक्षादयस्त्वप्राणिन एव, तत्र ये चर्ममया मृगादयस्तत्रेयं विभाषा। न तु प्राणिष्वित्येवं भवितव्यम्। अप्राप्ते विभाषा। **'जातिरप्राणिनाम्' इति निवृत्तम्,** पूर्वविप्रतिषेधश्च। अन्तरेणापि पूर्वविप्रतिषेधमियमप्राप्ते विभाषा। गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये संप्रत्यय इति मुख्येषु पशुषु विभाषा न मृद्गवादिषु।

[५१.७] उषविद ....। प्रत्ययान्तादिति वामि प्राप्ते। इजादेरित्यत्र प्रत्ययान्तादित्येतन्न संबध्यते। अस्यापि विधेर्नित्यत्वात् वचनानर्थक्यमापद्यते इति। अथ कथं प्रत्ययान्ता उषादय उषादिव्यपदेशं लभन्ते, यावता अक्तपरिमाणानुषादीन् परिगृह्य विभाषा विधीयते ? उच्यते। 'सनाद्यन्ता धातवः' (पा. ३. १. ३२) इत्यत्र प्रकारचतुष्टयम् —तदेकदेशविज्ञानम्, तद्वदतिदेशः, संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धः, प्रत्याख्यानमिति। तदेकदेशविज्ञानं तावत्—यथा समासान्त इत्यन्तग्रहणेन समासैकदेशत्वं डजादीनामिति बह्वृचादिग्रहणेन गृह्यन्ते, एवमिहापि सनादयोऽन्ता एषाम्=एकदेशा एषां ते इमे सनाद्यन्ता इत्येवं विज्ञायमाने उषेः सनेकदेशो गृह्यते उषिग्रहणेनेति। ननु चैवं कल्प्यमाने संज्ञाविधिरयं न भवतीति सना तदन्तविधिरस्ति। एवं च सति सनन्तोऽप्यन्यस्यैकदेशो विज्ञायेत। नैष दोषः। समानार्थस्य वा सनन्त एकदेशः स्यात्, अन्यार्थस्य वा। तत्र समानार्थस्योक्तत्वात् प्रयोगो नास्ति पच् पिपक्षतीति। अन्यार्थस्य विरोधात् असंबन्धे सति प्रयोगाभावात् पिपक्षतीति। अथ वा सनादीनेव प्राधान्येनाश्रयिष्यामः। न च प्रधानेन तदन्तविधिरस्तीति। एकदेशेषु प्रत्ययादित्यनुवर्तमाने उषिग्रहणेन ग्रहणात् विभाषेत्येवं प्राप्ते इयं विभाषा। अथ निवृत्तम्, केवलोऽपि उषिरुषिः सनन्तोपि। तत्र यदि पूर्वविप्रतिषेध एवमप्राप्ते परविप्रतिषेध एवमुभयत्रेत्यस्ति संदेहः। अथ वा तद्वदतिदेशोऽयम्, यथा 'बहुगणवतुडति संख्या' (पा. १. १. २३)—संख्याशब्दे एकादिपदार्थके आश्रीयमाणे तद्वदतिदेशो विज्ञायते—संख्यावद् भवतीति। एवमिह शास्त्रे भूवादिषु धातुशब्दः प्रसिद्धः, कार्याणि च यानि तानि उपादाय पदार्थैकदेशभूतानि इहोपात्ताः सनाद्यन्ता धातव इति सनाद्यन्ता धातुवद् भवन्तीति धातुकार्यं लभन्ते। एतत्तु परीक्ष्यम्, सत्यपि च तद्वदतिदेशे किमुषादिभिः सनन्तैः सामान्यातिदिष्टं कार्यं लब्धव्यं प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिः, अन्तोदात्तत्वम्, अथोषादीनामपि यत्कार्यं तदपीति। एष सामान्यकार्यं प्रति प्रकृतः। कुत एतत् ? सामान्ये विशेषाणां व्यभिचारित्वात्। यथा ब्राह्मणवदस्मिन् इति न माठरे यत् तदतिदिश्यते। एवं च कृत्वोक्तं 'सामान्यातिदेशे हि विशेषानतिदेशः'। सत्यम्, एवमेतत्। इह तु सामान्येऽतिदिश्यमानेऽतिदेश एवानर्थकः। संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धेनाप्यस्यार्थस्य तुल्यत्वात्। तस्मात् पदे तत्त्वात्तु यद् भवतीति। एतदेवं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। लाघवार्थमेतत् सामान्यशब्दोपादानम्। एतत्तु प्रतिविशेषमुपसंहृतं भूवादिरूपेणोपात्तम्। सनन्तो भवतिवत् एधतिवत् भवतीति, अस्ति उषेः सनन्तस्य उषिवदतिदेशात् विभाषा कार्यप्रतिपत्तिरिति। अयं त्वत्र दोषः — सनाद्यन्तानां सर्वधातूनां यत् कार्यं तत् प्राप्नोति इति। यदा संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धस्तत्कथम् ? यद्येवं कल्प्यते धातव इत्येतत् भूवादिपदार्थकम्,

ते च भूवादयः सनाद्यन्तानां संज्ञा। एवं तु कल्प्यमाने 'धातोः कर्मणः ....' (पा. ३. १. ७), 'धातोरेकाचः ....' (पा. ३. १. २२) इत्यत्रापि प्रसङ्ग इति। अथ मन्यसे प्रतीयमाना अत्र भूवादय इति, इहापि प्रतीयमाना 'सनाद्यन्ता धातवः' इति। तस्मादेककालैवेयं स्वरूपपदार्थिका भूवादीनां सनाद्यन्तानां च धातुसंज्ञा। यत्र तु विशेष उच्चरति, सा संज्ञा स्यात् यथा 'विभाषा कृवृषोः' (पा. ३. १. १२०) इति चिकीर्षतेः संज्ञा स्यात्। एतच्च प्रत्याख्यातम् — धात्वर्थे विधीयन्ते सनादयः, तत्र स्थानिवद्भावात् सिद्धा संज्ञेति। **अप्राप्ते। प्रत्ययान्ता धात्वन्तराणि।** एतदाख्यातमनेन प्रकारेण नैकदेशसंविज्ञानं सनादीनां, तद्वदतिदेशो [वा], किं तु संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धः, प्रत्याख्यानं वा। ततश्चाधिक्यात् उषादिग्रहणेनाग्रहणात् संदेहो नोपपद्यते। अपरे संशयमेवं वर्णयन्ति। उषिः क्विबन्त आचारे क्विप् प्रत्ययान्तश्च भवति तच्छ्रुतिश्चेति। इदमप्येवं समर्थयन्ते 'प्रत्ययान्ता धात्वन्तराणि' इति। नैतस्मादाचारक्विबस्तीति।

[५१.८] **दीपादीनां विभाषा।** 'दीपजन....' (पा. ३. १. ६१) इत्येतत्स्वर्यते इतीहानुमितम्। समुदायेनानुमीयते — भावकर्मणोश्चिण् भवति, दीपादीनां विभाषेति। न त्वङ्गाङ्गिभावेन। कुत एतत्? पृथक्पाठात्। इतरथा ह्येवमेव पठेत् — 'भावकर्मणोर्दीपादिभ्यो विभाषा' इति।

अथ विधायकमिदम्, कर्तरीति च निवृत्तम्, परविप्रतिषेधात् अप्राप्ते, पूर्वविप्रतिषेधादुभयत्र प्राप्ते इयं विभाषा।

अप्राप्ते। कर्तरीति हि वर्तते। विधायकं चेदमित्यभिप्रायः। **एवमपि संदेहो न्याय्ये वा कर्तरि कर्मकर्तरि वेति।** यदि कर्तरीत्येतदपि स्वर्यते, तत्र कर्तृपरिगृहीता दीपादयो वाक्यभेदेनेह क्रियाशब्दं लभन्ते। भावकर्मणोश्चिण् भवति। दीपादिभ्यः कर्तरि कर्मणि विभाषेति प्राप्ते इयं विभाषा। अथ कर्तरीति न स्वर्यते, कर्मकर्ता कर्ता भवतीति दीपादीनां कर्मकर्तरि उभयप्राप्तौ पूर्वपरविप्रतिषेधाभ्यां संदेह उपपद्यते। **सकर्मकस्य कर्ता कर्मवद् भवतीति।** यद्यपि बुधिः सकर्मकस्तथाप्येकरसं परिहारं वक्ष्यामीति अविशेषेणोक्तम् — **अकर्मकाश्च दीपादय इति। सोपसर्गाः सकर्मका भवन्तीति।** सोपसर्गो ह्यर्थान्तरवृत्तित्वं प्रतिलभते, भवति अनुभवतीति। **कर्मस्थभावकानां कर्मस्थक्रियाणामिति।** परिस्पन्दापरिस्पन्दभेदेन विभक्तोऽर्थात्मा भेदेनोपात्तो — भावः क्रियेति। कथं पुनरेतल्लभ्यम्? एवं तत्रोक्तम् — 'कर्मस्थक्रिया कर्मशब्देनोच्यते' इति। यथा पचतिः कर्मस्थक्रियः। कर्मणि हि क्रियाकृतो विशेष उपलभ्यत इति।

इदं तु 'अचः कर्तृयकि' (पा. ६. १. ९५) इत्यनेन विरुध्यते। एवं हि तत्रावस्थितं 'जायते स्वयमेव' इति। जनेरुपदेशे एवात्वम्। ततश्चोपदेशेऽजन्तोऽयमिति। यदि च कर्तृस्थभावकोऽयम्, कुतोऽस्य कर्तृयक्? इति।

[५१.९] विभाषाग्रे[प्रथमपूर्वेषु]। आभीक्ष्ण्ये इति निवृत्तम्, पूर्वविप्रतिषेधश्च। तत्र त्विदमुक्तम् — 'अग्रादिष्वप्राप्तविधेः समासप्रतिषेधः' इति। अप्राप्तविधाने ह्यग्रादयो निमित्तं प्रत्ययोत्पत्तौ। अथ तु प्राप्त इयं विभाषा, एवं सति निवृत्तेर्निमित्तमग्रादय इत्युपपदत्वाभाव इति। परिहारश्चोक्तोऽमैव यत् सह निर्दिष्टमुपपदं तत् समस्यत इति।

[५१.१०] तृन्नादीनां विभाषा। 'तृन्नन्नतीक्ष्णशुचिषु' (पा. ६. २. १६१) इति, 'आक्रोशे च', 'संज्ञायाम्' इति — यदि 'अच्कौ' इति निवृत्तम्, अतः संदेहेन भवितव्यम्। अथ 'आक्रोशे' इत्यत्र अच्कावनुवर्तेते, निःसंदिग्धमप्राप्तविभाषेयम्।

[५१.११] एकहलादौ (पा. ६. ३. ५९) 'संज्ञायाम्' इत्यनुवृत्तम्। 'पेषं वास ....' (५८) इत्यत्र नानुमीयेत, आरम्भसामर्थ्यात्। अस्ति पुनः काचित् संज्ञा संभवति 'एकहलादौ पूरयितव्ये'? अस्तीत्याह — उदपानमिति।

[५१.१२] चादिभिर्योग इति। कस्य योगे? युष्मदस्मदोः। ग्रामस्तव च स्वं मम च स्वमिति। यदा तु स्वस्य योगस्तदा भवन्त्येवादेशाः। ग्रामश्च ते स्वम्। नगरं च मे स्वमिति।

[५१.१३] यङि इति वा नित्ये प्राप्ते। 'अचि विभाषा' (पा. ८. २. २१) इत्यत्र 'यङि' इति वर्तते। यङि अचीति। तत्रैवं भवितव्यम्, यत्र यङ्परः अजनन्तरो भवतीति। क च भवतीति? यङ्लुकि निजेगिल इति। अपरे वर्णयन्ति। अवयवलोपे कृते यङि य एकदेशस्तस्मिन्नचीति। ये तु निजेगिल्यते इति वर्णयन्ति तेषामुभयत आश्रयात् अन्तादिवद्भावेऽसति दुर्लभं यङोऽच्परत्वम्।

[५१.१४] प्राप्ते च। न पूर्वविप्रतिषेधो न परविप्रतिषेधः। किं तर्हि? अनुवृत्तिरासु।

[५१.१५] विभाषा विप्रलापे। अव्यक्तवाचामपि च विप्रलापोऽस्ति। विप्रवदन्ति शकुनय इति इष्टानिष्टसूचकत्वात्। व्यक्तवाचामपि संभवति। विप्रवदन्ते

मौहूर्ता इति। प्राप्ते। व्यक्तवाचामिति वर्तते। तेन विप्रवदन्ति शकुनय इति भवितव्यम्।

[५१.१६] विभाषोपपदेन प्रतीयमाने (पा. १. ३. ७७)। संनिधानमुपपदात्मनेपदाभ्यामवद्योत्यते, यथा त्वं (?स्वं) पचसीति। एवं च कृत्वा संदेहे तूपपदमवद्योतकम्। एकान्तेन अप्राप्तविभाषेयम्। उभयत्र। निवृत्तम्, पूर्वविप्रतिषेधश्चेति।

[५१.१७] हृक्रोरन्यतरस्याम्। हरतेः प्रत्यवसानार्थता निमित्तं गत्यर्थता च करोतेरकर्मकत्वम्।

प्रथमस्य प्रथमे पादे षष्ठमाह्निकम्॥

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

Translation

"(Words in the) *svarādi* list and the *nipātas* (are called) *avyaya*" (P. 1. 1. 37).

[1. 1]

Here four ways (are possible) : Either *svar* etc. should be read in the *cādi* list or *ca* etc. should be read in the *svarādi* list. Similarly, either the name *nipāta* alone should be given or the name *avyaya* alone should be given. When one single list is made, only one name should be given, either the name *nipāta* or the name *avyaya*. With regard to *avyaya*, however, this is ascertained : 'Here some *avyaya*-s have action as the main (meaning), while some other *avyaya*-s have the the meaning of a case as the main (meaning). And this meaning has no connection with gender and number'. (The words) *svar* etc. also denote non-substance since they have the meaning of case as the main (meaning). The difference however is this : *svar* etc. are expressive of meaning whereas *ca* etc. are indicative of meaning. Since *svar* etc. absolutely denote non-substance, (the objector) raises a question against the separate listing (of the two classes). However, the reply, namely "Either of *ca* etc. conveying non-substance etc.", seems to be not so strong.

[2. 1]

Now (the objector) asks why only one of the two names is not given : "Now, what is the purpose of the two names ?" After having read (the rule) *prāg rīśvarān nipātāḥ* (P. 1. 4. 56) (the two rules) *svarādi* ... and *taddhitāś cāsarvavibhaktiḥ* (P. 1. 1. 37, 38) should be read and then (the rule) *cādayo 'sattve* (P. 1. 1. 57) (should be read). (The *siddhāntin*) tells many purposes (of the two names) in "The name *pragṛhya* will be wrongly applicable to *svar* etc. also". (For instance, the final) *a* (in the word *kva*) is a *taddhita* (suffix taught) by the rule *kimo't*. In (*kva*+*atra*) there will be (absence of Saṁdhi) caused by (the name) *pragṛhya*.

[2. 2]

(Objection :) (The five words *ca, vā, ha, aha* and *eva* only will be included) in the *cādi* list just as (they are referred to) in (the rule) *cādilope vibhāṣā*. (Reply :) This does not (happen). The statement of negation, namely *anāṅ* 'not *āṅ*', indicates that the four (alone) are not taken (by the word *cādi*.)

[2.3]

"Then (let there be) the name *avyaya* (alone)". Here also the fault (pointed out) earlier continues. If the name *avyaya* alone is to be (given) then the rule should be read as *avyayam ekāj anāṅ* '(the words) containing one vowel are called *avyaya* except *āṅ*'. *Svar* etc. closely follow.

[2.4]

However, the fault which is stated (in words) "That (has to be stated) by means of a longer rule", etc. can be removed. (The *vārttika*) will be read as *avyaye nañkucādīnām* '(the accent) of *nañ*, *ku* and *ca* etc., among *avyayas* (is retained)'. (Objection:) The understanding of only four (words) wrongly obtains. (Reply:) (Really speaking) the enumeration does not serve any purpose, because a prohibition is stated in connection with *ktvā* and (since the words) *snātvākālaka* etc. are directly mentioned (with proper accent), there is no difficulty (of wrong accent).

* * *

'Also (a word ending in a) *taddhita* suffix, which is not used in all cases (is called *avyaya*)' (P. 1. 1. 38).

[1.1]

Is this name *avyaya* (given) to (a word) ending in a *taddhita* suffix or to a *taddhita* suffix alone? It is understood that (The name *avyaya* is given) to the whole (word ending in a *taddhita* suffix). Why? (Because there is the *paribhāṣā*:) When a suffix is mentioned (it denotes) that (word) which begins with that (stem) to which it is added (and ends in that suffix).

[1.2]

(Objection:) Now, the rule that when a suffix is mentioned it stands for that (word) which ends in that (i. e. suffix) is prohibited in a statement of definition. (Reply:) Well, then there is (another) rule regarding the reference to that (word) which ends in that (suffix), which is laid down in (a specific) section in enumerative statement, namely, *prayojanaṁ sarvanāmāvyayasaṁjñāyām* 'the purpose (of the *tadantavidhi* is found) in case of the definitions of *sarvanāman* and *avyaya*'. For instance (the words) *paramoccaiḥ* 'very high' and *paramanīcaiḥ* 'very low' (get the name *avyaya*).

[1.3]

What is the difference between giving the name *avyaya* to the whole (word ending in a *taddhita* suffix) and (giving it) to a part (namely, the

taddhita suffix)? If the name *avyaya* is given to a part (i. e. a *taddhita* suffix) there will be no *luk* ' elision ' (of case ending in the forms) *yatra* ' where ', *tatra* ' there '. For, the case-ending is not added to a suffix.

[1. 4]

The reply is given (as follows :) Here *luk* will be effected on the authority of the statement (of *avyaya*) on the besis of (the simple fact that the case-ending comes) after (the suffix). (However) the statement (of *avyaya*) may be meant for the sake of *akac*. Therefore, there is no difficulty in (stating) *luk* of case-ending after the whole (word) when the name *avyaya* is given to the whole (i. e. the stem and the *taddhita* suffix).

[1. 5]

(Objection :) Now, when the whole is resorted to, how is (the word) *asarvavibhaktiḥ* connected with it ? For, a case-ending is not a cause of the creation of the whole, because wholes are to be inferred, since suffixes alone are prescribed (and not wholes).

[1. 6]

(Reply :) Here also as it is not possible to (refer to) the whole, reference is made to parts (of the whole). (Thus the rule means that) what ends in a *taddhita* suffix is called *avyaya*, provided all the case endings do not form its part. The name (*avyaya* may be given) to the suffix or (to the word) ending in the suffix, it makes no difference.

[2. 1]

" *asarvavibhakti* etc. ". The commentators are at variance on account of the different (ways of giving) constituent analysis. According to some (commentators) the constituent analysis (of the word *asarvavibhakti*) is (as follows) : ' That for the creation of which all the case-endings are not the cause '. However, since a *bahuvrīhi* cannot be (formed) of words like these which are not coreferential, this (constituent analysis) is just an exposition of the meaning (of *asarvavibhakti*), namely, that the case-endings are the cause and the suffix is the result. However, if the words existing (in the compound are alone to be retained in the constituent analysis, it will be as follows :) ' that which does not have all case-endings '. The costituent analysis according to others is this : ' that after which not all case endings (are added) '. (In the view) of these (commentators) also a *bahuvrīhi* is not (possible) in the sense of ablative ' since the earlier (*bahuvrīhi*) is prescribed, according to one alternative, in the sense of the suffix *matup* '. Therefore, (only the meaning) viz. that the *taddhita*

suffix is the cause and case-endings are the result (is understood from that constituent analysis). The ablative is used merely for exposition (of this meaning). (The correct constituent analysis) is however to be understood as follows : that which does not have all case-endings.

[2. 2]

In this case, those who describe (the meaning of the word *asarvavibhakti*) as that for the derivation of which all case endings are not the cause, give counter example as follows : "Why is (the word) *taddhita* (mentioned in the rule)? (The word) *upasarajaḥ* 'born of intercourse' and *mandurajaḥ* 'born in a stable' (are not called *avyaya*)". A case-ending is the cause of the production (addition) of every (suffix) — that suffix which immediately follows (a case-ending) as well as that suffix which is separated (from the case-ending by some intervening element). And this suffix *ḍa* is added by using the locative (by the rule) *saptamyāṁ janer ḍaḥ* '(the suffix) *ḍa* is added to root *jan* when a word in the locative (is an *upapada*)'. But it is not a *taddhita* suffix.

[2. 3]

(The words) *aupagavaḥ* 'offspring of Upagu' and *kāpaṭavaḥ* 'offspring of Kapaṭu' are (mentioned as) counter-examplas of the mention of (the word) *asarvavibhaktiḥ*. (Objection :) How can these be counter-examples? For, even when the word *asarvavibhakti* is mentioned the name *avyaya* does wrongly apply (to these words). How? If it is accepted that *asarvavibhakti* is that suffix in the context of which a case is mentioned by a word, as, for instance, (in rules like) *pratiyoge pañcamyās tasiḥ* (P. 5. 4. 44) and ... *akartari tṛtīyāyāḥ* (46), the suffix is *asarvavibhaktiḥ*. (But the suffix *aṇ* prescribed in the sense *tasyāpatyam* is not *asarvavibhakti*, because) the genitive (*tasya*) in the rule *tasyāpatyam* in the context of *aṇ* is mentioned in the form of meaning and not by a word. (Reply :) (Then) the fault (of application of the name *avyaya* to the suffix *thāl* taught by) this (rule) *prakāravacane thāl* (P. 5. 3. 23) (results). For, there is no case mentioned by a word (in this rule).

[2. 4]

Even if it is argued that this (suffix) *aṇ* is prescribed by referring to all cases, (e. g. in rules) *tasyāpatyam* 'his offspring', *tatra bhavaḥ* 'being there', *tata āgataḥ* 'coming from that' etc., even then it is not possible (to say that *aṇ* is *sarvavibhakti*), because the dative is not referred to. (If you say) that (dative) too is referred to e. g. in the rule : *bhaktād aṇ anyatarasyām* (P. 4. 4. 68) '(the suffix) *aṇ* is optionally added to *bhakta*' for instance, *bhākta* means he to whom boiled rice is given, but then (I say that) since the suffix *iñ*

dākṣi 'an offspring of Dakṣa' is prescribed only in the sense of an offspring, the character (in case of suffixes like *iñ*) of not having all cases (*asarvavibhaktitva*) does not cease.

[2. 5]

In this connection the view of the *vṛttikāra* seems to be that the *taddhita* suffix comes into being after a *prātipadika* 'nominal base'. That word having difference (in respect of case-ending) which is found in the constituent analysis is the finished word; it does not become subject to *vṛtti* 'integration'. Therefore, at the time of derivation, when it is desired to produce a suffix, either a word with a case-ending or a *prātipadika* can be the base (for the suffix), because both, (namely) what ends in a case-ending, and what is a *prātipadika*, are unworthy of usage. In this way the character of having all case-endings is established. The fault (which arises) in this (view) is however pointed out in the *vārttika* only (in case of the *taddhita* forms) *vinā* and *nānā*.

[2. 6]

"In respect of (the word) *asarvavibhakti*" etc. If the meaning 'that for which not all case-endings are a cause' is accepted and (accordingly the word *asarvavibhakti*) is accepted as a *bahuvrīhi*, an additional statement, namely, *avibhakti* (is called *avyaya*) should be made. In what sense is (the word) *avibhaktinimitta* understood? If it is explained as that of which a word in which a case-ending does not exist, namely, a *prātipadika*, is a cause, there will be a fault (of over-application) in connection with *aupagava* and others. Now, (if it is understood as) that for which *avibhakti*, that is, that with an unheard case, is a cause, even then there is a fault (of over-application) in case of *nitya*. For, this (suffix) *tyap* is ordained after (the *upasarga*) *ni*, the case-ending added to which is unheard. (If) *avibhakti* (means) that with regard to which no specific case-ending is mentioned, even then there is a fault (of over-application) in the case of *viśaṅkaṭa* etc. Therefore this (word *avibhaktinimitta*) is not a text (of the rule suggested by the *vārttikakāra*). What then? It is a pointer. To what? To the list. (The words) which are additionally mentioned in the list deserve to be included on this interpretantion of this rule. However, if the other meaning of the rule (is accepted), they need not be added.

[2. 7]

(Objection:) Now, (actual) addition by direct mention in words is called *upasaṁkhyāna*. (Reply:) This fault does not (arise), because (the *vārttikakāra* refers also to listing as *upasaṁkhyāna*. For instance, (he says): "(the word) *kim* should be listed in the *dvyādi* list because of the prohibition (of some suffixes)."

[2.8]

In this connection it can be (asked), 'What is the purpose of the rule when the list exists?' (The reply is that the rule is to be stated) so that (the *avyaya*-s) will be mentioned by both, definition and enumeration.

[2.9]

Or (the statement) *avibhaktinimittasya* is made (even) when the earlier condition (for *avyayasaṁjñā*) exists (so that) an addition will be made of those *avibhaktinimitta* words to which (the name *avyaya*) is not applicable by this rule (although) it is desired. Thus (the *Vārttika*) prescribes (*avyayasaṁjña*) to *vinā, nānā* etc. without resorting to the list. (In the case of the words *vinā, nānā*) the character of being *sarvavibhakti* (having all cases) results (out of the fact that) since the *taddhita* suffix is not enjoined by referring to any specific case. They are produced without any restriction (about case) and after they are produced, restriction (of case) is made. Then (the *avyayasaṁjñā*) is wrongly applicable also to *viśaṁkaṭa* etc. However, the non-application (of *avyayasaṁjñā*) to them is shown in the manner stated earlier.

[2.10]

"Why is (the name *avyaya*) not achieved (for the words *vinā* and *nānā*)?" (The question is asked, because the name *avyaya*) is achieved (for *vinā* and *nānā*) if another meaning of the rule (is accepted).

[2.11]

"Because this (suffix *nā*) is *sarvavibhakti*. What is the reason? (It is stated) without specific mention (of case)." What can be that which is other than *asarvavibhakti*? Either that for the derivation of which all the cases are cause or even that (for the derivation of which) not any (case is a cause) is other than that (i. e. *asarvavibhakti*). Or (it is not *asarvavibhakti*) "Because (it is stated) without specific mention (of case)". They (i. e. other scholars) explain (this as follows) : Since (the *taddhita* suffixes) are stated without referring to a specific case, or since no specific case is added (after these *avyaya*-s) (the suffix) is produced after an *avyaya* ending in any one case (out of seven).

[2.12]

"And an additional statement about *tral* etc. (should be made)". (Here) the word *ādi* should be understood in the sense of kind, because in the *Bhāṣya tasil* also is mentioned.

[2. 13]

"Now these (*tral* etc. are stated) by (referring to) the specific (case)". This is what (he) means : In connection with (nouns) other than *bhavat* only the ablative and the locative are the cause (of addition of *tral* etc.). Another (scholar explains this as follows) : Since (the words ending in *tral* etc.) have been recognised as correct words when (they are) connected with (the words) *bhavat* etc. (they can be described) as *sarvavibhakti* in this context. Therefore, (the name *avyaya*) being not applicable. So (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) says, "(Pāṇini) will say" etc.

[2. 14]

"But if the word without a case (is called *avyaya*)" etc. (The word *avibhakti*) means that after which the case is not heard. (Objection :) If it is like this, the word *rāja* in (compounds) like *rājapuruṣa* would become an *avyaya*. Then why is not the original accent of the earlier constituent (of the compound) retained ? The accent on the final (syllable) of the compound will be (found) in *aluk* compounds like *dāsyāḥputra* 'a whore's son'. (Reply :) This (correct accent in case of *rājapuruṣa* etc.) can be achieved also by (referring to) the enumeration 'among the *avyaya*-s *na*, *ku* and *ca* alone etc. (are accented)".

[2. 15]

(Objection :) This, then (is the fault) : (The words) *dadhi*, *madhu*, etc. (will wrongly be called *avyaya*). (Consequently) the suffix *akac* caused by (the name) will apply (and the form will be) *dadhaki*, while (the form) *dadhika* is desired. (Reply :) Well, then the class of words will be understood. And this whole class (of the formations of *dadhi*) is not without a case. (The word *dadhi*) is also accompanied by a case in other numbers, e. g. *dadhinī* 'two curds', *dadhīni* 'many curds'. And after the whole class of words is understood, the whole class of meaning also will be understood. Thus when the class of words is the same (in case of the two words *iti* and *iti*), (the name) *avyaya* will not be given to (*iti* which means) 'a cart', because there is difference of meaning (between the two *iti* words).

[2. 16]

But how does this fault of mutual interdependence not entail ? (The *siddhāntin*) thinks in this way : In respect of the name *avyaya* the absence of the case-ending is accepted on the basis of the consideration of popular usage. And these (*avyaya*-s) are absolutely devoid of case-endings in usage. Therefore, (we) proceed without referring to the understanding (of *avibhakti*) in grammar.

[2. 17]

"If that which is devoid of a case-ending (is called *avyaya*, this definition) cannot be established due to the fault of interdependence". This fault is pointed out by referring to the understanding (of *avibhakti*) in grammar. For the scince of grammar has laid down (the case-endings) *su* etc. after nominal base without any specific restriction. Just as (the words) *babhru*, *maṇḍu* and *lamaka* not conveying (the meaning 'offspring') are (regarded as) incorrect words while expressing the meaning offspring, in the same manner *vinā*, *nānā* etc. also will be (regarded as incorrect). In this situation it is necessary to formulate the rule *avyayād āpsupaḥ* removing (the case-ending) and stating the correctness of (an *avyaya*) devoid of a case-ending. What (Pāṇini) seeking (a grammatical operation) caused by a suffix (even after the loss of the suffix) means, by stating *luk*, is that the (case-endings) *su* etc. are not produced after *avyaya*-s, i. e. (the case-endings) are not utterred (after *avyaya*-s). (He seeks *pratyayalakṣaṇa*) so that whatever (grammatical features such as) the designation *pada* etc. are found (to obtain) when a suffix follows, should obtain also in the absolute absence of the suffix. Thus (one who wants) to know the state of being devoid of case-endings knows (it) from the science of grammar. Absence of a case-ending (results) after *luk* takes place, while *luk* is connected with the effort (of the *sūtrakāra* in the form of the *sūtra*). (The procedure) characterised by this (situation) is not capable of yielding desired result.

[2. 18]

"Or that which is without gender and without number (is called *avyaya*)". (Objection:) The alternative (stated here) cannot be justified since the earlier (definition of *avyaya* is) not established. (Reply:) There is no fault since a sentence can be connected with another sentence. (This sentence) is thus connected (with the earlier one): If that which is devoid of a case ending (is called *avyaya*, this definition) cannot be accepted due to the fault of mutual interdependence. Or (if) that which is without gender and without number (is called *avyaya*, the remainder is the same, viz. this definition) also cannot be accepted due to the fault of mutual interdependence. If this (connection of the two statements of the *Vārttikakāra*) is accepted, (the defect) 'fault of mutual interdependence' is not averted.

[2. 19]

Or the connection is made in this way: In connection with the statement: *avibhaktiḥ śabdaḥ* "a word devoid of a case-ending" the word *vibhakti* is used in the sense of (the case-endings) *su* etc., or by understanding *vibhakti* as

vibhāga 'separation', it is accepted as conveying difference. And these are (the aspects of) difference of a noun (from other categories), namely gender, number, *karman* etc. Here by referring to the absence of gender and number, (the *kāraka*-s) *karman* etc. are to be understood as discarded. Thus (the word) *avibhakti* (is to be understood) either as that, the case-ending of which is elided, or that, which does not contain a difference.

[2. 20]

Since the meaning is not at all stated in grammar (the *Vārttikakāra*), not perceiving the fault of mutual interdependence, introduces this (definition): "Or that which is without gender and without number is called *avyaya*".

[2. 21]

"In spite of this (new definition) there exists the fault of mutual interdependence". The student knows the meaning sometimes also in the science of grammar. For instance, he understands from the state of being *svaritet* (possessed of *svarita* as *it*) or being *ñit* (possessed of *ñ* as *it*) that the fruit of the action (conveyed by) a certain root is possible for the agent and (the fruit of the action conveyed by) certain another (root is) not (intended for the agent). However, one who is learned, understands (these facts) even without indication, since the *anubandha*-s *svarita* and *ñ* are discarded. This being the case the teacher has mentioned only such roots as have a twofold (fruit). Therefore, this one (i. e. the student) also, knowing (everything) from the science of grammar, understands the character of having gender and number also from the science of grammar. Therefore (Pat.) mentions the fault of interdependence.

[2. 22]

"This character of not having gender or not having number is not enjoined by grammar. What then? It is natural." All (features) are natural, still occasionally something opposite to this is found, for instance, "my (more than two) eyes are worth seeing (beautiful)", "my (more than two) feet are very tender", etc. When effort is made to remove contradiction (by making a direct statement) then (such statement) is called *vācanika* (a scientific statement). However, with reference to that where a contradiction is not found, no effort is made since nothing undesirable is perceived. Therefore, it is stated (in the *Vārttika*), "Or rather (this statement) is not (required) since nothing undesirable is perceived." For, there is no usage of *puruṣarāja* instead of *rājapuruṣa* 'king's man'. Similarly, there is no (usage) of *pacatipra* instead of the use of *prapacati* 'cooks well'. If such is the case with words in which contradiction is found, what to say of meanings? Because of this under-

standing, this character of not having gender or not having number is found (in the usage) without contradiction. This being the case, there is no fault of mutual interdependence.

[2. 23]

" However, (this) is established because of the list ". Since the fault of mutual interdependence persists according to the *Vākyakāra*, (he) introduces the list. Other (scholars) however interpret the word *tu* in the sense of *vā* ' or ' (and interpret the *Vārttika* as) " Or this is established because of the list ". This (solution) according to them is also not possible, because the whole (list is) rejected.

[2. 24]

From *tasil* etc. upto *pāśap*; *yāvāt* and *edhāc* (are called *avyaya*). In the (*svarādi*) list also (these words) are read as follows : The *taddhita* (suffixes) beginning with *tasil*, upto *edhāc*. (The suffixes) beginning with *śas* until the *samāsānta* suffixes. The suffixes beginning with *śas* (which is prescribed) after (a stem) denoting ' much ' or ' less ' upto (the suffix) *ḍāc* (which is prescribed) after *madra* in the sense of shaving. (The suffix) *thāl* (prescribed by the rule) (*pratnapūrva*)*viśvemāt thāl* (*thāl* is added to *pratna*, *pūrva*, *viśva*, and *ima*) is not listed in the *Vārttika*. However, effort is made (to include it, by stating that) the same (suffix) *thāl* which (is prescribed) in the sense of kind in sacred literature, is added to (stems) *pratna* etc. in their own meaning. (The suffix) ending in *m*, (namely) *am* and *ām*. However, in the *Vārttika āmi* is not listed, because (there) the *taddhita*-s are introduced. (The suffixes) conveying the same meaning as (that of) *kṛtvas*, (namely,) *kṛtvasuc*, *suc* and *dhā*; *tasi* and *vati*; *nā* and *nāñ*. Similariy, (the suffix) *tasi* (prescribed in the sense) *tenaikadik* ' in the same direction as that '; (the suffix) *vati* (prescribed by the rule) *tena tulyaṁ kriyā ced vatiḥ* (*vati* is added in the sense ' similar to that ' if the action (is similar)). All these (suffixes) are mentioned (here to point out that) these (should be) listed in the *gaṇa*.

[2. 25]

" Or let it be (as before) ". Having removed (the fault of mutual interdependence) based on meaning (now the *siddhāntin*) removes (the same fault) based on word. For whatever meaning is understood from grammar (is understood also from popular usage). If the use of (words) devoid of a case-ending is established by science of grammar, then those who do not know this science would not have used, as those who know (the science of grammar), (words) devoid of a case-ending. And they do indeed use (words devoid of a case-ending). Therefore,

the name *avyaya* will be applied only after taking resort to the popular understanding and not the understanding from the science of grammar. The same understanding is now being clearly perceived, "And the people are well conversant (with the meanings of 'one' etc.)". (The *siddhāntin*) offers by means of this a justification based on meaning. For people clearly understand the objects possessed of singularity, duality and plurality. In order to show this the following illustration is given : "(They) purchase one bull with one price" etc. This (illustration) is not useful when words are used. Even a fool who is engaged in selling or buying, prceeds the same way. Therefore this (illustration) is meant for explaining decision about meaning. Just as the meanings are decided while dealing with transactions, in the same manner (they are decided) at the time of the use of words. Therfore, at the time of grasping the meanings from them (i. e. words) the objects are certainly ascertained with regard to (their) singularity etc. How is this (true)? Since, even in incorrect usage, (the speaker) does not mention singularity or plurality with confusion in connection with trees etc. (He) uses numerals co-referential (with the objects). Usually (the speaker) does not use words like *nānā* ('many'). It has not been conveyed to him (i. e. ignorant) that the numbers (singular etc.) (are used) to denote singularity etc. Therefore, when it is said that a word without a case-ending is called *avyaya*, it would be proper to state that those with regard to which singularity etc. does not exist are indeed *avibhaktika*.

[2. 26]

"And know that this is reasonable". (In these words) now (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) offers justification. This thing can be understood also by justification. Although the division can be justified, it should be understood as a broad statement. "Some indeclinables have the meaning of case-ending as the main (meaning)". Indeclinables are said to have a two-fold charateristic. There also it should be understood that certain indeclinables convey neither the meaning of a case ending nor action as the main (meaning). ...

[2. 27]

"(The indeclinables) *uccaiḥ* 'up' and *nīcaiḥ* 'down' have the meaning of case-ending as the main (meaning)". It is concluded in the *Bhāṣya* (that both these indeclinables) have the meaning of the locative as the main meaning. Thus it is said : *uccaiḥ kaṭānāṁ sraṣṭā* : "(He is) a maker of mats on a high place". The indeclinable conveys substratum and power is the meaning of the case-ending. And that (meaning) is a non-substance. The absence of connection with gender and number is caused by that (i. e. non-substance).

[2. 28]

" (The indeclinables) *hiruk* and *pṛthak* have action as the main meaning ". Just as (the *upasarga*-s) *pra* etc. indicating only a special feature of action (conveyed by root) have action as the main (meaning), in the same manner (the indeclinables) *hiruk* etc. also are described as *kriyāpradhāna* 'having action as the main (meaning)'. (Objection :) If it is so, the use (of *hiruk* and *pṛthak*) without a word conveying action cannot be justified (in sentences like) *pṛthak devadattaḥ* 'Devadatta (is) separate'. Similarly, (the expression) *pradevadattaḥ* also does not exist. (Reply :) Such usage (i. e. *pṛthak devadattaḥ*) will be (justified) by implying action, just as the usage *niṣkauśāmbi* 'One who has left Kauśāmbī' (can be justified by implying action). If (you argue) that (such implication) is proper in a compound (only), (I say that) implication is found also in non-compounded (expressions). (For instance) the usage *prādeśaṁ prādeśaṁ viparilikhati* '(He) draws the line (by measuring) *prādeśa* after *prādeśa*', which is without the mention of another action, has been mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*. That (i.e. action) is expected by this (word *prādeśa*). (Objection :) If that is the case then the use of (the word conveying) action (along with *pṛthak* in the expression) *pṛthagbhūtaḥ* '(One who) became separated' is unjustified. (Reply :) This fault does not (arise). Just as both (the words) *prapatitaparṇa* and *praparṇa* (both meaning 'that from which leaves have fallen') are used, in the same manner here also (*pṛthagbhūtaḥ* also) will be used. And since another reason is stated, (*avyayas* like *pṛthak*) are always used without giving up connection with the feature of action. Therefore, there is no connection with gender and number. Thus the rule *taddhitaś cāsarvavibhaktiḥ* is rejected (in the *Bhāṣya*).

[2. 29]

Here an objection is raised : How is (the name *avyaya* applicable) to *svar* etc.? If they convey a meaning which is a substance, this (statement of Patañjali, namely) " Here some *avyaya*-s (have action as the main meaning) " is contradicted. And in the case of (a word) which conveys substance, connection with gender and number cannot be avoided. Therefore, *svar* etc. are not included (in the category of *avyaya* which is defined as) 'an *avyaya* is that which is devoid of case-ending'. Similarly, if the word *pīlumūlītaḥ* invariably conveys another object, (it has) the character of conveying a substance. If (it is accepted that it conveys) the meaning of the instrumental, then (the word conveys) non-substance.

[2. 30]

With reference to this, the *svarādi* list which is justified in the *Bhāṣya* as separate from the *cādi* list is pointed out (as a solution). Moreover, (gramma-

rians) describe the (meaning of the) instrumental indicated by another object as the meaning of *tasi* in this (word) *pīlumūlataḥ*, (whereas they describe) the meaning (of *aṇ*) as another object indicated by the meaning of the case-ending (in the word) *pailumūlī*. Just as the injunction *kartari* 'in the sense of agent' applies to both the main and the subordinate agent, for instance, (in the forms) *pacati* 'cooks' and *pācayati* 'makes (somebody) cook', (the same meaning, either as main or as subordinate, is understood from the two expressions, *pailumūlī* and *pīlumūlataḥ*).

[2. 31]

" And too much is being stated now-a-days ". The word *adyatve* 'now-a-days' refers to the present time specified by the formation of the rule. Too much is being stated if this rule is not formulated. While making a statement about number only (the rule) *ekavacanam* 'singular (case-ending is added to a stem)' should be made. (Then the rules) *dvayor dvivacanam* 'dual (case-ending is added) in the sense of duality', *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* 'plural (case-ending is added) in the sense of plurality' (are stated). Thus the (statement of) singular being a general rule, as it is not qualified by any specific meaning and not qualified by any specific number, will be cancelled by (the statements) dual and plural (endings) in the sense of duality and plurality respectively. Therefore (*ekavacana*) will be retained among (the objects) devoid of number as well as among those having singularity.

[2. 32]

(Objection :) Now, (the rule about dual ending and plural ending) is a restriction of (the endings) produced after stems without any specific condition. With reference to this (when it is accepted that) the meaning of a stem is five-fold, there will be no restriction of meaning if restriction of number (is assumed) and there will be no restriction of number if restriction of meaning (is assumed). How then can the cancelling (of singular by dual and plural endings) be justified ? Further, if (it is assumed that) the meaning of a stem is three-fold, the singularity being outside (the meaning of a stem), how can it be conveyed (by the singular ending) ? If (you argue that) even the meaning which is not included (in the stem-meaning) is also understood (from the ending), then (the singular ending) will also be in the sense of duality. Therefore resorting to the view (that the statement of dual and plural endings is a) *paribhāṣā*, this is stated (in the *Bhāṣya*) : " Singular ending is stated as a general rule ".

[2. 33]

It should be understood that the word *dvayoḥ* 'in the sense of two' is present (in that rule) where the word *dvivacana* 'dual ending' is mentioned,

Since the word *dvayoḥ* is present at the time of the statement of the named of *dvivacana*, the statement is like this : '*au*, *bhyām* and *os* are added to a stem (in general) as well as to a stem ending in (suffixes) *ṅī* and *āp* in the sense of two'. Similarly, '*jas* etc. (are added to a stem) in the sense of more than two'. In this interpretation since this (statement of dual and plural endings) is made when singular ending is necessarily applicable, the (two rules about dual and plural endings) can be understood as superseding (the singular ending). And these two (rules about dual and plural endings), being prescribed in specific meanings, are not applicable in the sense of singularity.

[2. 34]

" And the constituent analysis will not be made like this : *asarvā* means not all " etc. 'O, sir! (tell me), is the fault pointed out connected with this constituent analysis : that after which not all cases are produced?' 'No', he says. What then? (The constituent analysis) is stated as 'that for the derivation of which all cases are not a cause'. The fault which results in the rule when this constituent analysis is being made, is pointed out. Now (Patañjali) introduces (an opinion of) another commentator which, being adopted, there would not be any defect in the rule. In which view is that (possible)? Having given up (the constituent analysis) 'not all cases' (this commentator adopts) this (constituent analysis) 'that after which not the whole case (is added)'.

[2. 35]

In this connection this can be said : There are four ways of producing case endings after indeclinables. (One:) (All the case-endings) are added without any specific condition and restriction is stated with reference to those which are added. According to this view (the case-endings) without being dependent upon the meaning are added merely for the sake of *saṁskāra* 'fitness for use'. In this view although the constituent analysis is made as 'not the whole case' even then there is difficulty, because the whole case is already added. Moreover, the rules *nāvyayībhāvād ato'm tv apañcamyāḥ* and *tṛtīyāsaptamyor bahulam* indicate that the whole case is added. Since (the designation *avyaya*) is meant for one purpose common (to all), just as (case-endings are added) to *avyayībhāva*, in the same manner (they should also be added to other) indeclinables.

[2. 36]

Now, even if it is understood in this way, it is possible to bring fitness for use by (adding) any one ending. Then why should (all the endings) *su* etc. and the operations caused by them take place? Moreover, there is no reason for violating the sequence. Therefore, the nominative singular alone (should be

added to an indeclinable). In this case also the constituent analysis will be made in such a way that the (desired meaning) is established.

[2. 37]

Now the purpose of the mention of the word *prātipadika* (in P. 2. 3. 46) is stated. How can the nominative be produced after indeclinables so that the rule *sapūrvāyāḥ prathamāyā vibhāṣā* will be applied ? This is achieved if the constituent analysis ' *na sarvā vibhaktayo 'smāt* ' that after which all case-endings are not produced ' is accepted It is not achieved if (the constituent analysis) ' that after which the whole case is not added ' is accepted. For it is concluded that the whole case is produced (after an indeclinable).

[2. 38]

In this connection that view which is just now stated is accepted. And this is finally stated that the (addition of the) singular ending is a general rule. According to this view all singular endings are added to indeclinables. And the word *sarva* also conveys totality of kind, for instance, (in the expression) ' food of all kinds was eaten ', ' all kinds of feet were seen ' (or ' all kinds of *caraṇa*-texts were seen '). Even after a part (of each whole case) like (the singular ending) *su* or *am* is added, it could be said that all cases are added. Therefore for the comprehension of totality the constituent analysis *asarvā vibhaktiḥ* ' not the whole case ' is accepted.

[2. 39]

And that (statement) which indicates production of all cases (after *avyayībhāva* (merely) suggests the distinctness of *avyayībhāva* just as the statement about *samāhāra* ' bringing together ' in the *samāsa* section and in the the *ekavadbhāva* section suggests the becoming of one single meaning (as a distinct feature). The option prescribed by the rule *sapūrvāyāḥ ... vibhāṣā* should be interpreted as a distributed option. Further, in the case of violation of order also (it can be argued that) in the science of grammar the accusative and not the nominative is first mentioned. Thus there is absence of sequence also in theemployment of (case-endings).

[2. 40]

How is (the word) *upakuñjam* ending in *m* used ? And this (word) should be used (to convey) substance as it has been so described. After (its) correctness is accepted, its usage is sanctioned. However, the specific meaning is understood by the use of the verb-form.

[2. 41]

" Thus understood, the same is applicable also to *kṛt*-s ". If the constituent analysis *na sarvā asarvā* ' not whole ' (is accepted), then only (the rule) *asarvavibhaktiḥ* should be stated. Then this feature of *asarvavibhakti* ' not having the whole case ' also belongs to *kṛt*-s. (Therefore) the rule *kṛnmejantaḥ* need not be stated. " There (the word) *mānta* need not be mentioned ". (The author of the verse) implies (a reference to) the rule by the mention of (the word) *mānta*. " And (the rules) after that (which are) intended (to give *avyayasaṁjñā*) need not be framed ". (The word) *pare* means ' subsequent '. " The three meant for *kṛt* ". This is a reference to *ktvā*, *tosun* and *kasun*. These (three words) meant for *kṛt* should not be referred to by means of *grahaṇa* ' mention '. Then " rules (need not be stated) ". (The rules) *svarādinipātam* etc. (should not be made).

[2. 42]

Now the others explain (the verse as follows) : Other rules need not be framed. In (the word *pare*) the substitution of *śī* (in place of the suffix *jas*) cannot be obtained, since (*para*) does not convey *vyavasthā* ' fixed position '. Some (grammarians) explain (this substitution) as due to (the *Vār.*) *iyāḍiyājīkārāś ca* ' *iyāḍ*, *iyāc* and *ī* (are substituted in the place of case-endings in the Vedic literature) '. The line *trayaḥ kṛdarthāgrahaṇena yogāḥ* (is explained as follows :) *kṛdarthāgrahaṇam* means that cause, due to the presence of which the mention (of some words) for the sake of *kṛt* is not (necessary). (It is that cause) which being resorted to, the non-mention (of words) for the sake of *kṛt* is stated. Which is that cause ? (That cause is) the constituent analysis *na sarvā vibhaktiḥ* ' (that after which) the whole case is not (added) '. Further, *taddhita* need not be mentioned. In this view, just as (the rule) *kṛnmejantaḥ* is not read, in the same manner, for this (very reason) the (other) three rules, namely, *svarādinipātam avyayam*, *ktvātosunkasunaḥ* and *avyayībhāvaś ca* should not be framed.

[2. 43]

Now, this being the case the name *avyaya* is wrongly applicable to those words which are used in a specific number, for instance, *ekaḥ* ' one ', *dvau* ' two ' and *bahavaḥ* ' many ', because they are *asarvavibhakti*. Therefore, for the exclusion of such words even Kuṇi must mention (the word) *taddhita* (in the rule). Since (the name *avyaya*) is not applicable to *ṇamul* etc. even after (the word) *taddhita* is mentioned, (the rule) *kṛnmejantaḥ* has to be stated. And *svar* etc. are neither *kṛt*-s nor *taddhita*-s. (Therefore) now (the author of the verse) says, ' therefore the mention of *svar* etc. should be made '. Even then the fault

(of wrong application of *avyayasaṁjñā*) to *viṁśati* etc. (results). The word *viṁśati* (is used) ending in the singular number (alone) and (it is) a *taddhita* formation. Others explain (the fault as follows) : Even then the fault (of wrong application of *avyayasaṁjñā*) to *varaṇa* etc. (results). The word *varaṇa* is also used in the plural (alone) and (it is) a *taddhita* formation. Similarly, the name *avyaya* wrongly applies to (the word) *ubhaya* since it is never used in the dual. Therefore, (the author of the verse) points out by means of this verse that for this author of *vṛtti* also the *gaṇapāṭha* is more acceptable. (So he says,) " The mention of *kṛt*-s and *taddhita*-s (should be made) ". (It should be made) in the *gaṇapāṭha*. (He means that) the *kṛt*-s and the *taddhita*-s should be mentioned in the list alone. When it (i. e. the list) is (thus made) it is established that the definitions (given by) the *sūtrakāra* and the *vṛttikāra* are (thus) indicated (by) this (list).

[3. 1]

It is stated (by the sentence) : " The name *avyaya* is given by means of the list " that whatever is called *avyaya* should be mentioned in the list. " This (*avyayasaṁjñā*) does not apply to *paramoccaiḥ* ' very high ' and *paramanīcaḥ* ' very low '." There is no possibility of application (of the name *avyaya*) to that which ends (in *sarva* etc. which are called *avyaya*) owing to the absence of express mention, context or force in the rule of definition as well as in the rule of application. Therefore, the name (*avyaya*) should be applicable only to those which are measured as such. " (The *avyayasaṁjñā*) will be applicable by *tadantavidhi* ". (The *avyayasaṁjñā* will be applicable to *tadanta* words) by *tadantavidhi* which is stated in the *upasaṁkhyāna* (*Vār.*), namely, *prayojanaṁ sarvanāmāvyayasaṁjñāyām* ' the purpose (of *tadantavidhi* is served) in *sarvanāmasaṁjñā* and *avyayasaṁjñā* '.

[3. 2]

" Then it (*avyayasaṁjñā*) is applicable here also : *atyuccaiḥ atyuccaisau atyuccaisaḥ* ". How can a compound (be formed) here, since the word *uccaiḥ* primarily conveys location and hence it cannot be connected with *atikramaṇa* ' going beyond ' ? As for example, (in the sentence) *tatra paśya* ' see there ' the location is not connected with (the root) *dṛś*. With what then (is it connected) ? With that which is there. If it is understood that the use of the word *uccaiḥ* is due to the association (of an object) with the location which is high, then it is difficult to obtain the name *avyaya* (for the word *uccaiḥ*). (If you argue that the) statement (of *avyayasaṁjñā* for *uccaiḥ*) is understood as devoid of meaning (condition), just as (it is understood in connection with) *vinā* and *nānā*, (I say,) then the accusative cannot be (added to *uccaiḥ*). And it is stated that *ati* etc. are compounded in the sense of *krānta* ' crossed ' etc. with

(a word ending in) the accusative. Therefore, it is understood that (the object) for which there is an expectancy is understood through purpose or context, just as (in the case of sentences like) ' the white of the Brahmin '. And the view of Saunāgas is not accepted. What then (is accepted) ? (The two *vārttikas*) *siddhaṁ tu kvāṅsvatidurgativacanāt* and *prādayaḥ ktārthe* (are accepted).

[3. 3]

" There will be prohibition (of *avyayasaṁjñā* to *atyuccaiḥ*) by (the rule that *avyayasaṁjñā* is not applicable to a word if it is) subordinate ". (Objection :) How can this prohibition (apply to the word *atyuccaiḥ*) since the collection (of words *ati* and *uccaiḥ*) is not subordinate ? The reply is given (as follows) : It is said that it is *upasarjana* ' subordinate ' because *upasarjana* is its part. This means that *avyayasaṁjñā* is not applicable to that whose part is (an *avyaya* which is) *upasarjana*. (Objection :) " This (statement of) prohibition is read in the context of *sarvanāmasaṁjñā*. " (Reply :) The mark of *svarita* should be attached to that (prohibition). " And that (prohibition) is rejected there ". It is not possible to attach the mark of *svarita* to or to have an expectancy for that which is not mentioned.

[3. 4]

" So that (*avyaya*) should be understood as a significant term ". (Objection :) Now, if it is understood as a significant term, then, being dependent upon meaning, it will not reside in its own form. Consequently, it cannot be a name. Now if it is (regarded) as residing in the form alone irrespective of meaning, then the meaning cannot be obtained. Reply is given (as follows) : There are two kinds of names in the world. (One kind of name is) that which is used because of (some) cause when (that) cause exists, but which does not convey (that) cause. For instance, Śrīkṛṣṇa is a name of Vāsudeva, which is given because of the presence of blackness; but it is not used as conveying its connection with the black (colour). Sometimes the name Kṛṣṇa is given even to a fair (person). In the same manner, this name *avyaya*, which is given (to a word) because of the absence of many changes (of inflection), is used without conveying absence of many changes (of inflection). It is indicated by the making of the larger name, that it is the name of that which does not have many changes (of inflection), and not of that which has many changes (of inflection). And since the word *atyuccaiḥ* changes in many ways (i. e. inflected for various cases), it is not an *avyaya*.

[3. 5]

Or just as in case of the name *prasāraṇa*, (the use of) a specific case indicates repetition (of the name *prasāraṇa*), in the same manner this (defini-

tion of *avyaya*) is introduced as a source sentence. The making of the larger name (*avyaya*) indicates that the statement of application (of *avyayasaṁjñā*) associated with this (source sentence) is (obtained by) repetition. Therefore, it is concluded that the word *avyaya* is being repeated. Or else the making of the larger term (*avyaya*) indicates that the two words (of the same form *avyaya*) have been uttered by means of a single act (of pronunciation) by means of *tantra*.

[3.6]

"An *avyaya* is that which is not declined. In what is it not declined?" Since the locative is used in the verse, here also in the same manner the locative is used. "(It is not declined in) feminine, masculine, and neuter (genders), and in the properties of substance (namely), singularity, duality and plurality". The modifications such as being, appearing and disappearing, which (are found) in an object owing to the activity of the properties such as form, are also understood as being inferred. And absence of declining means expressing meaning through general power owing to the absence of the power to convey specific meaning just as in case of the group of fire (meanings). Since singularity is expressed by the stem, (the suffix) expressing it (i. e. singularity) is not applied, as for instance (in the word) *agnicit* 'one who keeps the sacred fire', because (the aim of conveying singularity) is achieved.

[3.7]

Or, there is neither a power to convey a general meaning nor a power to convey a specific meaning (in words like) *yatra* 'where' and *tatra* 'there'. This same meaning is conveyed by the verse, "the same in the three genders." The sameness is due to resemblance in form which (in turn), is due to accepting (gender and number) in general, or due to the complete absence (of gender and number), or due to abandoning of difference. "And (identical) in all the cases". *Karman* 'object' etc. are understood (here), "And (identical) in all numbers". Here (by the word *vacana*) number is referred to. "That which does not change (its form)" with respect to all these parts of stem "should be understood as an *avyaya*". (Objection:) How (to apply this definition) to *svar* etc. which convey a substance? (Reply:) There also substance is expressed. But it does not have a specific gender or a specific number. It is described as possessing a general number. This much (is true of such a substance, viz. that) it is possessed of number, because the number is identical (with the substance) through (the relation of) identity. It cannot be (asked) whether it is one or two or many.

* * *

" (A word ending in a) *kṛt* suffix which ends in *m* or *ec* (diphthongs) (is called *avyaya*) " (P. 1. 1. 39).

[1. 1]

When the reasons for (accepting) both (the interpretations) are present and when there is a statement showing fault(s) in both, the acceptance of one (meaning) and the absence of another (meaning), then the question (arises) : " How to understand this ? "

[1. 2]

The view (stating the meaning) ' the *kṛt* which ends in *m* ' is justified in this way : If this name is applicable to those *saṁjñin*-s which have not (yet) become names, then the *saṁjñin*-s, not being meant for others and fit for being connected with a qualifier, are connected with (the word) *mec*. So this view proceeds.

[1. 3]

However, if *kṛt*-s are already known as names and appear (in the rule) for explaining another name (i. e. *avyaya*), then in (respect of the application of) *tadantavidhi* (it can be said that the *tadantavidhi* is applicable) to those which have received the status of names, which are subordinate and (yet) which have become substantives through (being) names. *mec* is a qualifier (adjective) of (the word) *kṛdanta*. In this way the view (saying), ' a *kṛdanta* which is *mānta* ' etc. (is justified).

[1. 4]

Here *tadantavidhi* is not impossible by (the *Paribhāṣā*) *saṁjñāvidhau pratyayagrahaṇe* etc. (meaning) ' In a statement of a name a mention of a suffix (does not stand for that which ends in that suffix)'. Why ? Because it is stated that the purpose (of *tadantavidhi* is served) in the definition of *sarvanāman, avyaya* etc. Or because the significant term (*avyayа*) (which means) ' that which does not become modified ' is mentioned. Being declined in many (cases) or being not declined is not possible in the case of suffix alone. Therefore, even in the absence of the mention of *anta* these two (meanings) are found.

[1. 5]

However, those who disregard *tadantavidhi* which is additionally stated and the significant name (*avyaya*), and consider the possibility of this view on (the basis of the) mention of the word *anta* should be asked this : What is achieved ? Connection with *tadantavidhi* (is achieved). Is the name (*avyaya*)

understood for a *kṛt* which ends in *mec*? Or, is *mec* the main and *kṛt* its adjective? If (you say that) connection with *tadantavidhi* is achieved, then that (form) for the sake of which this view is adopted, namely, *kārayāṁcakāra* cannot be justified, because here the *kṛt* suffix does not end in *m*.

[1. 6]

If it is understood that the name *avyaya* is given to *mec* if it is *kṛt*, then the name *avyaya* should be applicable to that which ends in *m* since *m* alone is not attested. But *ec* alone is attested, (for instance, in the form) *dṛśe* 'for the sake of seeing'. (But then the name *avyaya*) will not be applicable to that which ends in that (i. e. *ec*), for instance, to the word *kartave* 'for the sake of doing'. Therefore, the mention of the word *anta* appears to be purposeless.

[1. 7]

However, the purpose of the mention of the word *anta* is described in the Nyāsa as being for the sake of understanding what originally ends in *ec*. So (the *avyayasaṁjñā*) should not be (applicable) to (*kumbhakāre* in the form) *kumbhakārebhyaḥ*.

[1. 8]

Or it is being pointed out by means of a direct mention (of *anta*) that here *kṛt* is the main (word) whereas *mec* is (its) qualifier, while this logically follows from resorting to a desirable relation between adjective and substantive.

[1. 9]

Or this is a source-sentence. The statement connected with application which is based on this should be, however, understood as follows: *m* and *ec* at the end of a *kṛt* is called *avyaya*.

[2. 1]

If it is understood (as follows): a *kṛt* which ends in *m* (is called *avyaya*, then the *avyayasaṁjñā*) will not be (applicable in the form) *kārayāṁcakāra*. For here that which ends in *m* is not a *kṛt* but *lakāra* (is a *kṛt*). Therefore here the name *avyaya* is not applicable. If it is understood (as follows): a *kṛdanta* which ends in *m* (is called *avyaya*), then since this (i. e. the form *kārayām*) is a *kṛdanta* through *pratyayalakṣaṇa*, and since it is directly heard as ending in *m* (the *avyayasaṁjñā* applies to *kārayām*). However, if it is understood in this way (the *avyayasaṁjñā*) wrongly applies to *pratām*, *pratāmau* etc. For this (word *pratām*) also is directly heard as ending in *m* whereas it is a *kṛdanta* on account of (the *kṛt* suffix) *kvip*. Therefore elision

(of the case-ending added to *pratām*) by the rule *avyayād*...etc. (would wrongly apply).

[2.2]

(Objection :) Now, since the removal of the singular ending after *ām* is established by the rule *halṅyāb* ... etc. (P. 6. 1. 68), what is the purpose of (applying the rule *avyayād* ... etc. to effect) elision ? (Reply :) This is the intention : Just as the dual and plural endings (are added to the root *kṛ* which is) attached, according to the different *kāraka*-s, in the same manner (dual and plural endings would be added to) the base of *ām*. The suffix *liṭ* is added to convey two or more agents or objects. Therefore, the dual and plural endings are added also to the form ending in *ām*, for instance, in the forms, *kārayāṁcakratuḥ* and *kārayāṁcakruḥ*. (The addition of) *akac* is not cited as an illustration (of the result of the application of *avyayaśaṁjñā*), because the meaning (of *kārayām* in the form *kārayāṁcakāra*) being incomplete, there is no connection with the meanings *ajñāta* ' unknown ' etc.

[2.3]

" (Elision) of all suffixes is certainly desired ". (He) argues : verily there is not a single *taddhita* suffix, which, being added to *ām*, is dropped. Why ? If it is argued that there are (the *taddhita*) suffixes (added to an *āmanta*) since the meanings such as *kutsā* ' contempt ', *praśaṁsā* ' praise ' and *prakarṣa* ' excess ' are not expressed by the *āmanta* form and that, further, these (*taddhita* suffixes) should be dropped, (the reply to this argument is that) after the elision (of these suffixes) non-expression (of these meanings) remains. If (it is argued that) (the suffixes) added to the attached form (*anuprayoga*) convey (the meanings *kutsā* etc.) of the *āmanta* form, (the reply is) in this case also (the *taddhita* suffixes) need not be added to the *āmanta*.

[2.4]

After having established non-addition (of *taddhita* suffixes after the *āmanta*) through argumentation (Pat.) explains it also by referring to the science of grammar : " Indeed (the elision of all suffixes after the *āmanta*) is desired, because (Pāṇini) says, ' Also, *kṛ* and other roots followed by *liṭ* are attached ' ". The word *ām* is continued there. (Therefore the rule reads) *āmaḥ anuprayujyate* which means that (*kṛ* and others are) attached after *ām*. If (a suffix) *tarap* etc. would be (added to the *āmanta*), *kṛ* and others cannot be attached (immediately) after (the *āmanta*). Therefore, (the *Vārttikakāra* also says that the statement of *anuprayoga* ' attachment is ') ' for the sake of the removal of intervention '. Moreover, if (it is accepted that the case-endings)

su etc. should be dropped, then the number also being expressed (by the case-ending, the suffix conveying) person, voice etc. also is added to the *āmanta* as (it is added) to any other whole stem. But, then, the *anuprayoga* which is adopted in order to express the complete meaning could not be adopted.

[2. 5]

" Since he reads the word *praśān* (in the *svarādi* list)." Here the *avyayasaṁjñā* applies to *praśān*, because the *n*-substitution by the rule *mo no dhātoḥ* (P. 8. 2. 64) is *asiddha* ' not effected '. This form cannot be (derived) from the root *śān* ' to sharpen ', because *san* is always added to it (i. e. *śān*). (Objection :) If *pratyayalakṣaṇa* does not apply here, how about *kārayāṁcakāra* ? (Reply :) It is accepted that the *jñāpaka* ' indication ' is restricted to (the items belonging to) the same class. (The *jñāpaka* therefore states that the name *avyaya*) is not given to a root ending in *m* (by *pratyayalakṣaṇa*, except to the form *praśān*). The feature of being connected with *upasarga* is, however, not included (in the *jñāpaka*), because (it is desired that the name *avyaya*) should not be given to *āptatām* ' one who desires an *āpta* (trustworthy) '. However, in this view (the name *avyaya*) wrongly applies to *lau* ' one who makes (somebody) cut (something) ' which is derived from the root *lāvi*. For it is both, *kṛdanta* and *ejanta* ' ending in *ec* '. This remains a fault (of this view) even when the removal of the objection by referring to the same stem or exclusion by means of the (*pratyayalakṣaṇa*) *paribhāṣā* (is accepted).

[2. 6]

In the case of the removal (of the objection) by referring to a stem not (originally) ending in *i* or *u*, (it can be said that the feature of having a stem ending in *i* or *u*) is possible in the case of *ec*, not in the case of *m*. " *Ādhaye* " : It should be decided in this connection whether the name *avyaya* (is given) or the (substitution of) *ay* etc. is effected after *guṇa* takes place. (The substitution of) *ay* etc. (applies) because of being later, while the name *avyaya* (applies) because of being *antaraṅga* ' inner '. If the name *avyaya* is given, *luk* ' elision ' should take place. And both (the operations) are not obligatory. If *luk* takes place, there will be no *ay* etc. If *ay* etc. take place, the condition for the application of the name *avyaya* being destroyed, there will be no *luk*. *luk* may take place (according to the *Pari.* :) *antaraṅgān api vidhīn bahiraṅgo lug bādhate*, ' *bahiraṅga* ' exterior ' *luk* supercedes even an *antaraṅga* ' interior ' operations.' Therefore, this statement should be made here.

[2. 7]

" *Kumbhakārebhyaḥ* ' for the pot-makers ' ". It is possible there to reject (the application of *avyayasaṁjñā*) (by means of the *Pari.*) *lakṣaṇapratī-*

padoktayoḥ pratipadoktasyaiva, 'Of (the two items obtained by) a rule and direct mention, that which is directly mentioned (should be accepted).' It is stated that that (item) which is always of the same form, directly perceived and *antaraṅga*, should be accepted. This (form, namely, *kumbhakāre*) is, however, to be inferred, not obligatory, and *bahiraṅga*. However, this (argument about rejection) is not stated (by Pat. since he thinks): 'I will discuss purposes of another *Paribhāṣā*'.

[3. 1]

Saṁnipāta, saṁśleṣa, samparka, and *ānantarya* mean one and the some thing. It means a grammatical operation which is characterised by this (i. e. *saṁnipāta*). That is not a cause. Of what? Of its *vighāta*. *tadvighāta* means that which destroys it (*saṁnipāta*). (It means that a grammatical operation characterised by *saṁnipāta*) is not a cause of another operation which destroys it (i. e. the *saṁnipāta*). I will show the destruction only while (discussing) the purposes. (I will show) whatever is being destroyed.

[3. 2]

"Shortening (is not a cause) of the operation of *tuk*, (for instance) *grāmaṇikulam* 'the family of the leader of the village.' The shortening which is dependent on the earlier and the later constituent (of the compound) by (the rule) *iko hrasvo 'ñyo gālavasya* (P. 6. 3. 61) 'according to Gālava an *ik* vowel other than *ñī* at the end of the earlier constituent (of a compound) is shortened when the latter constituent (of the compound) follows', is an operation caused by *saṁnipāta* 'close conjunction'. It cannot be the cause of the destruction of that (close conjunction). What is destroyed here? (The vowel) *ī* which is (one of the) close conjuncts is destroyed by the short (*i* which replaces it). (The augment) *tuk* is not a destroyer of that which is a close conjunct. Of what then? (It is a destroyer) of the close conjunction. The close connection between the earlier and the latter constituent is being destroyed by *tuk*. This (example) can be justified as the purpose (of the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*) if this *tuk* belongs to a part, and if a part of a part is not understood by the mention of the part. If however, a part of a part is (regarded as) a part of the whole, the closeness is not destroyed; therefore (this example) cannot be (cited as) a purpose of this *Paribhāṣā*.

[3. 3]

"Shortening is *bahiraṅga* and *tuk* is *antaraṅga*". Being dependent upon two *pada* shortening is *bahiraṅga*, while *tuk* is *antaraṅga* because it is dependent on one *pada*. (Question:) How to explain (the expression) *grāmaṇikulam* (when it means) 'a family which leads the village'? Here

shortening is not caused by the later constituent. (Reply :) Here also (it can be) justified (that the shortening is) *bahiraṅga*, because shortening is dependent upon the whole (as it is prescribed by the rule) *hrasvo napuṁsake prātidapikasya* ' (the final vowel) of a *prātipadika* is shortened when (it is in) neuter gender ', while *tuk* is dependent upon a letter (and hence, *antaraṅga*). There will be, however, a difficulty in (the expression) *grāmaṇi-chattram* ' the umbrella of the leader of the village ' if the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā* exists. For, here the meaning being ' the umbrella of the leader of the village ', after the shortening is effected, *tuk* caused by *kvip* does not take place. (*Tuk*) caused by *cha* also does not take place because of being conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. Therefore, (the word) would be heard without *tuk* as *grāmaṇichatram*. However, if the *bahiraṅga-paribhāṣā* exists, (*tuk*) caused by *cha* is effected, because of having the same condition.

[3. 4]

" The elision of *n* (cannot be a cause of *tuk* in the form *vṛtrahabhiḥ*) ' by the killers of Vṛtra ' ". Since the elision of *n* which is dependent upon the case-ending and the stem is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*, it cannot be a cause of *tuk*. Now, why does not the elision of *a* followed by *kvip* take place ? It is stated, ' that which ends in *a* at the time of teaching *ārdhadhātuka* (has its *a* dropped when *ārdhadhātuka* follows) '. " The elision of *n* has not been effected ". Here both the kinds of *asiddhatva* ' being not effected ' can be justified : (*asiddhatva* due to the rule) *pūrvatrāsiddham* and the *asiddhatva* due to being *bahiraṅga*. The elision of *n* being dependent upon the case-ending is *bahiraṅga*.

[3. 5]

" (The feature) of having *u* as the penultimate (vowel cannot be the cause) of (the feature of) being *akit* ' not having the *anubandha k* ' (in the form) *nikucita* ' crooked '." The elision of *n* which is (effected) by the rule *amiditām*... (P. 6. 4. 24) is dependent upon the *kit* suffix. The feature of having *u* as the penultimate vowel produced thereafter removes the appellation *kit* of the suffix which is the close conjunct. Therefore, it is understood that by this *Paribhāṣā* (the feature of having *u* as the penultimate vowel) does not become a cause of the appellation *akit*. Here even when (the suffix) is not *kit*, there is no removal of closeness whatsoever.

[3. 6]

" The substitution of *nā* (is not a cause) of lengthening when *yañ* follows (in the form) *amunā* ' by that '." When *nā* is to be substituted the

substitution of *mu* (should be regarded as) *siddha* 'effected'. This purpose (of the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*) is, however, stated by accepting the meaning '(*mu* substitution is) *asiddha* for that (grammatical operation) which applies when *nā* follows'. The substitution of *nā* being effected on the basis of the vowel *u* mentioned in the rule is not the cause of the destruction (of the closeness) since it is conditioned by close conjunction. What is destroyed here since the subsequent close conjunct is already destroyed by the substitution of *nā*? Closeness, however, remains. It is considered as follows : The close conjunct is destroyed by *ā* when lengthening is being effected. Therefore, (the substitution of *nā*) cannot be a cause of the destruction of the form of the earlier close conjunct.

[3. 7]

"The substitution of *mu* is not (*asiddha*) when the substitution of *ṭā* (is to be effected)". (Patañjali) will state that this (i. e. the word *ṭādeśa*) is a compound with all the cases. It stands (as a compound) with all the cases only by resorting to a general relation.

[3. 8]

"The substitution of *ā* (cannot be a cause) of *kittva* (in the form) *upādāsta*". When *luṅ* (is added to root *upa* + *dā*) and when *sic* follows, *guṇa* is effected. Afterwards, the substitution of *ā* (is effected). Following this procedure of derivation the substitution of *ā* (can be described as) conditioned by close conjunction. That substitution of *ā* cannot be a cause of the *kittva* which is closely connected with the name *ghu*. Here also *kittva* (should be understood as) the cause of a specific appellation. And if (*kittva*) is thus effected, the form of the latter conjunct in this example also is destroyed by the rule *hrasvād aṅgāt* (P. 8. 2. 27) 's following a stem ending in a short vowel is dropped when *hal* follows'.

[3. 9]

"The substitution of *tisṛ* and *catasṛ* (cannot be a cause) of the operation of *ṅīp*". Since the substitution (of *tisṛ* or *catasṛ*) is based on (the stems) *tri* and *catur* as well as on the case-ending, it is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. It is not the cause of *ī*. For when *ī* is added, it destroys the closeness of the two conjuncts as well as the form of the earlier conjunct by means of *yaṇ* substitution.

[3. 10]

"Since he (mentions) *na tisṛcatasṛ* (*ṅīp* is not added)". This (example) does not indicate (the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*). Why? This (rule,

namely, *na tisṛcatasṛ*) may be meant for the (words *tri* and *catur*) which are compounds, for instance, (in the expression) *priyatisṛṇām brāhmaṇānām* 'of the brahmins to whom three are dear.' Now, if (you argue) that the statement made there is made in connection with the Vedic literature, (I reply that) these two words *tisṛ* and *catasṛ* are read in the *svasrādi* list.

[3. 11]

"*Śatāni* 'hundreds' and *sahasrāṇi* 'thousands' (are the examples of the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*)". (The augment *num*) which is based on the stem and the *sarvanāmasthāna* suffix is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. After *luk* is effected the form of the latter conjunct which is a cause (of *num*) is destroyed. Therefore the closeness also is destroyed. Since the word *upadeśa* is (to be read in the rule *ṣṇāntā ṣaṭ*), and since the word *ṣṇāntā* is mentioned as containing the word *anta*, this also is not the purpose (of the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*).

[3. 12]

"*Śakaṭau* 'in the cart', *paddhatau* 'on the path' (are the examples of the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*)". (the substitute) *aut* is stated by the rule *ac ca ghe*ḥ. The form of the latter (conjunct) is damaged by that *au*, while that of the former (conjunct is damaged) by *a*-substitution. And (the suffix) *ṭāp* caused by that (i. e. *a* substitution) when effected would destroy the closeness of the stem and the suffix. However, it cannot be destroyed, because a single substitute (in place of two) is treated as a final (part). Now, (it can be argued that the closeness) may be destroyed (for the following reasons): the feature of being treated as final is adopted when a grammatical operation is to take place; and closeness is not a grammatical operation. It is worldly. Therefore, there will be intervention (of *ṭāp*). After *ṭāp* is added and after *yāṭ*- and *am*-substitution take place, an undesired form '*śakaṭāyām* will be derived. However, (the grammarians) describe the purpose of the (mention of *a*) as followed by *t* (i. e. *at*) in the rule *ac ca ghe*ḥ as precisely this, namely, that (*ṭāp*) should not be added.

[3. 13]

"(In the examples) *iyeṣa* and *uvoṣa*, after *guṇa* is effected... *ām* becomes due". Here in the (derivation of the form) *iyeṣa*, after *iyaṅ* is effected, (according to the view) that the *adhikāra dhātoḥ* (continues) up to (the rule prescribing) substitutes for *l*, the substitute for *l* (namely, *ṇal*) is effected because it is *antaraṅga*. And *guṇa* by the rule *puganta*... is effected since it is (taught) later than (the rule prescribing) reduplication. (The resultant) *e* is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. Therefore, it cannot be the cause of the appli-

cation of *ām*. If *ām* is effected the form of the conjunct suffix will be damaged. (Objection :) How is *uvoṣa* introduced as an example, since *ām* is already optionally prescribed by the rule *uṣavidajāgṛbhyaḥ*? (Reply :) (Patañjali) thinks like this : The option serves its purpose when a *kit* suffix follows : (in the forms) *ūṣāṁcakratuḥ* and *ūṣāṁcakruḥ*. However, in the case of this (form, namely, *uvoṣa*), after *guṇa* (which is prescribed) is effected when a *pit* suffix follows, *ām* should apply by another rule. Here also the meaning of *matup* is stated (as follows) : *matup* (is added) in the sense of a permanent connection. Therefore, *ām* is added to that (root) which is permanently possessed of a heavy syllable. Since this (heavy syllable) is not permanent, this (example) is not a purpose (of the *saṁnipātaparibhāṣā*).

[3. 14]

"Its defect is a suffix based on a letter ...". Since the stem alone is the cause of the suffix which is there, how is it established that (the suffix) is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*? (Reply :) (Patañjali) thinks like this : The rule *ata iñ* extends the name *pratyaya* to that which originally exists. Or (the rule *ata iñ* prescribes) that the collection (of the stem and the suffix) is a correct word, or the (suffix itself) is correct when it follows (the stem), or the name (*pratyaya*) which is conditioned by the *saṁnipāta* is correct.

[3. 15]

"The suffix is not conditioned by *saṁnipāta*". This statement means (the following) : the revered teacher considers something as being produced. 'Visualizing (the process of derivation)', which the suffix was not there after the stem, is understood. This view is described in (the *Bhāṣya* on the rule) *paraś ca* (in the following manner) : This is the function of the subsequent (suffix) that it should be subsequent. Moreover, neither correctness nor the name can be the cause of the removal of a letter. The name can be only indirectly the cause. And a cause cannot be like this. Therefore, (Patañjali) says "the suffix is not conditioned by *saṁnipāta*."

[3. 16]

"But then the name *aṅga* should not be the cause". For the name *aṅga* is characterised by the close conjunction of a stem and a suffix. It cannot be the cause of the removal of the letter because the form makes a close conjunct. In this (view), this (statement, that) the suffix based on *a* (cannot be the cause) of the removal of the letter *a* is not justified. Since the name *aṅga* is in general conditioned by *saṁnipāta*, all grammatical operations caused by the name *aṅga* will collapse.

[3. 17]

Some (grammarians) cite (the forms) *adhukṣat* ' milked ', *alikṣat* ' licked ' as the examples (of this *Vār.*). For this (suffix) *kṣa* which is based on the stem ending in *śal* and (the suffix) *cli* which is devoid of *iṭ*, is conditioned by *saṁnipāta* when it is being applied. This cannot be the cause of the substitution of *gha*, *ḍha* and *ku*. The state of being not effected does not exist here, because this *Paribhāṣā* does not have a (specific) place. Its place is the rule of application. Therefore it is impossible to say that its place is earlier. However, the Bhāṣyakāra has accepted the reading of the *Vārttika* as ' the suffix based on the letter *a* ' and has cited *dākṣiḥ* ' descendant of Dakṣa ' as the example.

[3. 18]

" The substitute *ā* (cannot be the cause) of the application of *puk*, for instance, (in the form) *krāpayati* ' makes (somebody) purchase.' (In this form) *ā* is substituted after *vṛddhi* is effected when *ṇi* follows. In this process of derivation the substitution of *ā* is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. It cannot be the cause of *puk*, because the augment *puk* removes the closeness of the two conjuncts. The difficulty is stated considering *puk* as belonging to the part (on the understanding that) *puk* is added to *ā* which is (a part) of the stem.

[3. 19]

" *Adīdapat* ' made (somebody) give '." (Here) the closeness is damaged by *puk*. (*Puk*) should not be the cause (of shortening) since otherwise the earlier conjunct would be destroyed.

[3. 20]

" The substitute *a* (taught by the rule) *tyadādi*...etc. (cannot be the cause) of the application of *ṭāp*." The substitute *a* which is caused by the conjunction of the stem and the case ending should not be the cause of *ṭāp*, because if *ṭāp* is effected the latter conjunct will not exist.

[3. 21]

" *papivān* ' protected '." Here the augment *iṭ* should not be the cause of the removal of the earlier conjunct.

[3. 22]

" *agnimān* ' possessed of fire '." Here the accent of *matup* which is caused by the previous *udātta* accent and the suffix *matup* is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. It cannot be the cause while effecting grave accent of the previous

(syllable) by the rule *anudāttaṁ padam ekavarjam*, because if the grave accent is effected, the hearing (of accent) of the earlier conjunct will be destroyed.

[3. 23]

" *Brāhmaṇi* ' O brahmin woman ! ', *brahmabandhu* ' O hypocrite brahmin woman ! '." Here the shortening, which is being prescribed by the rule *ambārthanadyor hrasvaḥ* when a vocative ending follows, is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. (Therefore) it cannot be the cause of the removal of the later conjunct. " Let (the elision) not (take place) in this way. It will be (effected by the rule) *ṅyantād* etc." (The elision will take place) if the word *dīrgha* is not mentioned in the rule *halṅyāb*...etc. There is no *sthānivadbhāva* since it is prohibited. Thus it is stated (by the *Vārttikakāra*) that when there is a mention of *ṅyāp* (there should be no *sthānivadbhāva* for a substitute which is) not *dīrgha* ' long '. This argument can explain the word *brāhmaṇi* but not the word *brahmabandhu*, because it does not end in *ṅī*. " The elision of the vocative ending is obligatory ". This does not mean the elision which (is prescribed) by mentioning the word *sambuddhi*. What then ? The elision of the vocative ending (prescribed) by any rule. Since both the rules are not obligatory, shortening is effected since (the rule prescribing it) is later. After (shortening is effected) elision does not take place. If (you ask), ' where is the scope (for the elision) ? (I reply that in the forms) *devadatta* ' O Devadatta ! ', *yajñadatta* ' O Yajñadatta ! ' (there is a scope for elision).

[3. 24]

" These faults are equal or even more ". This is a popular saying. In the world when many favours are done (to a person), if (he is) denied one (favour), he says : ' Much harm is caused (to me) '. In the same manner, here also this is said, because the *Pari.* is faulty.

[3. 25]

(Objection :) Now (the form) should be *same* since the word *sama* is read in the *sarvādi* list. If (you argue) that (the form *samāḥ*) is justified on the basis of the *nipātana*, then the mention (of *sama* in the form *samānām*) in the rule *yathāsaṁkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām* would be useless. (Reply :) With respect to this, (grammarians) say this : The word *sama* which is a synonym of the word *sarva* is mentioned in the *sarvādi* list, not (the word *sama*) which means ' equal '. Is the word *sama* which is mentioned in the *sarvādi* list used in the sense of *sarva* ? Yes, it is (used), says he (the *siddhāntin*). Where ? Both in the popular usage and in the Veda. In the popular usage people use (the sentence) ' Now the kingdom equally (belongs to

all)', when there is no king. It means that it is a kingdom of all. In the Veda the use (of the word *sama* is found in the sentence) *mā naḥ samasya dūḍhyaḥ* (ṚV. 8. 75. 9).

This is paraphrased by the author of the *Nirukta* as follows : *mā naḥ sarvasya durdhiyaḥ pāpadhiyaḥ*. According to other (grammarians), however, the definition (of the word *sama*) is (as follows) : ' *sama* means proper '. The word *sama* means ' proper ' or ' lawful ', it is called *sarvanāman*. Here however the word *sama* is not used in the sense ' proper '. Therefore, there is no fault.

[3. 26]

" Therefore there is no use of this *Paribhāṣā* ". What does this mean ? If the faults are many and advantages are few, those (advantages) should be enumerated. The *Paribhāṣā* whose faults have to be tolerated, need not be stated. " It is not (proper to say that) the *Paribhāṣā* should not be stated, (simply) because it has (some) faults ". What he (Pat.) means is this : All statements are defective, accompanied by faults. For instance, when it is said, *sthānivad ādeśaḥ* ' a substitute is like a *sthānin* (substituendum), (it) applies also to *alvidhi* ' a grammatical operation related to a phoneme '. Should then (the rule) not be framed ? (Pāṇini) provides measures against the faults. Moreover, what you think, namely, that the faults are more, is not correct. Why ? " Because, the faults are exhaustively listed. The purposes, however, are mentioned just as (a few) examples ". How ? Here (in the science of grammar) it is stated that *guṇa* takes place when a *sārvadhātuka* or *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows but not when a suffix with the *anubandha k* or *ṅ* follows. Since the rule does apply in (this) specific (situation), it is decided that elsewhere this exception is not applicable. In the same manner this rule (*Pari.*) which serves a number of purposes is a general statement which applies excepting the (places of) faults which have been mentioned. Therefore it is said : " Therefore what are its purposes ... " etc.

[3. 27]

All the purposes have been mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*. The exceptions are not exhaustively enumerated, because there are some more exceptions. For instance, the substitution of *-ya* for *ṅe* is conditioned by *saṁnipāta*. Therefore it may not be the cause of lengthening, because (in that case) the conjunct will assume a different form just as in the case of the form *amunā*.

[3. 28]

" One has to suggest remedies for the defects ". But the remedies are not given. The remedies can be given as follows : If the name *aṅga* is not the

cause (of the grammatical operations stated in the *adhikāra* '*aṅgasya*'), the rules pertaining to *aṅga* will have no scope. Consequently, the name *aṅga* (itself) will be redundant. In case of the form *krāpayati*, since (*puk*) is enjoined after (a root) ending in *ā*, the closeness (between the two conjuncts) is not damaged according to the rule that an augment added to a meaningful item is treated as its part. The shortening in the form *adīdapat* is indicated by the fact that he (i. e. the *sūtrakāra*) ordains *mittva* 'the state of being *mit*' to (the root) *jñā* by (the rule) *māraṇatoṣaṇaniśāmaneṣu jñā* '*jñā* (is *mit* in the senses) "killing" "satisfying" and "seeing". Since the word *upadhā* is continued here, shortening does not take place unless *puk* is effected. This is concluded from the statement *āpjñapyṛdhām īt* '*ī* is substituted (in the place of the vowel) of *āp*, *jñap* and *ṛdh* when *san* follows.' (The words) *yā* and *sā* (are justified) on the basis of (their) mention in the rule *na yāsayoḥ* '(*ik* is) not substituted in place of (*ā* of) *yā* and *sā*'. In the remaining (cases involving) elision of *ā* etc. remedies have to be thought of.

* * *

'Also an *avyayībhāva* compound (is called *avyaya*)' (P. 1. 1. 41).

[1. 1]

There may be the *sūtra* or an enumeration, namely, *kṛnmakārasaṁdhyakṣarānto 'vyayībhāvaś ca* 'a *kṛt* ending in *m* or a diphthong and *avyayībhāva* (are called *avyaya*)'; or (the word *avyayībhāva*) may be (interpreted) as that, which is not an *avyaya*, is treated as an *avyaya* i. e. it is an extension of the feature of that (i. e. *avyaya*); or (*avyaya*) may be (defined) as that, which does not have all cases, or that which does not have gender and number. In any case, "elision, accent on *mukha* and substitution of *s* in the place of *visarjanīya* are the purposes (of giving *avyayasaṁjñā* to *avyayībhāva*)."

[1. 2]

"*Upāgni* 'near the fire', *pratyagni* 'towards the fire'." These two adverbs convey the meaning of a case. Moreover, they express non-substance and since they convey common (gender and number), there is absence of gender and number. The word *pañcan* has no ability to be connected with a specific gender even though it expresses a substance. In words like *dāsyāḥputraḥ* 'son of a maid-servant' the case-ending is not meant for (conveying) number, but it is indicative of censure. (The case-ending) in the words *varṣāsujaḥ* and *goṣucaraḥ* is meant to point out (that they are) names. Here (i. e. in the forms *upāgni*, *pratyagni* etc.), however, when (it is said) '*su* is dropped',

merely fitness (for use) is done (by adding the case-ending); no specific number is understood.

[1. 3]

In the word *upāgnimukha* 'one whose face is near the fire', there will be the Udātta accent on *mukha*. In the word *upapayaskāraḥ* 'one who does near water', *s* will be substituted (in the place of *visarjanīya*). It should be stated that removal of accent and of *s*-substitution is the purpose (of the *avyayasaṁjñā* for the *avyayībhāva*). There is no fault (in saying) that elision, accent on *mukha* and *s*-substitution (are the purpose). He (the *Vārttikakāra*) states that it is the purpose in such a way that the general statement along with on exception is established in the same manner.

[1. 4]

"Is this a complete list or just an example?" (Objection:) If it is just an example, the *Vārttika* itself should not have been made, because all purposes are desired. (Reply:) The intention of asking the question is this: If it is a mere example the *Vārttika* is purposeless. If (it is accepted as) a complete list (of all examples), then the rule is purposeless. For, these purposes can be understood also from indicative statements.

[1. 5]

"He says that it is a complete list". The word refers either to the teacher or to people. "*api khalv apy āhuḥ*" means, "Moreover, they also say thus". By means of this (statement) they justify that it is a complete list. Since the other (grammarian) also rejects (other purposes), these are the only purposes. Or (it should be understood that) the purposes are stated by referring to some form. Other (grammarians) however avoid undesirable (results) directly. The *Bhāṣyakāra* states those purposes which are not discarded by them.

[1. 6]

"O (you), who are reciting loudly!". (Here) since *uccaiḥ* is a *kāraka* of address, treatment as a part of the latter is applicable (to it). It is rejected by saying that it does not apply to indeclinables. Therefore there will be accent on different *padas*. "It (i. e. a different accent) will also be there in (the expression) *upāgny adhīyāna* 'O (you) who are reciting near fire!'" Since the word *upāgni*, meaning 'near fire', conveys the location of study, it is a *kāraka* of the vocative. Therefore, (the treatment as a part of the latter) is prohibited since it is an *avyaya*. It is (however) not desired. There will be

one accent by the treatment as a part of the latter. " Because the word *avyaya* is mentioned in (the rule prescribing) *akac* ". Just as (the meanings) excellence etc. of an *avyaya* are (understood) through the action, in the same manner here also there is a connection with *akac*. Thus the undesirable form **upāgnaki* would be derived. (*upakumbham*) means *upakumbhībhūtam* ' that which has been near a jar '.

[1. 7]

" The behaviour of the teacher indicates ". Here an objection is raised. If the rule is discarded on the basis of this indication, then this (rule, namely) *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ* also should not be framed. It is possible to understand from the negative statement *kṅiti* that there is a (positive) statement. Here what is meant is this : Even after this rule is framed, specific purposes such as elision etc. alone are to be taken note of, and not others such as the prohibition of the treatment as a part of the latter etc. If this is so, they can be achieved through indication also. What is the use of the *sūtra* ?

[1. 8]

" (The word) *anuttarapadasthasya* is continued ". The continuation has to be accepted, of necessity, for the sake of (the forms) *paramapayaḥkumbhaḥ* ' a jar filled with the best milk ' and *gopayaḥkumbhaḥ* ' a jar filled with the milk of a cow '. Therefore, here (in the word) *upapayaḥkāraḥ*, (the *visarjanīya*) will not (change into *s*) since it is in the *uttarapada* ' latter constituent '.

[1. 9]

" A single purpose cannot cause the framing of a rule ". (By a rule is meant) a rule of definition or a rule of interpretation. However, (one single purpose) does cause (the formation of) another (kind of rule, for instance,) *jāgurūkaḥ* ' the suffix *ūka* is added to *jāgṛ* to convey an agent who is habituated, etc.'; *aṇ kuṭilikāyāḥ* ' the suffix *aṇ* is added to the word *kuṭilikā* in the sense, " carries by means of that ".'

[1. 10]

" If this much is the purpose " etc. What is meant is this : While (a grammatical operation) is mentioned in general in a rule, a specific operation is understood through inference. If however (the specific) mention is made along with the operation, there is a direct knowledge. In this connection, since knowledge through inference is a more lengthy (process) than direct knowledge, it should be stated in the section dealing with accent that (the word *mukha* is) not (finally accented in a *bahuvrīhi* if the word comes) after an *avyayībhāva*,

an indeclinable, a word signifying a quarter, the words *go* and *mahat*. But it is not stated like this. Therefore this is also not the purpose. Hence all the commentators have concluded that in words such as *upāgnimukha* there must be accent on *mukha*.

[1. 11]

Others argue (as follows) : The prohibition of accent on *mukha* is the only purpose and it is not stated there (i. e. in the rule dealing with accent). Since it is said, ' one purpose cannot cause framing of a rule ', this (purpose) is achieved (by assuming that) it is possible to ascertain (a word) which is not an *avyaya* as an *avyaya*. In that statement of prohibition which mentions *avyaya*, words signifying direction etc., an operation applicable to an *avyaya* is extended to *avyayībhāva*.

[1. 12]

Now, it is argued in the *Bhāṣya*. " He (Pāṇini) would have mentioned (the word *avyayībhāva*) there (in the rule *nāvyayādik*...etc.) only ". And it is not mentioned. Moreover, this rule is there. Therefore, here another purpose also is to be understood. Which is that (purpose) ? Prohibition of the genitive compound, (for instance,) *devadattasya upakumbham* ' near the jar of Devadatta.' (Here the compound is prohibited by the rule)...*suhitārthasadavyaya* ... etc.

* * *

" (The substitute) *śi* is called *sarvanāmasthāna* " (P. 1. 1. 42).

* * *

" (The suffixes) *su*, *au*, *jas*, *am* and *auṭ* (are called *sarvanāmasthāna*) except when (added to) a neuter stem " (P. 1. 1. 43).

[1. 1]

" If (it is stated that) *śi* is called *sarvanāmasthāna* and *suṭ* (is called *sarvanāmasthāna*) except when (they are added to) a neuter noun, (there will be) prohibition (of *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā*) to *śi* (which comes) in the place of *jas*." If (the rules) are read in this way (as stated above, the above mentioned fault arises). However, if (the rule) is read as *strīpuṁsayoḥ suṭ* ' *suṭ* added to feminine and malsculine nouns (is called *sarvanāmasthāna*), then this fault does not arise. As for the wording *anapuṁsakasya*, it can be interpreted as meaning ' (the *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā*) does not apply to (the suffixes added) to a neuter noun '.

[1. 2]

Now, why is (the rule) *śi sarvanāmasthānam* mentioned (here)? (Reply:) In order to show (the extent of) the topic. For, when (P. 1. 1. 43) is understood thus (i. e. as *prasajyapratiṣedha*), the obtaining (of the name *sarvanāmasthāna* by) *śi sarvanāmasthānam* does not become due. Others explain thus: If *suṭ sarvanāmasthānam* (is read as) an independent sentence (laying down the name *sarvanāmasthāna* separately) just as *śi sarvanāmasthānam* is an independent rule teaching the name *sarvanāmasthāna*, then the defect (results) in the prohibitive rule *anapuṁsakasya*.

[1. 3]

If, in (this *Vār.*) *jasi śipratiṣedhaḥ*, the substratum is understood in the nature of domain, then (*jasaḥ śi*) should be understood as '*śi* regarding *jas*'; or *jasiśi* (be understood) as (the substitute) *śi* of *jas*. The scope (for the name *s*°) given to *śi* as such is *śi* which concerns *śas* (as in): *kuṇḍāni paśya*.

[1. 4]

"Moreover, this (word *anapuṁsakasya*) has to be understood as a compound without semantic connection." A compound with (proper) semantic connection can be there because of direct connection where the action existing in the parts of the compound, which is expressed and understood because of being permanent, and which is inferred when it is not heard as it has naturally disappeared, is indicated by *naÑ*. However, here (i. e. in the compound *anapuṁsakasya*), since the word *napuṁsaka* is not connected with *naÑ* which is connected with (the verb) *bhavati* of which *sarvanāmasthāna* is the agent, (it is said that) this (word *anapuṁsakasya*) has to be understood as a compound without semantic connection.

[1. 5]

And this fault arises since (the word *anapuṁsakasya*) is a compound without semantic connection. Why? Because (*anapuṁsakasya*) is a statement of prohibition. Although in the case of both, the *prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*, there is an inference of non-application, this is the distinction (between the two): In the case of *prasajyapratiṣedha* there is an application (of a rule) preceded by prohibition, whereas in the case of *paryudāsa* one understands prohibition (at the same time, when) one understands the specific (statement).

[1. 6]

And in the case of this expression (namely the word *anapuṁsakasya*) it is possible to imagine that we understand that it is a *paryudāsa* since it is desirable. When it is a *paryudāsa* (the word) *anapuṁsaka* is adopted as meant for indicating another (gender). For the use (of a word) is of two kinds : either in its own form, or by negation of a different form. For instance, (either it is stated) 'Give food to the *kṣatriya*-s, the *viś*-s, and the *śūdras*' or (it is stated) 'Give food to non-Brahmins'. If it is a statement of the first kind, a Brahmin is not fed, since there is absolutely no (word) which refers to a Brahmin. Moreover, where restriction (is stated), there also (the statement) does not apply (to the other object). And here through the absence of *napuṁsaka*, *strī* and *puṁs* are being indicated. Since that which is being indicated is primary, a negation or a statement is connected with it. Therefore (the negation or the statement) is not associated with *napuṁsaka* but with *strī* and *puṁs* which are indicated (by *napuṁsaka*). This is stated (by Patañjali in the sentence), *napuṁsake na vyāpāraḥ*, 'there is no application (of negation or statement) in the case of *napuṁsaka*'.

[1. 7]

"Or because there is non-application (of the negation)". The negation is not applicable (to *napuṁsaka*) on the view (that *anapuṁsakasya*) is a compound without semantic connection. Why? "A statement or a negation is connected with that which is contiguous without intervention". And here contiguity is caused by meaning as well as by wording. How? If (*anapuṁsakasya*) is accepted as a separate negation, namely, *na napuṁsakasya*, then it is not possible to prohibit (the application of) *śi sarvanāmasthānam*. Why? Because of the force of the statement. For, *śi* (exists) in the domain of *napuṁsaka* alone. Therefore this (rule, namely) *suṭ* which is a contiguous statement, is accepted (as connected with the negation). It is not possible to prohibit the application (of the *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā*) to *suṭ* (stated by the rule) *suṭ*, (as well as) to *śi*. What then (is possible)? That (*sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā*) which is applicable by (the rule) *suṭ* (is prohibited by saying that it is) not (given) to (the *suṭ* suffixes added) to a neuter noun. This is stated (by Patañjali in the sentence) "The earlier statement is not prohibited, (the *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā*) will be (applicable) by that (statement).

[1. 8]

"But this application cancels the earlier application". It means that because of *vipratiṣedha* 'mutual opposition' (this statement cancels the earlier

statement). Of which two (rules) does the mutual opposition exist here? Co-existence of names is desired. Therefore mutual opposition (of the two) does not exist. (Mutual opposition) of the two rules is also not possible since (their) function is the same. The giving of name (*sarvanāmasthāna*) is that (one) function. The reply is given (as follows): Mutual opposition of (two *saṁjñā*-s or) two rules, one specified by the mention of prohibition and the other not specified by that (can exist). And because of the mutual opposition there is conflict (between the two). Contradiction involves in the co-existence of those (*saṁjñā*-s), the fruits of which are different from themselves. (The *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā* given to) *śi* finds scope in (the sentence) *kuṇḍāni paśya* 'Look at the pots', while (the *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā* given to) *sut* finds scope (in the words) *rājānau* 'two kings', *rājānaḥ* 'many kings', etc. Both (the rules defining *sarvanāmasthāna*) are applicable here, namely, (in the sentence) *kuṇḍāni tiṣṭhanti* 'Pots stand there.' (The *sarvanāmasthānasaṁjñā*) should be applied by (the rule) *sut* since it is later. Its being later indicates the continuation of the earlier definition. Moreover, the prohibition of the later (definition) also is an indication of non-application. (For example) Devadatta is not born (again) after his killer is killed. "(The statement) being prohibited cannot cancel (another statement)"

* * *

"'Or rather not' is called *vibhāṣā*" (P. 1. 1. 44).

[1]

"In the case of the rule *na veti vibhāṣā* the name (*vibhāṣā*) should be given to the meaning (of the expression *na vā*)." This (rule) cannot be justified in either of the two ways. Since there is absence of meaning and (even if meaning is assumed) the meaning is of the nature of a non-entity, (its) connection with the name (*vibhāṣā*) cannot be justified. The words *na vā* may be understood as two separate words or *na vā* (may be understood) as one word, just like *nakir* and *mākir*. In any case, prohibition or option can be shown with reference to that item, to be prohibited or to be made optional, which is understood from another word. And since here in the rule *na veti vibhāṣā* words conveying prohibition and option are not mentioned, the meaning does not exist at all. To what then should the name be given? Even if the meaning of *asti* be at hand, (*na vā*) would mean 'does not exist' or 'optionally exists' or 'does not optionally exist'. Since the meaning of this type is of the nature of a non-entity, the name cannot be connected with it. For that which is to be named is connected with the name through either genitive or nominative. And that which has become a non-entity cannot become *śeṣa* 'remaining'. Nor can it be referred to as 'this' or as 'that',

[2]

It is not correct to say : "Since there is no object (there can be no connection of *saṁjñā* with *saṁjñin*)." How? The word *navā* which is used in the *sūtra* as an indicator (of some other objects), is used along with a word conveying substance or a word conveying action. Further, a word conveying an action conveys either a subordinate action or a main action. In the case of the connection (of the word *navā*) with a word conveying substance there is neither prohibition nor option. Why? When the words conveying substance are used, they produce that knowledge which has assumed the form of the substance. That object either exists or does not exist. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible either to prohibit or to make optional the form of such an object.

[3]

That object alone, which is a predicate, can be either negated or made optional. Which is that (object)? (It is) an action, existence or a noun closely connected (with the action) in the use of a word conveying action (?).

[4]

(Question :) How (to explain) *apācakaḥ* 'non-cook'? (Reply :) In this case some (scholars) think that *nañ* is construed with the root *pac*. However, others think that (*nañ*) indicates natural absence of the particular existence of the agent of the action of cooking.

[5]

(Question :) How (to explain) *na pacati* 'does not cook'? Here also some (scholars) accept the action of cooking as a specific kind of existence. However, others think that since the relation of *sādhya* 'to be accomplished' and *sādhana* 'means of accomplishing' is not found between *pacati* 'cooks' and *bhavati* 'is', *nañ* negates the very connection of the action of cooking with existence.

[6]

For example, there are two different views regarding (the interpretation of the expression) *mātuḥ smarati* 'he remembers (his) mother'. Some (scholars) think that this nature of being *śeṣa* 'remaining' (which resides) in (the action of) remembering the mother is connected through an intermediate action just as (the nature of being *śeṣa* in constructions like) *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* 'king's servant' or *vṛkṣasya śākhā* 'a branch of a tree' (is connected through the actions of) giving and remaining respectively. This act of remembering also (is connected through an action). Since remembrance is about mother, it

takes place or remains there (i. e. in respect of mother). Therefore, taking place or remaining (of memory in respect of mother) is the cause of (being) *śeṣa*. There remembrance is not intended as *sādhya* 'to be accomplished' although it is (in fact) *sādhya*. Being looked upon from the beginning as a *sambandhin* 'related', it becomes a cause for (the use of) the genitive. When it is intended as *sādhya* then the accusative is added (as for instance,) *mātaraṁ smarati* '(he) remembers (his) mother'. Just as (there are two constructions), *vṛkṣasya phalaṁ*, 'a fruit of the tree' and *vṛkṣāt phalaṁ patati* 'a fruit falls down from a tree', (in the same manner, there are two constructions, namely, *mātuḥ smarati* and *mātaraṁ smarati*).

[7]

The view of others (is as follows): In the absence of another action, the action of remembering alone is the cause of (the relation of) *śeṣa*. For, an action can, either as *sādhya* 'to be accomplished' or as *sambandhin* 'related', have expectancy for a substance.

[8]

(It is) proper (to accept that there is) absence of mutual interaction among substances, since relation is (always) through an action. Therefore the word *navā* is meaningful.

[9]

It is said that there is no connection (of *na vā* with the name *vibhāṣā*) because of its being a non-entity. In this connection we say that the connection of the name with the action (implied by *navā*) is proper, because substance is understood at the time of giving a name. When a meaning accepted as helping (in conveying another meaning) is ultimately grasped as a form of an object, then being referred to by a pronoun it can be connected with the statement (of the rule). For instance, just as (in the construction) 'son of one who cooks' (a non substance is understood as a substance), in the same manner, this meaning is of the form of a substance. Thus here the meaning of *naÑ* as well as the meaning of *vā* comprehended by a pronoun at the time of (their) connection with the name (*vibhāṣā*) has become a substance. However, after the employment of words (in this way) is accepted, (the meaning of *na* and *vā*) is of the form of non-substance in the rules of application. Thus the connection (of the name *vibhāṣā* with the words *na* and *vā*) is proper (when the meaning is as follows): the name *vibhāṣā* should be understood as referring to that which is the meaning of (the expression) *na bhavati* (does not take place) and of (the expression) *vā bhavati* (takes place optionally).

[10]

How can one and the same object be both, a substance and a non-substance? In this connection some (scholars) have concluded that each object consists of all powers. They think that words referring to a specific aspect of the object specify that respective power. However, others (think that) no object exists, it is the words which, being used, produce the illusion of an object. And the power to produce (a specific meaning) is restricted (to constructions) like *gaccha, hanyate kaṁsaḥ* 'Go, Kaṁsa is being killed'. One says, *pacati* '(he) cooks', while another one producing the relation of the subordinate uses (the expression) *pacateḥ kartā* 'agent of the action of cooking' and yet another one (says), *pācakaḥ* 'a cook'. (In all these expressions) the content is the same. However, (a meaning) of the form *karaṇa* 'the most instrumental factor' etc. for instance, (in sentence like) *dātreṇa lunāti* '(he) cuts with a sickle', *grāmād āgacchati* '(he) comes from a village' and *brāhmaṇāya dadāti* '(he) gives (something) to a brahmin' is not (conveyed in different expressions).

[11]

Since the name *prātipadika* is prohibited to groups of meaningful (words), what kind of expression is this: *navetivibhāṣāyām*? Reply is given (as follows:) Since (the whole expression) is an imitation (of the words *na vā iti vibhāṣāyām*), it is a *prātipadika*. Therefore, it is not a group of meaningful words; it is one word having its own (form) as its meaning. (Objection): The prohibition of the name *prātipadika* according to the *Paribhāṣā* '*prakṛtivad anukaraṇaṁ bhavati*', 'an imitation is (to be treated) as the original', wrongly applies. (Reply:) This difficulty does not arise. For it is possible to prohibit that name (*prātipadika*) which is obtained by extension (to the imitation) from the original. However, that (name *prātipadika*) which is based on the (imitative) word itself cannot be prohibited. (Objection:) Even then there would be no application of *yāṭ* and *ām*, because (the imitation) does not end in *ṭāp*, as *āp* is not prescribed after a group (of meaningful words). (Reply:) This fault also does not arise. For, an *ābanta* is said to be that, at the end of which *āp* is heard. Moreover, (the application of the) '*pratyayagrahaṇa*' *Paribhāṣā* is prohibited (in the case of feminine suffixes by the statement) *astrīpratyayena* 'except with a feminine suffix.' It is like this. Or else it will be explained (as follows): *arthasaṁjñākaraṇam* 'giving a name to the meaning' is said in connection with (that name) *vibhāṣā* which (is stated) by resorting to the utterance *na vā*.

[12]

"What is the purpose?" He asks: "What purpose is intended by you in this case?" "Understanding of the word." Or (this means that) the purpose is stated negatively by referring to the opposite. "As elsewhere." Two reasons are implicit in this illustration. For, elsewhere at the time of giving a name the meaning is not heard (i. e. understood). For instance, in order to exclude *dāś* etc. the word *dādhā* is understood as a *saṁjñin* which, being unconnected with its (usual) meaning, is not engaged in conveying that meaning. And in the rule of application the (phonetic) form of *dā* and *dhā* is understood. It is not correct (to argue that) when a word is being understood its meaning also is contiguous, because it is to be inferred. Therefore, neither at the time of giving the name nor at the time of application there is (even a slight) contact with the meaning. Similarly, in this case also, since the meaning is not present and since it is to be inferred, it is not correct (to say that) meaning is understood. This is stated (by the expression) *yathānyatra*. Therefore in the rules of application of (the name) *vibhāṣā* the word *navā* will be substituted even though there is a reference in the nominative as (in the expression) *virāga viraṅgaṁ ca* '*virāga* becomes *viraṅga*'.

[13]

"Then that should be made". (This means) the making of *arthasaṁjñā* (should be made). Making specifically (something) is an object of making in general. Or else (it should be understood as) the rule by which a name is given to meaning should be made. "The mention of *iti* is for the sake of reference to meaning". Mention of *iti* is made. *Karaṇa* means that which is made. (The compound) *itikaraṇa* (is dissolved as) *itiś cāsau karaṇaś ca* '*iti* which is made'. Here also the relation between *sādhya* 'that which is to be accomplished' and *sādhana* 'means of accomplishing' (is to be understood) from the relation between the general and the specific.

[14]

"Is this (meaning) understood from *iti*, or is the additional meaning due to the additional word?" This is what is said: Should we accept (this meaning) without any reasoning, just because you have uttered *iti* which is just like the cawing of a crow? Another way (of explaining this is as follows): This is a Smṛti treatise. Just as in the world (people) are reminded of a measure by a lump of clay because of popular usage, in the same manner here the indeclinable *iti* is the cause of remembering (the additional meaning). For instance, the word *tu* is used as an indicator of the use of (a word in) opposite gender (in the usages like) *bahuguḍo drākṣā* 'grapes are slightly less sweet than molasses'.

[15]

"(He) says, '(It) is understood'." *gatam* means *pratītam* 'understood' or *upasaṁgṛhītam* 'gathered'. "How?" (This means,) whether (the meaning is understood) due to popular usage or or due to a grammatical rule. Some meanings are understood from grammar. For instance, (the knowledge) that the sounds *ā*, *ai* and *au* are (called) *vṛddhi* is obtained from grammar alone. (The meanings like) animal, offspring and deity (are understood) from popular usage. Or, (the word) *kutaḥ* means, *kuto hetoḥ* or *kuto nimittāt* 'for what rebson?' Since (the meaning is) not defined in grammar, (Pat.) resorts to popular usage in "from popular usage".

[16]

"Just as in popular usage (one says), 'he says '*gauḥ*'. The word *iti*, uttered after the word *go* ...". (Here) *gośabda* means (the word *gauḥ*) of which the word *go* is the stem, because the word *iti* is used after (a word which is) not a *prātipadika* 'nominal base'.

[17]

(Objection:) How is (the word *gauḥ*) totally disconnected with (its own) meaning when (it is said that) the relation between the word and meaning, as well as the word and the meaning (themselves) are permanent? Now, some words are resting in their own form while the others are resting in their meaning. And absoulte departure from meaning cannot be explained.

[18]

(Reply:) In this connection the practice is laid down (as follows): A word is devoid of expectancy after having conveyed its own meaning. The act (of uttering a word) is a means of understanding (the meaning). A word once uttered is not used many times. Therefore, it is not proper to say, "(A word) conveys this (meaning) after having conveyed that (meaning)". There is no denotation of meaning collectively, since a collection (of meanings) rests in many words. A collection is, (for instance,) *plakṣaś ca nyagrodhaś ca* '*plakṣa* and *nyagrodha*', (or) *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca* '(one) tree and (another) tree'. Option also is not possible, because there is no understanding of (many) meanings through repetition of a word. Therefore, according to a *saṁsargavādin*, knowledge arises, resting in meanings accompanied by all special features. When a specific word is uttered, knowledge with (that) specific form arises and (the listener) sorts out the possible meanings contained (in that word) just as one would, after tasting a juice, separate (ingredients like) molasses, (saying) 'It is this, it is that'. And one who sorts out (meanings) after having

obtained (knowledge) of this kind, first comprehends generic features, because the knowledge of the qualified (meaning) is not possible without the qualifier. However, another (listener) first comprehends the individual object because (a meaning) which stands without a resting place cannot be understood.

[19]

Similarly here also (it) is not (that in the case of the word *vibhāṣā*) first the word-form and then the meaning (is understood). But, just as the vowels *ā*, *ai* and *au* which, having been taught as having the form of *vṛddhi* and having transformed themselves into that form, have the same aim and function (as that of *vṛddhi*) because of the relation of identity, are mentioned in the form '*vṛddhi*' (in rules like) *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ*, in the same manner, in the world also the word *go* is the same as the object (i. e. a cow). Therefore the word *go* conveys the object which is transformed into (the word) *go*. Therefore, when the word *go* alone is used, it makes no difference whether it is identical with the meaning (lit. imposed on the object) or not. When the word *iti* is used, it manifests that use (of the word *go*) in which it is not imposed on the object. There its meaning is not transformed into the word-form. This is what is known as the falling away (of a meaning).

[20]

(Objection:) If this is so, how (do you say that) (mention) is made of *iti* after the word *navā*? For here the word (*navā*) conveys its own form not because it has no connection with meaning (but because of something else). (Reply:) This is, indeed, correct. However, when the relation between the word and its meaning is understood, (the knowledge that) that which is the meaning is identical with the word *navā* sometimes results. The word *iti* which is used cuts off the non-separation of the meaning of *navā* from the word (*navā*). This is how they explain (the falling away of meaning). Others explain (it as follows): Of the word and the meaning sometimes the word is mainly understood while the meaning is secondarily (understood), or (sometimes) the meaning is mainly understood while the word is secondarily (understood). The word *iti* causes reversion of the relation of main and subordonate. This is (what is described as) the falling away (of meaning.) Or, one and the same word is filled with all powers. Its power is delimited by (the word) *iti*. This is (what is described as) the falling away. Or, according to others, words (conveying different meanings) are different. But because of the identical form they become a cause in producing the knowledge of sameness (of the form): That is the same as this. Therefore, the word *go* which is used to convey the meaning (i. e. cow) is different from this word *go* (which conveys the word-form). The falling away (of meaning)

cannot be justified on this view. Or, it is possible (to say) that just as letters (are) meaningless, words (in a sentence) also are meaningless. Thus the meaning is understood from the sentence, *gaur ity ayam āha*, 'He says "*gauḥ*"'. If the collection (of words, i. e. the sentence) is meaningful, how can the word *go* have the word-form as its meaning? There is thus absence of the falling away (of meaning). However, since it is well-known that words have meanings in the usage, (it is regarded) in grammar that the *iti* words are indicative of reversion (of meaning). Thus (the statement) stands: ("the mention) is made of *iti* in order to point at the meaning".

[21]

(Question:) What sort of expression is this, namely, *yāsāv arthapadārthakatā* ... etc.? (Reply:) *Arthapadārthakatā* is said to be a relation. This (word i. e. *navā*) falling away from relation naturally falls away from meaning also. Moreover, since this meaning is adopted because of the relation, it is proper to adopt that which is the cause of conveying the meaning.

[22]

"Prohibition in respect of (the meanings) having the same word (should be stated)." The meanings, of which the same word is the conveyor, are *samānaśabda*. Prohibition of being *saṁjñin* should be stated in respect of those meanings which are *samānaśabda*. For the word *navā* conveys many meanings. If the cause for the use (of the word *navā*) specified by prohibition and option is not accepted, the name (*vibhāṣā*) will have to be given to all the meanings denoted by the word *navā*. And if the specific (meaning) is accepted there is a doubt as to why this specific (meaning) and not the other one (is accepted). Thus (there will be) either the contingency of all (meanings getting the name *vibhāṣā*) or doubt (regarding which of the meanings should be accepted). Therefore, prohibition of (meanings) having the same (conveyor) word is insisted on. (In the expressions) *navā kuṇḍikā*, *navā ghaṭikā*, the power (of *navā*) to express newness is indicated. And it is proper that (the name *vibhāṣā*) should be given to that (word *navā*) alone which conveys (the meaning) 'new', because in the case of (the meanings) prohibition and option another sentence is to be inferred after the words *na vā* forming part of the sentence (in which they are used) are heard, whereas (the meaning) new is directly expressed.

[23]

"What would happen?" For, the name is not a grammatical process (for deriving a form). What then? The operation caused by it (i. e.

the name) is a grammatical process. (For example) " *Vibhāṣā diksamāse bahuvrīhau* " ' the name *sarvanāman* is optionally given to *sarva* etc. when they occur in a *bahuvrīhi* compound which denotes a direction '. Since *sarva* etc. are words, and since being new or old is not a property of a word, how is this (rule) mentioned (as an illustration) ? And being new or old is not possible with reference to the name *sarvanāman*. Moreover, (the compound) *dakṣiṇa-pūrvā* ' a direction between south and east ' is a name of a direction. And it is absolutely impossible for it to be new or old. In the rule *vibhāṣā diksamāse* ... etc. the meaning ' new ' is present by this (word *vibhāṣā*). Therefore it will follow that the name *sarvanāman* is given to that which conveys the meaning ' new '. And when (a word for) a direction is used to convey a part (of a region, e. g. in a sentence like) " this is from that ", then the same meaning (i. e. part) conveys limit, (e. g.), *pūrvo vṛkṣo grāmāt* ' the tree is to the east of the village.' In the same way when (a word for) the intermediate region (between two quarters, i. e. a sub-quarter) is used to convey part, then the house or any other thing which is looked upon as belonging to that intermediate region can be (described) as new or old. Thus it is understood from the interpretation that newness is suggested by (suffixes) *smai* etc. just as it is understood that it is suggested by the sound of a leaf of a tree that it is (fallen on a) good ground.

[24]

" Or rather (the prohibition need) not (be stated), because a prohibition is understood if a (positive) statement precedes, just as in popular usage ". After the meaning of a word is restricted by means of purpose, content etc. (that word) is found to be (used) in a specific (meaning). (For instance, when it is said) *saindhavam ānaya* ' bring *saindhava* ', (the word *saindhava*) is found to be (used) in the sense of salt in the context of meal, whereas (it) is found to be (used) in the sense of a horse in the context of hunting. In the same manner since here the name is stated with respect to the rules of application, it is proper to accept that meaning of the word *navā* which is (suitable) in the rules of application. The (use of the) word *vibhāṣā* in the rules of application is preceded by a statement. Therefore (the word *navā*) will mean prohibition alone and it will not mean ' new ' because a (positive) statement is either introduced or understood. In the world also when the word *navā* is used after a topic is introduced, it means prohibition alone and it does not mean ' new '. Therefore the illustration is introduced.

[25]

The other (disputant) points out a fallacy in the illustration. " There is a reason why in the world (the word *navā* conveys negation)." " You

mention (the word *navā*) in a different gender." *Viliṅga* means *vyadhikaraṇa* 'having a different location'. The negation is understood only because of the mention (of the word *navā*) having a different location and not because of the precedence of the (positive) statement. (He) justifies this point (as follows): "Well, sir, you may mention (the word *navā*) in the same gender (i. e. location)." "But we do not know whether anywhere in grammar (the word *navā* is used in the same gender)." Nowhere in the grammar is (the word *navā*) mentioned as having the same location. For instance, (in the rule) *vibhāṣā senāsurācchāyāśālāniśānām* the mention (of *navā*) may be in the same gender, but it is not in the same case. Therefore, in grammar, in the rules where *vibhāṣā* is used it is not at all possible to understand the same location or a different location from the connection of the word. When, however, it is imagined in connection with *dakṣiṇapūrva* etc. through some human effort, then the word *navā* may or may nor be understood through the connection of the word, as conveying negation, but not as conveying (the meaning) 'new'. This is explained in this way: "Moreover, there is freedom of action."

[26]

By this (argument Patañjali) shows fallacy in the earlier statement, namely, in "There is a reason" etc. (Since the word *navā* is) understood as conveying negation even when it is mentioned in the same gender, it is incorrect to say "You mention the word *navā* in a different gender". When the word *navā* being used (in a sentence) is connected with the predicate, then it conveys negation since it is not at all connected with a substance. However, when it is coreferential with (a word) conveying a substance, it certainly conveys (the meaning) 'new.' It is not possible to say that the same (word) is both, with a gender and without a gender. And when it is well known about the followers of the Taittirīrya that (they say that) '(he) always eats very hot, fresh gruel ...' the word *navā* cannot mean new, so it is understood as conveying negation alone. However, when eating of gruel is for the first time prescribed for him for whom it is not already prescribed, then (the word *navā*) is correctly understood in the sense 'new' since it is purposeless to understand it as conveying negation. "There is option for the user." Here in the science of grammar, however, even if option is there, there would be no problem. Since the user proceeds with a uniform intention, it is also not (correct to say that) sometimes (the word *navā* is understood as) conveying (the meaning) 'new'.

[27]

(He) justifies this (by saying): 'And here (we) do not (connect the word *sarvādini*) with the word *vibhāṣā*". Why? Since the mention of

the name is the main (in the rule, the verb form) *bhavati* which is the taken as a predicate is the main (component of the statement) while the other (words) are subordinate to it. The word *vibhāṣā* cannot abandon the predicate which is the main and connect itself with *sarvādi*-s which are subordinate to it. Thus the meaning 'new' is not accepted for the same reason (which is stated) earlier (as follows): "Or, (the statement) is not (necessary), because the prohibition is understood since it is preceded by a (positive) statement".

[28]

"Unobligatoriness of the rule cannot be justified, because the name is given to prohibition". The words *na* and *vā* in the rule are a single particle like *nakir* and *mākir*. And this (particle) conveys negation just as in the sentence (i. e. *Vār.*) uttered just next for prohibition, namely, *navā vidhipūrvakatvāt*. Therefore, in the rule *vibhāṣā śveḥ* (P. 6. 1. 30) *vibhāṣā* is a name of negation which is the meaning of (the particle) *navā*. Under these circumstances, the forms *śuśāva*, *śuśuvatuḥ* etc. cannot be derived.

[29]

"(This) is achieved by making a statement of negation after the application". In the popular usage also negation after application is found (for instance, in the sentence): "You may go to the village or you may not". The statement of negation does not proceed without that which is being negated. Therefore, the statement of application is inferred from the very statement of negation. "However, this is contradictory". (Pāṇini says) "*vibhāṣā śveḥ*" having one form (of root *śvi*) in mind and this is a form of root *śvi*. Therefore, a statement about the same form, namely, that it is (derived) and it is not derived is contradictory. (Patañjali) tells this (in the following sentence): "It is not understood with what intention (Pāṇini applies the rule and prohibits it)".

[30]

The other (disputant) says that since the authority of the Teacher has been recognized, (the rule) *vibhāṣā śveḥ* should be understood (as follows): There are many *śvi* roots closely connected with the forms in usage which are mentioned in this form (namely, *śvi*). Of these a certain form exists with the absence of *samprasāraṇa* (in it), whereas another (form exists with *samprasāraṇa*) effected (in it). Just as by accepting many roots (of the same form) application (of a certain rule) may be shown in (the form of) some (roots), whereas prohibition (of the same rule may be shown) in (the forms of) some other (roots), in the same manner (here) also (both application and rejection of *samprasāraṇa* may be shown by resorting to different forms).

Why ? Because both application and rejection (of a grammatical operation) in one and the same (form) involve absolute self-contradiction. Thus (the rule about) *vibhāṣā* with reference to the root *ūrṇu* (may be explained as follows) : Many *ūrṇu* roots as well as many suffixes beginning with *iṭ* should be understood or the collections (of both). (The *Vārttikakāra*) states this in this way : " Or this (difficulty does) not (arise) on the basis of the possibility of application (in the forms) other than (those which are) subject to prohibition ".

[31]

" This thing — where is this achieved ?" In case of the that *vibhāṣā* which (is stated) with reference to (a certain grammatical operation) which is not already applicable, it is proper (to accept that) prohibition is meant for option, because (in that case) both application and prohibition do not then serve any purpose. For, application has a common domain (with the prohibition). (However) in connection with that *vibhāṣā* which (is stated) with reference to (a grammatical operation) which is already applicable, the statement (of application exists) earlier. Since it is generally applicable, it has already found scope. (However) its supersession, by inference of non-application of that (grammatical operation) in specific cases, does become due. Therefore there is no option. In connection with this it is argued (as follows) : If absolute prohibition is applicable in *prāptavibhāṣā* rules, then the term *vibhāṣā* in the rule *vibhāṣā diksamāse* would convey prohibition which is the meaning of the word *navā*. Therefore, (the rule) should be stated merely as *bahuvrīhau*. It is not necessary to mention the prohibition as *na bahuvrīhau*. The word *vibhāṣā* itself will be continued in that (rule). Similarly, in the case of (the rule) *vibhāṣā vipralāpe* the statement (of *ātmanepada*) which has served its purpose in (the rule) *vyaktavācām samuccāraṇe* would be cancelled in (the context of) *vipralāpa*.

[32]

" The long name *vibhāṣā* is given ". Long names are meaningful elsewhere. Here the length is not the means of inference of meaningfulness. What then ? Of separateness of *saṁjñins* only. This (word i. e. *navā*) is not a single particle. They are two particles. And this (word *vibhāṣā*) is a name of both the meanings namely prohibition and option. These two *saṁjñins* are not directly expressed by the word *vibhāṣā*. What then ? (They are) just the cause for the use (of the word *vibhāṣā*). In this connection, just this has to be considered : whether this name (*vibhāṣā*) is given to prohibition and option separately, like the name *vṛddhi*, or (whether it is given to both the meanings) together like the name *saṁyoga*. If (the name is given to both) separately, the

prohibition and option need not be applied in one place. Therefore, just as *vṛddhi* means the letter *ā* at some place and the letter *au* at others, in the same manner (*vibhāṣā*) may (convey) prohibition at some place and option at others. And the successive order of (the application of) prohibition first and of option next is difficult to obtain. If (both) together form the *saṁjñin*, then just as the name *saṁyoga* applies to the collection (of consonants) as a whole and not (to each consonant) seperately, in the same manner this (name *vibhāṣā*) also (would apply to both, prohibition and option together). Therefore, it cannot be justified to say that in the case of *aprāptavibhāṣā*, option (which is conveyed) by *vā* will take place owing to the absence of that which can be prohibited. For, if a name serves its purpose (by conveying application) to the whole, how can it convey parts? Moreover, the successive order is absolutely impossible since a whole does not contain a succession. Therefore it also cannot be justified to say that after the prohibition (conveyed) by *na* takes place, option (conveyed) by *vā* takes place. The reply is given (as follows): (In the sentence) *akṣā bhajyantāṁ bhakṣyantāṁ dīvyantām* 'Let the *akṣa*-s be broken, eaten and played' the whole which is being connected with (different) actions becomes subject to (these) actions through its contact with its parts. (Actually) a certain action is to be performed by means of a certain (part): A certain (*akṣa*) is to be eaten, a certain (*akṣa*) is to be broken. Thus when a part is broken the whole is (understood to be) broken; when (a part is) eaten, the whole (is understood to be) eaten. In the same manner here also since a certain action connected with a certain part is purposeless, the meaning of *na* is not employed. However, when (the meaning conveyed by) *vā* is employed, it is employed in the whole.

[33]

Even then, (since) the name (*vibhāṣā*) is given to both application and prohibition, it cannot be justified if they do not exist and are not employed. It is indeed possible to give a name by accepting two opposite meanings. For instance, this name, namely *saṁsāra*, is (a name) of birth and death. However, in the rules of application where *samprasāraṇa* is taught with the mention of *vibhāṣā*, the word *vibhāṣā* conveys that meaning once in the form of application and (once in the form of) prohibition. And that meaning is action. The nature of one and the same action which is not specified would be (thus) revealed by the word *na* or by the word *vā*. For instance, (in the expressions) *abhyuddharati* 'brings up near' or *upasamāharati* 'brings near' it is revealed by the use of the *upasarga* (viz. *abhi*) that the same person who brings up (something) brings it towards (somebody). However this is not possible in connection with this meaning, because (it involves) contradiction. As (the meanings) 'up' and

'towards' can exist in one meaning, an action cannot be specified like this (i. e. by both application and prohibition), because there is an absolute contradiction of existence and non-existence between (the sentences) 'it happens' and 'it does not happen'. If you think that these are two (different) actions, the word *vibhāṣā* cannot teach both, *samprasāraṇa* and absence of *samprasāraṇa*, since the two actions, being unconnected, cannot be (taught) in one sentence. If it is concluded that there is no *samprasāraṇa*, there is no second application of the word *vibhāṣā*. Therefore this (statement, namely, "(*samprasāraṇa*) optionally takes place", cannot (be obtained). If optional *bhavati* is understood, then the negative *bhavati* cannot (be obtained). Thus there exists doubt regarding the exposition of the meaning of *na*. Moreover, there is an absolute lack of semantic connetion in the interpretation (of the rule). Therefore it is said: "If (it is said that) it takes place, prohibition cannot (be obtained)". If it is interpreted that *samprasāraṇa* takes place, prohibition is not (possible). If (the *samprasāraṇa*) is understood negatively (i. e. in the form) 'does not take place', then application is not possible. Why is application not possible? Because there is absolute contradiction between application and prohibition.

[34]

"This, however, is established, because the former is cancelled by the latter." "The latter statement cancels the former statement". This is explained (as follows): First the levelling is brought about by means of prohibition, and then (the statement of) option is applied. For if option is applied first and prohibition (is applied) afterwards, option will be purposeless, because it would be absolutely cancelled by prohibition. But how to obtain this sequence? Reply is given (as follows): The teacher has given this name (*vibhāṣā*) which refers to a whole with its parts undivided and devoid of sequence, (by saying) "*na* and *vā* (are called *vibhāṣā*)". If this (name) does not perform (its) job by following this procedure in rules of application, the defining itself will be useless. Moreover, in the world one is reminded of the whole when parts are seen. If one who looks (at an object) comprehends the white colour separately and the black colour separately, he remembers the whole (and says): "this whole is variegated". (Objection:) But it is already said that since a word is not able to convey meaning of this type, this is accepted as a non verbal process. Reply is given (as follows): This indeed is a non-verbal process. Definition is just a means. It is (meant for) the inclusion of the option of this (specific) type. In the science of grammar a process (of optional application) is of three kinds: Either an injunctive statement is made non-obligatory, for instance, in the rule *vibhāṣorṇoḥ*. Or, a negative statement is made non-obligatory, for instance, in the rule *vibhāṣā vipralāpe*. And the name (*vibhāṣā*) has no purpose

to serve in these (two kinds of option), because (here) the purpose is served by the application (of *vibhāṣā*) in the ordinary sense (of option). However, in such rules as *vibhāṣā śveḥ* which are (cases of) *ubhayatra vibhāṣā* the word *vibhāṣā* once being applicable with its ordinary meaning, will be employed either in the positive statement or in the negative statement. If (*vibhāṣā*) is employed in the negative statement, it will not make the positive statement optional, because of its absence after its application (once). Or if it is employed in the positive statement it will not be employed in the negative statement, because its power is exhausted (in the positive statement). That is why it is said, "Is this *kittva* of *ktvā* and *san* after *ral* prescribed or prohibited?" Therefore, for the sake of (the student) who comprehends (*vibhāṣā*) in this way the teacher prescribes by means of defining (the term *vibhāṣā*) (its) application in a successive order in rules of application by means of separating the parts (in this way): "You should understand this meaning of *vibhāṣā* in the rules of application in this order". However, if a learned scholar thinks that since a statement being applicable again and again is different in each example, all *śvi* roots subject to *liṭ* are separately understood by (the expression) *śveḥ*, and the word *vibhāṣā* also (having) different (forms) due to this differentiation is employed again and again, for him (the teacher) will say that the definition itself is redundant (in the *Vār.*): "Or, (the definition) should not be taught, since it is well known".

[35]

"In (this science of grammar) which is an instruction of correct (words) correctness of that (operation) of which *vibhāṣā* is stated (will be made optional)". It has been stated earlier, that prohibition is understood, because the positive statement precedes. And the science of grammar is meant for the knowledge of correctness (of words). Therefore technical terms etc. are secondary to correctness. Therefore, since it is accepted from the context that correctness is the main (object of grammar), it follows that option is stated with regard to correctness. It is not proper (to connect) an operation with a secondary (object) when it is possible (to connect it with) the main (object). Therefore, (the rule) *vibhāṣā śveḥ* means this: (A form of) root *śvi* with *samprasāraṇa* effected is optionally correct. (It is so as in the case of) a form of a compound which is optionally correct. Therefore it is said that here that which is the main (object) is the topic under discussion. Application (of a statement) to the secondary (object) is due to the context. This being the case correctness will be made optional. But there will be no pairs (of correct forms). Another way (of explaining this *Vārttika* is as follows): This (term *vibhāṣā*) is present in the science (of grammar dealing with compounding). Since the

integrated form and the sentence convey different meanings, it is impossible to use one form for the other. Thus the mention of *vā* is purposeless. And since the presence and absence of a name in its domain of application is not desired, it is the correctness which is connected with *vibhāṣā*. Thus there is a difficulty.

[36]

" An incorrect (expression) will not be used ". Just as, when both the objects, one fit for eating and the other not fit for eating, are available, that which is fit for eating is accepted, in the same manner here also when both (correct and incorrect expressions) are available, the correct one will be used. " Never, indeed, is the incorrectness of the word *rājapuruṣa* desired ". Learned people never abstain from using this word. Nor is there any specific means for ascertaining a correct word, (means) by which one would understand that this is correct and this is not correct. And those (distinct features) like the acute accent on the final syllable of a compound are also secondary to correctness, (because it is understood that an expression) which is accented on the final of a compound is optionally correct.

[37]

" Moreover, two kinds will not be obtained ". That purpose, namely, the obtainment of the optional form, for which the rule is meant, will not be served. If option is stated with reference to correctness it would follow that the (form of the root) *śvi* with *samprasāraṇa* effected in it is optionally correct. Therefore, the forms like *śiśvāya* and *śiśviyatuḥ* will not be derived.

[38]

" He, who (accepts the view that) words are produced, optionally derives a compound. " What kind of impermanence of words is there ? Or what kind of permanence (of words is there) ? Whether permanence is accepted because of the permanence of the generic feature, or whether permanence of individual (phonemes) manifested by sounds is accepted, in what way can *vibhāṣā* be connected (with these words) ? It is not (correct to say that *vibhāṣā*) is possible because the practices of teachers differ or because the science of grammar today has proceeded in this manner. Therefore, may be it is a Pāṇinian grammar or a different grammar, this consideration is concerned with (the student who) understands (grammar in his own way). A certain student understands this exposition (of existing words) through the relation between modification and the object to be modified. (For instance, he understands by the rule) *iko yaṇ aci* that (in expressions like) *dadhy atra*, (*dadhy*) is another

state of (the word) *dadhi*. Another (student) understands it in a different way. (He thinks that) this (i. e. *dadhy*) is a different word altogether, belonging to the domain of euphonic combination which stands in the form of *yaṇ*. The science of grammar is merely a subsequent exposition (of what already exists). Therefore, for him who understands that owing to the application of grammatical rules two expressions, namely, *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* and *rājapuruṣaḥ* emerge from the basic expression *rājan as puruṣa s*, compound is the main (object) on account of its being derived (by the rule). And since the main (object) is subject to option, there is no deffect.

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"This defect does not arise even for him who thinks (that words are) permanent." Even when correctness is the main object it is not possible to think of option (with regard to correctness), because correctness cannot be made optional. Why can it not be made optional? Because it is not man-made. (In the expression) *brāhmaṇaśatena bhuktam* 'food was eaten by a hundred of Brahmins' the number is not connected with the action of eating although it is mainly conveyed. For it is not possible (to connect a number with an action). Therefore (the number) proceeds as the sign of that which is counted and the meaning 'food was eaten by brahmins who counted a hundred' (is understood). In the same manner here also it is possible to make that optional which is man-made. Since the technical term is man-made, it will be made optional and not correctness. For instance (it is said) *medhyaḥ paśur vibhāṣitaḥ* 'the sacrificial animal is made optional'. Here the act of immolation in the sacrifice which is the subject under consideration is made optional, because the state of being an animal and the state of being a bull are not man-made. "It is not considered whether (the animal to be immolated) is a bull or is not a bull". The thinking of the thinker does not proceed in this way, because this is not a matter which needs consideration, since it is not a subject of discussion regarding existence and non-existence.

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But it has already been stated, 'And the existence and non-existence of a name are not desired'. This indeed is true. However, it is stated according to (one's) understanding. The sentence "What then? The name is connected" is said to him who understands that the same (person) is brought by both (the expressions), the integrated form (i e. the compound) and the sentence and that since even the verbal expression is (sometimes) the same (in both, a compound and its analysis), as for instance, *dāsyāḥputraḥ* and *dāsyāḥ putraḥ*, the integrated form (i. e. compounding) certainly supersedes the

sentence just as in the case of the *ārdhadhātuka* formation, *vibhāṣā* is prescribed by the rule *vā liṭi*, because the rule completely cancels (the earlier rule). However, the sentence 'And existence and non-existence of a name are not desired' is said to him who understands different meanings (from a compound and a sentence). One should not think that what (I) say is my own thought. For it is said (by Patañjali in the *Bhāṣya*) on the rule *samarthānāṁ prathamād vā*: "Then the word *vā* need not be mentioned. — It should be mentioned. What is the purpose? Words are permanent. This being the case, this (word *vā*) sanctions correctness to the sentence".

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"If (words) are produced, (there would be) simultaneous (application) of (the suffixes) which are stated together (in one rule) as well as (of those) which are grouped together (by continuation)". What is the relevance of this sentence? — You argued that optional correctness would wrongly result in the view of one who thinks that (words are) permanent. That (objection) was refuted. If, however, it is accepted that (words are) produced, there is no fault of optional correctness. However, this fault, namely, simultaneous application of those suffixes which are sta ed together (is still there). The word *yugapad* is used in the sense of that which is mentioned simultaneously (or together) because of the possibility of its being used (simultaneously). (The word *yugapad* is thus a *taddhita* derivative) just as (the word) *yaugapadyam* (is derived by adding) a suffix conveying state. And here a group is meant by the word *anvācaya*. That (suffix) which is being inferred from the continuation of a word, (for instance, of *aṇ* in the rule) *ḍhak ca maṇḍūkāt*, is referred to by the words *anvācaya*.. "(For instance in the rules) *tavyattavyānīyaraḥ* and *ḍhak ca maṇḍūkāt*". What is the *prima facie* view? (The objector) thinks in this way: He who thinks that words are produced, explains words irrespective of their usage. (According to him) words are used after they are learnt from the science of grammar. Thus (the suffixes) *tavyat*, *tavya* and *anīyar*, prescribed in the sense of the same *kāraka*, form one word. That which is inseparable most certainly follows contiguously. For instance, when churning is undertaken for the sake of fire, the *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice also is first performed. Thus when *tavyat* proceeds, the other two (suffixes, namely) *tavya* and *anīyar* also have to proceed. Just as (their) proceeding, (their) use has to be simultaneous. Or, just as the words, their meaning also is produced according to them. Therefore the meaning of all (the three suffixes) simultaneously put together is stated. Therefore (the words) should be used in that form in which meaning is understood (from them).

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" However, he who thinks that (words are) permanent (explains correctness of words which are used) ". He merely explains the correctness of (the words) already used in the world. And (a word) in this form is not used. Therefore, simultaneous mention (of the three suffixes) is not correct.

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" A suffix comes after (a stem)." (Objection :) Just as there is no duality in the case of *tavya* since one and the same *kāraka* is conveyed, in the same manner *tavyat, tavya* and *anīyar* (together represent) one single (item) since (they convey) one *kāraka*. Therefore (their simultaneous application in one derivation) is possible when (a suffix is said) to come after (a stem). Moreover, the word *para* is used also in connection with that which is intervened. For instance, (it is said) : *param mathurāyāḥ pāṭaliputram* ' Pāṭaliputra is further than Mathurā '. Further it is said (in the *Mahābhāṣya*) that many suffixes can be subsequent (to a stem). (Patañjali says) : " There is one stem and many *yañ* suffixes ". (Reply :) This fault does not arise. He (who holds the view that words are produced) has already accepted that (suffixes) are many. For, simultaneous application or grouping together (of suffixes) is possible only when many (suffixes) exist. And (the rule) *sadavyaya* ... etc. in grammar also indicates (that there are many suffixes). Therefore, (Pāṇini) mentions (together those suffixes) which convey the same *kāraka* for the sake of brevity, thinking, " I need not utter separate case-forms ". Moreover, (the use of the) word *para* to refer to that which is intervened is rejected by mentioning the word *nirdiṣṭa* in connection with (words) referred to by the ablative. Further, many individual *yañ* suffixes are connected with the state of being subsequent. Since it is accepted that the generic feature of *yañ* (suffixes) is subsequent, it is the generic feature which is subsequent even when the individual suffixes are intervened. And since (the suffixes) *tavya* etc. cannot have a common generic feature, it is not possible to accept that (their) generic feature is subsequent.

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" Nor do we say that a chain of suffixes wrongly applies ". When it is said : " Utter (them) simultaneously ", it does not mean that they should be subsequent to one and the same stem. What then (does it mean) ? The argument of simultaneous mention means that (many suffixes) are added simultaneously after different stems. For, this meaning (of *yugapadvacanatā*) is used in the argument.

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" The use of a word is for the sake of understanding meaning ". It is not accepted here that the meaning which is accepted (in the usage) is stated with reference to the suffixes. Or, (even) if (it be accepted that) meanings are prescribed (in grammar, the rule) *bhāvakarmaṇoḥ tavyattavyānīyaraḥ* (should be regarded) as a collective statement introducing the statements of application from which one understands both words and (their) meanings. Therefore, the following sentences spread out: (The suffix) *tavyat* is added to a root in the sense of state and object; (the suffix) *tavya* is (added to a root) in the sense of state and object; (the suffix) *anīyar* is (added to a root) in the sense of state and object. Thus it is possible to avoid the undesired succession (of suffixes) tied to (one) *kāraka*. It is possible to imagine the connection (among words) as one desires, because the knowledge of the words in a statement rests in the user.

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" When there is a reference to a teacher or a region (the rule containing it) is restricted to that domain ". The frequent mention of a teacher in rules of application is called *śīlana*. When there is a reference to a region, for instance (in the rule) *eṅ prācām deśe*, it is desired to be restricted to the respective domain. Or, it is stated that when there is a mention of a teacher by referring to his family name or the direction (to which he belongs), (the rule concerned) should be restricted to that domain. Why? (The *Vārttikakāra*) thinks that he who understands grammar as the cause (of language), thinking that the usage is dependent upon grammar, and grammar is not dependent upon usage, thinks that according to this view the use of word not known from the usage is understood from grammar. (Thus the rule) *iko hrasvo* ... prescribes that a short vowel should be used. And when it results in the use (of a short vowel) by all speakers, restriction with reference to user (is laid down by saying) *gālavasya* 'according to Gālava'. With this meaning in the mind the illustration is given (by Patañjali) that Jamadagni (has cut) this (*avadāna*) five times.

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(Objection:) But this is a mere *arthavāda* 'a recommendatory statement.' Since an *arthavāda* is subordinate to *vidhi* 'injunction', *vidhi* is understood (from this statement). And that *vidhi* is, *catur avadyanti* '(they) cut (the oblation) into four pieces'. *pañcakṛtvo jāmadagnyasya* 'for those who belong to Jamadagni (an oblation is cut) into five pieces'. Since this topic is not popular it is understood from the scripture. In this connection, just as the act

(of cutting) by the statement *catur avadyanti* 'they cut (the oblation) four times' is repeated for all performers, in the same manner (the act of cutting stated by the expression) *pañcakṛtvaḥ* 'five times' applies (to all performers). It is (however) restricted to the specific performer of cutting, namely, the one belonging to Jamadagni. "One who does not belong to Jamadagni (does not) offer an oblation (five times)." For Jamadagni (did) this (namely, cutting of the oblation five times). Some refer to the offspring by the word for the father on the stredgth of the relation : 'that is this'. (The form) *avādyat* in *pañcamam avādyat* is Vedic Imperfect in the sense of the present tense. Others however think that because of the practice of the father, the son also cuts (the oblation five times).

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"However, he, according to whom words are permanent (thinks that the mention of Gālava is meant for respect etc.)". According to him the science of grammar being dependent upon usage, the (grammarians) merely remember the usages well known in the world; (they) do not (newly) establish connections (between words and meanings). Therefore, while shortening (of the final vowel of a *pūrvapada*) before an *uttarapada* is optional, Gālava is referred to merely because he remembers the shortening. Of what kind? (Of the same kind) as it is found in the world (i. e. usage). Thus quoting Gālava as an authority is nothing but (showing) respect to his intelligence, or (it is meant) to indicate that since Gālava remembers this, his grammar represents an uninterrupted (tradition). Other grammarians, however, remember a long vowel. It is not (correct to say) that (the form) remembered by Gālava is not used by another (grammarian). Nor is (it correct) to say that Gālava does not use a long vowel remembered by another (grammarian). There is thus no restriction with respect to the respective domain. "The mention of region is meant for (indicating) *kīrti* (of that region)". *Kīrti* means fame, praising aloud. Palaces etc. thus being a mark of fame are also referred to as *kīrti*. And some (obects) being thus praised receive refinement, for instance, Indradyumna etc. "However, (also for him) according to whom (words) are produced (the reference to Gālava is meant for showing respect etc.)". It is possible to understand respect in that (view) also. For, in the world respect is shown also by praising a man. Since Gālava is inclined to use a short vowel, you also should use (a short vowel). Thus it is possible (to understand) respect by quoting (Gālava) as authority. However, there is no knowledge of two (kinds of forms). Therefore, (the *Vārttikakāra*) says : "If it (is understood as) praise, knowledge of two (forms) will not be there". (One) understands a short vowel alone and not a long vowel from grammar.

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"Or, (option) need not be stated, because it is well known". The word *vā* conveys option. (Therefore it) means, 'or it may be stated'. A name of an expression is based on its form. Being based on the form, it is used in that form alone in the rules of application, and in grammar that (name) is used, for example, *vṛddhi* etc. However, this (name i. e. *vibhāṣā*) is not of that type. Thus he says: "Those who do not teach this name" etc. After mentioning a parallel (Patañjali) introduces (its) part as an example: "Those who perform a sacrifice also (understand impermanence when the word *vibhāṣā* is uttered)". Or, people in general may accept (the meaning of *vibhāṣā*) after learning it from the science (of grammar). However, the ritualists may not use in their system a technical term belonging to a different science since it is a different system.

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In this connection when it is understood that a rule in general applies to the whole class of examples, in that case the rule is to be stated for the sake of *ubhayatravibhāṣā*. Otherwise the word *vibhāṣā* in the rule *vibhāṣā śveḥ* (for instance), being utilized in a part of the sentence (for conveying) "it optionally takes place" or "it optionally does not take place", is not capable of accomplishing both (i. e. option and negation). If, however, you think that a rule is individually applicable to each individual example, then as many rules can be obtained from the source-rule *vibhāṣā śveḥ* as there are examples. In that case the rule need not be formulated. The teacher has, (therefore,) while indicating this very meaning, made use of different words in the rules of application. (Patañjali) shows this (by saying): "The teacher also, while teaching this technical term (conveys the same meaning by many other terms like *bahulam*, *anyatarasyām*, *ubhayathā*, *vā*, and *ekeṣām*)". How is it said: "Bhāradvāja is made to deviate from his own view"? The Reply is given (as follows): (Bhāradvāja) deviates from that which he (Pāṇini) has composed after remembering.

[51. 1]

"In the case of *aprāpta* (*vibhāṣā*) there are three bases for doubt". (The word) *aprāpta* is marked with *svarita*. The word *trisaṁśayāḥ* does not mean those *vibhāṣā* rules in which there are three doubts. Why? Because, doubt is one. For instance, (in the sentence) "(Is this) a post, (or) a man?" there is only one doubt and not two. Therefore, (the *vibhāṣā* rules) are described as *trisaṁśayā* because, (the doubt) has three bases.

[51. 2]

"*dvandve ca / vibhāṣā jasi*". (These rules) are mentioned to indicate the context of *vibhāṣā*. However, there is a doubt (about *vibhāṣā*) in (the rule) *prathamacaramatayа* etc. If (the word) *sarvādīni* is continued then it is *prāpte* (*vibhāṣā*); if (the word *sarvādīni*) is discontinued and (the rule is regarded as) *pūrvavipratiṣedha*, then (the rule) is *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*); and if *paravipratiṣedha* (is accepted), then it is *ubhayatra vibhāṣā*. (The word) *sarvādīni* has a scope when (suffixes) other than *jas* (are added) and there is an option in the case of *dvaya* etc. (Thus there are two forms, namely,) *dvaye* and *dvayāḥ*, because *dvi* is not *sarvādi*. In the case of the form *ubhaya* both the rules are applicable. The author of the *Dhyānagraha* has said, (this is) *aprāpte vibhāṣā*, because *pūrvavipratiṣedha* (is accepted) and (the rule *sarvādīni* etc.) is *antaraṅga*. But why is (the rule *sarvādīni*... etc.) *antaraṅga* only? Because *prakṛti* alone is mentioned (in that rule). On the other hand, *vibhāṣā* (taught by the rule, *prathamacarama* ... etc.) is *bahiraṅga* since (it is stated) by referring to *ubhaya* and *jas*. However, he (i. e. Patañjali) does not refer to both these reasons and describes it as *aprāpte vibhāṣā*: "It is *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*) since *ayac* is a separate suffix". That *ayac* which is accepted as a substitute will be understood as a separate suffix after the word *ubha*. In that case the text is read as follows: *ubhād avayave 'yac* (*ayac* is added to *ubha* in the sense of part), then *saṁkhyāyāḥ tayap* (*tayap* is added to a numeral) and *dvitribhyāṁ tayasyāyaj vā* (*taya* after *dvi* and *tri* is replaced by *ayac*). Or (the text of the *sūtras* should be read as follows): *saṁkhyāyā avayave tayap* (*tayap* is added to a numeral in the sense of part), *ubhād ayac* (*ayac* is added to *ubha* in the same sense) and *dvitribhyām vā* (optionally [*ayac* is added] to *dvi* and *tri*). ("*ṅīp*) will wrongly be due in connection with *tailamātrā*". (Objection:) But this word already ends in *ā*. (Reply:) This difficulty does not arise. It is not said that *ṅīp* wrogly applies to the word *tailamātrā*. What then? (It is said) that it wrongly applies to the word *mātra* which is derived by (adding the suffix *tran* taught by the rule) *huyāmāśrubhasibhyas tran*. Therefore, (the form) *tailamātrī* would be (derived). "That which is not included (is not understood by a *pratyāhāra*) even if it is similar (in phonetic form)". How to know that (*mātra*) is not included (in the *pratyāhāra mātra*)? The Reply is given (as follows): Although the code-letter is absent, the meaning which is denoted is the cause of recognising (*mātra*). Thus here that which is included (in the *pratyāhāra*) is understood from the meaning alone: That which conveys the meaning 'measurement' is included. However, (when the word *mātrac*) conveys the meaning 'size' in general, for instance, when from the sentence *iyam asya mātrā* (the meaning) *idam asya parimāṇam* is understood, then it is not included, because (the suffix *mātra*) which

is added after a stem and which conveys measurement is included. For instance, it is said, ' since *sic* etc. are seen in *luṅ* formation (it is different from the past participle) '.

[51. 3]

" (The rule) *ūrṇor vibhāṣā* (contains three kinds of doubt) ". If this (rule) is taken as having its action incomplete and conveyIng some (meaning) and with a *svarita* mark attached to it just like (the rule) *samarthānāṁ prathamād vā*, then, having completed its action in the rule *asaṁyogāl liṭ kit*, it applies there in the form of many sentences (as follows) : The *liṭ* suffix added to (a root) not (ending in) a conjunct consonant is *kit* ; (The *liṭ* suffix added) to *ūrṇu* is optionally (*kit*). It is inferred from the mention of (the word) *asaṁyoga* alone that there are many sentences, because *ūrṇu* is, indeed, ending in (a letter which is) not a conjunct consonant. Yet it is mentioned here for obtaining (the context of) *iṭ*.

Now, if (the rule is understood as a new) statement, then (the rule) not being stated in connection with *liṭ*, both the rules have independent scope. Therefore, there is a mutual conflict. If *paravipratiṣedha* is accepted here, then this (rule) is *aprāpta-vibhāṣā*. If *pūrvavipratiṣedha* is acceptod, then (it is) *ubhayatra* (*vibhāṣā*). How ? Here the *vibhāṣā* (rule) is earlier and the obligatory statement is subsequent. In the earlier case the *vibhāṣā* (rule is) subsequent and the obligalory rule is earlier.

" (The *vibhāṣā* is) *aprāpta*. Indeed *kittva* is different and *ṅittva* is different ". *Ñittva* is optional while *kittva* (is stated) in an obligatory rule. Because of different words there is a difference (between *kittva* and *ṅitta*). Different operations like *samprasāraṇa* and absence of *samprasāraṇa* are (applicable to) these two.

" If *ṅit* and *kit* are one and the same ". How (are they) one and the same ? One considers that that this is not an *atideśa* (extended application) of (the form, ' this is regarded) as that '. What then ? (This is) an extended application of a grammatical operation. That which applies by *atideśa* is a grammatical operation. And that is not different in the case of *ūrṇu*, may be it is *kittva* or *ṅittva*. Here rejection of *guṇa* is the grammatical operation. Is this rejection obligatory ? Or optional ? In this connection (Patañjali) says : ' If (the *kittva* and the *ṅittva* are) one and the same ' etc. " There is a doubt even when (the *kittva* and the *ṅittva*) are different ". How ? The (rule) *vibhāṣorṇoḥ* is continued in the rule *sārvadhātukam apit*. Since *iṭ* is not *pit*, it is inferred that the rule (*vibhāṣorṇoḥ*) applies as a separate statement. In this connection if (it is understood that) a *sārvadhātuka* suffix is *ṅit* and

sārvadhātuka along with *iṭ* (added) to *ūrṇu* is optionally *ṅit*, then (the rule is) *prāpte* (*vibhāṣā*). If the *svarita* is not specifically attached then (the rule) *sārvadhātukam apit* has a scope in (formations like) *cinutaḥ*. (The rule) *vibhāṣorṇoḥ* also has a scope in forms like) *prorṇavitā* and *prorṇuvitā*. In (the formation) *praurṇuvi* both the rules are applicable. Therefore (Patañjali) says, "(This is) *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*)". This is (a case of) *paravipratiṣedha*.

[51. 4]

"*Vibhāṣopayamane*". (Objection:) Since *gandhana* 'hinting' and *upayamana* 'accepting or marrying' are very different (from each other), there should be no doubt. (Reply: He) thinks that *gandhana* is subordinate to (a means of) *upayamana* and has therefore mentioned (it) as *gandhana*. For instance, the lightning which flashes in its original place is described (in the words) *balāhakād vidyotate* '(the lightning) flashes from the cloud'. Here (the rule is) *aprāpte vibhāṣā* because of *pūrvavipratiṣedha*. Or, (the rule) is concerned with *upayamana* and not with *gandhana*. Why? Because it (i. e. *gandhana*) is secondary. In this way (the rule) is *aprāpte vibhāṣā*.

[51. 5]

"*Anupasargād vā*". (The meanings) *vṛtti* etc. are not connected with (the rule) *upaparābhyām* because it is (separately) stated. Or, the meanings *vṛtti* etc. are not possible when (the *upasarga*-s) *upa* and *parā* precede (the root *kram*). A different meaning which is opposite to the meanings *vṛtti* etc. is mentioned in (the rule) *āṅa udgamane*. The same is the case with (the rule) *veḥ pādavikharaṇe*. In the case of (the rule) *propābhyāṁ samarthābhyām* the two (*upasargas*, namely, *pra* and *upa*,) are synonymous (in conveying) 'beginning' and not 'unhindered progress' etc.

[51. 6]

"The *dvandva* (compound) of *vṛkṣa*, *mṛga*, etc. is optionally (used in the singular)". The creatures such as *mṛga* etc. are not referred to by (the rule) *jātir aprāṇinām*. Trees etc. are not creatures at all. In that case option applies to those *mṛga* etc. which are made of leather (stuffed figures) and not to those (*mṛga* etc.) which are living animals. (The rule is) *aprāptavibhāṣā* if (the rule) *jātir aprāṇinām* is not continued and *pūrvavipratiṣedha* (is accepted). This is *aprāpta-vibhāṣā* even without *pūrvavipratiṣedha*. Of (two homophonous words, one conveying a) secondary and the other a primary (meaning), a grammatical operation is understood with reference to (the word which conveys) the primary (meaning). Therefore the option is understood in connection with real animals and not with animals as, e. g., a bull made of clay,

[51. 7]

" (*Ām* is optionally added to) *uṣ*, *vid* (and *jāgṛ*) ". (The rule teaches optional addition of *ām*) when *ām* is already applicable by (the statement that *ām* is added) ' to that which ends in a suffix '. (The expression) *pratyayāntāt* is not connected with (the expression) *ijādeḥ*, because then the rule would be redundant since this statement also is obligatory. Now, since the option is stated with reference to *uṣ* etc. which are measured (with reference to their phonemic form), how can *uṣ* etc. ending in a suffix be referred to as *uṣ* etc. ? The reply is (as follows) : Four ways are possible in the case of (the rule) *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ* : understanding (*san* etc.) as a part of the (root), treating (this) as that, the relation between a *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñin*, and rejection. Understanding as a part thereof (is explained as follows) : Just as on account of the mention of *anta* in the word *samāsānta* (the suffixes like) *ḍac* etc. form part of the compound to which they are added and therefore (they) are understood by the mention of (the words like) *bahvṛc*, in the same manner here also when (the word) *sanādyantāḥ* is understood as those which end in *san* etc. i. e. those of which *san* etc. form a part, (the suffix) *san* being a part of *uṣ* is understood by the mention of *uṣ*. (Objection :) Now if it is understood like this, this (rule namely, *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ*) not being a definition (of *dhātu*), there can be *tadantavidhi* for *san* ; and in that case that which ends in *san* also may be understood as a part. (Reply :) This difficulty does not arise. That which ends in *san* can be a part either of that expression which conveys the same meaning or of that (expression) which conveys a different meaning. In the case of (an expression) conveying the same meaning, the meaning being already conveyed there is no usage as *pac pipakṣati*. In the case of (an expression) having a different meaning the usage *pipakṣati* is not possible on account of difference of meaning since (the two meanings) are not connected. Or, we will accept *san* etc. as primary items. And *tadantavidhi* is not possible in the case of primary (items). Where (*san* etc. are understood as) parts and (the word) *pratyayāt* is continued, (they will) be understood by the mention of *uṣ*. Thus this option is *prāpte vibhāṣā*.

Now if (*pratyayāt*) is discontinued, *uṣ* stands for both, *uṣ* alone and *uṣ* ending in *san*. In this case if there is *pūrvavipratiṣedha*, then (the rule) is *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*); if there is *paravipratiṣedha*, it is *ubhayatra vibhāṣā*. In this way doubt exists. Or, this is an *atideśa* (i. e. treatment) of ' this as that '. For instance, (in the rule) *bahugaṇavatuḍati saṁkhyā*, since the word *saṁkhyā* is understood as conveying the meaning *eka* etc., treatment of this as that is understood (as follows) : They (i. e. *bahu*, *gaṇa* etc.) are treated as *saṁkhyā*. Similarly in the case of this rule (the treatment

of 'this as that' is understood). It is well known that the word *dhātu* means *bhū* etc. And having accepted those grammatical operations which are applicable to a part of the meaning (of *dhātu*), (the rule) *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ* is stated meaning thereby that those which end in *san* etc. are treated as *dhātu*. (Therefore) grammatical operations applicable to a *dhātu* apply (to them). However, it has to be found out whether even in *tadvadatideśa* 'treatment of this as that', *uṣ* etc. ending in *san* etc. obtain the grammatical operations generally stated, (such as) addition of a suffix and accent on the final (syllable), or the (specific) operations applicable to *uṣ* etc. also are obtained. The present (rule) is framed for general operations. Why is this so? Specific (operations) are excluded from general (operations). For instance, when (it is said,) 'he (should be treated) as a brahmin' (application of the properties) of Māṭhara is not extended to him. Therefore it is said, 'when there is an extended application of general properties there is no extended application of specific properties'. This is, indeed, true. However, here if the application of general properties is extended, the extended application itself would be redundant, because the same meaning is obtained by (understanding) the relation as of *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñin*. Therefore ... It should be understood in this way: The general expression is referred to in this rule for the sake of brevity. Finally this applies to individual (cases) represented by the expression *bhūvādi*: That which ends in *san* is treated as *bhū* or as *edh*. Since (the root) *uṣ* with (the suffix) *san* (added) after it is treated as (root) *uṣ*, optional application (of *ām*) is understood. However, (the following) difficulty arises: The operations which are applicable to all roots ending in *san* are wrongly applicable (to *uṣ* ending in *san*).

(Question:) How (to explain the rule of *prāpte vibhāṣā*) when the relation of *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñin* (is accepted)? (Reply:) It is understood that the meaning of the word *dhātavaḥ* is '*bhū* etc.' and that *bhū* etc. are names of (roots) ending in *san*. If it is thus understood then (the rule) would apply also in the context of (the rules) *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ* ... and *dhātor ekācaḥ*. If you think that here *bhū* etc. are suggested (then I say that) they are suggested also in (the rule) *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ*. Therefore, this name *dhātu* which conveys a word's own form (is given) simultaneously to both, (to the roots) *bhū* etc. and to those which end in *san* etc. Where, however, a specific (root) is mentioned, it will be the name. For instance, (*kṛ*) will be the name of *cikīrṣa* in (the rule) *vibhāṣā kṛvṛṣoḥ*. And this (rule) is rejected (in the *Mahābhāṣya* by arguing that) since *san* etc. are prescribed in the sense of roots, the name (*dhātu*) is obtained by *sthānivadbhāva*. "(This rule is) *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*, because) those (roots) which end in a suffix are different roots." What is explained in this way is that *san* etc.

are not understood as a part of (the roots to which they are added), nor is there the treatment of 'this as that'; but there is the relation of a *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñin*. Or, (the rule) is rejected. Therefore, since (roots ending in *san*) will not be understood from the mention of *uṣ* etc. as they are over and above (*uṣ* etc.), there is no room for doubt. Others explain the doubt as follows: *uṣ* is (a root) ending in *kvip*. By means of (the suffix) *kvip* (added to it) in the sense of behaviour, (*uṣ*) stands for both, (*uṣ*) ending in a suffix and (*uṣ*) as it is heard. In this case also (the statement) that those (roots) which end in a suffix are different roots is explained (by arguing) that (the suffix) *kvip* in the sense of behaviour is not added to this (root, namely *uṣ*).

[51. 8]

"*Vibhāṣā* in connection with *dīp* etc. (is *aprāpta-vibhāṣā*)". It is inferred here that (the rule) *dīpajana* ... is marked with *svarita*. It is (further) inferred as being continued as a whole (in the rule *ciṇ bhāvakarmaṇoḥ* in the following manner): *ciṇ* is added in the sense of verbal abstract and object, and after *dīp* etc. (it is) optionally added. However, it should not be (understood that there is) principal-subordinate relationship (between the rule *ciṇ bhāvakarmaṇoḥ* and the rule *dīpajana*...). Why? Because (the rule *dīpajana*...) is separately read. Otherwise (Paṇini) would have read (the two rules together) as *bhāvakarmaṇor dīpādibhyo vibhāṣā* '(*ciṇ*) is optionally added to *dīp* etc., in the sense of state and object'.

If (this rule is regarded as an independent) statement and (if) *kartari* is not continued, (the rule will be) *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*) because of *paravipratiṣedha*. (It will be) *ubhayatra vibhāṣā* by (accepting) *pūrvavipratiṣedha*. "(The rule is) *aprāpte* (*vibhāṣā*), because (the word) *kartari* is continued." It means that (the rule is an independent) statement. "Yet there is doubt whether (the rule applies in the sense of) agent proper or (in the sense of) agent who is (also) an object." If (the word) *kartari* is also marked with *svarita*, then *dīp* etc. being connected with *kartṛ*, there is a separate sentence and, therefore, (a separate) verb. (The suffix) *ciṇ* is added in the sense of verbal abstract and object. (The suffix *ciṇ*) is optionally added to *dīp* etc. in the sense of agent which is also an object. Therefore, this is a *prāpte vibhāṣā*. If (the word) *kartari* is not marked with *svarita*, then both the rules will be applicable to *dīp* etc. in the sense of agent who is object, because an agent who is an object is (also) an agent. Therefore, the doubt is justified on account of *pūrvavipratiṣedha* and *paravipratiṣedha*. "The agent of a transitive (verb) can behave as an object". Although *budh* is transitive, (thinking) 'I will prescribe a uniform rejection", (Patañjali) makes a general statement, namely,

"And *dīp* etc. are transitive". "(The intransitive roots) become transitive when they are accompanied by *upasarga*." For (a verb) accompanied by an *upasarga* obtains a different meaning, (for example,) *bhavati* 'is' and *anubhavati* 'experiences'. "(The rules stated in connection with an object are applicable) to those (roots) the action conveyed by which resides in the object as well as to those (roots) the state conveyed by which resides in the object". Meaning in general is mentioned as of two kinds, namely, *bhāva* 'state' and *karman* 'action' on the basis of distinction between movement and absence of movement. How is this to be obtained? It is said (in the *Mbh.*): "The action residing in the object is referred to by (the word) *karman*". For instance, the root *pac* is *karmasthakriya* 'having the action residing in the object'. For, the difference caused by the action is found in the object alone.

However, this (statement) contradicts (the discussion on the rule) *acaḥ kartṛyaki*. For there it is (said): "(something) is born of its own". *ā* is substituted in place (of the final) of *jan* in its 'original pronunciation' itself. Therefore it is *ajanta* 'ending in a vowel' in the 'original pronunciation'. And if it is *kartṛsthabhāvaka* 'having the state residing in the agent', how can there be *yak* in the sense of agent?

[51. 9]

"*Vibhāṣāgreprathamapūrveṣu* (is an example of *aprāptavibhāṣā*)". (The word) *ābhīkṣṇye* is discontinued and *pūrvavipratiṣedha* (is accepted). However, there (i. e. on the rule *vibhāṣāgre*...etc.) it is said (by the Vārttikakāra), 'prohibition of compound (should be stated), as the statement (of *ṇamul*) when *agra* etc. precede is not already applicable'. For *agra* etc. can be the cause of the addition of the suffix (*ṇamul*) if (the rule is understood) as a statement of that which is not already applicable. If it is *prāpte vibhāṣā*, in that case *agra* etc. would be the cause of removal of the suffix. Therefore, they cannot (function) as *upapada*-s. (This objection) is answered by saying that that *upapada*, which is mentioned along with *am*, alone is compounded.

[51. 10]

"*Vibhāṣā* (stated in connection with) *tṛn* etc. (is an example of *aprāpta-vibhāṣā*)". When *tṛn*, *anna*, *tīkṣṇa* and *śuci* (are compounded with *nañ* the final syllable is optionally accented). If *ackau* is not continued in the rules *ākrośe ca* and *saṁjñāyām* (P. 6. 2. 158, 159), then there should be a doubt. If *ackau* is continued in (the rule) *ākrośe ca*, then without any doubt this (rule) is *aprāptavibhāṣā*.

[51. 11]

" (The rule) *ekahalādau* ... etc. (is an example of *aprāptavibhāṣā*) ". (The word) *saṁjñāyām* is continued. It should not be inferred (to be present) in (the rule) *peṣaṁvāsa* ... etc. on the basis of the (specific) statement. Does a name (formed with *uda* as the first constituent) followed by (a word) beginning with a single consonant and conveying (an object) to be filled up (with water) ever exist ? ' It does ', he says. (It is the word) *udapāna* ' a water-vessel '.

[51. 12]

" When *ca* etc. are connected ". Connected with what ? With *yuṣmad* and *asmad* ; (for instance, in the sentence,) *grāmas tava ca svaṁ mama svaṁ ca* ' the village is your property and my property '. However, when the property is connected (with *ca* etc.), then certainly substitutes take place ; (for instance, in the sentence,) *grāmaś ca te svaṁ nagaraṁ ca me svam* ' the village is your property and the town is my property ".

[51. 13]

" Or, when (*l*-substitution) obligatorily applies before *yaṅ* (the rule *aci vibhāṣā* prescribes optional substitution of *l* before a vowel) ". (The word) *yaṅi* is continued in (the rule) *aci vibhāṣā*, (thus meaning) ' before *yaṅ*, before a vowel). This may be (explained) as follows : When *yaṅ*, immediately followed by a vowel, follows. When is (*yaṅ* immediately followed by a vowel) ? In *yaṅluk* (formation, for instance,) *nijegila*. Others explain this (as follows) : After the elision of a part the remainder of *yaṅ* is followed by a vowel. However, for those who describe (the word) *nijegilyate* (as as example), *yaṅ* followed by a vowel is difficult to obtain due to the absence of the treatment of (one single substitute) as both final and initial by resorting to both (the items which are substituted).

[51. 14]

" And (the following rules are instances of) *prāpte* (*vibhāṣā*) ". There is neither *pūrvavipratiṣedha* nor *paravipratiṣedha*. What then ? (The relevant word is) continued in these (rules).

[51. 15]

" *Vibhāṣā vipralāpe* (' when there is dispute, *vad* is optionally used in *ātmanepada* ') ". A dispute takes place also among (animals and birds) whose speech is inarticulate, (for instance,) *vipravadanti śakunayaḥ* ' birds wrangle ', because (their twittering) has auspicious or inauspicious implications.

(A dispute) is possible also among those whose speech is articulate, (for instance,) *vipravadante mauhūrtāḥ* ' astrologers dispute (among themselves) '. (This rule) is *prāpte* (*vibhāṣā*). The word (*vyaktavācām*) is continued (in this rule). Therefore, *vipravadanti śakunayaḥ* would be (a correct usage).

[51. 16]

" (*Ātmanepada* is) optionally used if (the fact that the fruit acrues to the agent) is understood from the word uttered near (the verb) ". The proximity is indicated by both, the word standing near and the *ātmanepada*, for instance, (in the sentence) *svaṁ pacasi* ' You cook for yourself '. Thus in case of doubt, a word standing near reveals (that the fruit of the action goes to the agent). This (rule) is certainly *aprāptavibhāṣā*. (It is) *ubhayatra* (*vibhāṣā*) (if the word *svaritañitaḥ*) is not continued and *pūrvavipratiṣedha* (is accepted).

[51. 17]

" *Hṛkror anyatarasyām* (is a *prāptavibhāṣā* rule) ". The meanings ' to eat ' and ' to go ' of root *hṛ* and the intransitive character of root *kṛ* are the conditions (of the addition of *ātmanepada* endings after *hṛ* and *kṛ*).

NOTES

svarādinipātam avyayam / P. 1. 1. 37

Summary : It is clear from the above definition that निपात is a sub-category of अव्यय. P. 1. 4. 57 : चादयोऽसत्त्वे states that the words च etc. are called निपात when they express a non-substance. In this connection Pat. raises two questions : 1. What is the purpose of making two separate lists, चादि and स्वरादि ? 2. What is the purpose of making two separate संज्ञाs, अव्यय and निपात ? The reply to the first question is that the words in चादि list are called अव्यय (and निपात) only when they express a non-substance, whereas the words in the स्वरादि list get the अव्ययसंज्ञा even when they express a substance. Therefore, in order to specify चादि words as असत्त्वे, the चादि list is separated from the स्वरादि list. The reply to the second question is that if only one संज्ञा, for instance निपात, is given to both स्वरादिs and चादिs, the प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा applicable to निपात will also be wrongly applicable to स्वरादिs and consequently, undesired forms will result. If, on the contrary, अव्ययसंज्ञा alone is given to both स्वरादिs and चादिs, there will be the defect of prolixity, because the whole list of निपातs will have to be enumerated in the *Vār.* : अव्यये नञ्कुनिपातानाम्. Pat. concludes that both the lists have to be separately given and both the संज्ञाs are to be separately made.

The author of the *Dīp.* explains, following Pat., the two alternatives regarding संज्ञा as well as the गणs. However, he appears to disagree with Pat. He points out, for instance, that अव्ययs also are असत्त्ववचन and implies thereby that अव्ययs cannot be distinguished from निपातs on this basis. He further criticises Pat. for not having given satisfactory reply to the question regarding the two separate संज्ञाs, although he himself does not offer any. Similarly, he finds fault with Pat.'s remark that if the अव्ययसंज्ञा alone is accepted there will be the fault of verbosity. He points out that the *Vār.* to which the fault is related is itself rejected by the Vārttikakāra.

In spite of this sporadic note of dissent the author seems to have accepted Pat.'s argument on the whole and agreed with him that two separate संज्ञाs and two separate lists are necessary.

[1]

1. इह किंचिदव्ययम् etc. According to Pat. the main difference between the स्वरादिs and the चादिs is that the चादिs are called निपात and अव्यय, only when they convey a non-substance, whereas स्वरादिs are अव्ययs when they

convey a substance also. The term सत्त्व is used by Yāska for the first time in contrast with भाव (*Nirukta* 1. 1). Generally, it stands for a substance as against भाव which means action. Pāṇini does not define the term although he uses the terms असत्त्व, and द्रव्य which is a synonym of सत्त्व. सत्त्व or द्रव्य is described in grammatical tradition as लिङ्गसंख्यान्वित 'possessed of gender and number'. Pat. says : स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकानि सत्त्वगुणा एकत्वद्वित्वबहुत्वानि च (*Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 38, I. 96. 14). According to this description of सत्त्व, स्वरादिs are सत्त्ववचनs 'expressive of substance', because usages like सुखमयं स्वः 'pleasant heaven', द्वे स्वः 'two heavens' are found. चादिs on the other hand are never connected with gender and number. Due to this difference स्वरादिs and चादिs have to be listed separtely.

However, the author of the *Dīp.* does not agree with Pat. on this point. He argues that among the two categories of अव्यय, namely क्रियाप्रधान and विभक्त्यर्थप्रधान, the स्वरादिs belong to the latter. They convey the meaning of case-endings. They are always used without case-endings e. g. स्वस्ति वाचयति 'makes (a person) recite auspicious hymns'. Here स्वस्ति is the *karman*. However, no case-ending is found in the word स्वस्ति to convey the कर्मन्. Thus the स्वरादिs themselves convey विभक्त्यर्थ 'meaning of a case-ending'. And that which conveys विभक्त्यर्थ has, even according to Pat., no connection with gender and number, *Mbh.* on P. I. 1. 38, I. 95. 21 : न चैतयोरर्थयोर्लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां योगोऽस्ति. Since gender and number are features of प्रातिपदिकार्थ and not of विभक्त्यर्थ, स्वर् etc. can be described as devoid of लिङ्ग and संख्या. As a result they become असत्त्ववचन just like चादिs.

2. एष खलु विशेषः ... etc. As pointed out above, the author of the *Dīp.* has dismissed Pat.'s argument about the difference between स्वरादिs and चादिs based on their respective meanings. Now he shows another point of difference between the two lists: According to him स्वर् etc. are directly expressive of the meaning, whereas च etc. are indicative of the meaning. This view again goes contrary to that of Pat. Grammarians speak of two kinds of meaning: 1. वाच्य, 'directly expressed' and, 2. द्योत्य 'indicated'. The majority of words in a language directly convey meaning. There are, however, some words which do not have a meaning of their own. Just as a lamp illuminates an already existing object, these words manifest the meaning of another word when they are used along with that word. For instance, the निपातs च etc. and the उपसर्गs प्र etc. have no meaning of their own. Therefore, they are द्योतक.

[2. 1]

1. पुष्कलं प्रयोजनमाचष्टे. Here the author says that Pat. has stated many purposes of giving two separate names, अव्यय and निपात. However, Pat.

has described only one, viz. the प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा. P. 1. 1. 14: निपात एकाजनाङ् teaches that a निपात consisting of one vowel is called प्रगृह्य. Now, if the अव्ययसंज्ञा is discarded, all the words listed in the अव्यय section will be called निपात. Those among them consisting of one vowel will be further called प्रगृह्य. For instance, क्व is a तद्धित formation derived from किम् by adding a suffix अत् by P. 5. 3. 12: किमोऽत्. According to P. 1. 1. 38: तद्धितश्चासर्वविभक्तिः, क्व is an अव्यय. However, if the निपातसंज्ञा alone is retained, it will be a निपात. Being an एकाच् निपात it will be called प्रगृह्य. Consequently, absence of euphony (प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि नित्यम्, P. 6. 1. 125) will be wrongly applicable to expressions such as क्वात्र and expressions like क्व अत्र (and not क्वात्र) would alone be regarded as correct.

[2. 2]

1. Here is a diversion. Assuming that one name, namely अव्यय, is retained, a problem regarding the iterpretation of the word चादि is raised. If निपातसंज्ञा is discarded, the rule निपात एकाजनाङ् will have to be emended to *चादय एकाजनाङ् (as Kaiy. says in his *Prad.* on the *Mbh.* on तच्चाशक्यम् etc. on P. 1. 1. 37; I. 94. 6). The word चादि is mentioned in three rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*: (1) चादयोऽसत्त्वे (P. 1. 4. 57), (2) चादिषु च (P. 8. 1. 58), and चादिलोपे विभाषा (P. 8. 1. 63). In the latter two rules चादि stands for the five words: च वा ह अह and एव that are directly mentioned in P. 8. 1. 24 : न चवाहाहैवयुक्ते. The word चादि in P. 1. 4. 57 denotes a long list of words beginning with च. Thus the word चादि denotes two different lists. Which of these two is intended by the word चादि in the amended rule चादय एकाजनाङ्? The पूर्वपक्षिन् argues that here चादि may stand for the list of the five words च, वा, etc. as it does in the rule चादिलोपे विभाषा. The reply is: No. The negation of आङ् by the word अनाङ् implies that here this list is not understood, since it does not contain आङ्. The negation अनाङ् becomes significant only if the अव्ययसंज्ञा is already applicable to आङ् and it is applicable only if the other चादि list, containing आङ्, is understood by the word चादयः.

2. न चत्वारो गृह्यन्ते. In fact, the चादि list understood in the rule चादिलोपे ..., contains five words, च, वा, ह, अह and एव. The author refers to them as चत्वारः (four) obviously by excluding च. The compound चादि is therefore to be understood as अतद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहुव्रीहि i. e. चः आदिर्येषां ते 'Those (four) at the beginning of which च stands'.

[2. 3]

1. अत्राप्यनुषक्तः पूर्वो दोषः. The difficulty in accepting निपातसंज्ञा alone was already pointed out in [2. 1]. Here the author shows the same difficulty even when the अव्ययसंज्ञा alone is accepted. Pat. does not mention this difficulty.

The author here means that if the अव्ययसंज्ञा alone is retained the rule mentioned above will have to be amended as अव्ययमेकाजनाङ्. Consequently, प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा will be applicable to any अव्यय that is एकाच्. The difficulty pointed out in the case of क will remain even if this alternative is accepted, because क will be an एकाज्-अव्यय.

[2. 4]

यस्तु दोष उच्यते. The author once again shows disagreement with Pat. According to Pat. if the अव्ययसंज्ञा alone is retained and the निपातसंज्ञा is discarded, the word निपात in the *Vār.* अव्यये नञ्कुनिपातानाम् (*Vār.* 3 on P. 6. 2. 2) will have to be replaced by a long list of words coming under the category of निपात. P. 6. 2. 2: तत्पुरुषे तुल्यार्थै ... teaches that an अव्यय which is a पूर्वपद of a तत्पुरुष compound retains its accent. The *Vār.* on this rule, अव्यये नञ् ... etc. states that only the अव्ययs नञ्, कु and निपात retain their accent. Now if the निपातसंज्ञा is discarded, the word निपात in this *Vār.* must be replaced by the list of those words which were called निपात. The list being long, the fault of गौरव entails. However, according to the author of the *Dīp.* this objection is not correct, because one can simply say चादि in the place of निपात. It is not necessary to mention the whole list.

There is, however, one difficulty in accepting this proposal. The word चादि may refer to, as already pointed out in [2. 3], only five words as it does in P. 8. 1. 24. How to avoid this undesired interpretation of चादि? The author's reply to this question is that the very *Vār.* अव्यये नञ्कु ... etc. has been already rejected by the *Vārttikakāra* himself by offering alternative *Vār*-s. The *Vār.* mentioned above is mainly intended to prohibit the application of P. 6. 2. 2 to अव्ययs ending in क्त्वा. The *Vārttikakāra* suggests that this prohibition can be achieved either by a simple *Vār.* क्त्वायां प्रतिषेधः '(the statement made by P. 6. 2. 2) is rejected in case of क्त्वा ', or by accepting तत्पुरुष compounds such as स्नात्वाकालक etc. with the correct accent as निपातनs. Since the above *Vār.* itself is rejected there is no point in raising an objection against the words used in that *Vār.*

* * *

taddhitaś cāsarvavibhaktiḥ / P. 1. 1. 38

Summary: The rule prescribes अव्ययसंज्ञा to all the words formed with a Taddhita suffix, that are used only in some cases, e. g. यत्र, ततः etc. However, The *Vārttikakāra* understands the word असर्वविभक्तिः as न सर्वा विभक्तिः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्य सः ' that (तद्धित) for the derivation of which all the case-endings

are not a cause' and finding the above definition too narrow, proposes two additional statements of the अव्ययसंज्ञा : (1) An अविभक्तिनिमित्त (that, for the derivation of which no case-ending is a cause) तद्धित is called अव्यय, and (2) the तद्धित words ending in त्रल् etc. are alled अव्यय. For the derivation of the तद्धित words विना and नाना, no specific case is required; they are therefore सर्वविभक्ति. Similarly, P. 5. 3. 14: इतराभ्योऽपि दृश्यन्ते implies that the suffixes त्रल् etc. are added to words also ending in the cases other than those mentioned in the rules teaching those suffixes; therefore words ending in त्रल् etc. also are सर्वविभक्ति. Hence the above two additional statements. Further, the Vārttikakāra himself finds fault with his additional statement about अविभक्तिनिमित्त तद्धित and proposes another statement: अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् (अव्ययम्) 'that which is without gender and without number is called अव्यय'. Although this new definition can cover all the तद्धित words which are desired to be called an अव्यय the *Vārttikakāra* finally rejects even this definition on the basis of the enumeration of all तद्धितs in the स्वरादि list.

Pat. first takes up the first additional statement made by Kātyāyana, namely, an अविभक्तिनिमित्त (Taddhita) is called अव्यय, and removes the fault with regard to it by invoking the principle of the basic nature of a word. He further justifies the word असर्वविभक्ति: in the rule by interpreting it in such a way that it can cover all the तद्धितs intended to be called an अव्यय. Finally, he removes the remaining difficulties by proposing that अव्यय is an अन्वर्थसंज्ञा, a significant name.

The author of the *Dīp.* first discusses whether the name अव्यय is applicable to the तद्धित suffix or to a word ending in a तद्धित suffix and concludes that the latter is called अव्यय. He then discusses different meanings of the word असर्वविभक्ति. He opens a controversy as to whether the अव्ययसंज्ञा applies to a तद्धित suffix or a word ending in a तद्धित suffix, and concludes that either way it makes no difference. The author of the *Dīp.* explains the terms असर्वविभक्ति, अविभक्तिनिमित्त, अलिङ्ग etc. as they are understood by Kāt. and Pat. with sufficient illustrations from usage. He also shows how the rule is rejected by accepting alternative definitions. Finally अव्यय is accepted as a significant term as suggested by Pat. While discussing statements in the *Mbh.* the author also throws light on various grammatical notions such as उपसंख्यान, प्रातिपदिकार्थ, शब्दाकृति, अर्थाकृति and अपभ्रंश.

[1. 1]

Since the rule mentions the word तद्धित, a question is raised whether the अव्ययसंज्ञा is given to the तद्धित suffix or to a word ending in a तद्धित suffix. The reply is given that according to the *Paribhāṣā* (प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात्स विहितस्तदादेस्तदन्तस्य च ग्रहणम्, *Pari.* No. 23), whenever a प्रत्यय is mentioned it stands

for that phonetic sequence which begins with that stem to which the suffix is added and ends with that suffix. Therefore, the word तद्धित here stands for तद्धितान्त 'a word ending in a तद्धित suffix'.

[1.2]

1. ननु च संज्ञाविधौ etc. An objection is raised against the above interpretation of the word तद्धित by invoking another *Paribhāṣā*, namely, संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिर्नास्ति (*Pari.* No. 27). According to this *Pari.* if a प्रत्यय is mentioned in a rule of definition, it does not stand for the word ending in that प्रत्यय. Since the present rule is a संज्ञाविधि 'a rule of definition', the word तद्धित in the rule cannot stand for तद्धितान्त.

2. एवं तर्हि औपसंख्यानिकः etc. Another rule is resorted to in order to obtain the अव्ययसंज्ञा for तद्धितान्त. According to the *Vār.* 8 on P. 1. 1. 72, *tadantavidhi* is recommended in the definitions of *sarvanāman* and *avyaya*. Therefore, just as the सर्वनामसंज्ञा is applicable to words like परमोच्चैः 'very high', परमनीचैः 'very low' etc. which end in words mentioned in the सर्वादि list, it is also possible to give the अव्ययसंज्ञा to a word ending in a तद्धित suffix.

[1.3]

What is achieved by making the अव्ययसंज्ञा applicable to a word ending in a तद्धित suffix rather than to the suffix itself? The author replies this question by means of an illustration. The words यत्र and तत्र are तद्धित derivatives. The तद्धित suffix त्रल् is added to the pronouns यद् and तद् ending in the locative (P. 5. 3. 10):

यत्+ङि+त्रल्		तत्+ङि+त्रल्
यत्+त्र	←— (P. 2. 4. 71) —→	तत्+त्र
यश्+त्र	←— (P. 7. 2. 102) —→	तश्+त्र
यत्र	←— (P. 6. 1. 97) —→	तत्र

After the words are thus derived, the case ending is added after them:

यत्र+स्	,,	तत्र+स्

The case-ending is elided by P. 2. 4. 82: अव्ययादाप्-सुपः. If the अव्ययसंज्ञा is given to the तद्धित suffix त्र the elision of स् will not take place, because P. 2. 4. 82 is effective only where a case ending is added to an अव्यय. In the above example the case-ending स् is added to the whole words यत्र and तत्र and not to the mere suffix त्र. Therefore, it is necessary to give the अव्ययसंज्ञा to the word ending in the तद्धित suffix rather than to the suffix itself.

Here it should be noted that the tradition distinguishes between two relations, one conveyed by the word पर and the other conveyed by the word विहित.

In the above examples the case-ending सु which immediately follows त्र holds a relation of पर (following) with the suffix त्र, whereas it holds the relation of विहित (prescribed or added to) in connection with यत्र or तत्र.

[1. 4]

An objection is raised here against the illustrations यत्र and तत्र cited in the preceding paragraph. The objector claims that the elision of the case-ending after the words यत्र and तत्र is possible simply by the force of the अव्ययसंज्ञा itself, which would otherwise be redundant. The author replies that the अव्ययसंज्ञा will not be redundant. It has other purposes to serve, e. g. the addition of the तद्धित suffix अकच् (P. 5. 3. 71) which is prescribed after an अव्यय. There is thus no point in giving undue weight to the अव्ययसंज्ञा in order to discard the application of तदन्तविधि.

[1. 5]

Another objection is raised against the view that a तद्धितान्त word is called अव्यय. Assuming that the word असर्वविभक्तिः means न सर्वा विभक्तयः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तम् अस्य ' that for the production of which all case-endings are not the cause ' the objector says that if the अव्ययसंज्ञा is given to the whole (i. e. the group of the stem and the following तद्धित suffix together), the adjective असर्वविभक्तिः which qualifies the word तद्धितः in the present rule cannot be justified. For instance P. 5. 3. 10 : सप्तम्यास्त्रल् teaches that the suffix त्रल् is added to a word ending in the locative. Since त्रल् is caused by only one case, viz. सप्तमी, त्रल् is असर्वविभक्ति ' not caused by all case-endings '. It is thus the तद्धित suffix and not the whole word which is असर्वविभक्ति. Therefore, असर्वविभक्ति can be an adjective of the तद्धित itself, not of the *taddhitānta*. In the constituent analysis न सर्वा विभक्तयः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्य the term उत्पत्ति is to be understood as विधान ' prescription '. The suffixes त्रल्, त्रस् etc. are prescribed by referring to specific cases such as the ablative and the locative. They are there असर्वविभक्ति.

[1. 6]

1. The above objection is removed by saying that the adjective असर्वविभक्तिः can be connected with the part i. e. the तद्धित suffix, if it cannot be connected with the whole, i. e. the तद्धितान्त word. The word असर्वविभक्ति is thus to be interpreted as असर्वविभक्त्यवयव ' that whose part is असर्वविभक्ति '. The present rule thus means that a तद्धितान्त word, whose part (i. e. the तद्धित suffix) is असर्वविभक्ति ' not caused by all cases ', is called अव्यय. There is thus no difficulty in accepting तदन्तविधि.

2. नास्ति विशेषः प्रत्यये संज्ञिनि etc. Finally, the author suggests that the merits and demerits involved in both the views—the तद्धित suffix is called अव्यय

or a तद्धितान्त word is called अव्यय—are equal. If the अव्ययसंज्ञा is given to a तद्धित suffix, there is the difficulty of effecting elision of case-ending as pointed out above. If, on the other hand, the अव्ययसंज्ञा is given to a तद्धितान्त word, there is the difficulty of construing the adjective असर्वविभक्ति. Thus both the views are equally defective. One is free to opt for either.

[2. 1]

1. The word असर्वविभक्ति has been interpreted in two ways: (1) न सर्वा विभक्तयः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्य (explained above in 1. 5); (2) न सर्वा विभक्तिः अस्मात् 'that after which all case-endings are not added'. The author while pointing out the difference between the two says that while विभक्ति is the cause in the first interpretation, it is the result in the second. According to the first view तद्धित suffixes in the derivatives such as यत्र, तत्र, यतः, पुरस्तात् etc. are prescribed with specific case-endings as the condition. They are not added when any other case-ending follows the stem. The specific case-endings which are असर्व (not all) are thus the cause of the addition of those suffixes. In the second view, however, the तद्धित derivatives are असर्वविभक्ति in the sense that they are used not in all cases but only in some specific cases. For instance, the तद्धित form पुरस्तात् is used only in the nominative, the ablative and the locative according to P. 5. 3. 27. The specific case endings which are असर्वाः 'not-all' are thus the result whereas the तद्धित suffix itself is the cause.

2. अर्थोपप्रदर्शनमेतत्. The constituent analysis, namely, न सर्वा विभक्तयः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्य in the first view cannot be accepted, because a बहुव्रीहि of असमानाधिकरण 'non-coreferential' words is not possible. There is no सामानाधिकरण्य 'correferentiality' between असर्वा विभक्तिः and उत्पत्तौ. Moreover, the word उत्पत्ति is not a constituent of the compound असर्वविभक्ति. Therefore, the author remarks that the constituent analysis is not to be taken seriously. It is just an elucidation of the meaning of the compound and not its constituent analysis in the strict sense. The proper constituent analysis would simply be असर्वा विभक्तिः अस्य 'that which does not have all case-endings'.

3. पञ्चम्या प्रदर्शनम् etc. In the second view also the constituent analysis, namely न सर्वा विभक्तिः अस्मात् 'that after which all case-endings are not (added)' is not correct. The author explains this as follows: the बहुव्रीहि compound असर्वविभक्तिः is formed by P. 2. 2. 24: अनेकमन्यपदार्थे, and the *Vār.* 5 on P. 2. 2. 25: मत्वर्थे वा पूर्वस्य विधानात् remarks that this बहुव्रीहि conveys the same sense that is conveyed by the तद्धित suffix मतुप् (P. 5. 2. 29). Since the meaning of मतुप् contains the genitive or the locative, the constituent analysis of the present बहुव्रीहि must contain either genitive or locative. The use of the ablative अस्मात् in the constituent analysis has thus no justification,

The author therefore says that the expression न सर्वा विभक्तयोऽस्मात् is not the constituent analysis; it is just the exposition of the meaning of the compound. He further remarks that the constituent analysis in this view also would be the same as in the first view, i. e. न सर्वा विभक्तयः अस्य 'that which does not have all case-endings'. For further discussion on the *Vār.* मत्वर्थे ... see part I of the *Dīpikā*, Āhnika VI, 1986, Note no. 1. 9. 2, p. 93).

[2. 2]

1. उपसरजः, मन्दुरजः etc. These are the counter-examples. If the word तद्धितः is absent in the rule, the अव्ययसंज्ञा will be wrongly applicable to any word derived by a suffix caused by — not all but – a specific case-ending. The forms उपसरजः and मन्दुरजः are derived from the root जन् preceded by the उपपद्स (1) उपसरे and (2) मन्दुरे (both in the locative) with the addition of the suffix ड according to P. 3. 2. 97 : सप्तम्यां जनेर्डः. Since the rule mentions the specific case namely सप्तमी as the condition for the addition of the suffix ड, it is असर्वविभक्ति. Therefore, by the present rule the अव्ययसंज्ञा would wrongly apply to the derivatives उपसरज and मन्दुरज. Consequently, elision of the case-ending after both these forms would wrongly apply and undesired forms (उपसरजम् instead of उपसरजः) would result. However, if the word तद्धितः is mentioned in the rule, this fault of over-application does not result. The suffix ड is a कृत्, and not a तद्धित suffix. Therefore, the अव्ययसंज्ञा by the rule तद्धितश्चासर्वविभक्ति does not apply to the above forms.

It must be remembered here that the above objection of overapplication is correct according to the first interpretation of the word असर्वविभक्तिः, namely, न-सर्वा विभक्तयः उत्पत्तौ निमित्तमस्य ।

2. यश्च विभक्तेरनन्तरः ... An objection may be raised against the objection stated above. The objector says that the forms उपसरजः and मन्दुरजः cannot be regarded as counter-examples since the specific case-ending which is the cause of the production of the suffix ड does not immediately precede the suffix ड. The word असर्वविभक्तिः implies a close conjunction without intervention between the specific case ending which is the cause and the suffix which is the result. For instance, the form यत्र is derived from यत्+ङि+त्रल् where the locative ending ङि and the तद्धित suffix त्रल् are closely connected. On the contrary, the form उपसरज is derived from उपसर+ङि+जन्+ड where जन् is intervening between ङि and ड. The author replies that the word असर्वविभक्ति means that which is caused by not all (but a specific) case-ending which may be either immediately preceding or intervened by some other element. In other words, it is not implied here that the case-ending must immediately precede. The objection that the forms उपसरजः and मन्दुरजः would wrongly come under the scope of the अव्ययसंज्ञा thus stands.

[2. 3]

1. कथमिदं प्रत्युदाहरणम् etc. This passage contains a discussion about the purpose of the word असर्वविभक्तिः in the present rule. Some grammarians cite तद्धित forms like औपगवः, कापटवः etc. as counter-examples of the word असर्वविभक्ति. औपगवः is derived from उपगु+ङस्+अण् in the sense उपगोः अपत्यम् 'Upagu's offspring' (P. 4. 1. 92). Since all case-endings are added to the form औपगव, it is सर्वविभक्ति. If the word असर्वविभक्ति is absent in the rule any तद्धित form would wrongly get the अव्ययसंज्ञा. The name thus being wrongly applicable to सर्वविभक्ति, तद्धितs must be restricted by mentioning the word असर्वविभक्तिः in the rule. Here the author introduces an objection against these counter-examples. Even after the mention of the word असर्वविभक्तिः in the present rule, the अव्यय-संज्ञा still applies to the words औपगवः, कापटवः etc., because the rule by which the तद्धित suffix अण् is prescribed contains a mention of only genitive. In P. 4. 1. 92 : तस्यापत्यम् the word तस्य implies that the suffix अण् is added after a word ending in the genitive. Therefore अण् is असर्वविभक्ति. Thus the अव्ययसंज्ञा wrongly applies to words like औपगव and कापटव which are derived by the असर्वविभक्ति-तद्धित suffix अण्.

The author's reply to this objection is that although the rule तस्यापत्यम् contains mention of the genitive, it is not directly mentioned, but implied by the word तस्य. The word असर्वविभक्तिः is to be interpreted as that which is caused by not-all (i. e. specific) cases which is directly mentioned (शब्दरूपेण आश्रिता) and not implied (अर्थरूपेण आश्रिता). The author further cites illustrations of a directly mentioned विभक्ति, such as प्रतियोगे पञ्चम्यास्तसिः (P. 5. 4. 44) 'the suffix तसि is added after a word ending in the ablative if it is connected with प्रति.' Here विभक्ति is directly mentioned by the word पञ्चम्याः.

2. इह दोषः etc. The author points out a fault in the view that the direct mention of a विभक्ति is implied by the word असर्वविभक्ति. P. 5. 3. 23 : प्रकारवचने थाल् teaches the addition of the suffix थाल् after a word conveying the meaning 'kind' or 'way'. The rule does not contain a direct mention of any specific case. Therefore, थाल् is not असर्वविभक्ति. Consequently, अव्ययसंज्ञा will not be applicable to forms such as यथा and तथा.

3. The line शब्दरूपेण मिदं (?) विभक्तिः ... etc. is difficult to interpret. Perhaps some letters between रूपेण and मिदं have slipped.

[2. 4]

1. The fault of overapplication was shown in the preceding paragraph. It was based on the assumption of the first of the two interpretations of असर्व-विभक्तिः. Here the author first tries to answer the objection by offering a different interpretation and then re-establishes it.

2. अणयं सर्वा विभक्तीः etc. Although the तद्धित suffix अण् taught by P. 4. 1. 92 : तस्यापत्यम् is conditioned by only genitive and hence असर्वविभक्ति, it is taught by many other rules containing a mention of other cases also, e. g. P. 4. 3. 53 : तत्र भवः 'being there' contains a reference to the locative, whereas P. 4. 3. 74 : तत आगतः 'arrived from that (place)' contains a reference to the ablative. If it is argued that the dative is not mentioned as a condition for अण्, that is not correct, because P. 4. 4. 66 : तदस्मै दीयते नियुक्तम् 'that is given to him invariably' contains a reference to the dative. Thus the suffix अण् being सर्वविभक्ति, the fault of the overapplication of the अव्ययसंज्ञा extending to औपगवः, कापटवः etc., which are derived from अण्, does not stand.

3. दाक्षिरिति इञ् etc. The author here offers another illustration as a counter-example of असर्वविभक्ति. The word दाक्षि 'offspring of Dakṣa' is derived from दक्ष with the addition of the तद्धित suffix इञ् in the sense तस्यापत्यम् 'his offspring' by P. 4. 1. 95 : अत इञ्. Since the few rules which prescribe इञ् do not contain a reference to all case-endings, but only to the genitive, इञ् is असर्वविभक्ति. Therefore, the अव्ययसंज्ञा wrongly applies to words ending in इञ् such as दाक्षि. इञ् is prescribed by P. 3. 3. 110, 4. 1. 95, 153 and 173.

The argument of the author is somewhat loose. In the first place, he does not provide illustrations for all the cases being the cause of अण्. He cites only four rules, containing a reference to the dative, the ablative, the genitive and the locative. What about the other cases? Secondly, the statement इञ् अपत्ये एव विहितः 'इञ् is taught only in the sense of offspring' is not correct. In fact, P. 4. 2. 80 : वुञ्छण्कठ ... etc. prescribes इञ् in four different meanings other than the अपत्यार्थ.

[2. 5]

1. Here the author points out that according to one view any तद्धित can be described as सर्वविभक्ति. The वृत्तिकार holds that a तद्धित suffix is added to a प्रातिपदिक. Another view is that a तद्धित suffix is added to a सुबन्त 'inflected word'. In fact, the Pāṇinian Pari.: समर्थानां प्रथमाद् वा (P. 4. 1. 82) implies that a तद्धित suffix is added to a सुबन्त, However, although it is added to a सुबन्त, the case-ending is dropped (P. 2. 4. 71) and virtually it is appended to a प्रातिपदिक. Thus both the views — प्रातिपदिकात् तद्धित उत्पद्यते and सुबन्तात् तद्धितोत्पत्तिः — are acceptable. Therefore, सर्वविभक्तित्व or otherwise cannot be decided on the basis of that. Moreover, any सुबन्त which is the srarting point of a तद्धित derivative is further reduced to a प्रातिपदिक. For instance, दशरथस्य is reduced to दशरथ in the process of derivation. And since no specific case-ending operates as a cause of a तद्धित derivative, any तद्धित form can be described as सर्वविभक्ति (i. e. not असर्वविभक्ति).

2. अस्मिंस्तु यो दोषः etc. If this view about सर्वविभक्ति is accepted, तद्धित forms like विना, नाना etc. cannot be called अव्यय. P. 5. 2. 27 : विनञ्भ्यां नानाजौ नसह teaches that the suffixes ना and नाञ् are added to the prepositions वि and न respectively when they convey a not-being-together. The derived forms विना and नाना are not caused by any specific case. Moreover, any case-ending can be added to them. Therefore they are सर्वविभक्ति. Consequently they have to be excluded from the अव्ययसंज्ञा.

[2.6]

1. अविभक्तिरिति etc. The *Vārttikakāra* points out the fault of अव्याप्ति 'non-application' (i. e. a too narrow definition) if the present rule is interpreted as meaning 'that तद्धित which is caused by non all (i. e. a few specific) case endings is called अव्यय.' He states that the अव्ययसंज्ञा taught by this rule does not cover indeclinables such as विना and नाना, because no specific case is the case of the addition of the तद्धित suffixes ना and नाञ् after the indeclinables वि and नञ्. In order to remove this fault the Vārttikakāra makes an additional statement : अविभक्तिनिमित्तः अव्ययं भवति 'that which is not caused by any case-ending is (also) called an अव्यय'. This additional statement takes care of तद्धित forms such as विना and नाना.

2. तत्राविभक्तिनिमित्तमिति कथम् etc. The author offers different possible meanings of the word अविभक्तिनिमित्त. The first meaning is अविद्यमानविभक्तिः निमित्तम् अस्य 'that for which a word devoid of a case-ending is the cause'. If this meaning is accepted, तद्धित forms like औपगव also will wrongly get the name अव्यय. The form औपगव is derived from the प्रातिपदिक *upagu* with the addition of the suffix अण् (P. 4. 1. 92). According to the view प्रातिपदिकात् तद्धितोत्पत्तिः, any तद्धित derivation can be described as अविभक्तिनिमित्त. Thus the अव्ययसंज्ञा will wrongly apply to all तद्धितs. In order to avoid this difficulty a second interpretation is offered viz.: अश्रूयमाणविभक्तिः निमित्तम् अस्य 'that which is caused by a word after which no case-ending is heard'. The words like उपगु are not अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति, because they are inflected for all cases. Therefore, the अव्ययसंज्ञा does not apply to औपगव etc. On the other hand, the indeclinables such as वि and न are not inflected and therefore they are अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति. The अव्ययसंज्ञा stated by the *Vārttika* thus correctly applies to them. However, if this meaning is accepted, the अव्ययसंज्ञा is wrongly extended to some other words ending in a Taddhita such as नित्य. The word नित्य is derived from the indeclinable नि with the suffix त्य (P. 4. 2. 104). Since नि is an indeclinable it is also अश्रूयमाण-विभक्ति. Further, a third interpretation of अविभक्तिनिमित्त, namely, अनाश्रितविभक्ति-विशेषः निमित्तम् अस्य 'that which is caused by a word which does not take any specific case' is offered. However, even this meaning is not free from fault. If it is accepted, the अव्ययसंज्ञा wrongly applies to the तद्धित's like विशंकट 'a giant'.

The word is derived by adding the तद्धित suffix शंकटच् to the indeclinable वि according to P. 5. 2. 28. Since वि does not take any specific case-ending, the form विशंकट can be described as अविभक्तिनिमित्त and, as a result, becomes subject to the अव्ययसंज्ञा. To sum up, all the three interpretations of the term अविभक्तिनिमित्त are faulty and therefore unacceptable.

3. तस्मान्नायं पाठः etc. If none of the meanings of अविभक्तिनिमित्त is acceptable, what is the purpose of the *Vār.*? The author's reply to this question is that the *Vār.* does not offer a different text of the rule. In other words, it does not state a different rule. It simply points to the additional words listed in the *gaṇapāṭha*. The *Vār.* implies that the words additionally listed in the *gaṇapāṭha* are called अव्यय when they are अविभक्तिनिमित्त. This means that the words which the Vārttikakāra intends to include in the category of अव्यय by means of his *Vār.* should be listed in the *gaṇapāṭha*.

4. सूत्रार्थान्तरे तु etc. The above reply is just an alternative interpretation of the उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक. Finally, the author points out that even the listing of the additional words in the *gaṇapāṭha* is not required if the present rule is interpreted differently. The final interpretation which covers all the indeclinables is given at the end of the *Mbh.*

[2. 7]

This passage contains a discussion on the meaning of the word उपसंख्यान. The objector argues that since उपसंख्यान usually means an additional statement made by the Vārttikakāra as supplementary to a *sūtra*, it cannot be rendered simply as पाठ 'listing' or 'mention'. In reply to this objection the author says that the word उपसंख्यान is used in the sense of listing also. For instance, the word किम् is already mentioned in the सर्वादि list and it is therefore a सर्वनामन्. Even then it is separately mentioned in the rule किं सर्वनामबहुभ्योऽद्व्यादिभ्यः (P. 5. 3. 2). Here the Vārttikakāra justifies the separate mention of किम् as follows : द्व्यादिपर्युदासात् किम उपसंख्यानम् 'the mention of किम् is due to the exclusion of द्व्यादि'. He means that since the above rule contains the word अद्व्यादिभ्यः 'after those other than द्वि etc.' and since किम् is included in द्व्यादि, the suffix taught by the above rule would not be added to किम्. However, it is desired. Therefore, separate mention of किम् is made in the rule. In the *Vār.* द्व्यादिपर्युदासात् ... the word उपसंख्यान means mention or listing. Thus Kāt. is found to be using the word उपसंख्यान in the sense of a mere mention also.

[2. 8]

It was stated at the end of [2. 6] that the उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक points to the गणपाठ which contains additional listing of those words which are अविभक्तिनिमित्त, since they are not covered by the rule तद्धिताश्च .... Now the objector asks:

What is the purpose of the *sūtra* if all the अव्ययs are being listed in the गणपाठ? The author replies that the *sūtra* is a लक्षण 'definition' of अव्यय, whereas the गणपाठ is meant for प्रपञ्च 'elaboration'. Since both are complementary to each other, both are mentioned.

[2. 9]

1. The fault of redundancy pointed out by the objector in the preceding passage is here removed by offering another solution. The अव्ययसंज्ञा is already applicable to all असर्वविभक्तितद्धितs by the rule तद्धितश्चा .... The उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक is meant for sush words as विना, नाना etc. which are not covered by the Pāṇinian rule. The उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक prescribes the अव्ययसंज्ञा to such words without taking note of the गणपाठ. It is thus necessary for विना, नाना etc.

2. विभक्तिविशेषस्य etc. Why are the words विना and नाना not covered by the Pāṇinian rule? The reply is: because they are not असर्वविभक्ति, but सर्वविभक्ति. How are they सर्वविभक्ति? The author replies that since no specific case is required for the addition of the suffixes ना and नाञ् after वि and नञ् respectively, all the case endings are produced by the general rule स्वौजस ... (P. 4. 1. 2). It is only after they are produced that restrictions such as बहुषु बहुवचनम् (P. 1. 4. 21), कर्मणि द्वितीया (P. 2. 3. 2) etc. apply. In this sense विना and नाना are सर्वविभक्ति. Therefore they cannot become अव्यय by this rule. Hence the *Vār.*

3. विशंकटादयोऽप्येवं etc. Like विना and नाना, other तद्धित derivatives such as विशंकट also can be wrongly called अव्यय since they are अविभक्तिनिमित्त. The *Vār.* which is meant to take care of words like विना and नाना thus extends to विशंकट etc. which is undesired. According to the author a solution was offered to avoid this over-application in an earlier passage [2. 6], which contains a reference to विशंकट and the solution is the additional mention in the गणपाठ of such words as are not covered by the rule तद्धितश्चा .... In other words, विशंकट does not become an अव्यय due to its non-mention in the गणपाठ. However, the real answer would be that विशंकट is not असर्वविभक्ति in the sense that all case-endings are added to it. The final interpretation of the word सर्वविभक्ति thus can remove the over-application.

[2. 10]

1. सूत्रार्थान्तरे etc. The अव्ययसंज्ञा is applicable to विना and नाना if a different interpretation of the word असर्वविभक्ति is accepted. सर्वविभक्ति means that to which all case endings are added. Since all case-endings are not added after विना and नाना, they are असर्वविभक्ति and hence अव्यय. The अव्ययसंज्ञा being thus already applicable to विना and नाना, what is the purpose of the *Vār.*?

The last few words in the MS make a difficult reading. AL read the MS यस्यष्टति as यस्य स्पष्टार्था.

The word सूत्रार्थान्तर can be understood in two ways: (1) A different meaning of असर्वविभक्ति as described above, or (2) a different interpretation of the rule द्वयेकयोः... (P. 1. 4. 22) proposed by Pat. later in his *Mbh.* Out of these two, the first one is already explained above. According to the second, the (nominative) singular ending is generally added as a rule to any *prātipadika.* Therefore, it will be added also to an अव्यय. Since dual and plural endings are not added to अव्यय, it is असर्वविभक्ति and therefore अव्यय. In this context सर्वविभक्तिः is to be understood as the whole case with all the three endings conveying three numbers. Any case, nominative for instance, is सर्वा विभक्तिः. Consequently, असर्वविभक्ति means that to which not all the three endings of a case are added. This point will be more clear later.

[2. 11]

While explaining the first *Vār.* on the present rule Pat. has pointed out that the उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक is necessary to give the name अव्यय to विना and नाना. Further, the second *Vār.* explains why विना and नाना are not covered by the Pāṇinian अव्ययसंज्ञा. The suffixes ना and नाञ् have the same final form, namely ना. Therefore, Pat. refers to both together as एषः (this) in singular. The suffix *nā* is, according to Pat., सर्वविभक्ति. The reason is that it is not stated with reference to any specific case-ending (अविशेषेण विहितत्वात्). The author of the *Dip.* here offers two interpretations of this statement. According to him सर्वविभक्ति means that which is not असर्वविभक्ति. This is possible in two ways: (1) That which is produced by adding all the cases is सर्वविभक्ति, and (2) that which is produced by adding none is also सर्वविभक्ति. And असर्वविभक्ति is that which is neither of the two.

Since the तद्धित suffix ना (ना/नाञ्) is not stated with reference to any case-ending (in other words, since no case ending is mentioned in the rule that prescribes ना) it is not असर्वविभक्ति. Since it is thus सर्वविभक्ति (other than असर्वविभक्ति) according to the second interpretation it cannot be covered by the Pāṇinian rule. According to the first interpretation also विना and नाना are सर्वविभक्ति, because the indeclinables वि and न are entitled to get any case ending by the rule स्वौजसमौट्... (P. 4. 1. 2) since they are प्रातिपदिक. Since indeclinables are not connected with number, gender, or कारक, all the 21 case-endings are added to them without any restriction. वि and न are thus सर्वविभक्ति according to the first interpretation. Pat. has, however, elsewhere referred to the एकवाक्यतापक्ष according to which addition of a singular case-ending is a general statement while other case-endings referring to different numbers and

कारक्s are specific. Therefore only a singular case-ending (that too, nominative,) is added to indeclinables. Indeclinables such as वि, नञ् etc. would therefore be, in this view, असर्वविभक्ति. Kaiyaṭa in his *Pradīpa* has pointed out that this view is abandoned by Pat. while accounting for the सर्वविभक्ति character of the suffixes ना and नाञ्. It should also be noted that the word सर्वविभक्ति sometimes qualifies the तद्धित suffix while at other times it qualifies the stem. In the final interpretation it qualifies the तद्धित derivative.

[2. 12]

The third *Vār.* is again an उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक. The word आदि in the compound त्रलादि mentioned in this *Vār.* should not be understood as meaning 'beginning', because in that case त्रलादि would mean those suffixes beginning with त्रल् (P. 5. 3. 10) and therefore would not include तसिल् (P. 5. 3. 7) which is taught prior to त्रल्. Therefore the author remarks that the word आदि should be interpreted as meaning 'kind'. त्रलादि thus means 'त्रल् and the like'. Since Pat. himself has mentioned the words यतः and ततः (which end in तसिल्) as illustrations of त्रलादि, it is necessary to include तसिल् in the त्रलादि list.

[2. 13]

1. An objection is here raised against the उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक accounting for त्रलादिs. The objector argues that since the suffixes त्रल् तसिल् etc. are stated with reference to specific case-endings सप्तम्यास्त्रल् (P. 5. 3. 10) and पञ्चम्यास्तसिल् (P. 5. 3. 7) — they are असर्वविभक्ति and hence they have the name अव्यय already by the Pāṇinian definition. The उपसंख्यान is thus redundant. Pat. answers this objection by referring to P. 5. 3. 14: इतराभ्योऽपि दृश्यन्ते which means that these suffixes are added to words ending in other cases too. Therefore, they are सर्वविभक्ति. Hence the necessity of their उपसंख्यान.

2. अभिप्रायः. The author further clarifies the reply given by Pat. He says that Pat. has stated in his *Bhāṣya* on P. 5. 3. 14 that these suffixes are added to words ending in all cases only when the derived तद्धित is connected with भवत् and a few other words (भवदादिभिर्योगे इति वक्तव्यम्). Otherwise the addition of these suffixes is restricted to the specific cases mentioned in the rules. The सर्वविभक्तित्व of the suffixes should thus be understood in a restricted context.

[2. 14]

1. The passage discusses the purpose of the definition अविभक्तिः अव्ययम् 'That which is devoid of a case ending is called अव्यय'. In fact, there is not a single प्रातिपदिक which is used without adding a case ending to it. Thus this definition would have no scope whatsoever. The author of the *Dīp.* therefore explains the meaning of the word अविभक्ति as अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति 'that after which

no case is heard'. The indeclinables are devoid of case-endings in actual usage. Although a case ending is added to them in the process of inflexion, it is dropped by the rule अव्ययादाप्सुपः (P. 2. 4. 82). Therefore the above definition fits well. However, another difficulty arises. If the definition is accepted, the अव्यय-संज्ञा will wrongly apply to any member of a compound, because while forming a compound of two finished words (पद्स) the case-endings added to them are dropped (P. 2. 4. 71) and thus they become अविभक्ति i. e. अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति. For instance, the constituent analysis of the compound राजपुरुषः is राज्ञः पुरुषः. It is derived as follows :

[राजन् ङस् पुरुष स्] स्	
[राजन् पुरुष] स्	P. 2. 4. 71.
[राज पुरुष] र्	P. 8. 2. 7, P. 8. 2. 66
राजपुरुषः	P. 8. 3. 15

Here the constituent राज may get the अव्ययसंज्ञा since it is अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति. And if it is an अव्यय the compound राजपुरुष will be wrongly accented on the last syllable of the first constituent, i. e. राज, according to P. 6. 2. 2: तत्पुरुषे तुल्यार्थ ... In actual usage, however, it is accented on the final syllable (राजपुरुषः) according to P. 6. 1. 223 : समासस्य. The definition अविभक्ति अव्ययम् thus incurs the fault of over-application.

2 समासान्तोदात्तत्वमलुक्समासेषु etc. One may argue here that if the above definition of अव्यय is accepted all the constituents of all compounds will get the अव्ययसंज्ञा and so the accent will be decided by P. 6. 2. 2. In that case P. 6. 1. 223 will find no scope and therefore it will be redundant. Therefore, in order to provide scope for P. 6. 1. 223, P. 6. 2. 2 should not be applied to compounds like राजपुरुषः. The author's reply to this objection is that P. 6. 1. 223 has a scope in compounds like दास्याःपुत्र where the case-ending is not elided according to P. 6. 3. 22.

3. परिगणनादप्येतत् etc. The author further points out that the *Vār.* अव्ये नञ्कु ... contains a list of अव्ययs which retain their accent when they occur as first constituents of a तत्पुरुष. Since words like राज are not included in this list, there is no difficulty of accent as was feared before.

[2. 15]

1. इदं तर्हि दधि मधिवति। Another objection is raised against the meaning अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति. If अविभक्ति is that the case-ending after which is not heard words like दधि, मधु etc. also will be called अव्यय. दधि and मधु are the forms of nominative and accusative singular of the stems दधि- and मधु- respectively. Since the case-endings added to these stems are dropped by P. 7. 1. 23, they become

अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति and, therefore, अव्यय. Consequently, the तद्धित suffix अकच् (P. 5. 3. 71) wrongly applies and undesirable forms like *दधकि (दध्+अक्+इ) emerge. The proper form should be दधिक by the addition of the तद्धित suffix क (P. 5. 3. 70).

2. एवं तर्हि शब्दाकृति etc. The author's reply to this objection is that the feature अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति is not to be understood in connection with individual words, but with the whole class. Although दधि is अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति in the nominative and accusative singular forms, in other forms, e. g. दध्ना, दधिभ्याम्, etc. it is not अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति. Therefore, considering the whole class of forms (शब्दाकृति) the feature अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति is not applicable to दधि. Therefore, the अव्ययसंज्ञा does not apply to it.

3. शब्दाकृतिग्रहणे चार्थाकृतिरपि etc. The whole class of forms of a stem referred to above also implies that all the forms must convey the same meaning (अर्थाकृति). For instance, the word इति has two different meanings although it has the same form (शब्दाकृति). It is an indeclinable meaning 'in this way' etc. It is also a primary derivative from the root इ with the suffix ति (P. 3. 3. 94) meaning 'going', or 'a cart'. The word इति cannot be called अव्यय in the second sense, because in that sense it is not अश्रूयमाणविभक्ति. — In the last line, the MS reads य॰जतिशकट॰ which we reconstruct as यथा इतिः शक॰ (AL as यथा विशंक॰) from the context.

[2. 16]

The Vārttikakāra points out the fault of interdependence involved in the definition of अव्यय offered by himself (अविभक्ति अव्ययम्). A question is here asked as to how to avoid that fault. The reply refers to the final answer given by Pat. in his *Mbh.* The feature अविभक्ति to is be understood in the context of usage and not in the context of grammatical derivation. All indeclinables are used without a case-ending in actual usage, although in grammar case-endings are added to them.

[2. 17]

1. The fault of interdependence mentioned in the *Vār.* (अविभक्तावितरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिः) is discussed in this passage. In fact, Pat. has very clearly stated the nature of the fault as follows: सत्यविभक्तिकत्वे संज्ञया भवितव्यम्, संज्ञया चाविभक्तित्वं भाव्यते, तदितरेतराश्रयं भवति. 'The name अव्यय should be there when absence of case-ending is there, and the absence of case-ending is caused by the name. Thus there is interdependence'. While explaining this statement the author of the *Dīp.* says that the fault of interdependence arises only in the context of grammar. The absence of विभक्ति is an evident characteristic of an अव्यय in the actual usage. If the definition is understood in the context of usage it means 'that which is devoid of a case-ending in usage is called अव्यय'. Here there is no

possibility of interdependence. However, in the grammatical context, any अव्यय is first a प्रातिपदिक and therefore it takes case-endings. It is only after a case-ending is added to an अव्यय, that its elision by P. 2. 4. 82 : अव्ययादाप्सुपः takes place. Thus the rule of elision is dependent upon the definition of अव्यय (अविभक्ति अव्ययम्) which in its turn is dependent upon that rule due to which the state of अविभक्ति results. The fault of interdependence results there in the grammatical context.

One may ask : Why does the grammar first prescribe addition of case-endings after अव्ययs and afterwards their elision ? Here the author gives a reply to this question. According to him the case endings are added to an अव्यय and then elided in order to confer the status of a पद on the अव्यय. According to P. 1. 4. 14 : सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् a पद is that which ends in a case-ending or a verbal ending. In fact, a case-ending is not actually added to an अव्यय. It is just on the imaginative level. The rule teaching the लुक् of अव्यय implies that the case-endings are not added or pronounced after an अव्यय. The imagination of the addition of case-endings after अव्ययs is thus for the sake of obtaining पदसंज्ञा for अव्ययs such as च, इति etc. in actual usage.

2. तद्यथा बभ्रुमण्डुलमकानाम् etc. The author gives an illustration of the words बभ्रु, मण्डु and लमक which are names of originators of Gotras. Different तद्धित suffixes such as य etc. are prescribed to these words in the sense तस्यापत्यम् 'his offspring'. Here the meaning 'offspring of बभ्रु' cannot be understood merely from the word बभ्रु without the addition of a तद्धित suffix. In the same manner the words विना, नाना etc. cannot convey any meaning unless a case-ending is added to them.

[2. 18]

The fault of interdependence was pointed out in connection with the definition अविभक्ति अव्ययम् offered by Kāt. Now he proposes another definition in the next *Vār.*, namely, अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् इति वा 'Or, that which is devoid of gender and devoid of number is called अव्यय'. While discussing this *Vār.* the author of the *Dip.* remarks that the word वा 'or' in this *Vār.* is unjustified, because the earlier alternative definition (अविभक्तिः अव्ययम्) implied by this option is not free from fault and is therefore unacceptable. Therefore, the word वा should not be understood to mean that Kāt. offers two alternative definitions of अव्यय The author proposes a different interpretation of this *Vār.* According to him, the words इतरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिः are understood by वा in this *Vār.* Thus the *Vār.* means that the definition अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् अव्ययम् is unjustified because of the same fault of interdependence. What he means is probably this : A word becomes devoid of gender and number after it gets the name अव्यय and it gets the name अव्यय if it is devoid of gender and number according to this new

definition. Thus there is the fault of interdependence. The author interprets the *Vār.* in the way described above in order to explain Pat.'s remark on this *Vār.*: एवमपि इतरेतराश्रयो भवति 'This (new definition) also suffers (from the fault of) interdependence'.

[2. 19]

The author of the *Dīp.* here offers a different interpretation of the definition अविभक्ति अव्ययम्. The word विभक्ति should not be here understood in its technical sense, i. e. case; it should be taken in its literal sense, i. e. division or difference. Gender, number and *kāraka* are the divisions (i. e. aspects) of a noun. The word अविभक्ति in the definition thus can be understood as meaning devoid of divisions such as gender and number. According to the author of the *Dīp.* the *Vār.* अलिङ्गमसंख्यमिति वा offers this new interpretation of the earlier definition अविभक्ति अव्ययम्. In other words, the word वा in this *Vār.* does not imply an optional definition, but rather an optional interpretation of the earlier definition.

This new interpretation of the *Vār.* is not acceptable, because the Vārttikakāra is hardly found to give an alternate interpretation of his own *Vār.* although Pat. occasionally does so. Moreover, there is no sufficient ground to reject the technical sense of the term विभक्ति. Lastly, an अव्यय is not devoid of कारक meanings. In sentences like स्वः तिष्ठति 'heaven stands', स्वर्गतः 'gone to heaven' etc. the indeclinable स्वर् is connected with different कारक functions.

[2. 20]

Earlier the *Vār.* अलिङ्गमसंख्यमिति वा was interpreted by continuing the words 'इतरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिः' from the preceding *Vār.*, as the definition अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् अव्ययम् also suffers from the fault of interdependence. In the preceding passage the same *Vār.* was explained as an alternative interpretation of the first definition. In this passage it is explained as an alternative definition of अव्यय. In order to establish this third view the author points out that the first interpretation of this *Vār.* mentioned above is not acceptable because there is no possibility of the fault of interdependence. The notions gender and number are related to the meaning rather than the form of a word and the *vyākaraṇa* has no concern with meaning. Therefore, the definition अलिङ्गमसंख्यमिति वा which is totally connected with the usage does not depend upon the rule of grammar prescribing loss of affixes after an indeclinable. The fault of interdependence thus does not hold. Pat. has discussed this point later.

[2. 21]

1. In this passage the author tries to establish the position of the पूर्वपक्षिन् who claims that this second definition of अव्यय also suffers from the

fault of interdependence. He speaks of two kinds of students : one, the विद्वस् 'learned' and the other, a व्युत्पित्सु 'a learner', *literally* 'one who desires to derive all features of linguistic behaviour from grammar'. It is the latter who sees the fault of interdependence in this definition. The notions of gender and number are grammatical and, therefore, according to him the features अलिङ्ग and असंख्य are dependent upon the rule of grammar.

2. यथा कर्त्रभिप्रायम् etc. An illustration is given here to explain the position of the व्युत्पित्सु who finds fault with the new definition of अव्यय. P. 1. 3. 72 : स्वरितञितः कर्त्रभिप्राये क्रियाफले implies the use of both आत्मनेपद and परस्मैपद in the case of roots having ञ् or स्वरित accent as an अनुबन्ध. As a matter of fact one can very clearly understand from usage that certain roots are conjugated in both आत्मनेपद and परस्मैपद. A व्युत्पित्सु, however, will approach grammar and come to know this from this rule alone. For a विद्वस्, on the other hand, the rule स्वरित ... is redundant. He resorts to usage rather than to grammar.

[2. 22]

1. Pat. has answered the objection against the new definition by saying that absence of gender and number in the case of an अव्यय is not ordained by a grammatical rule; it is rather natural : नेदं वाचनिकम् अलिङ्गता असंख्यता च। किं तर्हि? स्वाभाविकमेतत्। वाचनिक means obtained by a statement of grammar. What he means is that the nature of the language itself is such that the अव्ययs are used without gender and number. It is not because the rules of grammar prescribe this. Therefore, the fault of interdependence does not result here.

2. सर्वमेव स्वाभाविकं··· etc. The author here points out that Pat.'s statement : स्वाभाविकमेतत्, should not be taken seriously. There are some exceptions. For instance, although the eyes and feet of a person are always two, sometimes they are referred to in the plural e. g. अक्षीणि मे दर्शनीयानि 'my eyes are beautiful' or पादा मे सुकुमारतराः 'my feet are very tender'. Here the natural number would be dual, viz. अक्षिणी मे दर्शनीये। or पादौ मे सुकुमारतरौ. The author further cites the *Vār.* न वानिष्टादर्शनात् which implies that the grammar need not formulate rules for simple facts of language as long as they are not contradicted. For instance, it is not necessary to prescribe by rule that in compound राजपुरुषः the word राज should come prior to the word पुरुष, because, a different usage *पुरुषराज is never found.

3. तत्र शब्देष्वेव etc. The author has stated in the beginning of this passage that a rule of grammar is not necessary to prescribe what is intrinsic with the language. He showed by means of two illustrations that no rule is necessary to explain the natural order of words in forms like राजपुरुष and प्रपचति. Now he says that if no rule is required to explain the nature of words, why

should there be a rule to explain the nature of meaning? The notions of gender and number are related to the meaning of a word.

There is a slight confusion in understanding the text here. If we read अदृष्टव्यभिचारेषु instead of दृष्टव्यभिचारेषु as it appears in the MS, it would make a better sense.

'प्रतिदेषा' of the MS (*Dīp. p.* 6, *l.* 13) is corrupt. AL reconstruct प्रतिज्ञानादेषा which we follow, though it is not very satisfactory.

[2. 23]

After offering two definitions of an अव्यय in order to cover all the cases, finally the Vārttikakāra proposes a different solution by saying सिद्धं तु पाठात् '(the अव्ययसंज्ञा in all those cases where it is desired) is established by listing'. All the words which need to be called अव्यय should be enumerated in the गणपाठ. Kāt. offers this last solution because he feels that the earlier solutions in the form of two definitions suffer from the fault of interdependence. However, Pat. in his *Bhāṣya* has cleared away the fault of interdependence and thus established the definitions. Therefore, for him this third solution in the form of enumeration is only one more alternative. That is why he paraphrases the word तु in this *Vār.* as वा. Here the author of the *Dīp.* refers to this interpretation of Pat. and further remarks that it is not acceptable, because Pat. himself has finally rejected the two definitions of अव्यय and established पाठ as the ultimate solution: तस्मात् स्वरादिग्रहणं च कार्यं कृत्तद्धितानां ग्रहणं च पाठे। The author thus points out contradiction in Pat.'s own statements.

[2. 24]

1. In this passage the author describes those तद्धितs which are called अव्यय. These तद्धितs are listed in the पाठ given in the *Mbh.* as well as in the स्वरादि. The *Mbh.* reads: तसिलादयः प्राक् पाशपः। शसप्रभृतयः प्राक्समासान्तेभ्यः। मान्तः। तसिवती। कृत्वोर्थाः। नानाजौ। The स्वरादिपाठ reads: तसिलादिस्तद्धित एधाच्प्रत्ययान्तः। शस्तसौ। कृत्वसुच्। सुच्। आस्थालौ च्व्यर्थाश्च। अम्। आम्। प्रतान्। प्रशान्। The list given by Pat. contains additional mention of ना and नाञ् which take care of विना and नाना.

2. विश्वेमात्थाल् इति। etc. P. 5. 3. 111: प्रत्नपूर्वविश्वेमात्थाल् छन्दसि prescribes the addition of the suffix थाल् after प्रत्न, पूर्व, विश्व and इम. Since this rule is not covered by the range of rules mentioned in the पाठ, words like प्रत्नथा, पूर्वथा etc. cannot be called अव्यय. The author solves this difficulty by pointing out that the suffix थाल् taught by this rule is the same as the suffix थाल् taught by P. 5. 3. 23 which is covered by the above list. Although the author of the

Dīp. says : अयं वार्त्तिके नोपसंगृहीत, the list in which थाल् is absent belongs to the *Mbh.* and not to the *Vār.* See also below (3).

3. वार्त्तिके तु तद्धिताः प्रकृता इति etc. This line is misplaced in the MS. where it is read after यावन्मद्रात्परिवापणे डाच् इति। In our text, however, we have put it in its proper place after the sentence मान्तः अम् आम्। On Pat.'s statement viz. मान्तः is to be interpreted as the suffixes अम् and आम्, the author says that since Pat. has listed तद्धितs, the *kṛt* suffix आम् taught by P. 3. 1. 35 and the case-ending taught by P. 4. 1. 2 are not covered by the statement मान्तः. It is not clear why the author refers to the suffix as आमि while आम् is taught by P. 3. 1. 35 and P. 4. 1. 2. Similarly, he does not make a similar statement about अम् taught by P. 3. 4. 22, P. 3. 4. 101, and P. 4. 1. 2 which is also not covered by Pat.'s statement.

In this passage the author of the *Dīp.* refers to the *Vār.* at two places implying that the list is given by the Vārttikakāra. In the present text of the *Mbh.*, however, it is found in the *Mbh* , and not in the *Vār.* Does it mean that the list was known to the author of the *Dīp.* as a part of the *Vār.*?

[2. 25]

1. Pat. pointed out the fault of interdependence in connection with both the definitions proposed by Kāt. However, he removed this fault in connection with the definition अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् अव्ययम्. Later he also reestablished the first definition, अविभक्ति अव्ययम् by removing the fault. Here the author explains Pat.'s argument. According to the author, Pat. has already removed the fault of interdependence in connection with both the definitions by resorting to the meaning. Now Pat. again removes the fault by resorting to the word. The statement in the *Dīp.* अर्थाश्रये परिहृत्येतरेतराश्रयं ... etc. does not make much sense rather than what is stated above. In fact, Pat. does not twice refer to the fault of इतरेतराश्रय. In connection with the definition अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् he refers to the स्वाभाविक 'natural' character of लिङ्ग and संख्या and tacitly removes इतरेतराश्रय. In the next statement which is discussed in the present passage of the *Dīp.* he again refers to the usage and directly removes the fault in connection with the first definition. At both the places his argument is based on the usage. Therefore, it is not clear why the author makes the above remark (अर्थाश्रये परिहृत्य etc.). Further, the author seems to hold that in this very passage in the *Mbh.* first Pat. refers to शब्द and then to अर्थ. (Cf. अभिज्ञाश्च पुनर्लौकिकाः इति। अनेन अर्थावधारणाश्रयं समाधिमाह।). What appears to be Pat.'s argument can be briefly stated as follows : Although for grammarians अविभक्ति means that after which the विभक्ति (case-ending) is dropped, for a layman the word अविभक्ति simply means devoid of a case ending. Any ordinary person without the

knowledge of grammar makes use of अव्यय devoid of a case-ending, without being aware of the grammarians' doctrine that a case-ending is first added to an अव्यय and then dropped Thus the knowledge of grammar or of the grammatical concept of विभक्ति is not essential for the understanding of the definition of an अव्यय as well as its use. There is thus no interdependence. Pat. further refers to ordinary dealings among people and points out that ordinary people while purchasing a bull pay a certain price and pay the double price when they purchase two bulls. Although they do not know the grammatical concept of number, they carry out the transactions correctly. In the same manner, even without the knowledge of the concept of विभक्ति people use an अव्यय without a विभक्ति. It is thus the very nature of an अव्यय. The *Mbh.* reads: ये त्वेते वैयाकरणेभ्योऽन्ये मनुष्याः कथं तेऽविभक्तिकाञ्छब्दान् प्रयुञ्जते ? इति। अभिज्ञाश्च पुनर्लौकिका एकत्वादीनामर्थानाम्। आतश्चाभिज्ञाः। अन्येन हि वस्नेनैकं गां क्रीणन्ति अन्येन द्वावन्येन त्रीन्। अभिज्ञाश्च न च प्रयुञ्जते। तदेतदेवं संदृश्यताम् अर्थरूपमेवैतदेवंजातीयकं येनात्र विभक्तिर्न भवतीति।

2. न त्वयं शब्दप्रवृत्तौ etc. The author says that the illustration of the dealings in purchasing a bull is connected with actual practice rather than with the use of words. He gives another illustration which is connected with the use of words in the sentence यथापभ्रंशोच्चारणादिषु etc. Even those who utter words like वृक्ष incorrectly do not commit a mistake while mentioning the number. For instance, they may say *वक्क for वृक्ष but they never use *वक्कौ (dual) in the place of *वक्काः (plural). To sum up: The knowledge of number, gender etc. accompanies the knowledge of worldly objects, for which knowledge of grammar is not essential.

[2. 26]

Absence of number and gender in the case of an अव्यय was pointed out by Pat. by referring to usage. Further he establishes it by means of reasoning. He says that some अव्ययs primarily convey action whereas some others convey the meaning of cases. In both these respects there is absolutely no possibility of any connection with number or gender. Thus the absence of number and gender in connection with an अव्यय is established through reasoning. The *Mbh.* reads: तच्चाप्येतदेवमनुगम्यमानं दृश्यताम्। किंचिदव्ययं विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं किंचित् क्रियाप्रधानम्। ... न चैतयोरर्थयोर्लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां योगोऽस्ति।

In this passage, while commenting upon the *Mbh.* above, the author remarks that there are some अव्ययs which belong to neither of the two categories. The last two sentences in this passage are difficult to understand. It appears from the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa on this statement of Pat. that the author of the *Dīp.* means that some अव्ययs are neither विभक्त्यर्थप्रधान nor क्रियाप्रधान and yet

they are included in the category of अव्यय so that grammatical properties such as neuter gender, and अव्ययीभाव compound be applicable to them. The sentence कस्यचिच्च धर्मस्य प्राप्तिः आच्छाद्यते (? अन्वाख्यायते) can be thus interpreted in the light of Kaiyaṭa's remark as shown above. Read the *Pradīpa* !: तथा चात्र नपुंसकत्वमव्ययीभावश्चेत्यन्वाख्यायते।

[2. 27]

The author discusses the illustration of a विभक्त्यर्थप्रधान-अव्यय given by Pat. The अव्ययs उच्चैः 'high' and नीचैः 'low' are विभक्त्यर्थप्रधान. They convey अधिकरण 'location' which is the meaning of the locative case. The author refers to the view that शक्ति 'capacity' is the meaning of a case and remarks that since शक्ति is a non-substance, there is no scope for the connection of these अव्ययs with number or gender. For शक्ति as the meaning of कारक, see *VP*. III. 7. 11 to 43.

[2. 28]

1. The second category of the अव्यय, namely, क्रियाप्रधानम् is discussed here. क्रियाप्रधान literally means that which mainly expresses action. However, the author points out that अव्ययs such as हिरुक्, पृथक् etc. are क्रियाप्रधान in the sense that they indicate a specific action which is expressed by a verbal form just as उपसर्गs do. In other words, a क्रियाप्रधान-अव्यय does not directly convey a क्रिया; it is connected with a word which conveys it.

2. यद्येवं क्रियाशब्दमन्तरेण etc. If a क्रियाप्रधान-अव्यय is connected with a verbal form, then usages like पृथक् देवदत्तः 'Devadatta is separate' cannot be justified since the अव्यय *pṛthak* is not connected with a verbal form. A क्रियाप्रधान-अव्यय is compared to an उपसर्ग. Therefore, just as the usage *प्रदेवदत्तः is not correct, the usage पृथक् देवदत्तः also is not acceptable. The author's reply to this objection is that in such usages an action word is implied as it is implied in compounds like निष्कौशाम्बिः 'one who has gone out of कौशाम्बी'. The constituent analysis of the compound is निष्क्रान्तः कौशाम्ब्याः where the उपसर्ग *nis* is connected with the implied action word क्रान्तः. In the same manner the expression पृथग् देवदत्तः can be understood as पृथग् भूतो देवदत्तः.

3. समासे युक्तमिति चेत् etc. Yet another objection is raised here. An implied action and its connection with an उपसर्ग is possible only in a compound. Therefore, in the case of an अव्यय also implied action can be understood only in a compound. Since पृथक् देवदत्तः is not a compound an action word cannot be understood there. This objection is answered by stating that even in a sentence —and not only in a compound—an action word is implied. For instance, the sentence प्रादेश प्रादेशं विपरिलिखति is understood as प्रादेशं प्रादेशं विमाय परिलिखति

'(he) draws (lines) after measuring each span'. Here the उपसर्ग *vi* is connected with the verbal form माय, although विपरिलिखति is not a compound.

Again the पूर्वपक्षिन् argues that if a verbal form is implied when a क्रियाप्रधान-अव्यय is used, usages like पृथग्भूतः 'separated' where a verbal form is directly used, cannot be justified. To this objection, which in fact is absurd, the author replies by citing two illustrations, प्रपर्ण and प्रपतितपर्ण, both meaning 'that from which leaves have fallen' — both of which are correct. He means that a verbal form need not necessarily be implied ; it can also be explicit.

The letters between the words भाष्ये and यद्येवं (*p.* 7, *l.* 28 — *p.* 8, *l.* 1) are not legible in the MS. The text is reconstructed on the basis of the context. Similarly, the expression निमित्तान्तरविधानाच्च is difficult to explain although its literal meaning is clear.

[2.29]

1. स्वरादिषु कथम् ? etc. In the previous rule (P. 1. 1. 37) Pat. states that स्वरादिs are called निपात, and therefore अव्यय, whether they convey a substance or a non-substance : स्वरादीनां पुनः सत्त्ववचनानामसत्त्ववचनानां च. In the *Mbh.* on the present rule Pat. divides अव्ययs into two groups : (1) विभक्त्यर्थ-प्रधान, and (2) क्रियाप्रधान. Now, the author points out that the स्वरादिs belong to neither of the two groups when they are सत्त्ववचन, because in that case they are connected with gender and number. The new definition of अव्यय offered by Kāt. and established by Pat. is thus unable to cover the स्वरादिs when they are सत्त्ववचन.

2. एवं पीलुमूलतः etc. Another illustration shows that the new definitions suffer from the fault of अव्याप्ति. पीलुमूलतः is a तद्धित word derived from the word पीलुमूल (name of a mountain) by adding the suffix तस् in the sense तेनैकदिक् 'in the same direction with that.' The word means '(the lightning) by the side of the mountain पीलुमूल'. The suffix is taught by P. 4. 3. 113 : तसिश्च. The suffix अण् is also taught in the same sense by P. 4. 1. 112, which derives the form पैलुमूली. The two तद्धित words पैलुमूली and पीलुमूलतः are thus synonymous. Since both refer to an external object such as lightning, they are सत्त्ववचन. Therefore, पीलुमूलतः cannot be regarded as an अव्यय. If it is argued that the तद्धित suffixes अण् and तस् convey the meaning of the instrumental (since the meaning stated is तेनैकदिक्) and therefore पीलुमूलतः being विभक्त्यर्थ-प्रधान is called अव्यय, the अव्ययसंज्ञा would wrongly apply also to पैलुमूली. The new definitions of अव्यय thus create a problem in the case of the form पीलुमूलतः.

Although the MS reads पीलुमूलीतः, पीलुमूलतः appears to be the correct form. Cf. *Pradīpa* : शब्दशक्तिस्वाभाव्याच्च एकस्मिन्नर्थे विधीयमानयोस्तेनैकदिक् तसिश्चेत्यण्-

तसोर्भिन्नधर्मत्वम्। तत्र पैलुमूलमिति द्रव्यं प्राधान्येनाभिधीयते। पीलुमूलतः इति तु द्रव्योपसर्जनस्तृतीयार्थ इति तस्य साधनप्रधानता।

[2. 30]

1. This passage discusses solutions to the two difficulties raised in the previous passage. Firstly, the difficulty of non-application of the अव्ययसंज्ञा to स्वरादिs is solved by justifying the listing of स्वरादिs separately from the चादिs. In other words, a separate rule for स्वरादिs has to be made. In fact, Pat. has already stated this in the beginning of his *Bhāṣya* on the previous rule: किमर्थं पृथग्ग्रहणं स्वरादीनां क्रियते न चादिष्वेव पठयेरन्? चादीनां वा असत्त्ववचनानां निपातसंज्ञा, स्वरादीनां पुनः सत्त्ववचनानामसत्त्ववचनानां च। Secondly, with reference to the तद्धित word पीलुमूलतः the author says that of the two suffixes तस् and अण् in the sense तेनैकदिक्, तस् primarily conveys विभक्त्यर्थ whereas अण् primarily conveys अन्यपदार्थ. Therefore, the word पीलुमूलतः ending in तस् becomes an अव्यय, whereas the word पैलुमूली ending in अण् (and feminine suffix ङीप् added after it) does not. See *Pradīpa* cited in the previous note. पीलुमूली in the MS is to be corrected to पैलुमूली.

2. यथा कर्तरि इति etc. It may be argued in connection with the second solution that the two suffixes अण् and तस् added in the sense तेनैकदिक् cannot differ in their meaning as stated above. Both must convey the same meaning as the primary meaning. In reply to this objection the author gives an illustration. The finite verb ending in ति conveys the meaning कर्तृ 'agent' according to P. 3. 4. 69. In the form पचति the meaning कर्तृ conveyed by the ending ति is प्रधान 'primary', whereas it is गुणभूत 'subordinate' in the form पाचयति. Pat. in his *Mbh.* on P. 3. 1. 26 hints at this nature of the meaning when he remarks: यश्चाप्रधानं कर्ता सिद्धा तत्र कर्तरीत्येव तृतीया।

[2. 31]

After establishing the two definitions proposed by Kāt., Pat. turns back to the Pāṇinian definition and establishes that too. According to him the word असर्वविभक्ति should be interpreted differently. It does not mean 'that after which all cases are not added'. It rather means 'that after which the whole case is not added'. What Pat. means is this: Each case consists of three endings denoting three numbers. 'All cases' means all the 7 cases with 21 endings, while 'the whole case' means any one of the seven cases with all the three endings. For instance, all the three endings, सु, औ and जस् of the nominative together can be described सर्वा विभक्तिः 'a whole case'. Since the nominative singular only and no other case-ending is added to तद्धित words like यतस्, यत्र etc. they are असर्वविभक्ति. Consequently, it can be called अव्यय by the present rule.

Here a question arises : Why is the nominative singular ending alone and no other ending added to तद्धित words like यत्र तत्र etc.? Pat.'s reply to this question is discussed in the present passage. Pat.'s reply can be summed up as follows : P. 1. 4. 22 : द्व्येकयोर्द्विवचनैकवचने prescribes the addition of the singular case-ending to convey singularity and that of the dual ending to convey duality. P. 1. 4. 21 : बहुषु बहुवचनम् prescribes the addition of the plural case-ending to convey plurality. The three endings connected with three respective numbers are thus independent of each other. Pat. proposes a slight change in this position. According to him the word एक in P. 1. 4. 22 should not be mentioned. The rules should be as follows : एकवचनम् ' singular ending is added to a stem ', द्व्योर्द्विवचनम् ' the dual ending is added to convey duality ' and बहुषु बहुवचनम् ' the plural case-ending is added to convey plurality '. The rules being rephrased in this manner, a singular ending will be added as a general rule to any word even when no number is to be conveyed, whereas dual and plural endings will be added when specific numbers are to be conveyed. To the words like यत्र, तत्र etc. एकवचन will be added by the general rule. As they do not convey any specific number, dual and pural endings will not be added. Thus they will be असर्वविभक्ति and hence will be called अव्यय.

[2. 32]

Pat.'s interpretation of the एकवचन rule as a general rule (उत्सर्ग) can explain, as pointed out above. the असर्वविभक्ति character of words such as यत्र and तत्र. However, this interpretation does not seem to be justified. The author points out difficulties in accepting it. P. 4. 1. 2 : स्वौजसमौट् ... prescribes all case-endings after a stem without referring to the meaning. Therefore, the rules prescribing singular, dual and plural are restrictive (नियम). This restriction can be explained in two ways: It is either a प्रत्ययनियम, i. e. एकस्मिन्नेव एकवचनम्, or an अर्थनियम i. e. एकस्मिन् एकवचनमेव। The प्रत्ययनियम implies that singular ending can be added only if singularity is to be conveyed. If it is not to be conveyed, singular ending cannot be added. Consequently, it cannot be added to words यत्र, तत्र etc. since there singularity is not to be conveyed. The अर्थनियम implies, on the other hand, that a singular case ending alone is added to convey singularity. This does not, however, mean that singular ending is not added in the absence of singularity. Therefore, it can be added to यत्र, तत्र etc. also in the absence of singularity. Thus the अर्थनियम allows addition of the singular ending after indeclinables, whereas the प्रत्ययनियम does not. Pat.'s interpretation stands if अर्थनियम is accepted.

In this connection the author refers to the view पञ्चकं प्रातिपदिकार्थः ' a stem conveys five meanings (namely, जाति ' class ', व्यक्ति ' individual ', लिङ्ग ' gender ', संख्या ' number ' and कारक)'. If this view is accepted, since the number is

denoted by the stem itself, the case-endings will not directly convey it, but simply indicate it. In this case all the rules prescribing singular, dual and plural endings in the sense of respective numbers will be equally indicative and restrictive in nature. How can then the एकवचन rule be a general rule (उत्सर्ग) as stated by Pat.?

The author further shows that there is a difficulty even if the view त्रिकं प्रातिपदिकार्थः 'a stem conveys three meanings' is accepted. According to this view, only जाति, व्यक्ति and लिङ्ग are the meanings of a stem. Since number is not included in प्रातिपदिकार्थ, it must be conveyed by another unit such as an ending. However, this is not possible if Pat.'s interpretation of एकवचन rule is accepted According to him the rule is एकवचनम् (the word एक् in the Pāṇinian rule is removed). It prescribes addition of singular ending in general. In other words, the rule does not prescribe singular ending in the sense of singularity. Singular thus being an external meaning, it cannot be conveyed by singular ending. If one argues that external meanings also are conveyed by case-endings, it may be asked : why is not duality or plurality conveyed by the singular ending ?

A solution to this difficulty is offered by accepting the rules prescribing number as परिभाषाs. This point is explained in the following passage.

[2. 33]

1. The difficulty in accepting the एकवचन rule as the उत्सर्ग rule pointed above can be solved by treating the rules teaching द्विवचन and बहुवचन as परिभाषाs. The rule द्वयोः द्विवचनम् means, for instance, that the word द्वयोः is present in the rule where द्विवचन is mentioned. Such परिभाषा which prescribes the presence of a certain word while interpreting a rule is traditionally known as पदोपस्थापक-परिभाषा. The rule बहुषु बहुवचनम् is also a पदोपस्थापक-परिभाषा. It means that in the rule where बहुवचन is mentioned, the word बहुषु is present. These two परिभाषाs act as अपवाद of the general rule of एकवचन. P. 4. 1. 1 : ङ्याप्-प्रातिपदिकात्, P. 4. 1. 2 : स्वौजसमौट् and the Par. द्वयोः द्विवचनम् together teach that the dual endings are added to a stem when duality is to be conveyed. Similarly the statement about plural endings also can be made by putting together all the rules. एकवचन endings are added when neither duality nor plurality is to be conveyed. Thus the उत्सर्गापवाद relation between एकवचन on the one hand and द्विवचन and बहुवचन on the other is established.

2. द्विवचनसंज्ञिनोऽपि etc. It was stated above that the rules द्वयोर्द्विवचनम् and बहुषु बहुवचनम् are accepted as परिभाषाs and three rules, (1) स्वौजस... (2) द्वयोर्द्विव... and (3) ङ्याप्प्राति... are together interpreted through एकवाक्यता. One may, however, raise an objection against एकवाक्यता. The rule द्वयोर्द्विवचनम्

as a पदोपस्थापक-परिभाषा means that the word द्वयोः is present in that rule which contains the word द्विवचन. There is no mention of द्विवचन in the rule स्वौजस... Therefore, the परिभाषा cannot be applied to the rule. To this objection the the author's reply is that the परिभाषा is present also when a द्विवचनसंज्ञिन् 'that which is understood by the word द्विवचन' is present. द्विवचन is a संज्ञा and औ, आभ्याम्, etc. are संज्ञिन्s. The संज्ञिन्s are present in the rule स्वौजस.... Therefore, the परिभाषा applies to that rule.

[2. 34]

While establishing the Pāṇinian definition, namely तद्धितश्चा..., Pat. has proposed a different interpretation of the एकवचन rule as pointed out above. In addition to this, here he offers a different interpretation of the word असर्वविभक्ति. First he rejects the पूर्वपक्षिन्'s interpretation : असर्वा विभक्तयोऽस्मात् 'That to which all case endings are not added.' Two different interpretations of the word असर्वविभक्ति have been already discussed in [2. 1]. Further, merits and demerits of both of them have also been discussed (2. 2 to 2. 5). If असर्वविभक्ति is understood as न सर्वाः विभक्तयः यस्मात्, अव्ययसंज्ञा will not be applicable to any indeclinable since all case-endings are added to them. Therefore, Pat. prescribes a slight change in the constituent analysis of असर्वविभक्ति. Thus the *Mbh.* reads : न चाप्येवं विग्रहः करिष्यते — न सर्वा असर्वाः, असर्वा विभक्तयो यस्मादिति। कथं तर्हि ? न सर्वा असर्वा असर्वा विभक्तिरस्मादिति। त्रिकं पुनर्विभक्तिसंज्ञम्। In the new constituent analysis proposed by Pat., namely, न सर्वा विभक्तिः अस्मात् 'that to which the whole case is not added', सर्वा विभक्तिः means the whole case. Each case consists of three endings. If a certain word is declined in all the three endings of a particular case, it can be described as सर्वविभक्ति. If the एकवचन rule is accepted as an उत्सर्ग rule, the singular ending (of the nominative) alone may be added to words like यत्र, तत्र etc. Since the whole case (all the three endings) is not added after indeclinables, they are असर्वविभक्ति. In this way Pat. has connected the earlier interpretation of असर्वविभक्ति by using the words सर्वा and विभक्ति into singular instead of plural and by understanding the word सर्व as 'whole' rather than 'all'. If this new meaning is accepted along with the new interpretation of the एकवचन, the Pāṇinian definition of अव्यय (तद्धितश्चा...) can be justified. It should be, however, noted that this is not the सिद्धान्तिन्'s view. It will be discussed later.

[2. 35]

1. The author raises an objection against Pat.'s new interpretation of असर्वविभक्ति. First he refers to the four views regarding the addition of case-endings after an अव्यय. In this passage he mentions the first view. According to this view all the case-endings mentioned in the rule स्वौजस... are added to

an अव्यय irrespective of the fact that an अव्यय does not convey any number, since they are taught without reference to specific meaning (अविशेषेण). After all the case-endings are produced, restrictions regarding their application conditioned by specific meanings apply. Therefore, even after accepting the new interpretation of असर्वविभक्ति, the definition does not suit the अव्ययs, as they are सर्वविभक्ति according to this view.

2. केवलं संस्कारायैव etc. It may be asked, why are the case-endings added to अव्ययs, if they are ultimately to be dropped? The reply is, they are produced after अव्ययs for the sake of संस्कार 'refinement'. Unless a case-ending is added to an अव्यय it cannot have the status of a पद.

3. तत्र यद्यपि etc. The author points out that the difficulty of the non-application of the name अव्यय stands even after accepting Pat.'s new interpretation of असर्वविभक्ति. Further, he cites two Pāṇinian rules as an evidence to prove that all case endings are added to an अव्यय. P. 2. 4. 83 : नाव्ययीभावादतोऽम् त्वपञ्चम्याः teaches that there is no elision of a case-ending added to an अव्ययीभाव and that the case-ending except the ablative is replaced by अम्. An अव्ययीभाव compound is an अव्यय by P. 1. 1. 41. The non elision of a case-ending after an अव्ययीभाव stated in the above rule presupposes the addition of case-endings. The next rule, P. 2. 4. 84 : तृतीयासप्तम्योर्बहुलम् also prescribes optionally non-elision of a case-ending after an अव्ययीभाव and substitution of अम् in the place of instrumental and locative endings. Thus both these rules imply that according to Pāṇini all case-endings are added to an अव्यय.

The last line of this passage is amended to एकार्थायां प्रवृत्तावर्थात्तथाव्ययात् यथाव्ययीभावात् so as to fit in the context.

[2. 36]

1. The objector asks : 'If case endings are to be added to an अव्यय only for the sake of संस्कार why should one add all of them? Addition of any one case-ending is enough to bring about the necessary संस्कार. And since the nominative singular stands first in the list of case-endings, that alone may be added. If it is added and the other endings are not added the अव्यय becomes असर्वविभक्ति.

2. क्रमव्यतिक्रमे च etc. One may ask the objector : 'Why the nominative singular alone and not any other case-ending?' The objector's reply is that there is no good reason to disregard the first case-ending and go for the rest. There is the wellknown maxim about the equally qualified claimants followed everywhere : प्रथमातिक्रमे मानाभावः 'There is no ground to transgress that which is the first'.

3. एवमपि तथा विग्रहः etc. The author insists that even if the objector's opinion is accepted, that constituent analysis alone will be accepted which is

conducive to the desired result. He suggests that Pat.'s interpretation of असर्वविभक्ति has to be accepted.

[2. 37]

A justification for Pat.'s constituent analysis of असर्वविभक्तिः, namely, न सर्वा विभक्तयोऽस्मात्, is offered in this passage. If the nominative singular alone is desired to be added to an अव्यय and if, consequently, the analysis : न सर्वा विभक्तिः अस्मात् is proper, why should one insist upon Pat.'s analysis ? The author replies this question in the following manner : In the *Mbh.* on P. 2. 3. 46 Pat. has discussed the purpose of the mention of the word प्रातिपदिक in the rule. The word प्रातिपदिक is mentioned there, according to him, so that the nominative can be added to an अव्यय (which is also a प्रातिपदिक). P. 8. 1. 26 : सपूर्वायाः प्रथमाया विभाषा prescribes the substitution of वाम्, नौ, ते etc. in the place of the corresponding forms of युष्मद् and अस्मद्. The substitution of ते in the place of तव in the sentences such as ग्राम उच्चैस्ते स्वम् is possible only if the nominative is added to the *avyaya* उच्चैस्. The nominative can be added only if the word प्रातिपदिक is mentioned in P. 2. 3. 46. Here the *Mbh.* assumes the addition of the whole nominative i. e. all the three endings, and not that of the nominative singular alone. Therefore the constituent analysis : न सर्वा विभक्तयः अस्मात् is correct. Read the *Mbh.* : प्रातिपदिकग्रहणं किमर्थम् ? उच्चैर्नीचैरित्यत्रापि यथा स्यात् ।

The line सर्वस्मात् प्रथमाया विशेषोऽस्त्येवम° etc. is emended to सपूर्वायाः प्रथमायाः विभाषेत्येवम° etc., since otherwise it does not make any sense.

[2. 38]

1. तत्र यदनन्तरम् ... etc. The four views (referred to in [2. 35] above) regarding the addition of case-endings after अव्ययs are : (1) All case-endings are added. (2) Only the nominative singular is added. (3) All the three endings of the nominative are added, and (4) singular endings of all the cases are added. According to the author of the *Dīp.* the fourth view is accepted by Pat. as the final view. What Pat. means is that all the three endings of a case are not added to an अव्यय. Only the एकवचन ending is added. (एकवचन alone is added, because its addition is prescribed by the उत्सर्ग rule, एकवचनम् ।) An अव्यय thus is असर्वविभक्ति.

2. सर्वशब्दश्च प्रकारकात्स्न्यें etc. The fourth view implies the constituent analysis : न सर्वा विभक्तयः अस्मात्. The words सर्वा विभक्तयः means ' whole cases ' rather than ' all cases '. Any case with all the three endings is a whole case. The word सर्व is thus understood in the sense of ' whole '. The two meanings of सर्व, namely प्रकारकात्स्न्यं ' totality of kind ' and द्रव्यकात्स्न्यं ' totality of

substance' have been already discussed in the *Dīp.* on P. 1. 1. 27 : सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि (See *Dīp.*, Fasc. III, *p.* 14, *ll.* 10–14). The constituent analysis न सर्वा विभक्तयः अस्मात् thus means that, after which no whole case (i. e. with all the three endings) is added.

[2. 39]

1. The objector will perhaps argue that the fourth view referred to above, namely, that singular endings of all the cases are added to an अव्यय contradicts Pāṇini's rule नाव्ययीभावादतोऽम् ... (P. 2. 4. 83) which implies that all case-endings are added to an अव्यय. The author replies to this objection in this passage. He says that the Pāṇinian rule indicates that अव्ययीभाव differs from the rest of the अव्ययs in this respect. One understands from the rule that all case-endings are added to an अव्ययीभाव type of अव्ययs alone, whereas the उत्सर्ग rule एकवचनम् implies that singular endings of all cases alone are added to the rest of the अव्ययs. The author further offers an illustration to show that among all the items belonging to one category some can have special features distinguishing them form the rest. P. 2. 2. 29 : चार्थे द्वंद्वः prescribes formation of the द्वंद्व compound in the sense of च which means either इतरेतरयोग 'mutual connection', or समाहार 'collection'. However, the Sūtrakāra has restricted the meaning समाहार to a group of द्वंद्व compounds. Thus there are two groups in the category of द्वंद्व, one conveying the meaning समाहार alone, and the other conveying either समाहार or इतरेतरयोग. In the same manner the अव्ययीभाव type of an अव्यय is inflected for all the cases with all the endings, whereas the rest of the अव्ययs are inflected only for the singular endings of the cases. The word एकवद्भावकाण्ड in the *Dīp.* is a reference to the section P. 2. 4. 1–16 in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

2. सपूर्वायाः विभाषेति etc. If the view that the singular endings of all the cases are added to an अव्यय is accepted, then the words उच्चैः, नीचैः could be regarded as ending in the singular of any case, instrumental for instance. Consequently, the rule सपूर्वायाः ... would not apply to expressions like ग्राम उच्चैस्तव स्वम् since उच्चैः does not end in प्रथमा. The author solves this difficulty by pointing out that the rule सपूर्वायाः ... is a व्यवस्थितविभाषा rule 'a distributed option'. In other words, its application and non-application is decided by considering the usage.

3. क्रमव्यतिक्रमेऽपि etc. A reference has been already made to an argument that the nominative singular alone must be added to an अव्यय since the nominative is the first in the sequence, and there is no reason to violate the sequence (see [36. 2] above). Referring to this argument the objector says that singular endings of cases other than the nominative cannot be added to an अव्यय; therefore the view that the singular endings of all the cases are added to an

अव्यय cannot be accepted. The objection is rejected here by pointing out that in the section prescribing cases the nominative is not mentioned first. P. II. 3 deals with cases and it begins with the statement of accusative. The nominative is referred to only after all the cases except the genitive have been mentioned (P. 2. 3. 46 prescribes प्रथमा, whereas the earlier rules prescribe other cases). Thus the nominative is not the first in the order as far as the teaching of cases in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is concerned.

[2. 40]

It is clear from the preceding discussion on this rule that an अव्यय is genderless (अलिङ्ग) and a non-substance (असत्त्व). Here an objection is raised against this view. According to P. 2. 4. 18: अव्ययीभावश्च, an अव्ययीभाव is used in neuter. According to the definition लिङ्गसंख्यान्वितं सत्त्वम् 'that which is accompanied by gender and number is called सत्त्व' an अव्ययीभाव becomes a सत्त्व 'substance'. This contradicts the general definition of an अव्यय, namely, that it is अलिङ्ग and असत्त्व. The use of अव्ययीभाव compounds in neuter such as उपकुम्भम् ... which end in अम् (P. 2. 4. 83) thus cannot be justified. To this objection the author replies that since Pāṇini himself has prescribed the use of an अव्ययीभाव in neuter, we have to accept it.

Another implicit objection seems to be this: If an अव्ययीभाव like उपकुम्भम् is used in all cases, how to understand the meaning of different cases from the word ending in अम्? The reply seems to be this: The meaning of the specific case can be understood after the अव्ययीभाव is connected with the verb in the sentence in which it is used.

Although the MS clearly reads उपकुम्भम् the illustration usually found in the *Mbh.* is उपकुम्भम्.

[2. 41]

It has been already pointed out that Pat.'s interpretation of the word असर्वविभक्तिः, namely, न सर्वा विभक्तिः अस्मात् 'that after which a whole case is not added' is accepted as the final interpretation. The following verse appears in the *Mbh.* after this interpretation is given:

एवं गते कृत्यपि तुल्यमेतन्मान्तस्य कार्यं ग्रहणं न तत्र ।
ततः परे चाभिमता न कार्याश्चयः कृदर्था ग्रहणेन योगाः ॥
कृत्तद्धितानां ग्रहणं तु कार्यं संख्याविशेषं ह्यभिनिश्रिता ये ।
तस्मात्स्वरादिग्रहणं च कार्यं कृत्तद्धितानां ग्रहणं च पाठे ॥

This verse is explained in this passage. The phrasing of the verse is not straightforward. The author tries to get the desired meaning out of these cryptic

lines. The meaning of the verse as understood by the author can be summed up as follows : If the word असर्वविभक्ति is understood as shown above, the definition असर्वविभक्ति अव्ययम् can cover all the अव्ययs. It is not necessary to frame the five rules, स्वरादि ... etc. to define an अव्यय. The rule कृन्मेजन्तः need not be stated since the same feature (i. e. असर्वविभक्ति) is found in कृदन्तs also. The further three references, namely to क्त्वा, तोसुन् and कसुन्, meant for the sake of giving the name अव्यय to the three कृदन्तs also need not be stated. Thus the rules stated in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* to define an अव्यय need not be framed.

Here the author is forced to interpret certain words in a rather unusual way. For instance, apparently, the words ततः परे ... ... त्रयः कृदर्थाः ग्रहणेन योगाः mean 'the three rules after that (i. e. the rules कृन्मेजन्तः) which are meant for the कृदन्तs need not be mentioned' (the instrumental ग्रहणेन is difficult to construe). However, there are no three rules defining अव्यय after the rule कृन्मेजन्तः. Therefore, the author interprets the words त्रयः कृदर्थाः as three *kṛt* mentions, namely क्त्वा, तोसुन् and कसुन्, which are meant for the sake of कृदन्तs. Further, he separately interprets the words योगाः (न कार्याः) as 'the rules स्वरादि ...। etc. need not be stated'. Similarly, the word मान्तस्य in the verse is understood as a reference to the rule कृन्मेजन्तः rather than merely to मान्त 'ending in म (म्)'. Ultimately, the verse is understood as stating rejection of all the five rules defining अव्यय in favour of the rule असर्वविभक्ति अव्ययम्. This is a farfetched interpretation. However, as it is, the verse is difficult to interpret. The following passage [2. 42] offers another interpretation of the words virtually amounting to the same as the present interpretation.

[2. 42]

Other scholars accept the reading कृदर्थाग्रहणेन instead of कृदर्था ग्रहणेन and interpret the line as follows : The other three rules need not be stated because of (their) non-mention for the sake of कृदन्तs. In other words, since it is not necessary to mention the three rules for the sake of कृदन्तs, they need not be stated. The word कृदर्थाग्रहण is understood as कृदर्थम् अग्रहणम् यस्मिन् (हेतौ) 'that (reason) which, when accepted, leads to the non-mention for the sake of कृदन्तs'. And such a reason is the acceptance of the word असर्वविभक्तिः in the sense pointed out above. If the definition असर्वविभक्तिः is accepted, the rule तद्धितश्चा ..., as well as the following three rules, namely कृन्मेजन्तः।, क्त्वातोसुन्कसुनः। and अव्ययीभावश्च। need not be stated. Similarly, the rule कृन्मेजन्तः need not be framed as it has been pointed out in the first line of the verse. Thus, ultimately, all the five rules are rejected. This interpretation differs from the previous one in that it takes the word कृदर्थाग्रहण as the cause for the rejection of the three rules, although in fact, two rules are meant for the sake of कृदन्तs (कृन्मेजन्तः and क्त्वातोसुन्कसुनः।).

[2. 43]

1. In the previous passage it was pointed out that the definition असर्वविभक्ति अव्ययम् can cover all the अव्ययs and thus the five rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* defining an अव्यय can be rejected. In this passage, however, many difficulties in accepting the above definition are put forth and finally the गणपाठ, i. e. the listing of all the words that are desired to be called अव्यय, is stated as the final solution, as it is stated in the last line of the verses cited above.

If the name अव्यय is given to an असर्वविभक्ति word it will wrongly apply to numerals such as एकः, द्वौ, त्रयः etc. since they are also असर्वविभक्ति (for instance, एक is not inflected for dual and plural endings). Therefore in order to avoid this overapplication, the rule should be, असर्वविभक्तिः तद्धितः। Here the author refers to कुणि, an ancient grammarian. Does it indicate that the verses cited in the *Mbh.* (see 2. 40 above) are composed by कुणि ? Further, the author points out that even the mention of तद्धित is not sufficient. In order to extend the name अव्यय to कृदन्तs ending in णमुल् etc., a reference to कृत्s also must be made. The स्वरादिs are neither तद्धितs nor कृत्s. Therefore, they also must be listed. And finally, certain words like विंशति, उभय etc. should not get name अव्यय even though they are असर्वविभक्ति. In order to avoid the above difficulties the exact listing of the words to which the name अव्यय is to be given is recommended in the last line of the verses quoted in the *Mbh.*

2. एवमपि विंशत्यादिषु दोषः etc. Even if the rule तद्धितश्चासर्वविभक्तिः (अव्ययम्) is framed, the fault of over-application results. The word विंशति is both a तद्धित and असर्वविभक्ति (it is inflected for singular alone). Here the author refers to the view of other grammarians who cite वरणा instead of विंशति as an illustration. The word वरणा 'a city (called वरणा) not far away from (the country) वरण' is a तद्धित (P. 4. 2. 82) which is असर्वविभक्ति (since it is always declined in the plural). Therefore, the name अव्यय wrongly applies to वरणा.

[3. 1]

1. It was concluded in the foregoing discussion that the words which are called अव्यय should be listed in the *gaṇapāṭha*. Here the objector points out a fault in this definition. The name अव्यय should be applicable also to words परमोच्चैः and परमनीचैः as it applies to words उच्चैः and नीचैः which are listed in the *gaṇapāṭha*. However, since the words परमोच्चैः etc. are not listed in the *gaṇapāṭha*, they cannot get the name अव्यय. अक्तपरिमाण means that which is measured out. The words उच्चैः, नीचैः etc. are अक्तपरिमाण in the sense that they are mentioned in the *gaṇapāṭha* in the same forms उच्चैः and नीचैः. On the

other hand, the words परमोच्चैः etc. are not अक्षपरिमाण i. e. they do not appear in their own form in the *gaṇapāṭha*.

2. श्रुतिप्रकरणसामर्थ्यानाम् etc. The name अव्यय can be obtained for words परमोच्चैः etc. only by तदन्तविधि. However, तदन्तविधि is not possible here. Firstly, it is not possible by श्रुति i. e. direct mention. There is no explicit mention in the definition of अव्यय that the अव्ययसंज्ञा should be given also to तदन्तs. Secondly, there is no प्रकरण 'context' by which तदन्तविधि can be obtained. Finally, there is no सामर्थ्य 'force' by which the name अव्यय could be extended to तदन्तs since otherwise it would prove useless. For the name अव्यय serves a purpose when it is given to words उच्चैः, नीचैः etc.

3. तदन्तविधिना etc. The reply to the above objection is that the अव्ययसंज्ञा will be applicable to words परमोच्चैः etc. by तदन्तविधि which is stated in the उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक (*Vār.* 8 on P. 1. 1. 72): प्रयोजनं सर्वनामाव्ययसंज्ञायाम्। According to this उपसंख्यानवार्त्तिक, the तदन्तविधि is to be applied to the definition of अव्यय.

[3. 2]

1. इहापि तर्हि etc. If तदन्तविधि is accepted, the अव्ययसंज्ञा wrongly applies to the word अत्युच्चैः since it ends in the अव्यय 'उच्चैः'. Consequently, the desired forms अत्युच्चैसौ, अत्युच्चैसः etc. cannot be obtained.

2. कथमत्र समासो etc. Here is a diversion. It is discussed in this passage whether the compound अत्युच्चैस् can be formed. The objections and the replies can be summed up as follows: Objection: The word उच्चैस् cannot be compounded with the word अति which is used in the sense of अतिक्रान्त 'surpassing', because the compound of अति is prescribed only with a word in the accusative and उच्चैस् is an अव्यय conveying location which is the meaning of the locative. In expressions such as तत्र पश्य 'Look there', the verb पश्य is not connected with the location conveyed by the word तत्र, but rather with the object occupying that location: तत्र विद्यमानं पश्य. In the same manner the location conveyed by the word उच्चैस् cannot be connected with the act of अतिक्रमण 'surpassing'. Reply: The word उच्चैस् should be understood as signifying not simply 'high' but 'an object which is placed high'. Then the connection of उच्चैस् with the act of अतिक्रमण will be possible. Objection: If the word उच्चैस् is understood as conveying an object placed high it will be connected with gender and number and consequently, it will cease to be an अव्यय. Reply: Just as the name अव्यय is given to विना, नाना etc. without any meaning, in the same manner it should be given to उच्चैस् without meaning. Objection: Even if the name अव्यय is obtained for उच्चैस् how to obtain the accusative after it which is essential for the compound अत्युच्चैस्? Reply: The semantic connection between उच्चैः and अतिक्रान्तः should be understood from context or implication. For instance, from the expression

ब्राह्मणस्य शुक्लाः, one understands the meaning 'the white teeth of a brahmin' from the context, although the word दन्ताः 'teeth' is not present in the expression. Moreover, if the statement of the सौनागs, namely, अत्यादयः क्रान्ताद्यर्थे ... etc. cannot explain the compound अत्युच्चैस्, it does not matter, because the compound can be derived by other *Vār.*'s, namely, सिद्धं तु क्राङ्स्वतिदुर्गतिवचनात् and प्रादयः क्तार्थे। (*Vār.*'s 3 and 4 respectively on P. 2. 2. 18). We may give up the statement of Saunāgas and accept the *Vār.*'s. These *Vār.*'s prescribe compounding of the अव्ययs कु, आङ्, सु, अति etc. as well as of प्र etc. with semantically connected words. Thus the compound अत्युच्चैस् can be derived.

[3. 3]

1. It was pointed out earlier that if तदन्तविधि is accepted in the case of the name अव्यय, it will be wrongly applicable to words like अत्युच्चैस्. This difficulty is removed in the present passage by stating that the name अव्यय does not apply to अत्युच्चैस् since it is prohibited for an उपसर्जन. Since the word उच्चैस् in in the compound अत्युच्चैस् is an उपसर्जन 'subordinate', it is not called अव्यय. The objector argues that although the word उच्चैस् is उपसर्जन in the compound, the compound अत्युच्चैस् itself is not an उपसर्जन; therefore the name अव्यय will be still applicable to the word अत्युच्चैस्. The reply to this objection is that the word अत्युच्चैस् also can be called उपसर्जन since उच्चैस्, which is an उपसर्जन, forms a part of it. The prohibition उपसर्जनस्य न (अव्ययसंज्ञा) can be interpreted as meaning that the name अव्यय is not applicable to that of which an उपसर्जन is a part.

2. सर्वनामसंज्ञायां प्रकृतः etc. The objector points out that the prohibition उपसर्जनस्य न is read, not in the context of अव्ययसंज्ञा, but in that of the सर्वनामसंज्ञा. How can that prohibition be applied to the अव्ययसंज्ञा? The solution to this problem offered by the author of the *Dīp.* is that the prohibition उपसर्जनस्य न will be continued in the context of अव्ययसंज्ञा by attaching a स्वरित accent mark (P. 1. 3. 11 : स्वरितेनाधिकारः।). However, the author himself points out that this solution does not stand, because the prohibition itself is rejected already in the context of the सर्वनामसंज्ञा. How can that which is rejected (and therefore removed) be continued? How can a स्वरित be attached to that which does not exist?

[3. 4]

1. The solution offered by Pat. to the problem of the over-application of the name अव्यय to अत्युच्चैस् is that the name अव्यय is a significant term. अव्यय means that which is not declined. The name अव्यय applies only to such words which are not declined. Since the word अत्युच्चैस् is declined it is not called अव्यय.

2. ननु चान्वर्थसंज्ञायां etc. An objection is raised against the very concept of an अन्वर्थसंज्ञा. A संज्ञा is a name for something. It is not supposed to be

meaningful in itself. For instance, the word वृद्धि is a name for the vowels आ, ऐ, and औ. It does not have any meaning of its own beyond this, although etymologically it means 'growth'. In other words, a संज्ञा must be स्वरूपपर 'conveying its own form' (viz. the sequence of letters व् ऋ द् ध् इ in the case of वृद्धि). This being the case, a संज्ञा with a meaning of its own is a self-contradiction. If a संज्ञा has a meaning of its own it ceases to be स्वरूपपर 'conveying its own form' and if it is स्वरूपपर it cannot have another meaning. Therefore, the assumption that an अव्यय is a significant name is not correct.

3. लोके द्विप्रकारा ... etc. In reply to the above objection the author points out that there are two kinds of संज्ञा : (1) A name originally conveying its own meaning, and (2) a name not conveying its own meaning. (Actually, the author has not stated this second kind, though it can be inferred.) The illustration of the first kind is the name कृष्ण. The word कृष्ण means 'black'. It came to be used as a name of the Lord Vāsudeva, because he was black. Thus originally the word conveyed its own meaning when it was used first as a name. However, later on it was and has been used also as a name of a person who is not black. Thus the name कृष्ण lost its own significance when it came to be used as a name. In the same manner the word अव्यय originally signified such words as are not declined. However, when it is used as a name it does not convey any meaning of its own. Therefore, it can be described as स्वरूपपर. There is thus no contradiction involved in the concept of an अन्वर्थसंज्ञा.

3. यस्यानानागमनमस्ति ... etc. नानागमन is a paraphrase of व्यय 'declension in many cases'. If it is accepted, as explained above, that a name originally having a meaning of its own, does not convey its meaning when it is used as a name, then the name अव्यय can be used also to denote words like अत्युच्चैस् which are declined. Thus the basic problem, namely, the over-application of the name अव्यय to words like अत्युच्चैस् remains as it is. The reply to this problem can be inferred from the last two lines in this passage. The author means that the very fact that the lengthy term अव्यय is accepted by the सूत्रकार, who otherwise is a strong advocate of the principle of brevity, implies that the name अव्यय is given to such words which are not declined. The word अत्युच्चैस् therefore cannot get the name अव्यय since it is declined.

[3. 5]

An illustration is supplied in this passage to establish that अव्यय is a significant term. P. 1. 1. 45 : इग्यणः संप्रसारणम् defines संप्रसारण as 'i, u, ṛ, and ḷ in the place of y, v, r, and l respectively'. Pat. raises a question in the beginning of his *Mbh.* on this rule : किमियं वाक्यस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञा क्रियते — इग्यण इत्येतद् वाक्यं संप्रसारणसंज्ञं भवतीति, आहोस्विद् वर्णस्य — इग्यो यणः स्थाने वर्णः स संप्रसारणसंज्ञो भवतीति ?

'Is this name संप्रसारण given to the statement, (namely, that) the statement (rule) of replacement of *yaṇ* by *ik* is called संप्रसारण? Or is it given to a letter, (namely, that) the *ik* which replaces *yaṇ* is called संप्रसारण?' In other words, the question is, whether the name संप्रसारण should be given to the morphological process of replacement of *yaṇ* by *ik* or whether it should be given to each one of the vowels *i*, *u*, etc. which replace *y*, *v*, etc. The reply to this question is given in the *Vār.* 3 on the same rule: विभक्तिविशेषनिर्देशस्तु ज्ञापक उभयसंज्ञात्वस्य 'Reference to specific cases however indicates (that संप्रसारण is) a name of both'. Pāṇini uses the word संप्रसारण in different cases. For instance, P. 6. 3. 139: संप्रसारणस्य prescribes lengthening of the संप्रसारण which implies that the name संप्रसारण must be given to a vowel. On the other hand, P. 6. 1. 13: य्वः संप्रसारणम् prescribes संप्रसारण of य् of the suffix य्व when the words पुत्र and पति follow in a compound. This rule implies that the name संप्रसारण must refer to the process of the replacement of य् by इ. Thus the mention of the word संप्रसारण in different cases suggests that it is a name of both, the vowels and the process. But how can the single mention of संप्रसारण in the definition be a name for two different things? The commentators solve this problem by resorting to the device of आवृत्ति 'repetition' (Kaiyaṭa on *Mbh.* on P. 1. 4. 45: तत्र तन्त्रावृत्त्येकशेषाणामन्यतमाश्रयेणोभयोः संज्ञा सिध्यति।). The very fact that the word संप्रसारण is used in different cases indicates that it is originally repeated in the definition as इग्यणः संप्रसारणं संप्रसारणम्. Only one word संप्रसारण is retained in the rule because of the एकशेष 'one remnant'. The original repetition thus implies two definitions put together in one rule. In the same manner, according to the author of the *Dīp.*, the word अव्यय is originally repeated in its definition. The very fact that Pāṇini uses a long name अव्यय indicates that he intends two definitions of अव्यय, one containing its derivative meaning, namely, 'that which is not declined' and the other, without the derivative meaning, with the word अव्यय merely as स्वरूपपर 'conveying its own form'. Both these definitions are fused into one which is described as a निबन्धन-वाक्य, 'source-sentence' from which these two definitions emerge. As in the case of the definition of संप्रसारण, here also fusion of two संज्ञाs into one takes place by तन्त्र or एकशेष.

[3.6]

1. The derivative meaning of the name अव्यय is discussed in the *Mbh.* as न व्येति इति अव्ययम् 'अव्यय is that which does not go away' (वि+इ literally means 'to go away'). The technical meaning of वि+इ would be 'to be declined or inflected'. After the derivative meaning is explained, the next question is asked: 'In respect of what is an अव्यय not inflected?' Pat. replies: स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकानि सत्त्वगुणाः एकत्वद्वित्वबहुत्वानि च। The three genders and the three

numbers are the properties of a substance (लिङ्गसंख्यान्वितं सत्त्वम्). An अव्यय is that which is inflected for none of them.

2. गुणानां रूपादीनां etc. Pat. has stated some other criteria for the determination of the gender of a substance, in the *Mbh.* on P. 4. 1. 3. While explaining the verse, संस्त्यानप्रसवौ लिङ्गमास्थेयौ स्वकृतान्ततः Pat. says : कस्य पुनः संस्त्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिर्वा पुमान्? गुणानाम्। केषाम्? शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानाम्। All this discussion implies that the feminity consists in the disappearance of the qualities रूप, रस etc, whereas the masculine nature consists in their manifestation. Kaiyaṭa paraphrases संस्त्यान as तिरोभाव 'disappearance' and प्रवृत्ति as आविर्भाव 'manifestation'. Further, Kaiyaṭa quotes भर्तृहरि while explaining प्रवृत्ति as follows : प्रवृत्तिरिति सामान्यं लक्षणं तस्य कथ्यते। आविर्भावस्तिरोभावः स्थितिश्चेत्यथ भिद्यते॥ (*Vākyap.* 3. 14. 323). 'The general character of a being is referred to as प्रवृत्ति. It is divided into आविर्भाव 'manifestation', तिरोभाव 'disappearance' and स्थिति 'equilibrium'. All this discussion is presupposed in the sentence गुणानां रूपादीनां प्रवृत्तेः... etc. in the *Dīp.* The author means that the features of स्त्रीत्व and पुंस्त्व in terms of these kinds of प्रवृत्ति are also implied in the statement of Pat. : स्त्रीत्वपुंनपुंसकानि सत्त्वगुणाः.

3. अविगमन is a derivative explanation of अव्यय. An अव्यय is not declined in the sense that what is to be conveyed by a case-ending is conveyed by the stem itself. According to the view पञ्चकं प्रातिपदिकार्थः, all the five स्वार्थ, द्रव्य, लिङ्ग, संख्या, and कारक are conveyed by the प्रातिपदिक itself. While a प्रातिपदिक conveys these meanings in general, the case-ending added to a प्रातिपदिक conveys specific meanings such as a specific number. The author of the *Dīp.* states that an अव्यय also conveys a meaning in general just as a प्रातिपदिक does. अविगमन should be understood in this sense.

4. चरितार्थत्वाद्वा ... etc. Another justification for the absence of a case-ending after an अव्यय is that the meaning to be conveyed by a case-ending is already conveyed by the stem itself. For instance, अग्निचित् 'one who arranges fire (altar)' is a nominative singular. Since singularity is already expressed by the stem itself, no case-endlng after अग्निचित् is added to convey singularity. In the same manner, since an अव्यय conveys the meaning in its totality, no case-ending is added to an अव्यय.

[3. 7]

1. The verse defining अव्यय cited in the *Mbh.* is discussed in this passage. In the previous passage the concept of अव्ययत्व 'not being declined' was described as सामान्यशक्तयभिधान. This is given up in the beginning of the present passage and the definition of अव्यय given in the verse is accepted. The author points out that the statement that an अव्यय is identical in all the genders

should be understood in the sense that it conveys gender in general, or it does not convey any gender, or all the distinction of gender is abandoned since an अव्यय is used in the same form in all the three genders.

2. स्वरादिषु सत्त्ववचनेषु etc. A reference was already made to the fact that स्वर् etc. convey substance. Since a substance is always connected with gender and number, स्वर् etc. cannot be called अव्यय. The author replies that there is no intention on the part of the speaker to convey a specific gender or number in the case of स्वर् etc.

3. अभेदैकत्वसंख्यायाः etc. It is pointed out that a substance is connected with number only through the concept of अभेदैकत्वसंख्या. This concept is described in the following verse of the *Vākyap.* :

यथौषधिरसाः सर्वे मधुन्याहितशक्तयः।
अविभागेन वर्तन्ते तां संख्यां तादृशीं विदुः॥ *Vākyap.* 3. 14. 102.

'Just as all the medicinal juices exist in honey, without being separated from each other, and with all their powers deposited therein, that number should be understood in the same way'. अभेदैकत्वसंख्या thus means that number in which all numbers are merged. This number does not convey any specific number but, at the same time, represents all numbers together. A substance like स्वर् is connected with such number.

* * *

kṛn mejantaḥ / P. 1. 1. 39

Summary : The Vārttikakāra restricts the scope of this definition to such *kṛdantas* as originally end in *m*, *e* etc. and not in any other vowels. Further, he tries to remove the difficulty that would arise in the absence of this restriction by invoking the Pari. *saṁnipātalakṣaṇo vidhir* etc. The remaining *Vār.*'s deal with the merits and demerits of this Pari.

Pat. starts with two possible interpretations of the present rule depending upon the relation between the two words *kṛt* and *mejanta* : (1) *kṛd yo māntaḥ* 'A *kṛt* (suffix) that ends in *m* (etc.) and (2) *kṛdantaṁ yan māntam* 'a word ending in *kṛt* which ends in *m* (etc.)'. According to him either of the two interpretations can be accepted. Following the Vārttikakāra he discusses the pros and cons of the Pari. *saṁnipāta* ... etc. and finally remarks that in spite of the faults the Pari. has to be accepted keeping in view its merits.

The author of the *Dīp.* discusses the rationale behind the two meanings of the expression *kṛn mejantaḥ*. He also discusses the purpose of the mention

of the word *anta* in the rule and finally justifies it. He discusses the examples of the *sannipātaparibhāṣā* clearly pointing out the application of the Pari. At one or two places he shows disagreement with Patañjali.

[1. 1]

The author refers to the two possible interpretations of the expression कृन्मेजन्तः offered by Pat. : कथमिदं विज्ञायते — कृद्यो मान्त इति, आहोस्वित् कृदन्तं यन्मान्तमिति। 'How is this (phrase कृन्मेजन्तः) understood — a कृत् which ends in म (म्) or a कृदन्त which ends in म (म्)?' The question is, whether मेजन्तः 'ending in म् or एच्' is an adjective of कृत् or of कृदन्त. The two interpretations further lead to two different meanings of the rule as follows : (1) मान्तः यः कृत् तदन्तम् अव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात् 'That which ends in a कृत् which ends in म् is called अव्यय', (2) मान्तं यत् कृदन्तं तद् अव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात् 'a कृदन्त (a कृत् derivative) which ends in म् is called अव्यय'. These two meanings are further described by Pat. as leading to two difficulties which will be discussed later. It should be, however, noted in this connection that in both the interpretations the name अव्यय is given to a कृदन्त word. Kaiyaṭa points out the difference between the two views as follows : किं मेजन्तग्रहणेन कृद् विशेष्यते पूर्वं पश्चात्तु कृता तदन्तविधिः, आहोस्वित् पूर्वं कृता तदन्तविधिः पश्चात्तु कृदन्तं मेजन्तग्रहणेन विशेष्यते इति प्रश्नः। Nāgojibhaṭṭa in his *Uddyota* remarks : कृतो मेजन्तस्य प्रत्ययमात्रस्य संज्ञा उत कृदन्तस्य इति न शङ्कार्थः।

Thus the difference between the two interpretations is caused by the difference in relation between कृत् and मेजन्त. In the following passage this point is further clarified.

[1. 2]

Here the rationale behind the first interpretation is discussed. The term कृत् mentioned in this rule is a संज्ञा of certain suffixes listed under the *adhikāra* कृदतिङ् (P. 3. 1. 93). A संज्ञा is always meant for a संज्ञिन् 'that which is signified' and being परार्थ 'meant for another', it is subordinate. What is subordinate is a विशेषण in relation to what is not subordinate. In the rule कृन्मेजन्तः, while deciding the relation between the two words कृत् and मेजन्तः one has to ascertain which is main and which is subordinate. If कृत् is a संज्ञा it will be subordinate as explained above. However, if the present rule (P. 1. 1. 39) is understood before the rule कृदतिङ् (P. 3. 1. 93) is understood, कृत् is not a संज्ञा. Consequently, it is not subordinate. Thus मेजन्तः is understood as subordinate and therefore विशेषण while कृत् is विशेष्य. The rule then means मेजन्तो यः कृत् तदन्तम् अव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात्. कृत् stands for कृदन्त when it is a विशेषण, because the rule येन विधिः ... (P. 1. 1. 72) applies only to a विशेषण.

[1. 3]

The second alternative is discussed in this passage. If कृत् is understood as a संज्ञा, it is subordinate and therefore विशेषण. P. 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य prescribes that a विशेषण stands for that which ends in that विशेषण. Therefore, कृत् means कृदन्त and the rule is understood as कृदन्तं यन्मेजन्तं तदन्तमव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात्। The difference between the two views can be explained as follows: In the first view कृत् is विशेष्य in relation to मेजन्त, therefore मेजन्त is connected with कृत्. In the second view कृत्, being a संज्ञा, is a विशेषण, therefore, it means कृदन्त and मेजन्त is connected with कृदन्त. It must be noted, as already stated, that also in the first view कृत् is understood as कृदन्त (by Pari. 23 : प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात्स विहितः etc.) after it is connected with मेजन्त : मेजन्तं यत् कृत् तदन्तम् अव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात्।

[1. 4]

1. न चात्र तदन्तविधिः ... etc. In the above interpretation कृत् is understood as कृदन्त by applying तदन्तविधि (P. 1. 1. 72). However, तदन्तविधि cannot be applied to a प्रत्यय if it is mentioned in a संज्ञा rule, according to the Pari. 27 : संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तग्रहणं नास्ति। The author points out that there is the *Vār.* : प्रयोजनं सर्वनामा ... etc. which specifically mentions the application of तदन्तविधि in the case of the अव्ययसंज्ञा.

2. अन्वर्थनिर्देशाद्वा etc. Alternatively the author tries to justify the application of तदन्तविधि on the basis of अन्वर्थसंज्ञा. Since an अव्यय means that which is not declined or modified the name अव्यय must be first applicable to that which can be declined. Since a कृदन्त and not a कृत् suffix can be declined, कृत् in this rule has to be interpreted as कृदन्त by applying तदन्तविधि.

3. असत्येवान्तग्रहणे etc. Here the author points out that the mention of अन्त in the word मेजन्त is reduntant, because by simply applying तदन्तविधि, मेच् will be interpreted as मेजन्त. The word मेजन्त may, further, qualify either a कृत् or a कृदन्त and thus give rise to two alternative interpretations.

The MS reads °विधिः शक्यः which is emended to °विधिरशक्यः to suit the context.

[1. 5]

Here the author refers to the view of some other scholars that the second interpretation of the present rule can be obtained on the basis of the mention of अन्त in the word मेजन्त. According to them the very mention of the word अन्त connected with मेच् implies that मेजन्त is a विशेषण, and therefore the rule means मेजन्तं कृदन्तम् अव्ययं भवति।

However, the author points out that the mention of the word अन्त serves no purpose, because the desired meaning of the rule can be obtained even without

it. If the word अन्त is absent the rule would real कृन्मेच्. It yields two possible interpretations which cannot be accepted simply because they lead to undesired results. Therefore, one is forced to interpret the rule by invoking the औपसंख्यानिक-तदन्तविधि and अन्वर्थसंज्ञा, as मेजन्तं कृदन्तम् अव्ययं भवति. Of the two possible interpretations the first is discussed and rejected in the next part of this passage. In the rule कृन्मेच्, कृत् can either be a विशेष्य or a विशेषण. So also can मेच्. If कृत् is a विशेष्य, मेच् will be its विशेषण and by the application of the तदन्तविधि the rule would mean मेजन्तं कृत् अव्ययसंज्ञं भवति। If this interpretation is accepted the forms कारयाम्, हारयाम् etc. in the perfect forms कारयांचकार and हारयांचकार will not get the अव्ययसंज्ञा. They are the periphrastic perfect, third person singular forms of the roots *kṛ* and *hṛ*. कारयांचकार is derived in the following manner :

कृ+णिच्+लिट्	
कृ+णिच्+आम्+लिट्	P. 3. 1. 35
कार्+इ+आम्	P. 7. 2. 115, P. 2. 4. 81
कार्+ए+आम्	P. 7. 3. 84
कारयाम्+कृ+लिट्	P. 6. 1. 78, P. 3. 1. 40
कारयाम्+स्+चकार	P. 4. 1. 2
कारयाम्+चकार	P. 6. 1. 8, P. 7. 4. 62. etc.
कारयांचकार	

Since कारयाम् is a प्रातिपदिक, case-endings will be added to it. However, they cannot be dropped unless कारयाम् is an अव्यय. If the case-endings are not dropped the desired form कारयांचकार cannot be obtained. कारयाम् cannot be called अव्यय if the rule कृन्मेच् means मेजन्तं कृद् अव्ययं भवति, because आम् which ends in म् is not कृत् and लिट् which is कृत् does not end in म्. (आम् which is taught by P. 3. 1. 35 does not come within the scope of the *adhikāra* कृदतिङ्, P. 3. 1. 92, which teaches the name कृत्.) Thus the first meaning creates a difficulty in the derivation of कारयांचकार etc. *Mbh.* reads : यदि विज्ञायते कृद्यो मान्तः इति कारयांचकार हारयांचकारेत्यत्र न प्राप्नोति।

The MS reads प्राप्तति which is corrected to प्राप्तः. Similarly, कृदन्त is corrected to कृत् since otherwise the sentence cannot be properly understood.

[1. 6]

Here the second alternative is discussed. The rule कृन्मेच् can be understood as : म् and एच् which are कृत् are called अव्यय. Since a कृत् suffix म् is not attested the name अव्यय will be given to that कृत् which ends in म्, because otherwise the mention of म् in the rule will be useless. Although a कृत् suffix of the form of ए is attested in derivatives like दृशे (दृश्+ए [से] by

P. 3. 4. 9), it is not desirable to understand that एच् which is कृत् is अव्यय, because the name अव्यय cannot be applied to कृत्s ending in एच् in forms like कर्तवे (कृ+तवेन्, P. 3. 1. 9). Thus in view of the fact that the name अव्यय should cover the कृत् suffixes which end in म् and एच्, the words कृन्मेच् will be interpreted as मेजन्तं कृत्. Traditionally this way of argumentation is known as लक्ष्यानुरोधेन व्यवस्था 'arrangement in accordance with the target (words)'. The author therefore concludes that even without the mention of the word अन्त, the rule कृन्मेच् can be interpreted to obtain desired results.

[1.7]

In spite of the disposal of the word अन्त in the rule as described above, the author here points out its purpose as explained in the *Nyāsa*. (Was *Nyāsa* an ancient commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*? If at all it was, it is not extant today. The well-known *Nyāsa*, the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi on the *Kāśikā*, is much later than the author of the *Dīp.* Pat. often uses the word *nyāsa* in the sense of the original *sūtra* of Pāṇini.) The purpose of the mention of अन्त stated in the *Nyāsa* (?) is to point out that the name अव्यय taught by the present rule should be restricted to such कृदन्तs as originally end in म् or एच्, it should not be applicable to मान्त- or एजन्त-कृदन्तs which are not originally मान्त or एजन्त. For instance, कुम्भकार is a कृदन्त ending in *a*. The form कुम्भकारे which is arrived at while deriving the dative plural कुम्भकारेभ्यः is an एजन्त-कृदन्त. However, it is not basically एजन्त. Therefore, the name अव्यय does not apply to कुम्भकारे. Thus the mention of the word अन्त is meant for the precise application of the name अव्यय.

[1.8]

Another purpose of the use of the word अन्त in the rule is pointed out. The two alternatives about the relation between कृत् and मेजन्त have been aleady referred to in [1.1]. Both the words can be alternately विशेष्य or विशेषण in relation to each other. The desired relation is, however, that कृत् is a विशेष्य and मेजन्त is a विशेषण, so that the desired meaning, मेजन्तं कृदन्तम् अव्ययं भवति is obtained. The word अन्त compounded with मेच् affirms the विशेषण character of मेच्.

[1.9]

Here the author offers a still different interpretation of the rule. He suggests that the rule should be treated as a ग्रहणकवाक्य, an original, general statement. The प्रयोगसमवायि- वाक्य, the statement of application which is based on this, is कृदन्तो मेच् अव्ययम्. It means that म् and एच् at the end of कृत् suffix is अव्यय. It is not clear what the author has achieved by offering this interpretation.

Traditionally, ग्रहणकवाक्य is used to refer to the rule अणुदित्सवर्णस्य ··· (P. 1. 1. 69). Literally, however, it may mean a source-sentence or a general statement from which particular statements emerge. The relation between a ग्रहणकवाक्य and a प्रयोगसमवायि- वाक्य appears to be that between a theory and its application.

[2. 1]

1. कारयांचकारेति ... etc. Pat. has pointed out that both the meanings of कृन्मेजन्तः described above involve difficulties. The author discusses the examples given by Pat. in this context. If the rule is understood as कृद्यो मान्तः, तदन्तम् अव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात् the form कारयाम् in कारयांचकार cannot be called अव्यय. (See the *prakriyā* given above in 1. 5).

The suffix लिट् is called कृत् by P. 3. 1. 93 : कृदतिङ्. However, the suffix आम् is not कृत् since it is taught by P. 3. 1. 40. Thus there is no कृत् which ends in म् and that which ends in म् (i. e. आम्) is not कृत्. Since आम् is not a कृत्, the form कारयाम् cannot be described as मान्तं यत्कृत् तदन्तम् 'ending in that कृत् which ends in म्'. ('मान्त' should always be understood as मन्त 'ending in म् [not म].) Therefore, the name अव्यय does not apply to कारयाम्. It is however desired in order to drop the case-endings added to it. Since कारयाम् is meaningful (अर्थवत्), it is a प्रातिपदिक and therefore case-endings are added to it. They can be dropped by P. 2. 4. 82 : अव्ययादाप्सुपः, only if कारयाम् is an अव्यय. If the second interpretation, namely कृदन्तं यन्मान्तं तदव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात्, is accepted, कारयाम् can be called अव्यय. लिट् added to कृ+णिच् is a कृत् suffix. Although at the stage कृ+णिच्+आम्+लिट् the लिट् is dropped, still कारयाम् can be described as a कृदन्त according to the rule प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम् (P. 1. 1. 62) which prescribes that a gramatical operation caused by a certain suffix takes place even after the लोप (elision) of that suffix is effected. Thus कारयाम् being an अव्यय, the case-endings added to it are dropped.

2. एवं तु विज्ञायमाने ... etc. Now the author points out another difficulty. If the second interpretation is accepted in order to avoid the difficulty in the derivation of कारयांचकार, a difficulty arises in the case of the derivation of forms like प्रतामौ, प्रतामः etc. The word प्रताम् is derived by adding the कृत् suffix क्विप् to the root तम् (4th class) preceded by प्र in the following manner :

प्र+तम्+क्विप्	P. 3. 2. 76
प्र+तम्+व्	P. 1. 1. 3, 8, 9
प्र+तम्	P. 6. 1. 67
प्र+ताम्	P. 6. 4. 15
प्रताम्	

प्रताम् is thus a कृदन्त ending in *m*. Here also, as in the above case, the कृत् suffix is dropped. Yet by प्रत्ययलक्षण, प्रताम् is a कृदन्त. It is thus an अव्यय according to the second interpretation (कृदन्तं यन्मान्तं तदव्ययसंज्ञं स्यात्). Since it is an अव्यय all the case-endings added to it must be dropped by P. 2. 4. 82. For instance, when the dual ending औ is added to प्रताम् it will be dropped and, instead of प्रतामौ which is a desired from, *प्रताम्, an undesirable form, will be derived. The second interpretation thus leads to another difficulty, namely, the non-derivation of correct forms like प्रतामौ, प्रतामः etc and derivation of wrong forms such *प्रताम्.

[2.2]

1. The objector argues that in to order drop the case-ending after कारयाम् the second interpretation is not required. Since the form कारयाम्, which is a part of complete derivations like कारयांचकार etc., is not connected with any कारक or a number, no case-endings like the accusative, instrumental etc. (conveying numbers like the dual and plural) will be added to it. Consequently, only the nominative singular case-ending सु is added to कारयाम्. This ending can be dropped by P. 6. 1. 68 : हल्ङ्याब्भ्यो दीर्घात् सुतिस्यपृक्तं हल् which teaches that the suffixes स् and त् coming after a consonant, a long vowel or the feminine suffixes ङी and आप् are dropped. Thus for the sake of the elision of the case-ending after कारयाम्, the name अव्यय is not required.

The author's reply to this objection is that just as a perfect form of the root कृ attached to कारयाम् is connected with a कारक and number, in the same manner, कारयाम् also is connected with a कारक and number. Therefore, in order to drop the case-endings other than स् (nom. sing), the name अव्यय for कारयाम् is required.

2. अकच् तु नोदाहियते etc. If the name अव्यय is given to कारयाम् for the dropping of the case-endings, this name will cause another grammatical function, namely the addition of the suffix अकच् by P. 5. 3. 71 : अव्ययसर्वनाम्नामकच् प्राक् टेः. If अकच् is added, undesirable forms like कारयकांचकार will be derived. However, according to the author of the *Dīp.* the question of the addition of अकच् to कारयाम् does not arise, because कारयाम् which is a part of derivatives like कारयांचकार does not convey a meaning which can be coreferential with meanings like अज्ञात 'unknown', अल्प 'small', etc. The suffix अकच् is one of the स्वार्थिक suffixes which convey meanings like अज्ञात, कुत्सित etc. These meanings can be coreferential with a meaning which is complete. Since the form कारयांचकार, and not its part कारयाम्, conveys a complete meaning, अकच् cannot be added to कारयाम्.

[2. 3]

1. The difficulty regarding the form कारयांचकार is discussed in the *Mbh.* There it is stated that even if the first interpretation (कृद्यो मान्तः etc.) is accepted, there will be no difficulty in the derivation of कारयांचकार. The case-endings after कारयाम् will be dropped by another rule, namely, आमः (P. 2. 4. 81). If it is argued that the rule आमः prescribes elision of लिट् alone and not of any other suffix as the word लेः is continued from the previous rule, the reply given in the *Mbh.* is that लेः need not be continued. In that case, the rule आमः would prescribe elision of any suffix that is added to a word ending in आम्. This is, in fact, desired, says Pat.

Here the author tries to show that Pat.'s statement, इष्यते च प्रत्ययमात्रस्य (लुक्) ' (elision) of all suffixes is desired ' should be understood in a different sense. Pat. means that no addition of any suffix is possible after a word ending in आम्. The author further shows how addition of a तद्धित suffix after a word ending in आम् is not possible. It was pointed out in the previous passage that the meaning of आमन्त is not coreferential with the meaning कुत्सा etc. which is conveyed by the तद्धित suffixes like पाशप्. Now, one may argue that पाशप् etc. are added to convey meanings like कुत्सा, simply because these meanings are not expressed by कारयाम्. The author discards the possibility of the addition of पाशप् etc. by saying that since पाशप् etc. added to an आमन्त are dropped, the meanings conevyed by them will remain unexpressed. Thus there is no point in adding पाशप् etc. to कारयाम् and other आमन्त words.

2. अथानुप्रयोगादुत्पन्ना ... If somebody argues that the meanings कुत्सा etc. which are conveyed by पाशप् etc. are connected with the meaning of the complete form कारयांचकार though not with its part (कारयाम्), the author says that in that case अकच् etc. must be added to the complete form and not to the आमन्त. The author concludes that no suffix according to Pat. is added to आमन्त.

3. कुत्साप्रशंसाप्रकर्षा इति etc. कुत्सा etc. are the meanings conveyed by the स्वार्थिक suffixes such as क, अकच् etc. See P. 5. 3. 47, 55, 57 and 66.

[2. 4]

1. Pat.'s statement इष्यते च प्रत्ययमात्रस्य (लुक्) is interpreted by the author in a different sense as pointed out above. According to him, here लुक् does not mean elision; it means non-addition. What Pat. means is that there is an absolute absence of addition of any suffix after an आमन्त. In the above passage this was explained by giving logical arguments. In this passage it is supported by a statement from grammar. In the rule कृञ्चानुप्रयुज्यते लिटि (P. 3. 1. 40) the word आम् is continued. It implies that कृ and other roots are attached immedi-

ately after आम्. In other words there must not be intervention of any other item between आम् and कृ. Thus the rule कृञ्चानु ... indicates that no suffix like तरप् is added to आम्. The *Vār.* व्यवहितनिवृत्त्यर्थं च (*Vār.* 9 on P. 3. 1. 40) also supports this. It means that the addition of कृ etc. after आम् is stated by P. 3. 1. 40 in order to discard intervention of any other item between आम् and कृ.

The author's interpretation of लुक् as non-addition rather than elision is due to his attempt at saving Pat. from self-contradiction. In his *Mbh.* on P. 3. 1. 40 Pat. describes आमन्त as a part which is incomplete in meaning (अपरिसमाप्तार्थं). Therefore, there is no possibility of addition of any suffix after आमन्त. कृ and other roots are added to an आमन्त in order to complete its meaning. Therefore, it is more logical to say that no suffix is added to an आमन्त rather than to say that any suffix that is added to an आमन्त is dropped.

2. किं च स्वादयो यदि लुप्येरन् etc. One may argue that if the rule आमः means, as Pat. has suggested, that any suffix added to आम् is dropped, there will be no difficulty, because whatever suffix will be added, will be dropped and the close juxtaposition between आम् and कृ will be retained. There is thus no harm in prescribing addition and subsequent elision of a suffix. The author says in this connection that if a suffix, a case-ending for instance, is added to आम्, the meaning such as the singular number conveyed by it will be retained even after its elision and therefore the addition of कृ etc. which is meant to supply the meaning such as number etc. to आम् will be reduntant. If a suffix added to आम् has already expressed the meaning, why should कृ etc. be added to convey the same meaning? The very statement of अनुप्रयोग 'addition' will be thus reduntant. Read the *Mbh.* on P. 3. 1. 40 : आमन्तमव्यक्तपदार्थकं तेनापरिसमाप्तोऽर्थ इति कृत्वानुप्रयोगो भविष्यति।

[2. 5]

1. It has already been pointed out that if the second interpretation of कृन्मेजन्तः is accepted the difficulty regarding कारयांचकार will be removed, but the word प्रताम् will get the name अव्यय which is undesirable. The word प्रताम् is derived by adding the कृत् suffix क्विप् to the root तम्. If प्रताम् is called अव्यय, the case-endings added to it will be dropped. Therefore, the forms प्रतामौ, प्रतामः etc. cannot be derived. In order to avoid this difficulty Pat. suggests a ज्ञापक based on the inclusion of the word प्रशान् in the स्वरादि list. The word प्रशान् is derived as follows :

प्र+शम्+क्विप्	P. 3. 2. 76
प्र+शम्+व्	P. 1. 1. 3, 8, 9
प्र+शम्	P. 6. 1. 67

प्र+शाम् P. 6. 4. 15

प्र+शान् P. 8. 2. 64

Although the derivative ends in न्, it is मकारान्त at the time of the application of the rule कृन्मेजन्तः, since the change of म् into न् prescribed by P. 8. 2. 68 is असिद्ध 'not effected' for the rule कृन्मेजन्तः. Therefore, प्रशान् can be called अव्यय by कृन्मेजन्तः. Why is it then mentioned in the स्वरादि list? The inclusion of प्रशान् in the स्वरादि list, being thus redundant, indicates that the name अव्यय should not be given to a कृत् derivative which is a कृदन्त by the प्रत्ययलक्षण Pari., except in the case of the derivative प्रशान्. The कृत् suffix क्विप् added to प्र+ताम् as well as प्र+शम् is elided and it is only through the Pari. प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम् that प्रशान् as well as प्रताम् are described as कृदन्तs. The above ज्ञापक restricts the scope of the name अव्यय to प्रशान् and implies that no other derivative which is a कृदन्त by प्रत्ययलक्षण Pari. is called अव्यय. The possibility of the application of the name अव्यय to प्रताम् is thus removed.

2. One may argue that प्रशान् is included in the स्वरादि list, because the name अव्यय for प्रशान् is not possible, since it is derived not from the root शम् but from the root शान् which ends in न्. Thus प्रशान् is not a मकारान्त-कृदन्त. Therefore, it is mentioned in the स्वरादि list as it cannot get the name अव्यय by the rule कृन्मेजन्तः. Thus it cannot be a ज्ञापक as described above. The author replies that the suffix सन् is invariably added to root शान् by P. 3. 1. 6 : मान्बधदान्शान्भ्यो दीर्घश्चाभ्यासस्य. Therefore प्रशान् cannot be derived from शान्.

3. यदि प्रत्ययलक्षणम् etc. If the name अव्यय is not given to any derivative other thae प्रशान् which is मकारान्त by प्रत्ययलक्षण, कारयाम् will again cease to be an अव्यय. Since the कृत् suffix णिच् added to कृ+णिच्+आम् is dropped, कारयाम् is a कृदन्त only by प्रत्ययलक्षण. If the ज्ञापक restricts अव्ययसंज्ञा to प्रशान् as described above, कारयाम् will not be an अव्यय and the difficulty in the derivation of कारयांचकार will remain unsolved. Therefore, the author defines the nature of the ज्ञापक and says that it is restricted to roots which end in म्. Since कारयाम् is not a root ending in म्, it does not become subject to the ज्ञापक. The derivatives like प्रताम्, प्रशाम् etc. are कृदन्तs as well as roots ending in म् according to the maxim, क्विबन्ता धातुत्वं न जहति 'The words ending in क्विप् do not cease to be roots'.

4. सोपसर्गत्वं तु नाश्रीयते. A ज्ञापक is suppossed to be related to such forms as belong to the category of the form on which the ज्ञापक is based. In the present case the ज्ञापक is based on the form प्रशान्. Therefore, it must refer to every कृदन्त which is derived by adding the suffix क्विप् to a root ending in म् and which is also preceded by an उपसर्ग. The ज्ञापक then would be सोपसर्गस्य मकारान्तस्य धातोश्चेद् अव्ययसंज्ञा तर्हि प्रशान् इत्यस्यैव, नान्यस्य. However, this

restricted form of the ज्ञापक is not desirable. If this restriction is accepted, the name अव्यय will wrongly apply to कृदन्तs like आसताम्. आसताम् is derived from the root तम् preceded by a कारक (and not an उपसर्ग) आस-, by the addition of the suffix क्विप् in the sense of agent (आसान् ताम्यति=काङ्क्षति). Since the root is not preceded by an उपसर्ग, the ज्ञापक will allow the name अव्यय to this form.

The MS reads आसाताम् which does not make any sense. (AL read सौताम्.)

5. अस्मिंस्तु पक्षे ... etc. It was shown above that the second interpretation helps in removing difficulties in establishing desirable forms. However, the fault of over-application also results. The rule now means : कृदन्तं यत् मान्तम् एजन्तं च तदव्ययसंज्ञं भवति. The कृत् derivative लौ is an एजन्त-कृदन्त. It ends in a diphthong and is derived by adding the कृत् suffix क्विप् to the causative of the root लू (9th class) in the following manner :

लू+णिच्+क्विप्	P. 3. 1. 26; 3. 2. 76
लौ+इ+व्	P. 7. 2. 115; 1. 3. 7, 9
लौ+इ	P. 6. 1. 67
लौ	P. 6. 4. 51

The application of the name अव्यय to लौ (one who makes somebody cut something) would lead to undesirable forms.

The author suggests two ways to remove this difficulty. Firstly, the *Vār.* 2 on the present rule, अनन्यप्रकृतिरिति वा will not allow the name अव्यय to लौ. The *Vār.* suggests that the name should be given to that कृदन्त which ends in म् or एच् in its original form. The final diphthing in लौ is not original; it is a modification of ऊ by applying the वृद्धि rule. Since लौ is not an अनन्यप्रकृति-कृदन्त, the name अव्यय will not be applicable to it. Secondly, the wrong application of the name अव्यय to लौ can be avoided by invoking the Pari. (No. 52) लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैव ग्रहणम् 'Between the two (kinds of forms, namely,) secondary and direct, the direct (form) should be accepted'. The character of being एजन्त is not direct or basic to the form लौ, as it is in the forms कर्तवे, गमध्यै etc. (where the कृत् suffixes originally end in ए and ऐ respectively). In other words, since लौ is an एजन्त-कृदन्त only through लक्षण, (i. e. by application of a rule), the name अव्यय is not applicable to it. Kaiyaṭa remarks : लावयतेर्लौरित्यस्यापि न भवति अस्मादेव ज्ञापकाल्लाक्षणिकत्वाद्धौकारस्य । Nāgoji, while explaining this statement, says : अस्मादेवेति । धातुमात्रापेक्षं ज्ञापकमिति भावः. Both these commentators mean that if the ज्ञापक excludes all the roots except प्र+शम् (धातोश्चेत् प्रत्ययलक्षणेन अव्ययसंज्ञा तर्हि प्रशान् शब्दस्यैव), then the name अव्यय cannot apply to लौ.

[2. 6]

1. The *Vār.* 1 : कृन्मेजन्तश्चानिकारोकारप्रकृतिः states that a मेजन्त-कृदन्त other than that which originally ends in इ or उ should be called अव्यय. This *Vār.* is meant to remove the difficulty of wrong application of the name अव्यय to forms like आधये, आधेः etc. Pat. says : कृन्मेजन्तश्चानिकारोकारप्रकृतिरिति वक्तव्यम्। इह मा भूत् — आधये आधेः चिकीर्षवे चिकीर्षोः इति।

आधये is a dative singular of the कृदन्त form आधि which is derived as follows :

आ+धा+कि	P. 3. 3. 92
आ+धा+इ	P. 1. 3. 8, 9
आ+ध्+इ	P. 6. 4. 64
आधि	

The dative singular of आधि is derived in the following manner :

आधि+ङे	P. 4. 1. 2
आधि+ए	P. 1. 3. 8, 9
आधे+ए	P. 7. 3. 111
आधय्+ए	P. 6. 1. 78
आधये	

Here आधे which is a modified form of आधि by applying the गुण rule (P. 7. 3. 111) is एजन्त and कृदन्त, since आधि, its प्रकृति 'base', is a कृदन्त. Therefore, the name अव्यय by the present rule would apply to आधे and consequently, the case ending ए would drop. The desired form आधये would not be therefore derived. A similar difficulty would arise in the derivation of the dative singular चिकीर्षवे from चिकीर्षु which is a कृदन्त. The *Vār.* अनिकारोकार ... removes this difficulty by restricting the scope of the name अव्यय. According to the *Vār.* the name अव्यय is not given to that एजन्त-कृदन्त which is originally इकारान्त or उकारान्त. Since the form आधे has इकारान्त base आधि, it is not called अव्यय.

2. इदमत्र संप्रधार्यम् etc. The author tries to establish the necessity of the *Vār.* by refuting the argument of the पूर्वपक्ष. The पूर्वपक्ष argues as follows : At the stage आधे+ङे two rules are applicable : (1) The name अव्यय for आधे by the present rule and, (2) the substitution of अय् in the place of ए by P. 7. 3. 111. The conflict between the two rules cannot be resolved by invoking the principles of पर or नित्य. If the name अव्यय is effected first, elision of the case-ending will take place and therefore there will be no scope for अय् substitution. On the other hand, if अय् substitution is effected first, the resultant form being आधय्, and

there will be no scope for the name अव्यय and the consequent elision. Both the rules are thus अनित्य. The conflict can be resolved by invoking the principle of अन्तरङ्गत्व. The अय् substitution which is caused by the following vowel is अन्तरङ्ग with reference to the name अव्यय (and लुक्) which is caused by the following suffix ङे which is responsible for the change of इ into ए in the form आधे. Since अय् substitution is अन्तरङ्ग it will be effected first and after it is effected, there is no scope for the name अव्यय. The difficulty in the derivation of आधये is thus removed. It is therefore not necessary to state the *Vār.* अनिकारोकारप्रकृतिर्वा. The author's reply to this पूर्वपक्ष is as follows : Although the name अव्यय and the लुक् caused by it are बहिरङ्ग, they are more powerful by the Pari. (No. 114) अन्तरङ्गानपि विधीन् बहिरङ्गो लुग् बाधते, which states that लुक् supersedes other operations even when it is बहिरङ्ग. Therefore at the stage आधे+ङे the name अव्यय will be effected for the application of लुक् and the undesired form *आधे instead of आधये will be derived. In order to avoid the application of the name अव्यय meant for the application of लुक्, the present *Vār.* is necessary.

[2. 7]

1. Kāt. suggests another alternative for restriction of the present rule in the *Vār.* 2 : अनन्यप्रकृतिरिति वा 'Or (it should be stated that a कृदन्त ending in *m* or *ec*) which does not have a different base (is called अव्यय)'. Pat. remarks that among the two restrictions suggested by Kāt. this latter one is preferable since it is helpful in justifying many other forms like कुम्भकारेभ्यः. Read the *Mbh.* किं पुनरत्र ज्यायः ? अनन्यप्रकृतिरिति वचनमेव ज्यायः। इदमपि सिद्धं भवति कुम्भकारेभ्यो नगरकारेभ्य इति।

कुम्भकारेभ्यः is dative plu. of कुम्भकार, a कृदन्त which is derived in the following way :

कुम्भं करोति	
कुम्भ+अस्+कृ+अण्	P. 3. 2. 1
कुम्भ+कृ+अ	P. 1. 3. 3, 9; 2. 4. 71
कुम्भ+कार्+अ	P. 7. 2. 115; 1. 1. 51
कुम्भकार	

The dative plu. of कुम्भकार is derived as follows :

कुम्भकार+भ्यस्	P. 4. 1. 2
कुम्भकारे+भ्यस्	P. 7. 3. 103
कुम्भकारेभ्यः	P. 8. 2. 66; 8. 3. 15

Here the form कुम्भकारे is एजन्त and कृदन्त (because it is a modification of the कृदन्त 'कुम्भकार'). Therefore, the name अव्यय wrongly applies to कुम्भकारे. If it is applied, the case-ending भ्यस् would be dropped and an undesirable form *कुम्भकारे, instead of कुम्भकारेभ्यः, would result. This difficulty cannot be removed by the earlier *Vār.*, namely अनिकारोकारप्रकृतिर्वा, since the प्रकृति i. e. कुम्भकार is neither इकारान्त nor उकारान्त. Therefore, the *Vār.* 2 अनन्य-प्रकृतिरिति वा is mentioned. It states that an एजन्त-कृदन्त, the प्रकृति of which is not different (from the एजन्त-कृदन्त itself), is called अव्यय. Thus the कृदन्तs like कर्तवे, गमध्यै etc. which basically end in एच् get the name अव्यय, whereas forms like कुम्भकारे whose प्रकृति is not एजन्त do not.

2. शक्यं तत्र ... etc. The objector argues that the difficulty in the case of कुम्भकारेभ्यः can be removed by referring to the Pari. लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः ... । Since कुम्भकारे is a secondarily derived एजन्त and not a प्रतिपदोक्त-एजन्त, the name अव्यय will not apply to it. A प्रतिपदोक्त 'directly mentioned' word is always preferred to a लाक्षणिक 'derived' form, because it is नित्य 'permanent', प्रत्यक्ष 'directly visible' and अन्तरङ्ग 'complete within itself' as compared to the लाक्षणिक, which is imaginary, not permanent and बहिरङ्ग 'dependent upon external elements'. (The terms अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग should not be here understood in their usual technical sense.)

The author points out in this connection that although it was possible for Pat. to remove the difficulty in the derivation of कुम्भकारेभ्यः with the help of the लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्त Pari., he does not do so, because he wants to discuss another Pari. namely the संनिपातपरिभाषा, and to give कुम्भकारेभ्यः as an illustration of that Pari. The संनिपातपरिभाषा is discussed in the latter part of the *Mbh.* on the present rule. The following passages deal with it.

[3. 1]

The author discusses the meaning of the संनिपातपरिभाषा (Pari. 85). The straightforward, simple meaning of the Pari. is as follows: A grammatical operation caused by a close conjunction (of two units) cannot be a cause of the destruction of that (close conjunction)'. However, a slight change in this meaning is introduced here by differently interpreting the word तद्विघात. The compound तद्विघात should not be understood as षष्ठीतत्पुरुष meaning तस्य विघातः 'Its destruction', but it should be understood, according to the author, as an Upapada Tatp. meaning तं विहन्ति इति 'that which destroys it'. It is thus derived as follows:

तद्+अस्+वि+हन्+अण्	P. 3. 2. 1
तद्+वि+घान्+अ	P. 7. 3. 54; 7. 2. 116

तद्+वि+घात्+अ P. 7. 3. 32

तद्विघात.

The meaning of the Pari. would be then as follows: 'A grammatical operation caused by a close conjunction (of two units) cannot be a cause of (the application of) a rule which destroys that conjunction'. The Pari. and its illustration are discussed in the following passages.

[3. 2]

1. The *Vār.* ह्रस्वत्वं तुग्विधेः etc. gives an illustration of the संनिपात Pari. ग्रामणिकुलम् 'the family of the leader of the village' is a compound. The word ग्रामणी is derived by adding the suffix क्विप् to the root नी preceded by the object ग्राम as follows:

ग्राम+अस्+नी+क्विप्

ग्राम+नी P. 2. 4. 71; 6. 1. 67

ग्रामणी P. 8. 4. 1

When the word ग्रामणी is compounded with the word कुल, the final ई of ग्रामणी is shortened by P. 6. 3. 31. At the stage ग्रामणी कुल the augment तुक् is applicable by P. 6. 1. 71: ह्रस्वस्य पिति कृति तुक् which teaches that त् is added to a short vowel when a पित् suffix follows. Here, although the पित् suffix, namely क्विप् added to ग्राम+नी, is dropped, the shortening caused by it can take place by the Pari. प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम् (P. 1. 1. 62). If तुक् is effected the form would be *ग्रामणित्कुलम्. In order to avoid this undesirable form the संनिपातपरि. is employed. According to this Pari. the shortening of the long ī at the end of the word ग्रामणी which is caused by the close conjunction between ई (final of ग्रामणी) and the उत्तरपद 'कुल', cannot cause the application of तुक्, since तुक् would destroy that close conjunction.

2. कस्य पुनरत्र विघातः ... etc. Here the पूर्वपक्षिन् raises an objection: Since ई (the final of ग्रामणी) is already removed by the short इ which is substituted in its place, it cannot be said that there is a destruction of the संनिपात between ई and the उत्तरपद. The author's reply to this objection is as follows: The augment तुक् is not understood as destroying the close conjunct ई; it destroys the close conjunction between the पूर्वपद (ग्रामणी) and the उत्तरपद (कुल).

3. अयं च तुक् यदि अवयवभक्तो ... etc. According to the Pari. (No. 11) यदागमास्तद्गुणीभूतास्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यन्ते, an augment is treated not as an independent element, but as a part of that to which it is added. The augment तुक् is a part of इ (final of ग्रामणि). Since इ is a part of the word ग्रामणि, तुक् can be described

as a part of a part (अवयवावयवो). If the above Pari. is understood as being applicable also to a part of a part, तुक् which is a part of ङ् will be treated also as a part of ग्रामणि. In other words, ग्रामणिन्, and not ग्रामणि, will be understood as the पूर्वपद. In that case तुक् cannot be described as destroying the संनिपात between the पूर्वपद and the उत्तरपद. Therefore the author remarks that the compound ग्रामणिकुलम् can be regarded as an illustration of the purpose of the संनिपातपरि. only if the part of a part is not regarded as a part of the whole (i. e. तुक् is not regarded as a part of ग्रामणि).

[3. 3]

1. बहिरङ्गं ह्रस्वत्वम् etc. In the *Mbh.* the illustration ग्रामणिकुलम् is explained away by referring to the अन्तरङ्गपरि.: नैतदस्ति प्रयोजनम्। बहिरङ्गं ह्रस्वत्वम्, अन्तरङ्गस्तुक्। असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे. Thus, according to Pat., since the shortening which is बहिरङ्ग is असिद्ध 'not effected' for the operation of तुक् which is अन्तरङ्ग, तुक् is not added. The word ग्रामणिकुलम् cannot be, therefore, an illustration of the संनिपातपरि°.

2. अथ ग्रामं नयति .... The objector tries to retain ग्रामणिकुलम् as an illustration of the संनिपातपरि. by explaining the compound differently. He describes it as a कर्मधारय compound meaning ग्रामणि कुलम् 'a family leading the village', and not as षष्ठीतत्पुरुष as described above. ग्रामणि is a neuter singular qualifying the word कुलम्. The shortening of ई in the word ग्रामणी is effected here not by इको ह्रस्वो ..., but by ह्रस्वो नपुंसके (P. 1. 2. 47) which states that the final vowel of a stem in neuter is shortened. Since the shortening does not require an उत्तरपद, it is not द्विपदाश्रित, and hence, not बहिरङ्ग. Therefore, अन्तरङ्गपरि. cannot be applied to solve the problem of the undesired application of तुक्. It can be solved only with the help of the संनिपातपरि°.

The author replies that here also shortening is बहिरङ्ग with respect to तुक् because, while तुक् is conditioned by a letter (ह्रस्व), shortening is conditioned by a group of letters (प्रातिपदिक). Therefore, the अन्तरङ्गपरि. can take care of this compound also.

3. अत्र हि ग्रामण्यः छत्रम् etc. The author points out that the संनिपातपरिभाषा creates a difficulty in the derivation of the compound ग्रामणिच्छत्रम्. The word meaning 'the umbrella of the leader of the village' is a षष्ठीतत्पुरुष. Here after the shortening is effected by इको ह्रस्व ..., तुक् is applicable by two rules: (1) ह्रस्वस्य पिति कृति ... (P. 6. 1. 71) and (2) छे च (P. 6. 1. 73). तुक् prescribed by P. 6. 1. 71 does not take effect, because, as already explained while discussing the word ग्रामणिकुलम्, it is अन्तरङ्ग with respect to the ह्रस्व. तुक् caused by P. 6. 1. 73 also would not apply because of the संनिपातपरि°. However, it is desired. Since both the तुक् (caused by P. 6. 1. 73) and ह्रस्व are समानाश्रय

(because both are dependent on the पूर्वपद and the उत्तरपद), the अन्तरङ्गपरि. does not apply here and, in the absence of the संनिपातपरि. तुक् caused by छ is effected after ह्रस्व takes place. Kaiyaṭa remarks : यदि तु संनिपातलक्षणः इत्याश्रीयते तदा ग्रामणिच्छत्रम् इत्यत्रापि तुम्र स्यात्। ह्रस्वत्वतुगागमयोस्त्वत्र साम्यादन्तरङ्गत्वं बहिरङ्गत्वं नास्तीति छलक्षणस्तुक् सिद्धो भवति। However Nāgojibhaṭṭa says : अत्रापि वर्णमात्राश्रयत्वेन तुगन्तरङ्गः पूर्वोत्तरपदाश्रयो ह्रस्वो बहिरङ्गस्तद्दोषेष्वस्यागणनाच्च। तस्मादत्र तुम्र भवत्येवेत्यन्ये।

[3. 4]

1. Another example of the संनिपातपरि., namely वृत्रहभिः, is discussed in this passage. वृत्रहन् is derived by adding क्विप् (P. 3. 2. 87) to हन् preceded by the object वृत्र. The instrumental plural form is derived as follows :

वृत्र + अस् + हन् + क्विप् + भिस्	
वृत्र + हन् + भिस्	P. 2. 4. 71; 6. 1. 67
वृत्र + ह + भिस्	P. 8. 2. 7
वृत्रहभिः	P. 8. 2. 66; 8. 3. 15

At the stage वृत्रह + भिस्, even after the dropping of क्विप्, तुक् prescribed by P. 6. 1. 71 applies according to प्रत्ययलक्षणपरि. (P. 1. 1. 62). However, the elision of न् by P. 8. 2. 7 which is caused by the name पद् dependent upon the close conjunction between the stem ending in न् and the following case-ending cannot be the cause of the operation of तुक् which destroys the संनिपात. Therefore तुक् does not take place and the desired form वृत्रहभिः is derived.

2. अथ 'अतो लोपः' ... कस्मान्न भवति ? etc. Although the application of तुक् can be avoided by the संनिपातपरि., how to avoid the undesirable application of the elision of the final अ of वृत्रह by अतो लोपः (P. 6. 4. 48) ? The author's reply is as follows : the rule अतो लोपः prescribes elision of the final अ of that root which ends in अ when an आर्धधातुक suffix is enjoined after it. Since the root हन् ends in न् and not in अ when क्विप् is enjoined after it, the rule अतो लोपः does not apply here.

3. असिद्धो नलोपः ... etc. Patañjali rejects this example : एतदपि नास्ति प्रयोजनम्। असिद्धो नलोपस्तस्यासिद्धत्वान्न भविष्यति। The elision of न् is prescribed by P. 8. 2. 7 : नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य, which is a rule in the असिद्धकाण्ड. Therefore, by P. 8. 2. 1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धम् the elision of न् is असिद्ध 'not effected' for the rule prescribing तुक्. Thus तुक् does not take place. According to the author of the *Dīp.* नलोप is असिद्ध also because it is बहिरङ्ग (since it is dependent upon the stem and the following suffix as well as on the name पद) with respect to तुक् which is अन्तरङ्ग. Therefore the application of तुक् can be avoided also by referring to the अन्तरङ्गपरि°.

[3. 5]

1. निकुचित is a past passive participle derived by adding the suffix क्त to root कुन्च् preceded by नि in the following manner :

नि+कुन्च्+क्त	P. 3. 2. 102
नि+कुच्+त	P. 6. 4. 24
नि+कुच्+इ+त	P. 7. 2. 35
निकुचित	

Here after the elision of न् the form of the root is कुच्. The root कुच् thus being उदुपध 'having a penultimate *u*', the rule उदुपधाद् भावादिकर्मणोरन्यतरस्याम् (P. 1. 2. 21) becomes applicable. According to this rule the suffix क्त after कुच् would be अकित्. Consequently the rule क्ङिति च (P. I. 1. 5) which prescribes non-application of गुण and वृद्धि before कित् and ङित् suffixes would not apply and by the application of गुण (P. 7. 3. 86) the undesired form निकोचित would be derived. In order to avoid this difficulty the संनिपातपरि. is resorted to. According to this Pari. the feature of being उदुपध which is caused by कित्त्व cannot be the cause of the application of the rule which destroyes अकित्त्व. (The feature of उदुपधत्व is caused by नलोप which is caused by कित्त्व, therefore, कित्त्व is indirectly a cause of उदुपधत्व). Thus गुण caused by अकित्त्व is avoided.

2. नात्र संनिपातिनो etc. The author raises an objection : Although the feature of उदुपधत्व causes removal of कित्त्व, it cannot be said to be the cause of the destruction of the संनिपात between the root कुच् and the following suffix. Even after गुण is effected there is no संनिपातविघात. Therefore, there is no question of the application of the संनिपातपरि°.

Although the author has not explicitly given a reply to this objection, his earlier statement : अनया परिभाषया अकित्त्वव्यपदेशस्य निमित्तं न भवतीति कल्प्यते implies it. He means that the present Pari. applies even when a rule caused by a संनिपात can become a cause of the removal of a nomenclature of one of the conjuncts. Here कित् which is a nomenclature of the suffix क्त cannot be removed by उदुपधत्व.

[3. 6]

1. अमुना is an example of the संनिपातपरि°. This instrumental singular of अदस् is derived in the following manner :

अदस्+टा	P. 4. 1. 2
अद्अ+टा	P. 7. 2. 102

अद्+आ	P. 6. 1. 97; 1. 3. 9
अमु+आ	P. 8. 2. 80
अमु+ना	P. 8. 2. 3; 7. 3. 120

After द् is replaced by मु the substitution of ना cannot take place, because the substitution of मु which is taught by P. 8. 2. 80 is असिद्ध for the substitution of ना (P. 7. 3. 120). Pāṇini has removed this difficulty by making a special statement, न मु ने (P. 8. 2. 3) which means that when ना substitution is to be effected मु substitution is not regarded as असिद्ध. Thus ना is substituted. However, after ना is substituted, another rule, सुपि च (P. 7. 3. 102), is applicable. According to this rule the final अ of a stem is lengthened when a case-ending beginning with a यञ् letter follows. Since P. 8. 2. 80 is असिद्ध for this rule, at the stage अद्+ना the rule becomes applicable. However, the संनिपातपरि. removes its application and the form अमुना is retained. According to the Pari. the ना substitution cannot be the cause of the application of the lengthening rule which would destroy the संनिपात between the final short vowel (उ) of the stem and the following case-ending.

2. कस्यात्र विघातः etc. The author explains how the rule of lengthening destroys the संनिपात. The ना substitution is caused by the संनिपात between the final short vowel of a stem and the following case ending (i. e. टा). After ना is substituted, one of the संनिपातिन्s, namely the case-ending टा, is destroyed. Thus although the close conjunct is already destroyed by the ना substitution alone, the संनिपात itself remains undisturbed. And if the lengthening rule caused by ना applies, आ would be substituted in place of उ and thus the form of the preceding संनिपातिन् would be destroyed. The संनिपातिन् being thus destroyed the संनिपात is also destroyed.

3. ने तु यत्प्राप्नोति...etc. The author points out that अमुना can be regarded as an example of the संनिपातपरि., if the rule न मु ने is understood as ने कर्तव्ये मुभावः सिद्धः 'मु substitution should be regarded as सिद्ध when ना is to be effected'. The rule is, however, interpreted by some grammarians as ने कर्तव्ये कृते च यत्प्राप्नोति तत्र मुत्वं सिद्धम् 'मु is सिद्ध when ना is to be effected or, when any other rule, after ना is effected, is applicable'. According to this second interpretation मु will be सिद्ध also for the lengthening rule and in the absence of final अ, the lengthening will not take place. The very possibility of the application of the lengthening being thus discarded, there is no scope for the application of the संनिपातपरि°. therefore the author says that the present Pari. applies in the example अमुना if it is assumed that मु substitution is असिद्ध with respect to the rule that applies after ना substitution takes place.

[3.7]

Pat. rejects the example अमुना by referring to a different interpretation of the rule न मु ने which is offerred by Kāt. The *Vār.* (1 on P. 8. 2. 3) : न मु टादेशे is explained in the *Mbh.* as follows : न मु टादेश इति वक्तव्यम्। किमिदं टादेश इति ? ... सर्वविभक्त्यन्तोऽयं समासः। टाया आदेशष्टादेशः, टायामादेशष्टादेश इति। The word टादेश thus means 'a substitute in the place of टा' or 'a substitute when टा follows'. The compound टादेश is षष्ठीतत्पुरुष in the former case, whereas it is सप्तमीतत्पुरुष in the latter case. Hence it is described as सर्वविभक्त्यन्तः समासः 'a compound with (the word टा) ending in all cases' (here the word सर्व should not be taken literally. Kaiyata's remark on the word अलविधि in P. 1. 1. 56, namely, बहुत्वप्रतिपादनपरमेतत्। न ह्यत्र सप्त विभक्तयः संभवन्ति holds true of this case also). If the meaning of the सप्तमीतत्पुरुष is accepted, the rule न मु टादेशे would mean 'when a substitute is to be effected (in the place of an element) followed by टा, मु- substitution is not असिद्ध'. In the present case मु substitution will be thus सिद्ध when lengthening of the final अ by the rule सुपि च is applicable. The मु- substitution being सिद्ध the lengthening will not take place.

[3.8]

उपादास्त is third person singular, mid. of Aorist of the root दा preceded by उप. It is derived as follows :

उप+दाङ्+लुङ्	P. 3. 2. 110
उप+अ+दा+च्लि+त	P. 6. 4. 71; 3. 1. 43
उप+अ+दा+सिच्+त	P. 3. 1. 44
उप+अ+दे+स्+त	P. 7. 3. 84
उप+अ+दा+स्+त	P. 6. 1. 50
उपादास्त	P. 6. 1. 101

Here, after आ is substituted in the place of ए, दा would be called घु by the rule दाधा घ्वदाप् (P. 1. 1. 20). Consequently, P. 1. 2. 17 : स्थाघ्वोरिच्च would apply. According to this rule the ending त would be कित् and आ of दा would change into इ. Further, स् would be dropped by P. 8. 2. 27 : ह्रस्वादङ्गात् and an undesired form, *उपादित would result. This is avoided by resorting to the संनिपातपरि°. According to the Pari. the आ substitution cannot be the cause of P. 1. 2. 17 which prescribes कित्त्व of the suffix after दा, because the *ā*-substitution owes its existence to the संनिपात between the root दा and the following suffix त which is अकित्. The *ā*-substitution cannot thus destroy the feature, namely, अकित्त्व of one of the संनिपातिन्s, namely त. Here also, as in the earlier example (निकुचित; see 3. 5), neither the संनिपात nor a संनिपातिन् is destroyed, but

the व्यपदेश 'nomenclature' namely अकित् is being destroyed. If the इ substitution is effected, there would be destruction of one of the संनिपातिन्s, namely आ.

[3.9]

According to P. 7. 2. 99, the numerals त्रि and चतुर् are replaced by तिस् and चतस् respectively before a case-ending when they are to be used in the feminine gender. Since the substitutes तिस् and चतुस् end in ऋ, P. 4. 1. 5 : ऋन्नेभ्यो ङीप् which prescribes addition of the feminine suffix ङीप् after a stem ending in ऋ or न्, applies. However, if ङीप् is added it would lead to an undesirable form, such as *तिस्रीणाम् instead of तिसृणाम्. The undesired application of ङीप् is avoided by means of the application of the संनिपातपरि°. According to this Pari. the substitutee तिस् and चतस् which owe their existence to the संनिपात between the stem (त्रि and चतुर्) and the following case-ending cannot allow the rule prescribing the feminine suffix ङीप् which would destroy the संनिपात to apply. If ङीप् is added to तिस् not only is the संनिपात of तिस् and the following case-ending destroyed, but also one of the संनिपातिन्s, namely तिस्, is damaged because the suffix ई causes the change of ऋ into र् by इको यणचि (P. 6. 1. 77) (thus तिस् becoming तिस्र).

[3.10]

1. Pat. has rejected the above example by arguing that since Pāṇini himself mentions the feminine stems as तिस् and चतस् in P. 6. 4. 4, he thereby implies non-application of the feminine suffix ङीप्: एतदपि नास्ति प्रयोजनम्। आचार्यप्रवृत्तिर्ज्ञापयति यदयं न तिसृचतसृ इति नामि दीर्घत्वस्य प्रतिषेधं शास्ति। P. 6. 4. 4 : न तिसृचतसृ teaches that in feminine the lengthening of the stems तिस् and चतस् before the suffix नाम् does not take place. Since Pāṇini himself mentions the stems as तिस् and चतस् and not as *तिस्री and *चतस्री, it is abvions that he does not intend the application of the feminine suffix ङीप्. The संनिपातपरि. is thus not required to avoid the addition of ङीप्.

2. इदमलिङ्गम् etc. This *Dīp.* does not agree with the above argument of Pat. According to him the rule न तिसृचतसृ is required to avoid the application of दीर्घ in compounds such as प्रियतिसृणाम्. प्रियतिस् is a बहुव्रीहि meaning प्रियास्तिस्रः येषां ते 'Those to whom three are dear'. When the genitive plu. suffix नाम् is added to प्रियतिस्, the rule नामि (P. 6. 4. 3) applies and the rule न तिसृचतसृ cancels the application of lengthening prescribed by नामि and the form प्रियतिसृणाम् is derived. Thus, since the rule न तिसृचतसृ serves a purpose, it cannot be regarded as indicating non-application of the feminine suffix ङीप् after तिस् and चतस्. However, Kaiyaṭa and others do not agree with this argument of the author of the *Dīp.* According to Kaiyaṭa, although the stem प्रियतिस् is mascu-

line, तिसृ is feminine and therefore the feminine suffix ङीप् is applicable after तिसृ even in this compound. If ङीप् is added the rule न तिसृचतसृ will be useless. Therefore we have to accept that the rule indicates non-application of the suffix ङीप् after तिसृ and चतसृ. The *Prad.* reads: ननु समस्तार्थमेतत् स्यात् प्रियतिसृणां ब्राह्मणानामिति। अत्र ह्यङ्गं पुंसि वर्तते इति नास्ति ङीपः प्राप्तिरिति केचित्। तदयुक्तम्। न हि ङीब्विधानेऽङ्गाधिकारोऽस्ति। तत्रावयवस्य स्त्रीत्वप्रवृत्तित्वान्ङीपः प्राप्तिः केन वार्यते इति ज्ञापकमेव।

It is not clear why the author uses the word उपसमस्त instead of समस्त. The line अथ तु छन्दस्युक्तं...etc. cannot be properly interpreted in the present context. Perhaps it refers to the rule छन्दस्युभयथा (P. 6. 4. 5) which would justify the form प्रियतिसृणाम्. However, this is not a good argument since the form is not necessarily *chāndasa*. Finally, the author says that the words तिसृ and चतसृ are included by the author of the *gaṇapāṭha* in the स्वस्रादि list. P. 4. 1. 10: न षट्स्वस्रादिभ्यः teaches that the feminine suffix ङीप् is not added to the words which are called षष् and the words in the स्वस्रादि list. The गणपाठकार thus does not agree with Pat.

[3. 11]

1. The संनिपातपरि. is employed while deriving the neuter nominative plural forms शतानि, सहस्राणि etc. The form शतानि is, for instance, derived as follows:

शत+जस्	P. 4. 1. 2
शत+शि	P. 7. 1. 20
शतन्+इ	P. 7. 1. 72; 1. 3. 8, 9
शतान्+इ	P. 6. 4. 8
शतानि	

At the stage शतन्+इ the name षष् applies to शतन् by P. 1. 1. 24: ष्णान्ता षट्. If it is applied, the rule षड्भ्यो लुक् (P. 7. 1. 22) would apply and the case-ending इ would be dropped. This undesired application is avoided by means of the संनिपातपरि°. The augment नुम् added to शत is caused by the संनिपात between शत and the following case-ending. Therefore it cannot be the cause of the name षष् which leads to the destruction of the संनिपात by causing elision of the case-ending.

2. अत्राप्युपदेशवचनमस्तीति etc. The author rejects this illustration by arguing that the name षष् prescribed by P. 1. 1. 24 applies only to those words which end in ष् or न् in their उपदेश (original) form. This is stated in the *Vār.* 1 on P. 1. 1. 24: षट्संज्ञायामुपदेशवचनम्. Further, P. 1. 1. 72: येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य is a Pari. by which the word अन्त can be obtained while interpreting

P. 1. 1. 24. The mention of the word अन्त in ष्णान्ता, being thus redundant, indicates that the name षष् applies to those words alone which originally end in ष् or न्. Since the original word is शत and not शतन्, P. 1. 1. 24 does not apply and the consequent application of elision does not take place.

Kaiyaṭa, however, points out that the word अन्त in ष्णान्ता is meant to show the connection of *ṣṇa-* with संख्या. Thus he remarks : ष्णान्ता षडित्यन्तग्रहणमौपदेशिकप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमित्यत्र न भवतीति चेत् संख्यासंप्रत्ययार्थं बहुव्रीह्यर्थं तत्स्यादित्यदोषः ।

[3. 12]

1. शकटौ is locative singular of शकटि. It is derived as follows :

शकटि+ङि	P. 4. 1. 2
शकट+औ	P. 7. 3. 119
शकटौ	P. 6. 1. 88

At the stage शकट+औ the feminine suffix टाप् is applicable by the rule अजाद्यतष्टाप् (P. 4. 1. 4). If it is applied it will destroy the संनिपात between the stem and the suffix. Therefore according to the present Pari. टाप् which is the cause of the संनिपात does not take place. Although टाप् is not caused by the संनिपात itself, it is caused by one of the संनिपातिन्s, namely, the stem शकट. Therefore, the Pari. applies.

2. तच्चाशक्यं विहन्तुम् etc. The author rejects this example by arguing that even after the feminine suffix टाप् is added there is no damage to the संनिपात, because टाप् and the preceding अ together combine into one single substitute आ (P. 6. 1. 101) and this single substitute is treated as the final part of the stem by the Pari. अन्तादिवच्च (P. 6. 1. 85). There is thus no intervention of टाप् which would disturb the संनिपात.

3. अथ त्वेवं विहन्येत etc. The objector puts forth a counter-argument. He says that the अन्तादिवद्भाव ' feature of being treated as the final or the initial part ' is a grammatical feature and it is resorted to when a grammatical operation is to be effected. Since the संनिपात is not a grammatical operation, the अन्तवद्भावपरि. does not apply. Therefore the intervention by टाप् destroying the संनिपात remains and it is removed only by resorting to the संनिपातपरि.

4. Since the earlier argument is refuted, the author offers another argument. The rule अच्च घेः (P. 7. 3. 119) which prescribes the substitution of अ in place of the stem-final इ and of औ in place of the suffix ङि, mentions अत् and not अ as the substitute. In other words, the substitute अ is तपर ' followed by त् ' and according to the Pari. तपरस्तत्कालस्य (P. 1. 1. 70) अ stands for अ alone and not for its सवर्णs. However, according to another Pari. अणुदित् ...

(P. 1. 1. 57) अ being a predicate will always stand for itself. Therefore, the mention of अ as अत् in P. 7. 3. 119 is redundant. Being redundant it indicates that the substitute अ remains as it is. Thus the application of the feminine suffix टाप् can be avoided.

[3. 13]

1. इयेष is perfect, third person, singular form of the root इष्. It is derived as follows :

इष्+लिट्	P. 3. 2. 115
इष्+इष्+लिट्	P. 6. 1. 8
इ+इष्+ति	P. 7. 4. 60; 3. 4. 78
इ+इष्+णल्	P. 3. 4. 82
इ+एष्+अ	P. 7. 3. 86; 1. 3. 3, 7, 9
इय्+एष्+अ	P. 6. 4. 77
इयेष	

There is no difficulty in deriving the form इयेष according to the प्रक्रिया given above. However, the author points out that if it is accepted that the substituted ति in the place of लिट् takes place before the reduplication since it is अन्तरङ्ग, then a wrong form is derived. If the substitute ति takes place first, it is further replaced by णल् (P. 3. 4. 82). At the stage इष्+णल् reduplication (P. 6. 1. 8) and गुण (P. 7. 3. 86) are simultaneously applicable. After गुण is effected on account of its being पर, at the stage एष्+णल्, P. 3. 1. 36 : इजादेश्च गुरुमतोऽनृच्छः applies. If it is applied, the undesirable form *एषांचकार emerges. Since the application of आम् by this rule is caused by the गुरु syllable ए (in एष्) which in its turn is caused by the संनिपात of the stem इष् and the following suffix णल्, the संनिपातपरि. applies here and the application of आम् (which would destroy the संनिपात by removing the suffix णल्) is prevented.

2. उवोषेति कथम् ... etc. उवोष is another example of this Pari. It is perfect, third person singular form of ths root उष् derived in the same manner as इयेष above. Here also the difficulty would arise if लिट् is first substituted and consequently गुण takes precedence over reduplication. The संनिपातपरि. stops the application of आम् and the desired form उवोष is derived. Here the author raises an objection. P. 3. 1. 38 : उषविदजागृभ्योऽन्यतरस्याम् already prescribes an optional application of आम् after उष्. Therefore, according to Pāṇini both the forms, उवोष and ओषांचकार, are correct. Why should then the संनिपातपरि. be adopted to avoid the derivation of ओषांचकार which is a desired form? This objection is answered by arguing that although आम् is optionally applicable according to P. 3. 1. 38, and, in fact, optional forms like ओषांचक्रतुः, ओषांचक्रुः are

derived, in the derivation of the third person singular form instead of the two optional forms, उवोष and ओषांचकार, only the latter would be derived, because even while deriving the optional form उवोष the application of आम् at the stage ओष्+णल् by another rule, namely इजादेश्च गुरुमतो ..., is unavoidable. Therefore, the संनिपातपरि. is required to prevent the application of आम् by the above rule.

However, finally, the author points out that the rule इजादेश्च गुरुमतो applies only to those roots which originally contain a गुरु syllable. Since उष् which is the basic root does not contain a गुरु syllable and ओष् which contains a गुरु syllable is not the basic root, the above rule does not apply at the stage ओष्+णल्. Therefore, the Pari. is not required to prevent its application.

The word गुरुमत् in the rule mentioned above is a *taddhita* derived by adding the suffix मतुप् to the word गुरु by P. 5. 2. 94. Here the suffix मतुप् conveys नित्ययोग 'permanent association' according to the author of the *Dīp.* (नित्ययोग is one of the meanings of मतुप् described in the *kārikā* cited in the *Mbh.* on *Vār.* 1 (on P. 5. 2. 94): भूमनिन्दाप्रशंसासु नित्ययोगेऽतिशायने। संसर्गेऽस्तिविवक्षायां भवन्ति मतुबादयः।) Accordingly, गुरुमत् means that which invariably contains a गुरु syllable. Since the root इष् does not always contain a गुरु syllable, the rule इजादेश्च does not apply.

Note : We have emended the MS ऊषांचक्रतुः ऊषांचक्रुः (retained in AL) to the correct forms ओषांचक्रतुः, ओषांचक्रुः, taking the MS reading as a scribal error.

[3. 14]

1. After listing the examples illustrating the purpose of this Pari. the Vārttikakāra now lists the exceptions in the *Vār.*'s तस्य दोषः etc. The first example where the Pari. creates a problem is दाक्षि. It is derived as follows :

दक्ष+इञ्	P. 4. 1. 95
दाक्ष+इ	P. 7. 2. 117
दाक्ष्+इ	P. 6. 4. 148
दाक्षि	

दाक्षि means a descendant of दक्ष. The suffix इञ् is added to the stem दक्ष by P. 4. 1. 95 which prescribes इञ् after a stem ending in अ. The suffix इञ् is thus caused by the stem-final अ. P. 6. 4. 148 prescribes elision of the stem final if a suffix with the *anubandha* ञ् or ण् or क् follows. According to this Pari. the elision of the final अ of the stem दक्ष thus caused by the following suffix इञ् cannot take place since it would destroy the close conjunction between the stem-final *a* and the following suffix *i*. However, the elision is desired in order

to arrive at the correct form. Therefore, the Pari. is not applied here and the form is regarded as an exception. This exception represents all such forms where a grammatical operation based on a letter leads to another causing the disappearance of the same letter.

2. कथं व्यवस्थितम् ... etc. An objection is raised. The suffix इञ् is conditioned by the stem ending in *a* and not by a संनिपात. How can then the addition of the suffix be regarded as संनिपातलक्षण? The reply is as follows: the suffix इञ् is not added by the rule अत इञ्. It already exists after the stem दक्ष. The rule अत इञ् merely stamps its correctness. The rule confirms the correctness either of the combination दक्ष+इञ् or merely of the suffix इञ्. Or it stamps the correctness of the प्रत्ययसंज्ञा (of इञ्) prescribed by P. 3. 1. 1–3. The संनिपात of the stem and the suffix is thus established by accepting the grammarian's principle that words are permanent (नित्याः शब्दाः) and that the function of grammar is merely to point out the correctness of the already existing words and word-elements.

[3. 15]

1. Pat. remarks on the above example : न प्रत्ययः संनिपातलक्षणः 'the suffix is not conditioned by *saṁnipāta* '. While explaining this remark the author points out that in spite of the view that the words are permanent the grammarians assume that the words are produced and speak of the production of a suffix after a stem. Accordingly, if the suffix *iñ* is produced after the stems *dakṣa* etc. in the above examples, the suffix cannot be regarded as संनिपातलक्षण. Kaiyaṭa comments on the above sentence as follows : कल्पितप्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेनान्वाख्यानात्प्रकृतेरविद्यमान एव प्रत्यय उत्पाद्यते इत्याशयः।

2. अयं च पक्षः ... etc. Pat. in the *Mbh.* on P. 3. 1. 2 has assumed this feature of a suffix, namely, that it is produced, when he says : एतद्धि तत्परस्य कार्यं यदसौ परः स्यात्। The whole argument in the *Mbh.* can be summed up as follows : The rule परश्च (P. 3. 1. 2) prescribes that a suffix should be subsequent to the stem. Here it can be argued that since a suffix will always be subsequent to the stem mentioned in the ablative by the Pari. तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य (P. 1. 1. 67), which teaches that a grammatical operation should be effected on that element which is subsequent to that mentioned in the ablative, the rule परश्च is not required. All the rules teaching a suffix mention the stem in the ablative. Therefore the Pari. would apply everywhere. However, this is not correct. The Pari. prescribes application of a grammatical operation to an already existing subsequent item. Therefore it cannot be applied when a suffix is being ordained. The proper place for the application of the Pari. would be a rule which teaches a grammatical operation to a suffix already existing as subsequent to the stem. In order to justify the application of the Pari. in the present context

Pat. argues that since the being subsequent to the stem is itself a grammatical operation the Pari. applies. This argument assumes that a suffix is produced and while being produced, it is placed subsequent to the stem by the above Pari. Thus Pat. has also assumed that a suffix is produced. On the statement of Pat., namely, एतद्धि तत् परस्य कार्यं यदसौ परः स्यात्, Kaiyaṭa remarks : परस्य कार्यम् इति। उत्पत्तिरेव कार्यम्।

Finally, the author states that a mere संज्ञा or a statement of its correctness cannot be regarded a cause of the removal of a letter. Therefore, the above exception cannot be accepted.

[3. 16]

1. In the preceding passage it was pointed out that since the suffix *iñi* cannot be described as conditioned by *saṁnipāta*, the argument that it would not be the cause of the elision of the final *a* according to this Pari. is rejected. Therefore the exceptions दाक्षि etc., cited earlier, cannot be justified. However, Pat. argues that the name अङ्ग which is caused by the conjunction between a stem and a suffix (P. 1. 4. 13) would not cause elision of the stem-final *a*, which is desired. Pat. has thus established that दाक्षि etc. are exceptions to this Pari.

2. एतस्मिन् इदमसमर्थितम् etc. The author points out two faults in Pat.'s argument given above. Firstly the name अङ्ग may be described as causing non-application of the elision of the stem-final. However, the statement of the *Vār.* that the suffix caused by the vowel *a* cannot be the cause of the removal of the letter would not be correct. Secondly, if the name अङ्ग is thus regarded as not being the cause of the elision, it may be regarded the cause of the non-application of any other grammatical operation caused by the name अङ्ग itself. Thus the author points out that there is no agreement between the statement of the *Vār.* and Pat.'s justification. Later commentators, Kaiyaṭa for instance, have tried hard to show the agreement.

[3. 17]

1. The example दाक्षि given in the *Mbh.* is based on the reading of the *Vār.* as follows : वर्णाश्रयः प्रत्ययोऽवर्णविचालस्य अनिमित्तं स्यात् 'the suffix caused by a letter would not be the cause of the removal of the letter *a*'. Since the Sanskrit orthography allows optional existence of the अवग्रह ('ऽ' sign), the *Vār.* can also be read as वर्णाश्रयः प्रत्ययो वर्णविचालस्यानिमित्तं स्यात् 'a suffix caused by a letter would not be the cause of the removal of (that) letter'. In the first reading there is a reference to the disappearance of the *a* whereas the second reading refers to the disappearance of any letter. Some grammarians have accepted the second reading and have offered other examples, namely अधुक्षत्,

अलिक्षत् etc. The author discusses these in this passage. अलिक्षत् is Aorist third person singular, of the root लिह्. It is derived in the following way :

लिह्+लुङ्	P. 3. 2. 110
अ+लिह्+च्लि+त्	P. 3. 1. 43; 6. 4. 71
अ+लिह्+क्स+त्	P. 3. 1. 45
अ+लिद्+स+त्	P. 8. 2. 31
अ+लिक्+स+त्	P. 8. 2. 41
अ+लिक्+ष+त्	P. 8. 3. 57, 59
अलिक्षत्	

Here the suffix क्स prescribed by P. 3. 1. 45 is conditioned by the *saṁnipāta* of the root लिह् and following suffix *cli*. The change of *h* into *ḍh* (P. 8. 2. 31) and the consequent change of *ḍh* into *k* is caused by the suffix *ksa*. According to the present Pari., *ksa* should not cause these changes. However, in view of the desired form अलिक्षत् the Pari. is not applied here. The form अधुक्षत् is derived in the same manner with the additional change of the root-final *h* into *gh* (P. 8. 2. 32).

2. न चात्रासिद्धत्वमस्ति ... etc. One may argue that the changes घत्व, ढत्व, and कत्व are prescribed by the rules in the असिद्धकाण्ड, while the Pari. which belongs to the present rule (P. 1. 1. 39) belongs to the सिद्धकाण्ड. Therefore the Pari. cannot apply in the context of the changes which are not effected. The objection is replied to by the author by arguing that the Pari. cannot be described as belonging to the सिद्धकाण्ड, because the place of a Pari. is the rule in which it is applied. In other words, the law of असिद्ध does not apply to a Pari. which is described as परितोगामिनी भाषा ' statement going on all sides '.

Finally, the author tells that Pat. has accepted the first reading and therefore cited दाक्षि as an exception.

[3. 18]

1. क्रापयति is another exception to this Pari. It is present, third person, singular form of the causative from the root क्री. It is derived as follows :

क्री+णिच्+लट्	P. 3. 2. 123; 3. 1. 26
क्रै+इ+ति	P. 7. 2. 115
क्रा+इ+ति	P. 6. 1. 48
क्रा+प्+इ+अ+ति	P. 7. 3. 36; 3. 1. 68
क्रा+प्+ए+अ+ति	P. 7. 3. 84
क्रा+प्+अय्+अ+ति	P. 6. 1. 78
क्रापयति	

The root final ई is replaced by ऐ which is replaced by आ (P. 6. 1. 48). The change to आ is caused by the *saṁnipāta* of the root and the suffix. Therefore, according to this Pari. the augment *puk* (P. 7. 3. 36) which is caused by the root-final *ā*, cannot take place. However, since the augment पुक् is desired for the derivation of the correct form क्रापयति, the Pari. is here abandoned and the form is regarded an exception.

2. अङ्गस्य य आकारः ... etc. According to the Pari. the augment पुक् cannot take place, because by intervening it removes the conjunction of the root and the following suffix. One may, however, argue that by the Pari. यदागमास्तद्गुणीभूतास्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यन्ते (No. 11) an augment becomes an integral part of the item to which it is added. Therefore, after the addition of the augment the whole sequence क्राप् becomes a root. Consequently, the conjunction of the root and the following suffix is not disturbed.

In this connection the author says that the form क्रापयति is cited as an exception to the Pari. assuming that the augment पुक् is added to the root-final *ā*, rather than to the root क्रा as a whole.

[3. 19]

अदीदपत्, the Aorist third person singular of the causative from the root दा is derived in the following manner :

दा+णिच्+लुङ्	P. 3. 2. 110; 3. 1. 26
अ+दा+इ+च्लि+त्	P. 6. 4. 71; 3. 1. 43
अ+दा+इ+चङ्+त्	P. 3. 1. 48
अ+दा+प्+इ+अ+त्	P. 7. 3. 36
अ+दप्+इ+अ+त्	P. 7. 4. 1
अ+द+दप्+इ+अ+त्	P. 6. 1. 11
अ+दि+दप्+अ+त्	P. 7. 4. 93; 7. 4. 79; 6. 4. 51
अ+दी+दप्+अ+त्	P. 7. 4. 94
अदीदपत्	

The augment पुक् (P. 7. 3. 36) is caused by the conjunction of the root ending in *ā* and the subsequent suffix. The augment itself, while taking place, removes the conjunction and thus implies non-application of the Pari. After it is effected the vowel *ā* of *dā* is shortened by P. 7. 4. 1. According to the Pari. the shortening which is caused by पुक् that is संनिपातलक्षण should not take place. However, it is desired for the derivation of the correct form. Therefore the Pari. does not apply here.

[3.20]

या and सा are the feminine forms of the pronouns यद् and तद् respectively. The nominative singular form या is derived in the following way :

यद्+स्	P. 4. 1. 2
यअ+स्	P. 7. 2. 102
यअ+टाप्+स्	P. 4. 1. 4
या+स्	P. 6. 1. 101
या	P. 6. 1. 68

The substitution of *a* in place of *d* (P. 7. 2. 102) is caused by the conjunction of the stem यद् and the following suffix. It causes the application of the feminine suffix टाप् which leads to the dropping of the suffix स् (P. 6. 1. 68). According to the Pari. the substitution which is संनिपातलक्षण should not cause the application of the feminine suffix टाप् which would be the cause of the removal of the suffix. However, in view of the desired form the Pari. is abandoned.

[3.21]

पपिवान् is the nominative singular of पपिवस्, Perf. participle, which is derived from the root पा by adding the *kṛt* suffix क्वसु. Following is the process of its derivation :

पा+लिट्	P. 3. 2. 115
पा+क्वसु	P. 3. 2. 107
पा+पा+वस्	P. 6. 1. 8
पा+पा+इ+वस्	P. 7. 2. 67
पा+प्+इ+वस्	P. 6. 4. 64
प+प्+इ+वस्	P. 7. 4. 59
पपिवस्	

The augment इट् is caused by the conjunction of the root ending in *ā* and the following suffix. According to the Pari. it cannot be the cause of the application of the elision of the root final *ā* which would destroy ths *saṁnipāta*. Since the elision is desired, the present form is regarded as an exception.

[3.22]

अग्निमान् is the nominative sigular of अग्निमत (fr. अग्नि+मतुप्). The word अग्नि is accented on the final इ (घृतादीनां च। *Phit. Sū.* 21). After the possessive suffix मतुप् is added, in the form अग्निमत् the initial *a* of मतुप् is accented by P. 6. 1. 176 : ह्रस्वनुड्भ्यां मतुप्. Consequently the accent on the final इ of अग्नि

changes into अनुदात्त by P. 6. 1. 158 : अनुदात्तं पदमेकवर्जम्. Thus the form अग्निमान् would be derived. Here according to the present Pari. the change of the original *udātta* accent on इ of अग्नि into अनुदात्त cannot take place because it is caused by the उदात्त on the initial *a* of मतुप् which owes its existence to the conjunction of the finally accented stem अग्नि and the subsequent suffix. The form अग्निमान् is accepted as an exception to this Pari.

In the first sentence उदात्तं पूर्वं instead of उदात्तपूर्वं would make a better reading.

[3. 23]

1. The vocative singular forms of feminine words ending in ई or ऊ such as ब्राह्मणि and ब्रह्मबन्धु are cited in the *Mbh.* as examples of the exception (*Vār.* (16), नदीह्रस्वत्वं संबुद्धिलोपस्य). After the nominative singular suffix स् is added to ब्राह्मणी in order to form a vocative, the stem-final ī is shortened by P. 7. 3. 107. The short vowel at the end of the stem further causes the elision of the case-ending स् according to P. 6. 1. 69 : एङ्ह्रस्वात् संबुद्धेः and the vocative ब्राह्मणि is derived. Here the Pari. does not allow the elision of the case-ending which is caused by the short vowel at the end of the stem, because it would mean destruction of the latter संनिपातिन्, namely the suffix *s*, one of the two संनिपातिन्s which causes the shortening. Therefore, in order to get the desired form the Pari. is abandoned and the form is accepted as an exception.

2. मा भूदेवं ङ्यन्तात्...etc. Pat. refers to a view of some grammarians according to which the case-ending added to the feminine stem ब्राह्मणी can be dropped by another rule, namely हल्ङ्याब्भ्यो दीर्घात् ... (P. 6. 1. 68). Thus the question of conflict with the Pari. does not arise. This view is rejected on the ground that P. 6. 1. 68 prescribes elision of the case ending after a long vowel (दीर्घ) and since the shortening has already taken place the rule cannot apply to ब्राह्मणि+स्. The author remarks that following the *Vār.* (20) ङ्याब्ग्रहणेऽदीर्घः on P. 1. 1. 56, we may accept that the word दीर्घ is not present in P. 6. 1. 68. Therefore, the rule can apply after the shortening takes place. Further, the short *i* cannot be regarded as the original long ī by invoking स्थानिवद्भाव, because स्थानिवद्भाव is prohibited in case of दीर्घ (P. 1. 1. 58).

[3. 24]

So far nine examples where the Pari. is useful and eight examples where it creates problems have been discussed. It is clear from the number of the examples and the exceptions that the Pari. has more advantages than disadvantages. How can then Pat. say that the disadvantages are of equal number or even more ? The author tries to explain Pat.'s statement by referring to human

psychology. When a certain system is beneficial in many aspects but leads to even a small difficulty people make much ado about the difficulty and declare the system to be faulty. A similar kind of an exaggerated statement is made here by Pat. in connection with this Pari.

[3. 25]

Here is a diversion. The author is struck by the use of the word समाः by Pat. According to him, सम being a pronoun, the proper form of the nominative plural should be समे, not समाः. One may argue that this usage should be accepted as correct on the basis of its use by Pat. just as the usage समानाम् in P. 1. 3. 10 is accepted as correct. The author's reply to this is that if such usages are accepted, the mention of the word सम in the सर्वादिगण will be futile. The author however himself offers a solution to this problem as follows : The word सम conveys two meanings : (1) 'all', and (2) 'equal'. When it conveys the first meaning, it is a सर्वनामन्. Since the word सम in the above statement means 'equal', it is not a सर्वनामन्. The use of the form समाः is thus justified. Finally, the author cites illustrations to show that the word सम is used in the sense of 'all'. The sentence समराज्यम् इदम् means 'this is a kingdom of all', if this sentence is uttered when there is no king. Similarly, in the *ṚV* 8. 75. 9, the word सम is used in the sense 'all' as is evinced by Yāska's paraphrase. At the end of his discussion, however, the author records another view according to which the word सम is called सर्वनामन् if it conveys the meaning 'proper'. Anyhow, the usage समाः in the *Mbh.* is justified even on this view.

[3. 26]

1. The objector argues that if the Pari. incurs more faults than advantages, it should not be stated. Pat. however says in defence of the Pari. that it should not be discarded merely because it leads to some difficulties. In this connection he offers two illustrations: न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते, न च मृगाः सन्तीति यवा नोप्यन्ते 'Nobody abstains from cooking various dishes because beggars are there, nor is barley not sown because animals are there'. In other words, one should also consider the advantages of certain undertaking. The author elaborates this point further by stating a general truth: सर्वा वाक् सापराधा etc. 'Every statement can have some defect.' Each rule has an exception. P. 1. 1. 56 : स्थानिवदादेशोऽनल्विधौ is cited as an illustration. The rule teaches that a substitute (आदेश) is to be treated as the substituendum (स्थानिन्). This rule also has an exception. If a grammatical operation involving a phoneme is to be effected, the आदेश is not to be treated as स्थानिन्. Therefore, Pāṇini says : अनल्विधौ "not in case of grammatical operations involving a phoneme" along with the rule itself. The difficulties are thus to be removed.

2. यच्च मन्यसे ... etc. With a view to establishing the Pari. Pat. further argues that although it appears that the merits and demerits of this Pari. are equal, it is not true. The Vārttikakāra has listed all the demerits but he has not listed all the merits. Among the merits of this Pari. he has enumerated only some just by way of a few examples. There are many other examples for the sake of which the Pari. is required. The author further refers to the rule सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः (P. 7. 3. 84) and points out that although the गुण taught by this rule is not applicable when the suffixes with the code-letter क् or ङ् follow, the rule stands, because it applies to many more cases. In other words, a general statement has to be made in spite of the exceptions. The Pari. is a general statement and therefore has to be adopted.

[3. 27]

Although in the previous section the Pari. is justified following Pat., here the author finds fault with Pat.'s statement : दोषाः खल्वपि साकल्येन परिगणिताः. According to the author Pat. has given an exhaustive list of examples but not of the exceptions. For instance, just as the Pari. has to be given up while deriving the form अमुना, it has to be given up also while deriving dative singular forms from masculine stems ending in अ, for instance, रामाय. The form रामाय is derived as follows :

राम+ङे	P. 4. 1. 2
राम+य	P. 7. 1. 13
रामा+य	P. 7. 3. 102
रामाय	

Here the lengthening of the final *a* of राम is caused by the subsequent suffix य. However, since the substitution of य is caused by the *saṁnipāta* between a stem ending in अ and the dative singular ending ङे, it cannot be, according to the Pari., the cause of the lengthening which would destroy the earlier conjunct, namely अ. As the lengthening is desired in order to arrive at the correct form रामाय, this has to be treated as an exception to the Pari.

[3. 28]

1. While advocating the utility of the Pari. Pat. says that although there are exceptions to this Pari. attempts should be made to explain them away. Thereupon the author of the *Dīp.* remarks that Pat. has merely suggested that the faults should be removed; but he himself has not made an attempt to remove them. This is yet another case of a direct attack levelled against Pat. Moreover the author himself has suggested some ways to remove the difficulties. For instance, the difficulty created by this Pari. in deriving words like दाक्षि can

be solved by arguing that if the अङ्गसंज्ञा does not cause various operations such as elision of *a* taught in the अङ्गाधिकार, both the अङ्गसंज्ञा and the operations taught in the अङ्गाधिकार would be purposeless. Therefore, in spite of the Pari. the rules in the अङ्गाधिकार operate. Here the author's argument that the अङ्गसंज्ञा would be useless is not acceptable, because there are quite a few cases where the Pari. does not have any scope while the अङ्गसंज्ञा is effective, e. g. P. 6. 4. 7, 120; 8. 3. 78 etc.

2. क्रापयतीत्याकारान्तस्य etc. In the derivation of क्रापयति the augment पुक् is added to the root क्रा and not just to the final आ. The augment thus being a part of the meaningful unit, it cannot be described as destroying the *saṁnipāta*. Thus the Pari. अर्थवतो ह्यागमः ... etc. is accepted in this connection and the difficulty is removed.

3. अदीदपदिति etc. In the derivation of the form अदीदपत् the shortening takes place on the basis of a ज्ञापक. The गणसूत्र 'मारणतोषणनिशामनेषु ज्ञा' teaches that the root ज्ञा is मित् in the senses मारण etc. P. 6. 4. 92 : मितां ह्रस्वः teaches shortening of the penultimate vowel. This rule applies only after the augment पुक् is added to ज्ञा, because the shortening is prescribed to a penultimate vowel and आ of ज्ञा can be penultimate only after पुक् is added. Thus, since otherwise the मित्त्व taught by the गणसूत्र will be purposeless, shortening has to be effected in spite of the Pari. One cannot argue that in order to avoid the application of the Pari. shortening should take place before पुक् is added, because the mention of ज्ञप् in P. 7. 4. 55 indicates that the shortening taught by P. 6. 4. 92 in which the word उपधायाः is continued, takes place only after पुक् is added.

4. या सा etc. While deriving the words या and सा the feminine suffix टाप् must be added, in spite of the Pari., because Pāṇini himself has mentioned the two words in P. 7. 3. 45.

Finally, the author says that in the case of the remaining exceptions an attempt should be made to find out solutions.

* * *

avyayībhāvaś ca / P. 1. 1. 41

Summary: Kāt. in his *Vār.* points out three purposes of the name *avyaya* for an *avyayībhāva* compound. After explaining them Pat. adds that according to some grammarians a statement of prohibition of application of any other grammatical operation caused by the name *avyaya* for the *avyayībhāva* compound is necessary. For instance, grammatical operations like the addition of the suffix *akac*, which is prescribed for an *avyaya*, should not be applicable

to the *avyayībhāva*. Finally Pat. rejects the purposes pointed out by Kāt. and concludes that the rule is not necessary.

At the very beginning the author of the *Dīp.* points out that there are two ways of giving the name *avyaya* to the *avyayībhāva* compound : (1) the present rule, and (2) the mention of the *avyayībhāva* in the *gaṇasūtra* included in the *svarādi* list. He further says : " Anyway, there are three purposes counted by Kāt. ". He explains the three purposes with illustrations. However, he does not agree with Pat. in rejecting the rule. At the end he argues that since the rule is stated by Pāṇini, he must be having some other purposes in his mind. The author mentions rejection of a genitive compound in constructions like *devadattasya upakumbham* as one of the purposes of the present rule.

[1. 1]

The present rule has extended the name अव्यय to the अव्ययीभाव compound. Here the author points out other alternative ways of obtaining that name for the अव्ययीभाव. In the स्वरादिगण there is a गणसूत्र ' कृन्मकारसंध्य... ' etc. which includes अव्ययीभाव also due to which it gets the name अव्यय. Further, the term अव्ययीभाव itself being self-expressive implies that the अव्ययीभाव is so called because it is treated as an अव्यय which originally it is not. Finally, the अव्ययीभाव can be an अव्यय simply by virtue of being अलिङ्ग and असंख्य ' without gender ' and ' without number ' by the general definition : अलिङ्गमसंख्यम् अव्ययम्.

In any case, says the author, the three purposes of the name अव्यय for the अव्ययीभाव, namely लुक्, सुखस्वर and उपचार which have been enumerated in the *Vār.* 1, have to be accepted.

[1. 2]

लुक् is the main purpose of giving the name अव्यय to the अव्ययीभाव. For instance, the case-ending added to the अव्ययीभाव ' उपाग्नि ', is dropped by P. 2. 4. 82 : अव्ययादाप्सुपः. Now, if लिङ्ग, संख्या and कारक, which are the meanings of case-endings, are absent in उपाग्नि etc. why at all should a case-ending be added ? उपाग्नि conveys a non-substance and hence is devoid of gender and number. There is thus no need to add a case-ending, much less to drop it. In this connection the author cites a few examples to show that the case-endings serve many other purposes. For instance, although a numeral such as *pañcan* ' five ' conveys substance it cannot express a specific gender which is conveyed by the case-ending added to it. In words like दास्याःपुत्रः ' son of a whore ' the case-ending conveys not number but it serves to convey abuse (P. 6. 3. 21). The case-ending in compounds like वर्षासुज, गोपुचर etc. indicates that they are names (P. 6. 3. 9).

Similarlly, a case-ending is added to an अव्ययीभाव compound in order to give it a status of a *pada* so that it can be used in a sentence.

[1. 3]

The remaining two purposes are discussed in this passage. मुखस्वर means the accent of the word मुख. P. 6. 2. 167 prescribes accent on the final syllable of मुख which is a later constituent in a बहुव्रीहि compound. However, according to P. 6. 2. 168 मुख is not finally accented if the earlier constituent of the बहुव्रीहि is an अव्यय; for instance उपाग्निर्मुखः 'one whose face is near fire'. Since the earlier constituent of this compound, namely उपाग्नि, is an अव्यय, P. 6. 2. 168 is effective and मुख is initially accented. The present rule is thus necessary to avoid the final accent on मुख caused by P. 6. 2. 167. Similarly, in the *kṛt* derivative उपपयःकारः the change of the विसर्जनीय after य into स् is avoided by अतः कृकमि ... etc. (P. 8. 3. 46) because उपपयस् is an अव्यय. P. 8. 3. 46 teaches that in a compound विसर्जनीय after अ which does not belong to a latter constituent is changed into स् when कृकम् etc. follow except when it belongs to an अव्यय. Since उपपयस् is an अव्ययीभाव, and hence an अव्यय, the change of the विसर्जनीय into स् (which is technically known as उपचार) does not take place.

The objector argues that the Vārttikakāra should have said, 'Removal of मुखस्वर and of उपचार is the purpose of the present rule'. The author replies that it is not incorrect to say that मुखस्वर and उपचार are the purposes, because here the reference is to the general rules about मुखस्वर and उपचार along with their exceptions. Thus मुखस्वर means the accent of मुख taught by P. 6. 2. 167 and 168, while उपचार refers to P. 8. 3. 46 which also includes the exception suggested by the word अनव्ययस्य.

[1. 4]

It is already said above that the *Vār.* 1 on this rule enumerates three purposes of the name अव्यय for अव्ययीभाव. Here Pat. raises a question whether the *Vār.* exhausts all the purposes or it only mentions some for illustration. In either case the fault of redundancy arises according to the author. If the *Vār.* is understood as mentioning just a few purposes for illustration, then the *Vār.* becomes redundant. A *Vār.* is supposed to give an exhaustive list. On the other hand, it is assumed that the rule becomes redundant, since the purposes enumerated in the *Vār.* are already indicated by other rules.

[1. 5]

Pat. has accepted the *Vār.* as an exhaustive enumeration of purposes. While paraphrasing Pat.'s sentence परिगणनमित्याह, the author remarks that the

subject of *āha* is either the teacher or people (i. e. grammarians). This passage contains one more comment of the author viz. on Pat.'s statement : अपि खल्वप्याहुः. Here the repeated use of अपि is explained by the author by saying that the first अपि means एवम् 'in this way'. The author further explains why Pat. regards the *Vār.* as a परिगणन. Since other purposes have been rejected by grammarians the purposes listed in the *Vār.* are established as the purposes of the present rule.

The MS निदिशन्नि। शब्द is read as निर्दिशन्नितिशब्दो by AL. We read tentatively °शति शब्दः. The ideal reading would have been : °शत्याहशब्दः

[1. 6]

1. Pat. refers to the view of some grammarians as follows : अपि खल्वप्याहुः—यदन्यदव्ययीभावस्याव्ययकृतं प्राप्नोति तस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्य इति '(Others) say that whatever else is applicable to an *avyayībhāva* by virtue of its being an *avyaya* should be prohibited'. Further he cites पराङ्गवद्भाव as an example. In the sentence उच्चैरधीयान, उच्चैः is an अव्यय conveying the meaning of locative. It means 'on a higher place' and is semantically connected with अधीयान 'studying'. It is thus a कारक of the आमन्त्रित (vocative) अधीयान. By P. 2. 1. 2 उच्चैः will be treated as a part of the following word अधीयान and, consequently, it will lose its own accent. However, it is not desired. Therefore, the *Vār.* अव्ययप्रतिषेधश्च prohibits पराङ्गवद्भाव of an अव्यय (and we therefore have *uccair adhīyāna*). This prohibition would apply also to constructions like उपाग्न्यधीयान in which the अव्ययीभाव compound उपाग्नि is an अव्यय (by the present rule) preceding a vocative. However, it is not desired. The word उपाग्नि is initially accented by P. 6. 1. 198, and it retains its accent in the usage. Therefore, the prohibition of पराङ्गवद्भाव in the case of an अव्यय should not be applied to an अव्ययीभाव compound.

2. अकच्यव्ययग्रहणात् ··· etc. There is another instance where a grammatical operation applicable to an अव्यय in general does not apply to अव्ययीभाव. P. 5. 3. 71 : अव्ययसर्वनाम्नामकच् प्राक् टेः prescribes addition of the suffix अकच् before the last vowel of an अव्यय (e. g. उच्च+अक्+ऐस्=उच्चकैः from उच्चैः). If अकच् is added to an अव्ययीभाव compound like उपाग्नि because it is an अव्यय, a wrong form *उपाग्नकि would be derived. However the usage allows उपाग्निक only, where, क and not अकच्, is added. Therefore the prohibition of अकच् should be stated in respect of अव्ययीभाव.

In this connection the author assumes an objection and removes it. If an अव्यय like उच्चैस् and उपाग्नि is असत्ववचन 'conveying a non-substance', how can the suffix अकच्, which is stated as conveying various meanings such as 'small' 'unknown' etc. which are properties of a substance, be added to an अव्यय?

The author replies that just as properties like प्रकर्ष 'excellence' are stated to be connected with an अव्यय through the action with which it is connected, in the same manner the above meanings are also connected with an अव्यय through the action with which it is connected. This argument perhaps refers to P. 5. 4. 11 : किमेत्तिङव्ययघादाम्वद्रव्यप्रकर्षे which prescribes आम् after किम् etc. which end in the suffix तर or तम if the excellence of a substance is not to be conveyed. This rule mentions अव्यय. The *Kāśikā* remarks : क्रियागुणयोरेवायं प्रकर्षे प्रत्ययः। The above rule is not discussed in the *Mbh.*

3. उपकुम्भीभूतम् etc. P. 5. 4. 50 : कृभ्वस्तियोगे ... prescribes addition of the suffix च्वि when there is a connection with the root कृ or अस्. Further, P. 7. 4. 32 teaches that the stem final अ is replaced by ई when च्वि follows. Thus we have derivations like शुक्लीभवति 'becomes white' etc. The application of P. 7. 4. 32 is prohibited in the case of an अव्यय (Such a statement is not available in the present text of the *Vārttika*; it has to be, however, inferred from the *Bhāṣya* अव्ययप्रतिषेध उच्यते।). This prohibition should not apply to an अव्ययीभाव. Otherwise, wrong forms such as *उपकुम्भभूतम् instead of उपकुम्भीभूतम् will be derived. Therefore it should be stated that the prohibition of the application of P. 7. 4. 32 in the case of अव्ययs does not apply to अव्ययीभाव.

[1. 7]

After discussing quite a few instances where the name अव्यय for अव्ययीभाव has to be prohibited, Pat. objects to the very existence of the rule thus : यदि परिगणनं क्रियते नार्थोऽव्ययीभावस्याव्ययसंज्ञया 'if the list (of exceptions) is given, no purpose is served by giving the name अव्यय to an अव्ययीभाव compound'. But then what about the purposes for which the name अव्यय is required for an अव्ययीभाव ? Pat. replies this question by pointing out that all the purposes are served by some other means. For instance, the first purpose, namely *luk*, (taught by P. 2. 4. 82), is already hinted by Pāṇini in his rule नाव्ययीभावादतोऽम् त्वपञ्चम्याः (P. 2. 4. 83). The rule teaches that the case-ending added to an अव्ययीभाव ending in अ is not dropped, but it is replaced by अम् except in the ablative. Here the negation of the elision of the case-ending itself suggests that elsewhere elision takes place, because a negation always presupposes a proposition. The statement of *luk* being thus already implied, the present rule is not required to obtain it.

Here the author points out how this argument is funny. He says that if the rule is rejected on the basis of the implication described above, many other rules also could be rejected by similar arguments. For instance, the rule सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः (P. 7. 3. 84) which prescribes गुण of a stem ending in इक् before a सार्वधातुक or an आर्धधातुक suffix need not be stated since it is implied by

the rule ङिति च which prescribes negation of गुण and वृद्धि before a suffix with क् or ङ् as its अनुबन्ध. In other words all positive statements, being implied by their respective negative statements, need not be made.

However, considering that a respected Teacher like Pat. could not make such a funny statement, the author tries to interpret it in a different way. According to him Pat. means that although the rule is framed for the sake of the three specific purposes and not for the sake of the rejection of other purposes such as पराङ्गवद्भाव, even those three purposes can be obtained through indications. The author's attempt to justify is, however, equally weak as it hardly changes the earlier argument.

[1.8]

The second purpose of the name अव्यय for an अव्ययीभाव, namely उपचार, is disposed of by Pat. by arguing that if the word अनुत्तरपदस्थस्य 'not of that which is in the उत्तरपद' is continued in the rule अतः कृकमिकंस ... etc. which prescribes उपचार, the change of the विसर्जनीय into स् will not take place in words like उपपयःकार since it belongs to the उत्तरपद. While justifying Pat.'s argument the author remarks that the अनुवृत्ति of the word अनुत्तरपदस्थस्य is necessary also for the sake of many other examples such as परमपयःकुम्भः 'a jar completely filled with milk' where the विसर्जनीय after पय which forms part of the उत्तरपद does not change into स्.

This again is not a happy argument. It is difficult to accept that in the compound उपपयःकारः, उप is the पूर्वपद and पयःकार is the उत्तरपद, whereas the meaning implies उपपयस् as the पूर्वपद and कार as the उत्तरपद.

[1.9]

Finally, the third purpose, namely, मुखस्वर is acceped as the purpose of the rule. However, the grammatical convention, namely that a rule should not be stated merely for one example, prevents the fomation of the rule. A *sūtra* 'rule' is a general statement, and hence meant to explain a number of examples. The very method of grammar is to make general statements and their exceptions. Therefore, the present rule which serves just a single purpose does not deserve to be stated. In this connection, the author cites a few examples of rules which serve a single purpose. P. 3. 2. 165 : जागुरूकः prescribes the suffix -ऊक to the root जागृ- and derives the only form जागरूक. Another rule, P. 4. 4. 18 : अण् कुटिलिकायाः prescribes the suffix अण् to कुटिलिका, deriving the single form कौटिलिक. There are, in fact, hundreds of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* which deal with single derivations. According to the statement नैकमुदाहरणं योगारम्भं प्रयोजयति 'one single example cannot cause a rule' all these rules should not

have been stated. The author therefore restricts the scope of the above statement to संज्ञा and परिभाषा rules. A definition or a Pari. rule must have a general application. It must be employed in more than one rule. If the name अव्यय taught by the present rule applies in the domain of मुखस्वर alone, it need not be stated.

[1. 10]

Finally Pat. has established that for a single example this संज्ञा rule need not be stated. However, the question still remains: if the rule does not exist, how to explain the मुखस्वर ? Pat. has given the solution: यद्येतावत्प्रयोजनं स्यात् तत्रैवायं ब्रूयात् नाव्ययादव्ययीभावाच्चेति 'If this alone had been the example, he (Pāṇini) would have mentioned it there (i. e. in the rule) itself, "not after an अव्यय as well as अव्ययीभाव" etc.'. The author explains this statement elaborately. If the मुखस्वर was really intended by Pāṇini he would have accounted for it by mentioning अव्ययीभाव in P. 6. 2. 168 instead of teaching the name अव्यय for the अव्ययीभाव. Teaching the specific accent of मुख preceded by अव्ययीभाव is a direct statement which is preferable to teaching the same by referring to अव्यय and, through अव्यय to अव्ययीभाव which is a statement based on inference. For the sake of brevity Pāṇini would certainly prefer a direct statement. However, since he has not mentioned अव्ययीभाव in P. 6. 2. 168, obviously he does not intend the मुखस्वर. This logic has led all the commentators to conclude that the word मुख preceded by an अव्ययीभाव (e. g. उपाग्निमुखम्) is finally accented according to P. 6. 2. 167.

[1. 11]

The author refers to the view of other grammarians who accept मुखस्वर according to P. 6. 2. 168, rather than according to P. 6. 2. 167. In their opinion the word मुख is not finally accented if it is preceded by an अव्ययीभाव compound. However, they obtain this specific accent not by extending the name अव्यय to अव्ययीभाव but simply by accepting अव्ययीभाव as a significant term. The term अव्ययीभाव literally means 'state of becoming an अव्यय of that which is not an अव्यय'. Thus the very term implies that an अव्ययीभाव is treated as an अव्यय. Therefore, P. 6. 2. 168 is effective in examples like उपाग्निमुख.

[1. 12]

The foregoing discussion on the third purpose, namely मुखस्वर, shows that at least according to some grammarians the word मुख should not be finally accented when it is preceded by an अव्ययीभाव. Further, Pāṇini prefers the use of a संज्ञा to a direct statement. This fact suggests that Pāṇini might have thought of some more purposes of the name अव्यय for अव्ययीभाव. The author illustrates

one, for example. The genitive compound taught by P. 2. 2. 8 is denied in the case of an अव्यय by P. 2. 2. 11. Accordingly, since अव्ययीभाव is also an अव्यय, the word देवदत्तस्य is not compounded with the अव्यय 'उपकुम्भम्'. P. 2. 2. 8: षष्ठी prescribes a compound of a word ending in the genitive with a syntactically connected word, while P. 2. 2. 11: पूरणगुणसुहितार्थसदव्ययतव्यसमानाधिकरणेन prohibits compounding of a word ending in the genitive with a word conveying completion (of a number), quality, prosperity, with a present participle, with an indeclinable, etc. According to the later commentators, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Nāgeśa for instance, the word अव्यय in P. 2. 2. 11 refers only to the अव्यय ending in a *kṛt* suffix. Since the word उपकुम्भम् is not a कृदन्त, there will be no difficulty in compounding देवदत्तस्य with उपकुम्भम् according to them.

* * *

śi sarvanāmasthānam / P. 1. 1. 42

Summary: the Vārttikakāra treats both the rules together. Accordingly, both the rules together would make one statement, namely, that the suffixes *su, au, jas, âm, auṭ* and the substitute *śi* are called *sarvanāmasthāna* except when they are added to a neuter noun. In that case, the substitute in the place of the suffix *jas* added to a neuter noun (P. 7. 1. 20) would not get the name *sarvanāmasthāna*. This is undesirable. The *Vār.* 1 points out this fault and in the following two *Vārttika*-s removes it by stating that the negative compound *anapuṁsakasya* does not prohibit the name *sarvanāmasthāna* which is taught by the earlier rule (P. 1. 1. 42).

Patañjali follows the Vārttikakāra and adds that the word *anapuṁsakasya* should be interpreted as a *paryudāsa* rather than as a *prasajyapratiṣedha*. He further justifies the irregular compound *anapuṁsakasya*.

The author of the *Dīp.* points out in the beginning that the whole discussion in the Bhāṣya is centred round the rule *suḍ anapuṁsakasya* rather than the earlier rule. He further explains the notions of *asamarthasamāsa, prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*. According to him both the kinds of negation imply the same thing, namely an inference of non-application. However, one has to prefer one to the other on the basis of the context.

[1. 1]

1. In the *Vār.* 1 the objector points out a difficulty. The negative compound अनपुंसकस्य in the rule सुडनपुंसकस्य implies that the suffixes सु, औ, जस्, अम् and औट् (= सुट्) added to a neuter noun are not called सर्वनामस्थान. P. 7. 1. 20: जश्शसोः शिः prescribes the substitute शि in the place of the nom. pl. ending जस् as well as the acc. pl. ending शि after a neuter stem. According to

the negative statement अनपुंसकस्य, the substitute शि in the place of the nom. pl. जस् following a neuter stem would not be called सर्वनामस्थान. Consequently the nom. pl. form कुण्डानि, for instance, cannot be derived. The word कुण्डानि is derived as follows :

कुण्ड + जस्	P. 4. 1. 2
कुण्ड + शि	P. 7. 1. 20
कुण्डन् + इ	P. 7. 1. 72
कुण्डान् + इ	P. 6. 4. 8
कुण्डानि	

Here both, the augment नुम् taught by P. 7. 1. 72 and the lengthening of the penultimate vowel taught by P. 6. 4. 8 are conditioned by सर्वनामस्थान. Since the suffix शि is not called सर्वनामस्थान as it is added to the neuter stem कुण्ड, the two rules would not apply and the desired form would not be derived. The illustration कुण्डानि तिष्ठन्ति is given by Pat. to explain the difficulty mentioned in the *Vār.*

2. अथ त्वेवं पठ्यते etc. The author of the *Dīp.* further explains that the difficulty shown above is caused by the negative compound अनपुंसकस्य. If, however, the rule is read as सुट् स्त्रीपुंसयोः 'the सुट् suffixes added to feminine and masculine nouns are called सर्वनामस्थान', then the suffix शि being called सर्वनामस्थान by the preceding rule (शि सर्वनामस्थानम् । P. 1. 1. 42), there will be no difficulty in deriving the form कुण्डानि.

The difficulty stated above exists only if the negation stated in the word अनपुंसकस्य is understood as a प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध. On that view, it would mean '(सुट् added) to a neuter noun is not called सर्वनामस्थान'. However, if it is understood as a पर्युदास, it would mean '(सुट् added) to a noun other than a neuter noun (is called सर्वनामस्थान)'. In that case although शि (in ths place of जस्) following a neuter stem does not get सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा by the rule सुडनपुंसकस्य, it does get it by the earlier rule since that rule prescribes the name सर्वनामस्थान for शि which is a substitute in the place of both, the nom. and the acc. pl. The प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध on the other hand straightaway derives the name सर्वनामस्थान to शि added to a neuter noun. Kaiyaṭa remarks: प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधाश्रयेण पूर्वपक्षः, पर्युदासाश्रयेण सिद्धान्तः ।

[1. 2]

1. अथ शिसर्वनाम ... etc. The *Vār.* 1 mentions both the rules, namely शि सर्वनामस्थानम् and सुडनपुंसकस्य. Since the difficulty pointed out in the *Vār.* is connected only with the latter, the author of the *Dīp.* questions the purpose of the mention of the former. He further explains the purpose as विषयप्रदर्शनार्थम्

'for the sake of pointing out the topic'. If the two rules are treated together as forming one topic, namely the सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा, the negation stated in the word अनपुंसकस्य would apply to both. Further, if the negation is understood as प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध, the nom. pl. suffix शि added to a neuter noun will not get the name सर्वनामस्थान even by the rule शि सर्वनामस्थानम्.

2. अपरे एवं ... etc. The author cites the view of other grammarians in this conection. According to them although the rules शि सर्वनामस्थानम् and सुडनपुंसकस्य are put together in the *Vār.* and they together form one topic, they should be treated separately as they are two separate sentences. In fact they are two independent rules. Therefore, the negation अनपुंसकस्य is connected with the latter rule alone. Consequently, it means that the suffixes सु, औ, etc. added to a neuter noun are not called सर्वनामस्थान.

[1. 3]

In (the *Vārttika*) *jasi śipratiṣedhaḥ* if the location is understood as (the location of) the subject, (*jasi śi* would mean) '*śi* in respect of *jas*' or (the compound) *jasiśi* (is understood) as *śi* (in the place) of *jas*. (The rule) referring to *śi* (as *sarvanāmasthāna*) has a scope in (the substitute) *śi* in respect of *śas* for instance, (in the expression) *kuṇḍāni paśya* 'see the pots'.

It must be noted that in both the views described above the difficulty in the derivation of the nom. pl. कुण्डानि persists as long as the negation (अनपुंसकस्य) is understood as प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध.

The author offers two interpretations of the *Vār.* part, जसि शिप्रतिषेधः. Literally, the expression would mean 'prohibition of शि in the place of जस्.' However, this is not intended. The Vārttikakāra means to say that if प्रसज्य-प्रतिषेध is accepted there would be prohibition of सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा for शि which is substituted for जस् (i. e. nom. pl. ending). The undesired interpretation as shown above is caused by the compound शिप्रतिषेधः. The term जसि is desired to be connected, not with whole compound शिप्रतिषेधः, but with the first part, namely शि. This has been explained in the present paragraph. Thus the locative जसि has to be understood as a locative of subject: जस्विषये यः शिः तद्विषये सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञाप्रतिषेधः 'The prohibition of the name सर्वनामस्थान for शि which is stated in connection with जस्'. Or, the whole expression should be understood as a single word, namely जसिशिप्रतिषेधः rather than two. The compound जसिशि is understood as जसेः शिः 'शि (in the place) of जसि.' The compound जसिशि-प्रतिषेधः thus means 'prohibition (in respect) of शि (in the place) of जस्'.

[1. 4]

1. According to the प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध view the word अनपुंसकस्य means नपुंस-कस्य (सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा) न भवति '(शि added) to a neuter noun is not called

सर्वनामस्थान'. It is clear from this meaning that the particle नञ् is construed, not with नपुंसक, but with भवति. Therefore, अनपुंसक is an असमर्थसमास 'a compound of two semantically unconnected words'.

2. यत्र वर्ति... etc. Here the author explains why अनपुंसक is an असमर्थसमास. The objector may argue that the verb भवति is understood in the interpretation of this compound as it is understood in the meaning of negative compounds such as अपुत्रः (न भवति पुत्रः यस्य) or अधनः (न भवति धनं यस्य). The author says that a negative compound can be a समर्थसमास only when the action, either directly mentioned or being understood, is conveyed by the particle नञ् in the compound. In other words a negative compound is a समर्थसमास if नञ् means अविद्यमान 'not existing'. That नञ् is further construed with the following constituent e. g. अब्राह्मणः means अविद्यमानः ब्राह्मणः 'not being a Brahmin'. Since the compound अनपुंसक is not understood as अविद्यमानं नपुंसकम् 'not being neuter', it is not a समर्थसमास. अनपुंसकस्य is paraphrased as नपुंसकस्य सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा न भवति. The verb भवति is thus semantically connected with सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा rather than with नपुंसकस्य.

[1. 5]

The difficulty described above exists only if the word अनपुंसकस्य is interpreted as प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध. The author further explains the difference between the two kinds of negation. Although, both the प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध and the पर्युदास imply non-application, they differ from each other in that the प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध states the negation first and the application follows, whereas according to the पर्युदास, the application comes first and negation follows. In the present case it can be said that according to the प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध the rule would mean : नपुंसकस्य शिः सुट् च सर्वनामस्थानं न भवति। शिः सुट् च सर्वनामस्थानं भवति. On the other hand, according to the पर्युदास, the rule would mean नपुंसकभिन्नस्य शिः सुट् च सर्वनामस्थानं भवति। नपुंसकस्य तु न भवति। In the former case, there is a direct negation of सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञा in the case of neuter शि and सुट्, while it is indirect in the latter case. The last line, प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधे विच्छेदोपक्रमा...etc. cannot by properly understood. विच्छेद् is understood as प्रतिषेध.

[1. 6]

1. In order to avoid the difficulty the author proposes adoption of पर्युदास. According to him, if अनपुंसकस्य is accepted as पर्युदास, the word नपुंसक will be understood as उपलक्षण, indicating not नपुंसक but स्त्री and पुंस्. The word नपुंसक being thus subordinate as it is meant for other (viz. स्त्रीपुंस्), there will be no direct negation of नपुंसक and thus the nom. pl. ending शि added to a neuter noun can be called सर्वनामस्थान.

2. द्विप्रकारा हि प्रवृत्तिः... Here the author explains, with the help of an illustration, how a meaning differs in the two ways of negation. A Brahmin can be denied food either by stating क्षत्रियविट्शूद्रान् भोजय 'Give food to क्षत्रियs, विश्s, and शूद्रs' or by stating अब्राह्मणान् भोजय 'Give food to non-Brahmins'. In both the statements food is denied to a Brahmin either by directly mentioning him or by an indirect reference. In the present case, in the पर्युदास interpretation the name सर्वनामस्थान is stated in connection with स्त्री and पुंस्. It is neither prescribed for nor denied to नपुंसक. Therefore the negation has no connection with नपुंसक.

The illustration given above does not properly fit in the context. It should be understood only so far as it explains the two ways of stating a fact.

[1.7]

1. The *Vārttika*-s 2 and 3, namely नाप्रतिषेधात् and अप्रसेर्वा, give a reply to the objection raised in the first *Vār.* described above. The contents of the *Vār.* 2 were explained in the above passage. Here the author explains the third *Vār.* It says that the prohibition is not applicable to शि which is substituted in the place of जस्. While explaining it, Pat. cites the Pari. (No. 62) अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति...। This Pari. says that any statement, either affirmative or negative, is always connected with that which is near to it. Since सुट् (P. 1. 1. 43), and not शि (P. 1. 1. 42), is close to the word अनपुंसकस्य, the prohibition is connected with सुट्. The negation of the name सर्वनामस्थान thus applies to सुट्. Application of the name सर्वनामस्थान to शि (substitute in the place of both, nom. pl. and acc. pl.) by P. 1. 1. 42 remains intact.

2. अशक्यमिदं प्रतिषेद्धुम्... etc. The author further explains why the prohibition is not connected with the earlier rule. If the prohibition of the name सर्वनामस्थान applies to शि, the very statement शि सर्वनामस्थानम् would be futile. The substitute शि replaces the suffixes जस् and शस् when they are added to a neuter noun alone. Therefore, if the name सर्वनामस्थान is not extended to शि by applying the prohibition अनपुंसकस्य, the very existence of the rule becomes questionable. Therefore, on the basis of the statement in a separate rule, the name सर्वनामस्थान has to be extended to शि.

[1.8]

1. An objection may be raised against the reply given above. Since the two rules P. 1. 1. 42 and 43 prescribe the name सर्वनामस्थान and thus belong to the same domain, they can be described as तुल्यबल 'having equal power' and therefore विप्रतिषेध 'mutual conflict (of equals)' exists between the two. According to P. 1. 4. 2: विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्, the latter rule cancels the earlier. Therefore, the name सर्वनामस्थान taught by P. 1. 1. 42: शि सर्वनामस्थानम् is cancelled by the

next rule, P. 1. 1. 43. Since P. 1. 1. 42 is thus cancelled by P. 1. 1. 43, the negative statement अनपुंसकस्य which is a part of P. 1. 1. 43 is also connected with the earlier rule.

One may argue in this connection that both the rules teach a technical term and विप्रतिषेध does not exist between two technical terms. The objector replies that although the two rules teach the same संज्ञा, they are different from each other in that one is accompanied by a negative statement (अनपुंसकस्य), whereas the other is not. Further, both the rules yield different results. The word कुण्डानि in the sentence कुण्डानि पश्य is an example of P. 1. 1. 42 whereas the words राजा, राजानौ etc. are examples of the latter rule. Each one of the two rules has thus an independent scope. (In the sentence कुण्डानि पश्य, the word कुण्डानि is an acc. pl. form whers शि has replaced the acc. pl. ending whereas in the sentence कुण्डानि तिष्ठन्ति, *kuṇḍāni* is a nom. pl. form where the nom. pl. is replaced by शि.) Both the rules, however, meet in the example कुण्डानि तिष्ठन्ति. In the word कुण्डानि the nom. pl. being replaced by शि the name सर्वनामस्थान is applicable by both, शि सर्वनामस्थानम् and सुडनपुंसकस्य. The विप्रतिषेध in such cases is resolved by invoking P. 1. 4. 2. Thus P. 1. 1. 43 cancels P. 1. 1. 42.

2. परत्वं पूर्वस्या अनुवृत्तेः etc. The objection stated above is removed in this last part of the paragraph. The argument of the author can be summed up as follows: The latter rule teaching the name सर्वनामस्थान to सुट् should be regarded as continuation of the earlier rule. Further, the prohibition stated in the word अनपुंसकस्य indicates non-application of the name सर्वनामस्थान in a certain domain; it does not cancel what is already applicable. A popular maxim says that even if the killer of Devadatta is killed, Devadatta who is already dead cannot be revived thereby. If the name सर्वनामस्थान of शि that is in the place of nom. pl. (in sentences like कुण्डानि पश्यन्ति) which is applicable by P. 1. 1. 42 is cancelled by P. 1. 1. 43, it cannot be regained by cancelling P. 1. 1. 43 by means of the prohibition अनपुंसकस्य. On the contrary, P. 1. 1. 43 which is prohibited by the statement अनपुंसकस्य cannot, in its turn, prohibit P. 1. 1. 42. This is what is stated in the *Mbh.*: नोत्सहते प्रतिषिद्धा सति बाधितुम् '(the rule) being prohibited is not competent to cancel (the earlier rule)'.

* * *

na veti vibhāṣā / P. 1. 1. 44

[1]

1. In the *Vār.* 1 Kāt. suggests that the name *vibhāṣā* should be given to the meaning of the expression *na vā* rather than to the expression *na vā* itself. There are two kinds of *saṁjñā*-s in Pāṇini's grammar. *Saṁjñā*-s given to

words or letters, and *saṁjñā*-s given to meaning. The name वृद्धि is given to the the letters आ, ऐ and औ, whereas the name कर्तृ is given to the meaning of स्वतन्त्र, namely 'independent', rather than to the word स्वतन्त्र itself. Kāt. suggests that the name विभाषा should be understood as belonging to the latter type.

The author of the *Dīp.* points out that the name विभाषा can be given neither to the expression न वा nor to its meaning. He further explains how the name विभाषा cannot be given to the meaning of the expression न वा. He argues that a *saṁjñā* cannot denote a non-entity. Since the meaning of न वा is negative, it cannot be understood from the word विभाषा.

2. इह च न वेति ... etc. The author points out that since there is no mention either of an object or of an action with which न वा may be connected, there exists nothing which can be signified by the name विभाषा.

3. अथाप्यस्त्यर्थः ... etc. One may argue that the verb अस्ति 'is' is always understood in the expressions in which no other action is mentioned. Thus the expression न वा can be connected with the verb अस्ति and it can be said that the name विभाषा is given to the meaning of the expression न वा अस्ति. The author replies that even after the verb अस्ति is supplied, the meaning still being of the nature of a non-entity no relation can be established between the संज्ञा and the संज्ञिन्.

4. संज्ञां प्रति हि... etc. The author further argues that a संज्ञिन् is usually mentioned either in the genitive or in the nominative. For instance, in P. 1. 1. 68 : स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा, the संज्ञिन्, namely शब्दस्य, is mentioned in the genitive while in P. 1. 1. 1 : वृद्धिरादैच्, the संज्ञिन्, namely आदैच्, is mentioned in the nominative. Since the meaning of the form of a non-entity is not a substance, no case-ending can be added to it. Bhartṛhari clearly states in the *Vākyap.* that a संज्ञा may cause the addition of a genitive, or a nominative case-ending after a संज्ञिन् even when it has no external meaning. Cf. I. 66 :

प्राक् संज्ञिनाभिसंबन्धात् संज्ञा रूपपदार्थिका।
षष्ठ्याश्च प्रथमायाश्च निमित्तत्वाय कल्पते॥

The difficulty mentioned above can be therefore removed by arguing that the use of the genitive or the nominative after a संज्ञिन् is stated in connection with a संज्ञिन् which is of the nature of स्वरूप, i. e. the word's own form. But there it is an entity whereas here the संज्ञिन् is a non-entity. Therefore the question of the use of nominative or genitive does not arise.

5. नापि इदं तदिति etc. The mention of the संज्ञिन् in the nominative such as इदम् 'this' or तद् 'that' is also not possible in the case of the meaning of न वा since it is असत्त्वभूत. Cf. *Nirukta* 1. 1 : अद इति सत्त्वानामुपदेशः (An entity is referred to as 'this').

[2]

This *Dip.* refutes the objection raised in the preceding paragraph. It points out that the expression न वा itself cannot convey any meaning unless it is connected either with a substance or an action. Therefore it is an उपलक्षण, indicator, of another meaning. The author further discusses one of the two possible alternatives, viz. the connection of न वा with a substance and points out that the expression न वा when connected with a substance does not make any sense, becuse the knowledge of a substance is either positive or negative. A substance cannot be negated, nor can it be made optional.

[3]

The author points out that a prohibition or an option can be stated with reference to an action alone. That action may be of any kind, even mere existence conveyed by verbs like अस्ति. Finally, he says that prohibition and option can be connected even with a noun which is closely connected with some action.

The meaning of प्रातिपदिकं वा आलम्भनं क्रियाशब्दप्रयोगे is not clear. Perhaps the author means that even when action is conveyed not by a verbal form but a nominal form like कृदन्त (e. g. गतः, पक्वः etc.), negation or option can be stated with reference to it.

Was possibly आलम्बनं the original text?

[4]

The question is raised : With what is the negative particle न in the word अपाचकः connected ? Is it connected with the root पच् or with the noun पाचक? Following the earlier discussion it should be connected with पच्. However, here the author records both the views. First he cites the view that न is connected with the action denoted by the root पच्. The word अपाचक therefore conveys absence of the action of cooking. According to the second view, however, absence of the agent of the action of cooking is conveyed, because न is connected with पाचक. The second view further implies that this absence which takes place as a natural event is merely indicated by नञ्. Cf. the *Mbh.* on P. 2. 2. 6 : यदा पुनरस्य पदार्थो निवर्तते किं स्वाभाविकी निवृत्तिराहोस्विद् वाचनिकी?... एवं तर्हि स्वाभाविकी निवृत्तिः।... तद्यथा समन्धकारे द्रव्याणां समवस्थितानां प्रदीपनिमित्तं दर्शनम् न च तेषां प्रदीपो निर्वर्तको भवति (I. 411. 3-12)।

[5]

It was stated earlier that a negation is made either of an action or of existence. Here the author discusses how negation is connected with the verb

पचति in the sentence न पचति. Here again two views are cited. According to one view the action of cooking is a kind of specific existence and न is connected with that existence. In other words, न negates the specific existence denoted by पच्. According to the other view पचति cannot denote a specific existence since there is no relation of साध्यसाधनभाव between पचति and भवति. Both पचति and भवति denote साध्यक्रिया 'action to be accomplished'. Therefore, one cannot be described as a साधन 'means of accomplishing' of the other. In the absence of this relation न cannot be stated as negating the specific existence denoted by पच्. On the contrary it negates the very connection of the action denoted by पच् with existence.

It is difficult to trace the source of these two views.

[6]

1. The two different views regarding the expression न पचति are explained with the help of an illustration. The author discusses two views regarding the expression मातुः स्मरति '(he) remembers (his) mother'. According to one view sometimes the action which is to be accomplished is not intended to be so. The action-conveying word is connected with the other word through some other action. Therefore the other word holds the relation of शेष (i. e. non-*kāraka* relation) with that action. This gives rise to a different construction. For instance, in the construction मातरं स्मरति the object मातृ is directly connected with the action of remembering. However, in the construction मातुः स्मरति the object मातृ is connected with the action of remembering through the शेष relation according to the rule अधीगर्थदयेशां कर्मणि (P. 2. 3. 52) which prescribes use of the genitive in connection with such an object. This relation of शेष is comparable to that between राज्ञः and पुरुषः etc. राजन् 'king' is connected with पुरुष 'servant' through the action of giving wages. The relation of शेष thus involves some action. In the same manner in the expression मातुः स्मरति the object मातृ is connected with the action of remembering through the action of taking place or residing. The स्मरण 'remembrance' is connected with मातृ through the relation of विषयविषयिभाव. Thus it can be said that it takes place or resides in mother. This being the cause of the relation of शेष, the genitive is added to मातृ. However, when this relation is not intended and when the action of remembering is intended as the action to be accomplished (साध्य), then the object is directly connected with the action and the usual construction मातरं स्मरति '(he) remembers (his) mother' takes place.

2. यथा वृक्षस्य ... etc. An illustration is given to explain the two usages मातुः स्मरति and मातरं स्मरति. In the sentence वृक्षात् फलं पतति 'a fruit falls from a tree', वृक्ष is directly connected with the action of falling through the relation of अपादान. On the other hand, in the sentence वृक्षस्य फलं पतति 'a fruit of a tree

falls', the relation of वृक्ष with the action is not direct but through the object, viz. फल which is connected with वृक्ष by the action of resting or residing. Thus the relation of a noun with a verb is dependent upon विवक्षा, 'intention of the speaker'. It can be direct or indirect.

[7]

The second view regarding the expression मातुः स्मरति is discussed here. According to this view it is not necessary to imagine another action in order to justify the use of the genitive in the word मातुः, because the action conveyed by the verb स्मरति itself can be intended either as साध्य or as a संबन्धिन्. In the former case the object is used in the accusative, whereas in the latter case it is used in the genitive.

[8]

Coming back to the point the author concludes that the expression न वा has to be connected with some action-word since the words conveying a substance cannot be directly connected with each other. They can be connected only through some action. An action which is yet to be accomplished can have connection with a substance which is सिद्ध i. e. accomplished. What kind of relation can be there between two सिद्ध substances ? The word न वा is thus meaningful when it is connected with the action-word. The objection mentioned in [1] (अर्थाभावात् ... संज्ञासंबन्धानुपपत्तिः) is thus removed. The other objection (असत्त्वभूतत्वाच्चार्थस्य ...) is removed in the next passage.

[9]

1. An argument has already been made in [1], that since the meaning of *na vā* is a non-entity it cannot be connected with the name *vibhāṣā*. Further, it has been stated that a non-entity cannot be referred to by a pronoun like 'this' or 'that'. The author now refutes the argument. He says that although the meaning of *na* and *vā* is a non-entity, it is an entity at the time when the name *vibhāṣā* is given to it, because the name is given to the meaning of the expression *na bhavati* as well as *vā bhavati*. Since the meaning of expression *na bhavati* or *vā bhavati* is an entity, it is possible to refer to it by a pronoun. (Cf. *Vākyap.* I. 66 cited in [1. 3] above.)

2. यथा पचति ... etc. In the sentence यः पचति तस्यापत्यम्, although the expression पचति does not refer to an entity but to an action, by the use of the pronouns यत् and तत् it assumes the form of an entity.

3. आश्रितशब्दव्यापारे तु ... etc. Although *na* and *vā* are understood as entities at the time of giving the name *vibhāṣā*, their meaning, which is in fact

a non-entity, is understood at the time of the application of the name *vibhāṣā*. For instance, in P. 6. 1. 30 : विभाषा श्वेः the term विभाषा is understood as conveying the meaning ' does not take place ' and ' optionally takes place '. The rule thus means that before *liṭ* and *yaṅ* suffixes *samprasāraṇa* does not take place in the root *śvi* and that it optionally takes place. (These two meanings of the term विभाषा leading to two separate statements will be discussed later.)

[10]

1. It is stated in the previous passage that the words *na vā* convey a meaning of the nature of a substance at the time of its being connected with the name *vibhāṣā*, and that they convey non-substance at the time of actual application of the word *vibhāṣā* in a rule. But how can a word convey two opposite meanings ? The author offers two replies citing two different views. According to one view, each and every object possesses all kinds of powers. It is the word expressing that object which delimits the power of that object in a specific context. For instance, a person called देवदत्त functions as the subject in a sentence like देवदत्तो ग्रामं गच्छति. ' Devadatta goes to a village ', while he functions as an object in a sentence like रामो देवदत्तं पश्यति ' Rāma sees Devadatta '. The same object देवदत्त thus possesses different powers to perform different functions. Its specific power in a specific context is made manifest by the word. Thus an object can be both an entity and a non-entity and a word conveying that object delimits its meaning to either of the two. According to the other view, there are no objects in this world. It is the word, which produces the world. Bhartṛhari describes this power of the word in a number of verses in the Brahmakāṇḍa of the *Vākyap.* e. g. :

शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः ।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममेतद् विश्वं व्यवर्तत ॥ २० ॥

The idea of entity and non-entity are thus a creation of the word; they do not represent actuality.

2. सा च प्रकल्पनशक्तिः ... etc. The author further explains the second view. The power of creation residing in a word is to be understood in a restricted sense. Just as when somebody says, ' Go, Kaṁsa is being killed ', Kaṁsa is not actually killed then, only the killing of Kaṁsa is enacted in a drama, in the same manner the world of ideas produced by word is not real but illusory. The various kinds of powers in an object are just a play of words. For instance, one and the same idea, namely the agent of cooking may be conveyed by a variety of expressions such as पचति, पचतेः कर्ता, पाचकः, etc. However, in this respect also the power of the word is restricted. Some ideas cannot be conveyed by different expressions. For instance, the notion of the

'करण' कारक can be conveyed by expression like दात्रेण लुनाति. The same notion cannot be conveyed by any other parallel construction. The same is the case with other कारकs like संप्रदान (e. g. ब्राह्मणाय ददाति), अपादान (ग्रामाद् आगच्छति) etc. Cf. *Mbh.* on P. 3. 1. 26, *Vākyap.* II. 434, III. 7. 5 etc.

[11]

1. The author discusses the grammar of the expression नवेतिविभाषायाम् occurring in the first *Vār.* on this rule. The objector argues that the locative ending cannot be added to the expression न वेति विभाषा as it is not a *prātipadika*, because the name प्रातिपदिक cannot be given to a group of meaningful words except a compound (*Vār.* 6 [on P. 1. 2. 45] : अर्थवत्समुदायानां समासग्रहणं नियमार्थम्।). The objection is removed by arguing that the expression नवेतिविभाषा- (in नवेतिविभाषायाम्) is not a group of meaningful words, but it is an imitation of the rule न वेति विभाषा. An imitation has its own phonetic form as its meaning. Further, an imitation is not a group of words but one single word. Therefore, there is no difficulty in calling नवेतिविभाषा a प्रातिपदिक and adding the locative ending to it.

The objector points to the Pari. प्रकृतिवदनुकरणं भवति (36) 'an imitation is treated as the original' and argues that since the प्रकृति 'न वेति विभाषा' is an अर्थवत्समुदाय 'group of meaningful words' other than a compound, the name प्रातिपदिक is not applicable to it and therefore it does not apply also to its imitation. The reply to this objection is that although the prohibition of the name प्रातिपदिक for the imitation is due to the said Pari. the imitation itself being a significant word deserves the name प्रातिपदिक in its own right. It cannot be prohibited. The phonetic form itself is its meaning.

2. एवमप्यटाबन्तत्वाद्. The objector raises another objection, this time against the addition of the augment *yāṭ* (P. 7. 3. 113) as well as the substitute *ām* for the locative ending *ṇi* in the form विभाषायाम्. This form contains a Locative sing. ending *ām* after the feminine suffix टाप् prescribed by P. 4. 1 4, added to the कृत् form विभाष and the augment याट् prescribed by P. 7. 3. 113 for a *ṇit* case-ending after a stem ending in the feminine suffix आप्. Since here the expression नवेतिविभाषा and not the single word विभाषा is the प्रातिपदिक, there is no possibility of the addition of the feminine suffix टाप् after *नवेतिविभाष (which is not a प्रातिपदिक) and consequently of the augment याट् and the ending -*ām*. Two solutions are offered to remove the objection : (1) Although the Pari. प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात्स विहितस्तदादेस्तदन्तस्य च ग्रहणम् prescribes that when a suffix is mentioned the expression which begins with that word to which the suffix is added and which ends in that suffix should be understood and therefore the word आपः in the rule याडापः must mean that

expression which begins with that to which आप् is added and which ends in आप्, this Pari. does not apply to feminine suffixes according to another Pari. स्त्रीप्रत्यये चानुपसर्जने न (26). Therefore there is no difficulty in applying the rule याडापः. Since the imitation नवेतिविभाषा itself contains the feminine suffix आप् at the end, there is no question of adding the feminine suffix. (2) The expression नवेतिविभाषायाम् may not be understood as an imitation and a प्रातिपदिक. It may be understood as follows : In the case of the name विभाषा which is defined as न वा by mentioning the expression न वा, the name should be given to the meaning. According to this interpretation विभाषा, and not नवेतिविभाषा, is the word. Therefore the difficulty in the addition of the Locative ending *-ām* and the augment याट् does not arise.

[12]

1. The first two *Vār.*-s on this rule read as follows : नवेतिविभाषायामर्थसंज्ञाकरणम्। शब्दसंज्ञायां ह्यर्थासंप्रत्ययो यथान्यत्र। These two *Vār.*-s together mean, 'In the case of (the rule) न वेति विभाषा the name (विभाषा) should be given to the meaning (of न वा), because if the name (विभाषा) is given to the word (न वा), the meaning (of न वा) will not be understood as (it happens) elsewhere. According to P. 1. 1. 68, a word in grammar stands for its own phonetic form. For instance, the name वृद्धि is given to the phonetic form of the phonemes आ, ऐ, and औ by P. 1. 1. 1. Since this is not desired in the case of the name विभाषा, the *Vār.* recommends अर्थसंज्ञाकरणम्. Pat. introduces the second *Vār.* by saying किं प्रयोजनम् 'What is the purpose?' However, a closer look at the *Vār.* shows that it is not the प्रयोजनम् 'purpose', but rather the difficulty which is mentioned in the second *Vārttika*. Thus it would be more proper to say को दोषः? (What difficulty would be there?) instead of saying किं प्रयोजनम्. अर्थसंप्रत्यय is the प्रयोजनम् of अर्थसंज्ञाकरण, whereas अर्थासंप्रत्यय is a difficulty arising out of the absence of अर्थसंज्ञाकरणम्. Considering these facts, the author of the *Dīp.* explains the *Mbh.* statement किं प्रयोजनम् and the *Vār.* subsequent to that as a reference to a negative purpose.

The *Dīp.* cites the *Mbh.* text as शब्दसंप्रत्यय, while the present available text reads शब्दस्य संप्रत्ययः. Further, the *Mbh.* text यथान्यत्र is cited in the *Dīp.* after the expression शब्दसंप्रत्यय, whereas in the available text it precedes the expression शब्दस्य संप्रत्ययः. Does this indicate a different reading of the text of the *Mbh.* or just carelessness of the author of the *Dīp.* or of the scribe?

2. हेतुद्वयमत्रान्तर्भूतम् ... etc. According to the author of the *Dīp.* the expression यथान्यत्र implies two purposes. A name which is defined stands, for two reasons, for a phonetic form rather than its meaning. Firstly according to the Pāṇinian Pari. स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा (P. 1. 1. 68) an expression stands for its own phonetic form. Therefore, in the संज्ञा rule दाधा घ्वदाप्

(P. 1. 1. 20) the expression दाधा, which is the named of घु, stands for its own form, and not its meaning. Therefore, the roots दाश् etc. which convey the same meaning as that of the root दा are not understood by the expression दा. Secondly, in the rules where the name घु is employed, घु conveys दा and धा and not their meaning since the meaning is later inferred. It is, in fact, understood not directly from the word घु but at a tertiary level. The meaning which is (thus) distantly connected with the name cannot be said to be conveyed by the name.

3. तेन विभाषाप्रदेशेषु...etc. It is thus clear from the foregoing discussion that the name विभाषा as any other name like घु stands for the expression न वा without any concern with its meaning. The rule न वेति विभाषा would thus imply that the स्थानिन् 'विभाषा' is repaced by the आदेश 'न वा'. One may argue in this connection that the relation of the स्थानिन् and the आदेश is conveyed by the genitive in Pāṇini's grammar, e. g. तस्य तात् (P. 7. 1. 44) 'तात् replaces त'. Since the word विभाषा is used in the nominative, we cannot say that the word विभाषा is replaced by the words न वा. This objection is removed by the author by citing an illustration. The गणसूत्र (on P. 5. 1. 64) : विराग विरङ्गं च prescribes that विरङ्ग replaces विराग. Here the स्थान्यादेशभाव is understood even in the absence of the genitive.

The consequences of शब्दसंज्ञाकरण instead of अर्थसंज्ञाकरण as described by the author of the *Dīp.* are farfetched. In the first place, स्थान्यादेशभाव does not necessarily exist between a name and its named in the संज्ञा rules. Even in the case of the rule दाधा घ्वदाप्, the name घु is not given to only expression दा and धा, but to roots having that form. Thus the meaning does play a certain role in the संज्ञा rules. Secondly, cases of the non-use of the genitive to convey स्थान्यादेशभाव are sporadic. The genitive is, as a rule, used in Pāṇini's grammar to convey स्थान्यादेशभाव (P. 1. 1. 49).

[13]

1. The outcome of the foregoing discussion is expressed in the sentence तत्तर्हि कर्तव्यम् in the *Mbh.* It means that the name विभाषा should be given to the meaning of न वा. The reading in the available printed editions of the *Mbh.* is, तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम् 'Then it should be stated'. The author of the *Dīp.* seems, however, to know the reading तत्तर्हि कर्तव्यम् and tries to explain it. The word अर्थसंज्ञाकरणम् in the *Vār.* 1 is referred to by the word तत् in this sentence which therefore means, तत् अर्थसंज्ञाकरणं कर्तव्यम्, 'the making of अर्थसंज्ञा should be made'. The author points out the semantic feature pecular to this sentence. Here the action of doing is both the predicate and the subject. The purport of the sentence thus is, 'making should be made' or 'doing should be done'. The author

further explains that here the action of doing something specific is the कर्मन् 'object' of the action of doing in general. Thus the relation between the two actions is that of सामान्य 'general' and विशेष 'specific'.

2. शास्त्रमर्थसंज्ञाकरणम्.. etc. The author proposes another interpretation of the sentence अर्थसंज्ञाकरणं कर्तव्यम् by adding the word शास्त्रम्. Thus the sentence means, 'a rule or a statement which prescribes अर्थसंज्ञाकरण should be made'.

3. इतिकरणः क्रियते. This again is a cognate construction as the above one. Here also the author explains the relation between the object action, namely इतिकरण lit. 'making of इति' (i. e. mention of इति) with the predicate action, क्रियते 'is made' as that of सामान्यविशेषभाव which leads to साध्यसाधनभाव. Here making is साध्य 'to be accomplished' and it is achieved by means of mentioning इति which is साधन 'means of accomplishing'.

The word *karaṇa* in the compound इतिकरण is understood as क्रियते इति 'that which is made'. The suffix ल्युट् is added to root कृ in the sence of कर्मन् by P. 3. 3. 113 : कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्।

[14]

1. While explaining the *Vār.* 3, इतिकरणोऽर्थनिर्देशार्थः, Pat. raises the question whether the additional meaning, namely the meaning of न वा, is conveyed by इति. Each word has a power to convey a specific meaning. The relation between the word and the meaning is fixed. Does the word इति have the power to convey the specfic meaning in the rule न वेति विभाषा as pointed out before? Or is the relation between the word इति and the specific meaning which is desired arbitrary? In his comment on this question the author of the *Dīp.* compares the word इति with काकवाशित 'cawing of a crow'. Just as, when a crow caws no meaning is understood, similarly we do not understand any meaning from the word इति. We accept simply on your authority that the word इति conveys this meaning. The analogy of काकवाशित can be explained in another way. Pat. refers to काकवाशित in the *Mbh.* on P. 4. 3. 53, न हि काको वाश्यत इत्येवाधिकारा निवर्तन्ते 'the अधिकार rules do not stop because the crow caws'. Pat.'s argument can be summed up as follows : Pāṇini does not, on many occasions, specify the limit of a certain अधिकार rule. Then how to know that an अधिकार is not continued beyond a certain rule? One cannot say that one should stop continuing an अधिकार when one hears the cawing of a crow. There is absolutely no connection between the cawing of a crow and the continuation of an अधिकार. In the same manner no relation exists between इति and the additional meaning attached to it. However, it is accepted because Kāt. has intended it.

2. अपरः प्रकारः ... etc. Another way to connect इति with the additional meaning is the rule of memory. When a word is uttered, one is reminded of a certain meaning. This meaning is, though not directly, distantly connected with the word through remembrance. The author gives an illustration of the word लोष्ट. The word लोष्ट literally meaning 'a lump of clay' reminds one of a certain measure. Similarly, the word इति reminds one of this meaning. The meaning is thus not directly conveyed by इति, but is remembered as a secondary meaning. (The text in the MS which reads as लेपो लोष्टादिभिः is difficult to understand. Was the word लोष्ट used to convey a certain measure?)

3. यथा विपरीतलिङ्गप्रवृत्तेः ... etc. Another illustration is given to explain the relation between इति and the meaning. The author here refers to the discussion in the *Mbh.* on the word तु in P. 5. 3. 68 : विभाषा सुपो बहुच् पुरस्तात्तु. The rule teaches the addition of the affix बहुच् before (and not after) a word in the sense 'almost'. While explaining the purpose of the indeclinable तु in the rule Pat. says : इदं तर्हि प्रयोजनम् — प्रागुत्पत्तेर्यल्लिङ्गं वचनं च तदुत्पन्नेऽपि प्रत्यये यथा स्यात् — बहुगुडो द्राक्षा, बहुतैलं प्रसन्ना, बहुपयो यवागूरिति। According to this statement the indeclinable तु which literally means 'but' implies that the word to which the affix बहुच् is added, retains its original gender and number although it is used as an adjective. For instance, in the word बहुगुडः 'almost like molasses' which is an adjective of the feminine word द्राक्षा, the original masculine gender of the word गुड is retained.

Just as the use of the original gender is implied by the word तु, a reference to the meaning of न वा is implied by इति.

[15]

Pat. says that the connection of the word इति with the specific meaning as explained before is established in usage. The author further comments on this statement and remarks that this meaning of इति is not stated by grammar, as the meaning of the word वृद्धि is stated in the rule वृद्धिरादैच् (P. 1. 1. 1); It is already established in usage.

[16]

1 Pat. offers a popular illustration of the use of the word इति as follows : तद्यथा लोके गौरित्ययमाहेति गोशब्दादितिकरणः परः प्रयुज्यमानो गोशब्दं स्वस्मात्पदार्थात्प्रच्यावयति। सोऽसौ स्वस्मात्पदार्थात्प्रच्युतो यासावर्थपदार्थकता तस्याः शब्दपदार्थकः संपद्यते। एवमिहापि नवाशब्दादितिकरणः परः प्रयुज्यमानो नवाशब्दं स्वस्मात्पदार्थात्प्रच्यावयति। The idea expressed in this passage is as follows : The word गौः means 'a cow' or 'a bull'. However, in the sentence गौरित्ययमाह 'He says गौः', the word does not stand for its literal meaning i. e. a cow or a bull, but it conveys the meaning

'the expression गौः'. Thus here the word गौः abandons its अर्थपदार्थकता 'function of conveying an object meaning' and assumes शब्दपदार्थकता 'function of conveying word-form (as the meaning)'. This is caused by the word इति attached to the word गौः. The word इति thus makes a word, to which it is added, change its own meaning and convey a different one, viz. its own form.

2. गोशब्दादितिकरणः ... etc. The author points out the mistake in Pat.'s remark, गोशब्दाद् इतिकरणः परः प्रयुज्यमानः which literally means, 'the word इति being used after the word *go*'. In the sentence, गौरित्ययमाह। the word इति is used after the finished word गौः and not गो. Thus, according to the author, by the word गोशब्द Pat. means गोशब्दप्रकृतिः '(a finished) word of which (the stem) गो is the base' i. e. the word गौः.

[17]

According to Pat. the word इति added after गौः causes the word गौः to abandon its own meaning (see the *Mbh.* cited in 16. 1). An objection is raised against this remark in this passage. The objector argues that since according to the *Vār.* 1 the words, their meanings and the relation between them are permanent, a word cannot give up its own meaning and assume another one. Nor can it be said that each word contains both, शब्दपदार्थकता and अर्थपदार्थकता and that इति causes either of the two to be dropped while the remaining one is retained. For some words are only शब्दपदार्थक while others are only अर्थपदार्थक. Therefore it is not correct to say that a word abandons its own meaning after इति is added to it.

The first *Vār.* सिद्धे शब्दार्थसंबन्धे is paraphrased by Pat. as सिद्धे शब्दे, अर्थे संबन्धे च. Pat. thus connects the word सिद्धे with all the the three words, शब्द, अर्थ and संबन्ध separately. Here, by the words शब्दे च अर्थे च etc. the author refers to this interpretation of the *Vār.*

[18]

In order to answer the question raised in the previous passage the author takes a diversion into the philosophy of word and meaning. The discussion in this passage is summed up below.

A word is a means to convey a certain meaning. After a certain meaning is understood from a word, the function of the word is over. It cannot be used again and again to convey different meanings. One word conveys one meaning at a time. It is also not proper to say that a word collectively conveys many meanings, because a collection of meanings presupposes a collection of words. Nor can it be said that different meanings are alternately conveyed by a word, because there is no fixed order in the understanding of different meanings from a word. Then how to account for the understanding of more than one meaning

from a word? The author here refers to the view of a संसर्गवादिन् who thinks that the knowledge of meaning understood from a word itself is qulified with all specific meanings. There is no actual abandoning of one meaning and receiving of another. All this happens on the mental plane. For instance, one drinks a juice made of different ingredients and tries to identify the taste of each of the ingredients in the juice although they are not separately tasted by him. The tastes of all the ingredients are collectively present in the juice. In the same manner, all meanings are collectively present in the knowledge and one who has this knowledge sorts out one meaning at a time according to the requirement.

Incidentally, the author refers to two views regarding the meaning of a word. According to one view a word first conveys the जाति 'generic feature' and then the व्यक्ति 'individual' whereas according to the other view the process is the other way round. The Vārttikakāra, Pat., and later grammarians often refer to these two views which are ascribed to वाजप्यायन and व्याडि respectively. Cf. *Vār.*-s 35 : आकृत्यभिधानाद्वैकं विभक्तौ वाजप्यायनः। and *Vār.* 45 : द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः। on P. 1. 2. 64. The जातिपक्ष is based on the view that the knowledge of a qualified object is always accompanied by the knowledge of the qualifier. For instance, the knowledge of घट is accompanied by the knowledge of घटत्व. Therefore, it is described as घटत्वप्रकारकघटविशेष्यकज्ञानम्. Unless the qualifier (विशेषण), namely the घटत्व, is understood, the qualified (विशेष्य), namely the घट, is not understood. According to the व्यक्तिपक्ष, however, the individual (द्रव्य) is first understood. The व्यक्तिपक्षवादिन् holds that since a जाति resides in a व्यक्ति it cannot be understood first without its location.

The words अपोद्धृत्य and अपोद्धरन् remind one of the word अपोद्धारपदार्थ used by Bhartṛhari in the *Vākyap.* I. 24 in the sense of a part-meaning abstracted from a whole.

[19]

In the preceding passage an objection was raised against Pat.'s remark that the word इति causes न वा to abandon its own meaning and convey another meaning. Here the author of the *Dīp.* explains the notion of प्रच्युति and removes the objection. It is true that since the relation of a word with its meaning is permanent we cannot say that the word न वा abandons its meaning. In fact, there is no actual giving up of any meaning and taking up of a new one, because the relation between a word and its meaning is that of identity (तादात्म्य). This relation is so close that in the day-to-day practice people do not feel the separate existence of a word from the object signified by it. Thus both the शब्दरूप-अर्थ (sound-sequence) and the अर्थरूप-अर्थ (meaning) are inseparable from a word. This close identity is explained by the author with the help of the

illustration of the term वृद्धि. The relation between the technical name वृद्धि and its named, namely the vowels आ ऐ, and औ, is so closely identical that whenever the term वृद्धि is used in a Pāṇinian rule, one understands, without fail, the three vowels. The relation between a word and its meaning thus being one of identity, the word इति added after the word न वा only brings to light the अर्थरूप-अर्थ separately. The role of इति is thus that of an indicator (द्योतक). The process of प्रच्युति 'falling away' of the meaning is thus mental, rather that actual.

The relation of identity between a word and its meaning is described by grammarians beginning with Pat. Bhartṛhari refers to this relation in a number of verses, e. g. *Vākyap.* II. 40 :

सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धो बुद्ध्या प्रक्रम्यते यदा ।
वाक्यार्थस्य तदैकोऽपि वर्णः प्रत्यायकः क्वचित् ॥

See also *Vākyap.* II. 128, III. 14. 84, 85, 188, 228, etc.

The word योगक्षेम literally means acquisition and preservation of property. However, in scientific literature, the word एकयोगक्षेम or तुल्ययोगक्षेम is used in the sense, 'having identical aim or prospects'.

[20]

It is argued that प्रच्युति cannot take place in the case of the word न वा, because न वा is not basically शब्दपरक. A word which is not yet connected with an outside meaning, or a word, though having a popular meaning, is used to convey its own form is, शब्दपरक, e. g. onomatopoetic words. The word न वा however has its own meaning, namely 'rather not'. Therefore, it cannot be शब्दपरक. The reply is given that after the meaning of the word न वा is understood, the identity between the word न वा and its meaning is cognised. This identity is removed by the word इति.

In the remaining passage the author dwells upon the concept of प्रच्युति and offers its different interpretations according to different views, in addition to the view described above. According to one view प्रच्युति is nothing but reversion of गुणप्रधानभाव 'relation of the principal and the subordinate' between a word and its meaning. A word possesses both, a word-form (शब्द) and a meaning (अर्थ). Sometimes the word-form of a word is mainly understood while its meaning is understood secondarily. Sometimes it is the other way round. When इति is added to a word, the mutual relation between शब्द and अर्थ is reversed. According to another view, while a word is all-powerful, इति curbs its power and restricts it to the power of conveying either word or meaning. Some scholars however think that a word is not all-powerful. There are as many words as there are meanings : The Mīmāṁsakas

for instance accept this view (अर्थभेदे शब्दभेदः।). Thus a word conveying its word-form is different from (the apparently same) word conveying a meaning. In this view प्रच्युति cannot be explained since both शब्दरूप-अर्थ and अर्थरूप-अर्थ do not reside in one and the same word. The author refers to yet another view according to which a word has no meaning at all. It is the sentence which is meaningful. Bhartṛhari has propounded this view in the *Vākyap.* e. g. I. 73 :

पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च।
वाक्यात्पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन॥

Further, in the Vākyakāṇḍa, he has elaborately discussed his own theory of वाक्य as the ultimate meaningful unit. In this view also प्रच्युति cannot be explained as a word conveys no meaning. Finally the author points out the difference between grammar and speech and explains that since all words are शब्दपदार्थक in grammar (P. 1. 1. 68 : स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा।) and अर्थपदार्थक in actual speech, the word इति indicates reversion of this as a result of which the word न वा which is शब्दपदार्थक since it is mentioned in a grammatical rule, is understood as अर्थपदार्थक.

[21]

While explaining the function of इति after a word Pat. says : सोऽसौ स्वस्मात्पदार्थात्प्रच्युतो याऽसावर्थपदार्थकता तस्याः शब्दपदार्थकः संपद्यते 'This word (गो) having fallen away from its own meaning comes to have the word(form) as its meaning, giving up its capacity as expressive of meaning'. This would mean, in simple words, that the word गो conveys शब्द instead of conveying अर्थ. The word अर्थपदार्थकता literally means 'the state of being अर्थपदार्थक "having अर्थ as the meaning"'. The suffix ता (तल्) prescribed by Pāṇini in the sense, तस्य भावः 'its state' (P. 5. 1. 119) conveys संबन्ध 'relation' according to Pat. as he is cited in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* (Ed. R. P. TRIPATHI, Varanasi, 1952, p. 119) as follows : कृत्तद्धितसमासेभ्यः संबन्धाभिधानं भावप्रत्ययेन. Therefore the word अर्थपदार्थकता means the relation of अर्थपदार्थक i. e. the relation of a word with its meaning. Since the relation between a word and its meaning is the basic cause of understanding a certain meaning from a certain word, Pat. thought it worthwhile to mention the relation while pointing out the deviation of a word from its meaning.

[22]

The *Vār.* 4, समानशब्दप्रतिषेधः prescribes that a rule, that the name *vibhāṣā* is not given to homonyms of न वा, should be stated. The word (sound-sequence) न वा, if understood as a single word, conveys, in addition to the meaning 'prohibition and option', other meanings like 'new' 'fresh', etc. (in

the feminine sing.). The prohibition is therefore necessary in order to restrict the scope of the name *vibhāṣā* to the word न वा meaning 'prohibition and option'. The *Vār.* is explained in this passage. Here the word समानशब्द is interpreted as an adjective of अर्थ thereby meaning 'having the same word'. However, it would be more proper to understand the word समानशब्द as referring to word rather than to meaning. समानशब्द thus means a homonym. The word नवा meaning 'new' is a homonym of न वा meaning 'or not'. The name *vibhāṣā* should not be given to the word नवा meaning 'new'.

The author explains that this prohibitory *Vār.* is necessary for two reasons: (1) In the absence of such a prohibition, the name *vibhāṣā* will be wrongly applicable to all the homonyms of न वा, and (2) there will be a doubt as to which of the meanings of न वा should be accepted here. The author while further explaining the second reason points out that when a choice is to be made among the homonyms one would select the word नवा meaning 'new', because this meaning is directly understood, whereas the meaning 'or not' which is desired is understood from the sentence which is inferred from the original sentence. In other words, the meaning 'prohibition and option' is secondarily understood while the meaning 'new' is primarily understood. Therefore the latter would be more acceptable. It is therefore necessary to state the prohibitory *Vār.*

[23]

1. Pat. refers to P. 1. 1. 28 : विभाषा दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ as an illustration of the undesired consequence if the prohibitory *Vār.* is not stated. The rule teaches that the name सर्वनाम is optionally given to the word सर्व etc. in a बहुव्रीहि of words conveying quarters. In the absence of the prohibitory *Vār.* the word विभाषा in the rule may convey the meaning 'new'. Here the author introduces an objection : Even if we assume that the word विभाषा conveys the meaning 'new', what kind of connection can be there between this meaning and the name सर्वनामन् which is taught by the rule? सर्वनामन् being a name, it cannot be described as new. Further, a compound formed by this rule, e. g. दक्षिणपूर्वा, also cannot be described as new since it is a name of an intermediate quarter. Therefore, the meaning 'new' can be connected only with a word like शाला 'house' which is qualified by a compound like दक्षिणपूर्वा. The rule विभाषा दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ would thus mean that the name सर्वनामन् is optionally given to words सर्व etc. in a बहुव्रीहि of words denoting quarters when the object qualified by the compound is new. Thus दक्षिणपूर्वा शाला means a newly built house in the south-east; cf. *Mbh.* : दक्षिणपूर्वस्यां शालायाम्। अचिरकृतायां संप्रत्ययः स्यात्।

2. स्मायादिष्वङ्ग्यं प्रत्यग्रत्वम् etc. The purpose in giving the name सर्वनाम to words like दक्षिणपूर्वा is to cause the addition of case-endings like स्मै, स्मिन् etc.

Thus, we have constructions like दक्षिणपूर्वस्मै, दक्षिणपूर्वस्मिन् etc. The author says that if विभाषा is understood as conveying the meaing 'new', we have to accept that in the word दक्षिणपूर्वस्यै the meaning 'new' is indicated by the case-ending स्यै which is peculiar to a सर्वनामन्. The illustration given by the author to explain this is not clear. (The reading वृक्षपर्णं in the MS is corrected to वृक्षपर्णं.) When a leaf falls on smooth ground it makes a faint sound. स्वनादिव्यङ्ग्यं would be a better reading in this interpretation. Perhaps, what the author wants to point out is that even a sound can indicate some meaning. Anyhow, the last line cannot be satisfactorily interpreted.

[24]

Necessity of the prohibitory *Vār.* is rejected in the *Vār.* 5 which is discussed in this passage. Various means to resolve ambiguity of meaning caused by homonymy have been laid down by ancient writers. Bhartṛhari speaks, for instance, of fourteen such means (see *Vākyap.* II. 315-316). The author of the *Dīp.* refers to them and argues that the meaning of the word न वा has to be decided on the basis of the context just as it is done in the popular usage. An illustration of the word सैन्धव is given. The sentence सैन्धवमानय means 'bring salt' in the context of meal, whereas it means 'bring the horse' in the context of hunting. In the same manner, since the name विभाषा appears in the rules of application where a certain statement is understood, the context demands that the word न वा should mean 'prohibition and option' rather than 'new'. Prohibition always implies existence of a positive statement. Since such a statement is either directly or indirectly understood in the rule where the word विभाषा is used, it is implied by the context that the word न वा means prohibition and option. The meaning 'new' does not fit in the context. Even in the popular usage the word न वा is found to be used to convey prohibition if it is preceded by a certain statement.

The reading प्रदेशानाभूय (AL read प्रदेशानां भूयसां) is difficult to understand. आ+भू means to help. Therefore literally it would mean 'having helped the rules of application.'

[25]

1. The word न वा can mean either negation or 'new'. In the latter case it is an adjective. It is nominative singular of the feminine word नवा. As an adjective it requires a substantive in the same form, i. e. nominative singular of a word in feminine. For instance, in expressions like नवा शाला 'new house' one can easily understand from the use of the word शाला that नवा is an adjective meaning 'new'. Thus the use of the word नवा in the sense 'new' implies सामानाधिकरण्य which consists of the same location, the same gender, and the same

number as that of the other word with which it is construed. The author points out in this passage that nowhere in Pāṇini's grammar does the word विभाषा have this kind of सामानाधिकरण्य. Therefore, विभाषा cannot stand for नवा meaning new. In a rule like विभाषा सेनासुराशालाछायानिशानाम्, *vibhāṣā* (i. e. नवा) may be said to have the same gender as that of सेना, सुरा, etc.; but it does not have the same case (विभाषा or नवा is in the nominative, whereas सेनासुरा ... निशानाम् is in the genitive).

2. तस्मान्नैव ... Apparently in the rules of Pāṇini there is no direct सामानाधिकरण्य between विभाषा and any other word. However, such a relation can be established through some special effort, as for instance the connection that has been already shown between विभाषा (i. e. नवा) and शाला through दक्षिणपूर्वा. Nowhere in Pāṇini's grammar सामानाधिकरण्य between विभाषा and another word in a rule is understood by mere श्रुतिसंनिपात 'connection of words'.

[26]

1. It has already been pointed out that when the word नवा is the nominative singular form of the feminine word नवा, it can be understood as meaning new or fresh and in that case it stands as an adjective of another feminine word in the nominative singular. On this ground the objector argues that in the popular illustration cited by Pat. namely ग्रामो गन्तव्यो न वा। the word न वा conveys negation, because it cannot be an adjective of the word ग्रामः which is in the masculine gender. In other words, even in the popular usage a विलिङ्गनिर्देश 'mention in a different gender' is indicative of the meaning negation, whereas a समानलिङ्गनिर्देश is indicative of the meaning 'new'. Thus the argument made by Kāt. and Pat. on the ground of popular practice (*Vār.* 5 : न वा विधिपूर्वकत्वात्प्रतिषेधसंप्रत्ययो यथा लोके। Pat. comments : विधाय किंचिन्न वेत्युच्यते, तेन प्रतिषेधवाचिनः संप्रत्ययो भवति।) is rejected by the objector.

While refuting the argument of the objector the *Mbh.* argues that the समानलिङ्गनिर्देश of नवा (or rather, of विभाषा) is never found in the rules of grammar. It further argues that even in the case of the समानलिङ्गनिर्देश there is an option for the listener to understand the word नवा in either sense. In fact, the meaning of नवा in such a case depends upon the विवक्षा 'intention of the speaker'. Pat. explains this with the help of an illustration as follows : तद्यथा — यवागूर्भवता भोक्तव्या नवा। यदा यवागूशब्दो भुजिना संबध्यते भुजिर्नवाशब्देन तदा प्रतिषेधवाचिनः संप्रत्ययो भवति — यवागूर्भवता भोक्तव्या नवा। नेति गम्यते। यदा यवागूशब्दो नवाशब्देनाभिसंबध्यते न भुजिना तदा प्रत्यग्रवाचिनः संप्रत्ययो भवति यवागूर्नवा भोक्तव्या। प्रत्यग्रेति गम्यते।

In the sentence यवागूर्भवता भोक्तव्या नवा the word नवा and the word यवागू are used in the same gender. However, in spite of the समानलिङ्गनिर्देश the word नवा could mean negation if it is connected with the verbal form भोक्तव्या. In that

case the sentence would mean 'You may not eat the gruel'. If, however, it is connected with the word यवागू, it means fresh. Then the sentence means 'You may eat the fresh gruel'.

While explaining the reasoning behind these two meanings the author of the *Dīp.* says that the word नवा means new when it is connected with the substance (i. e. यवागू), while it conveys negation when it is connected with an action (i. e. भोक्तव्या). He further points out that in the illustration यवागूर्भवता भोक्तव्या नवा it is proper to understand the word नवा in the sense 'new', because it is well known that those who belong to the तैत्तिरीय branch of the black यजुर्वेद always eat fresh hot gruel.

While it is thus possible that the word न वा may convey negation even in a समानलिङ्गनिर्देश, the intention of the speaker decides which of the two meanings is desired in a certain context and the speaker is free to select either.

2. यतस्तु प्रयोक्तुः···etc. If the speaker is free to select either of the two meanings, why should not we say that Pāṇini, as a speaker, intends the meaning new rather than negation? The author replies that a speaker has only one intention in his mind at a time. एकरसा प्रवृत्तिः means use of a certain expression with a single intention. Since Pāṇini proceeds with the intention of conveying negation by the term विभाषा, he cannot have, at the same time, another intention to convey the meaning 'new'.

[27]

After pointing out that the word न वा may convey negation even in a समानलिङ्गनिर्देश, Pat. argues that in the rule विभाषा दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ, the connection of the word विभाषा with सर्वादीनि is not intended. It is intended with the predicate भवति since it is the main component of the sentence. Therefore, विभाषा conveys negation. *Mbh.*: न चेह वयं विभाषाग्रहणेन सर्वादीन्यभिसंबध्नीमः—दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ सर्वादीनि विभाषा भवन्तीति। किं तर्हि? भवतिरभिसंबध्यते—दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ सर्वादीनि भवन्ति विभाषेति।

Thus since न वा which is the meaning of विभाषा is connected with भवति which is the विधेय and not with any other word in the rule, it conveys negation. The author of the *Dīp.* points out at the end of this passage that this argument amounts to the same as stated in the earlier *Vār.*, न वा विधिपूर्वकत्वात् etc. The name सर्वनामन् is already stated with reference to the सर्वादि by the rule सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि (P. 1. 1. 27). Therefore, it is more proper to connect विभाषा with the predicate भवति in the rule विभाषा दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ where it is understood.

[28]

The *Vār.* 6, विध्यनित्यत्वमनुपपन्नं प्रतिषेधसंज्ञाकरणात् states an objection that the use of विभाषा in Pāṇinian rules is unjustified, because it leads to negation. If the word न वा is understood as conveying negation (alone) and not option in all the rules where विभाषा is used, negation alone and not option, will be understood. This is not desired. For instance, the rule विभाषा श्वेः (P. 6. 1. 30) prescribes optional संप्रसारण of the root श्वि in the Perfect formation. We have thus pairs of optional forms like शुशाव/शिश्वाय, शुशुवतुः/शिश्वियतुः etc. If विभाषा means negation, this optional character of the rule cannot be justified. Whatever rule contains विभाषा will be understood as a statement of negation alone. Cf. the *Mbh.* : प्रतिषेधस्येयं संज्ञा क्रियते। तेन विभाषाप्रदेशेषु प्रतिषेधस्यैव संप्रत्ययः स्यात्।

While explaining this argument the author of the *Dīp.* says that if the expression न वा is understood as a single particle (नवा) rather than two separate particles (न वा), then it is understood as conveying negation. The objection raised in the above *Vār.* implies that नवा is a single particle. Cf. Kaiyaṭa : विध्यनित्यत्वमिति। विकल्प इत्यर्थः। नवाशब्द एकनिपातः प्रतिषेधवाची तस्येहोपादानादिति भावः।

[29]

The difficulty put forth in the *Vār.* 6 is removed by *Vār.* 7, सिद्धं तु प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधात्. The negation always implies application. Unless something is already applicable it cannot be prohibited. Thus both, application and prohibition, of a certain grammatical operation are understood when विभाषा is used.

This argument is, however, refuted by another one in the *Vār.* 8, विप्रतिषिद्धं तु. Vārttikakāra means that to say that a certain grammatical operation is both laid down and prohibited involves self contradiction. For instance, there is no point in first prescribing संप्रसारण for root श्वि and then prohibiting it. The result would be null. Therefore Pat. says : अत्र न ज्ञायते केनाभिप्रायेण प्रसजति केन निवृत्तिं करोतीति।

[30]

1. The author of the *Dīp.* offers a solution to the problem of self-contradiction. It consists in the view that although the *dhātupāṭha* contains only one root श्वि, there are many roots of the same form. All these roots, श्वि 1, श्वि 2, श्वि 3 etc., are mentioned by a single reference in the *dhātupāṭha*. The forms like शुशाव, शुशुवतुः etc. which contain संप्रसारण are derived from, say, श्वि 1, whereas the forms शिश्वाय, शिश्वियतुः etc. are derived from श्वि 2. Different forms thus being traced to different roots, there is no room for contradiction. The

rule विभाषा श्वेः would thus mean that there is संप्रसारण of श्वि 1 while श्वि 2 does not undergo संप्रसारण in the लिट् formation.

2. एवमूर्णोर्विभाषेति ... etc. The difficulty in the derivation of various forms of the root ऊर्णु also can be removed by positing many ऊर्णु roots. Thus both, the absence and presence of गुण, in the diffierent forms of the root ऊर्णु when followed by a suffix beginning with इट् taught by P. 1. 2. 3 can be explained by positing different ऊर्णु roots; the forms like ऊर्णुविता should be traced to ऊर्णु 1 whereas the forms like ऊर्णविता should be derived from ऊर्णु 2.

[31]

The *Vār.* 9 removes the difficulty of self-contradiction on the basis of सामर्थ्य. Thus Pat. remarks : प्रसङ्गसामर्थ्याच्च विधिर्भविष्यत्यन्यत्र प्रतिषेधविषयात् । प्रतिषेधसामर्थ्याच्च प्रतिषेधो भविष्यत्यन्यत्र विधिविषयात् । Thus in order to make both statements (the statement of application and that of prohibition) meaningful, both application and prohibition will take place. Pat. further remarks that this solution of प्रसङ्गसामर्थ्य holds true in the case of an अप्राप्तविभाषा alone. प्राप्तविभाषा is a rule which prescribes optional application of something which is already stated by another rule. अप्राप्तविभाषा means a rule which prescribes optional application of something which is not otherwise due. It contains both, the statement and its optional application. In a प्राप्ताप्राप्तविभाषा (or उभयत्रविभाषा) rule there is a combination of both the types described above. These three types will be later illustrated with the help of examples. Pat. tells that the अप्राप्तविभाषा rules alone can be explained by resorting to प्रसङ्गसामर्थ्य. Since both the application and the prohibition mentioned in a प्राप्तविभाषा rule will otherwise be purposeless, both will be given scope. However, it is not necessary to give scope for application of something taught in a प्राप्तविभाषा rule because the application is already prescribed by another rule and therefore finds scope elsewhere. Thus prohibition alone will be understood in प्राप्तविभाषा rules. The author of the *Dīp.* further points out that if प्रतिषेध alone is understood in प्राप्तविभाषा rules, mention of न in rules like न बहुव्रीहौ will be redundant. The rule न बहुव्रीहौ (P. 1. 1. 29) follows the rule विभाषा दिक्समासे बहुव्रीहौ (P. 1. 1. 28). Since P. 1. 1. 28 is a प्राप्तविभाषा rule, the word विभाषा would mean prohibition. Since the word विभाषा can be continued in P. 1. 1. 29, the mention of the negative particle न in P. 1. 1. 29 would be redundant.

[32]

1. The defect of self-contradiction was removed by means of प्रसङ्गसामर्थ्य. However, Pat. points out that प्रसङ्गसामर्थ्य can be resorted to only in the case of an अप्राप्तविभाषा, because in the case of a प्राप्तविभाषा the application is already stated by some other rule. Therefore, विभाषा would convey prohibition alone in प्राप्तविभाषा

rules. In order to remove this defect Pat. offers the solution of महासंज्ञाकरण. It is assumed that Pāṇini who is usually keen on using shorter expressions, makes use of larger terms like सर्वनामन् and संप्रसारण in order to convey some more meaning by the term. Thus a larger term is interpreted as conveying its own literal meaning in addition to its technical meaning (e. g. सर्वनामन्). Here Pat. resorts to the same device of महासंज्ञाकरण. However, he gives a different purpose : तत्र महत्याः संज्ञायाः करणे एतत्प्रयोजनम्, उभयोः संज्ञा यथा विज्ञायेत — नेति च वेति च। The term विभाषा thus being a larger term conveys two meanings, prohibition and option. Thus whenever the term विभाषा is used, both prohibition and option are conveyed. Patañjali further says : तत्र या तावदप्राप्ते विभाषा तत्र प्रतिषेध्यं नास्तीति कृत्वा वेत्यनेन विकल्पो भविष्यति। या हि प्राप्ते विभाषा तत्रोभयमुपस्थितं भवति — नेति च वेति च। तत्र नेत्यनेन प्रतिषिद्धे वेत्यनेन विकल्पो भविष्यति।

2. अत्र त्वेतदेव विचारयितव्यम् ... etc. The question whether the name विभाषा conveys the two meanings together (i. e. a composite meaning of two constituents) or two independent meanings separately is discussed here. The author explains both the alternatives with the help of illustrations and shows difficulties involved in each one of them. Just as the name वृद्धि conveys three vowels आ, ऐ, and औ separately, विभाषा may be said to convey prohibition and option separately. In that case it may convey prohibition in some rules and option in some other rules. It cannot convey both prohibition and option together which is desired in the case of a प्राप्तविभाषा (see *Mbh.* above). On the contrary, if it is said to convey both the meanings together, it cannot convey only option which is desired in the case of an अप्राप्तविभाषा.

The author of the *Dīp.* solves the difficulty in the following manner : The name विभाषा can be said to convey both prohibition and option together. The word अक्ष in the sentence अक्षा भज्यन्ताम् भक्ष्यन्ताम् दीव्यन्ताम् conveys three meanings, namely, an axle, a nut, and a die. Each one of them is separately connected with the three verbs भज्यन्ताम्, भक्ष्यन्ताम् and दीव्यन्ताम्. The sentence thus means, 'may the axles be broken, the nuts be eaten, and the dice be played". Just as the word अक्ष conveys the three meanings together and yet each one of them is separately employed, it can be accepted that the name विभाषा conveys both the meanings together, whereas one of them is understood at a particular place as required by the context.

[33]

It is achieved by the device of महासंज्ञाकरण that the name विभाषा conveys two meanings, application and prohibition of something. Here the author points out that the two meanings being opposed to each other the name विभाषा cannot serve its purpose, since the two opposite meanings cannot exist together. *Vār.*-s 10, 11 and 12 : विधिप्रतिषेधयोर्युगपद्वचनानुपपत्तिः। भवतीति चेन्न प्रतिषेधः। नेति चेन्न

विधिः। are discussed in this passage. It is possible to give a name to two opposite objects; for instance, the name संसार is given to birth and death. However, it does not mean that they exist simultaneously. Two different qualities which are not opposite to each other can stay together in an object. For instance, in the expression अभ्युद्धरति the two *upasarga*-s अभि 'towards' and उद् 'up' can together qualify the verb हरति 'brings', because they do not contradict each other. The two meanings of विभाषा, however, cannot exist together as one is exactly opposite to the other.

The line नवतोऽर्थस्य ... cannot be satisfactorily interpreted. The MS is not clear.

[34]

1. The difficulty mentioned in the previous passage is removed in this passage. The *Vār.* 13, सिद्धं तु पूर्वस्योत्तरेण बाधितत्वात् states that the two meanings, prohibition and option are employed in a rule in the same order in which they are mentioned in the definition. Thus a statement made in a rule is first negated and then made optional. The author points out that the employment of विभाषा in this sequence alone serves a purpose. If the order is reversed and prohibition is employed after option, statement of option would be redundant.

2. भवति च लोके .... The author here repeats the statement he has already made in the earlier passage, namely that the name विभाषा is given to both, prohibition and option together, although the two are employed separately in a rule of application (Cf. No. 32 : यथा अक्षा भज्यन्तां भक्ष्यन्तां ... etc.). He further remarks that the knowledge of the whole which proceeds from the knowledge of the parts is not a verbal cognition. It is obtained through स्मृति (remembrance). Therefore a definition like न वेति विभाषा is just a means of the process of cognition.

3. त्रिप्रकारो हि शास्त्रे ...। The author explains three kinds of विभाषा following the tradition in order to establish the utility of this rule. Reference has been already made to the three types (see note on [31]). P. 1. 2. 3 : विभाषोर्णोः is an example of अप्राप्तविभाषा. It teaches that a suffix along with the augment इट् which is added to the root ऊर्णु is optionally ङित्. No other rule prescribes ङित्त्व of a suffix added to ऊर्णु. Since P. 1. 2. 3 prescribes both ङित्त्व and its option, the rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा. P. 1. 3. 50 : विभाषा विप्रलापे teaches that आत्मनेपद suffixes are added to the root वद् to indicate dispute when reference is to a collective talk of those whose speech is distinct (i. e. human beings). Since आत्मनेपद of वद् is already prescribed by P. 1. 3. 48, this rule is a प्राप्तविभाषा. In both the rules mentioned above विभाषा means option and this ordinary meaning of विभाषा serves a purpose. The definition न वेति विभाषा has no special purpose to serve in these two kinds of विभाषा.

Prohibition of a statement is not possible in an अप्राप्तविभाषा rule, because the statement is not already made by any other rule. On the other hand, in a प्राप्तविभाषा rule although first prohibition and then option is employed according to the definition, there will be no difference in the result. The definition न वेति विभाषा is purposeful in the उभयत्रविभाषा rules. For instance, P. 6. 1. 30 : विभाषा श्वेः teaches optional संप्रसारण of the root श्वि when the लिट् suffixes and यङ् follow. According to P. 6. 1. 15 : वचिस्वपियजादीनां किति, संप्रसारण is already applicable to श्वि before the लिट् suffixes other than the three singular Parasmaipada endings of लिट्. The rule विभाषा श्वेः is thus partly प्राप्तविभाषा and partly अप्राप्त-विभाषा. Such a rule is known as प्राप्ताप्राप्तविभाषा or उभयत्रविभाषा. Because of the mixed character of the rule there arises a doubt whether the प्राप्त-संप्रसारण should be prohibited or option should be stated with reference to the अप्राप्त-संप्रसारण. One and the same rule cannot prescribe both prohibition and option. Therefore, as the definition न वेति विभाषा implies, first prohibition is stated with reference to the संप्रसारण taught by the rule irrespective of whether it is प्राप्त or अप्राप्त. After the संप्रसारण of श्वि before all लिट् endings as well as the यङ् suffix is prohibited and the domain of the application of the rule is thus levelled, the option is stated. The rule विभाषा श्वेः is thus interpreted as follows : लिटि यङि च श्वेः संप्रसारणं न भवति । लिटि यङि च श्वेः संप्रसारणं विभाषा भवति । Thus the application of the definition न वेति विभाषा in an उभयत्रविभाषा rule results in two statements, first a statement of prohibition, and next a statement of option. The first statement (i. e. the statement of prohibition) cancels the application of संप्रसारण whenever it is applicable by the other rule (P. 6. 1. 15). The संप्रसारण thus being अप्राप्त in all cases is optionally stated by the second statement and the pairs of forms like शुशाव/शिश्वाय, शुशुवतुः/शिश्वियतुः are derived. The application of the definition न वेति विभाषा in such rules thus saves the rules from the fault of self-contradiction which results from their mixed character.

3. यस्तु विद्वानेवं ... etc. Finally, the author points out that the rule न वेति विभाषा does not serve any purpose if नानाशब्दवाद is accepted. According to this view there are as many श्वि roots as the derived forms of श्वि. Since the root श्वि in each form is different from the other, the rule विभाषा श्वेः applies separately to each root. Thus there is no possibility of any kind of confusion and self-contradiction. The definition is thus purposeless. The last *Vār.* clearly states this fact.

[35]

1. The *Vār.* 14 reads : साध्वनुशासनेऽस्मिन् यस्य विभाषा तस्य साधुत्वम्. The *Vār.* thus points to the difficulty in the employment of the technical term विभाषा in the rules of application. The main aim of the science of grammar is to lay down correctness of words. Correctness (साधुत्व) being thus the predicate of

each rule, the word विभाषा in a rule of application will be construed with the word साधु and the meaning of a rule would be that a certain derivative is optionally correct. The term विभाषा will be thus connected not with a grammatical operation (like संप्रसारण taught by a rule like विभाषा श्वेः) but with the resultant form such as शुशाव. In other words, the rule विभाषा श्वेः would, for instance, mean that forms like शुशाव where संप्रसारण is effected are optionally correct. Thus the pairs like शुशाव / शिश्वाय, शुशुवतुः / शिश्वियतुः will not be derived by the rule.

2. कृतसमासरूपः साधुः etc. The author gives an illustration to show that विभाषा is connected with साधु. P. 2. 1. 11 : विभाषा is an अधिकार continued throughout the compound-section. Here विभाषा has to be connected not with the predicate समास but with the word साधु which is the main predicate of the science of grammar, because समास cannot be optional. This point is further explained by introducing अपरः प्रकारः 'another way' of explaining the connection of विभाषा with साधु. The author argues that since a समास, e. g. राजपुरुषः, conveys a meaning different from the corresponding non-compounded expression राज्ञः पुरुषः, there is no point in describing समास as optional. समास must take place whenever एकार्थीभाव 'integrated meaning' is intended, whereas वाक्य or non-compounded expression necessarily conveys व्यपेक्षा 'mutual expectancy'. Thus both समास and वाक्य are obligatory in their mutual domains. Therefore विभाषा which is continued in all the rules teaching समास has to be connected with साधु.

[36]

1. Patañjali points out that even if option is connected with समास, there will be no difficulty, because the compound which is correct will be used. The author of the *Dīp.* explains Patañjali's argument with the help of an illustration. Just as one selects an eatable item out of the two items, eatable and non-eatable, in the same manner the speaker will choose the correct form of the compound, since it is desired. Moreover, the compound राजपुरुष is accepted and used by scholars as a correct word.

2. न चात्र साधौ etc. The author points out a defect in this argument. When there are two words of the same form, it is difficult to differentiate the correct (साधु) word from an incorrect (असाधु) one. A correct compound is finally accented according to P. 6. 1. 223 and therefore the accent on the final syllable may serve as a distinguishing mark of a correct word. However, even the accent being secondary to correctness, option will apply to correctness and not to the accent. In other words, both the correct and the incorrect forms will be accented according to P. 6. 1. 223.

[37]

The *Vār.* 15, द्वैधाप्रतिपत्तिः points out another difficulty if विभाषा is connected with साधुत्व (correctness). The purpose of विभाषा in a rule of application is to account for two optional forms. However, this basic purpose will not be served if विभाषा is connected with correctness because the rule would then amount to mean that a certain form is optionally correct and optionally incorrect.

[38]

1. The two difficulties stated in the *Vār.*-s 14 and 15 arise if it is accepted that words are नित्य 'permanent'. However, they do not arise if it is accepted that words are अनित्य or कार्य 'to be produced (by grammar)', according to Pat. The term विभाषा would then imply that a certain form is either produced or not produced.

2. किंभूता पुनरनित्यता .... The author discusses the concept of नित्यता and अनित्यता of words. In the beginning he points out that विभाषा serves no purpose if a word is regarded as नित्य on the basis of नित्यत्व of आकृति 'generic feature' of the phonemes produced by sounds. Further, he argues that विभाषा cannot be explained by referring to the difference of treatment between two grammarians or the difference between ancient and modern (ऐषमस्त्य) grammars. According to him it is the student of grammar having a particular way of understanding for whom विभाषा serves a purpose. The author then describes two types of students : (1) Those who think that the science of grammar prescribes modifications in forms, and (2) those who think that it is not modifications but different forms which are produced by grammar. (The view of the former is comparable to the विवर्तवाद, whereas that of the latter is comparable to the परिणामवाद.) In other words, the form दध्य् in दध्यत्र is nothing but a modification of दधि according to the first view, while it is a separate expression according to the other. This latter is the कार्यवाद. विभाषा has relevance in this view.

[39]

Here the author points out that विभाषा has relevance also in the view that words are permanent. In this view correctness of words is the main predicate of the rules. However, विभाषा is not connected with correctness, because correctness cannot be made optional, since it is not man-made (Cf. *Vākyap.* I. 28 नित्यत्वे कृतकत्वे वा तेषामादिर्न विद्यते।). Therefore, विभाषा is naturally connected with the predicates such as समास, प्रत्यय etc. This point is further explained with the help of two illustrations :

(i) ब्राह्मणशतेन भुक्तम् 'food was eaten by a hundred of Brahmins'. In this sentence although the cardinal number शतम् is connected with the verbal

form भुक्तम्, it is the ब्राह्मणs rather than the number who actually partake of the food. Therefore, ultimately the ब्राह्मणs is connected with the act of taking food.

(ii) मेध्यः पशुर्विभाषितः 'There is an option regarding the animal to be immolated'. In this sentence option is not connected with the animal such as a bull or a goat, because it is not man-made. The option is connected with the act of immolation.

[41]

1. The *Vār.* 16, कार्येषु युगपदन्वाचययोर्यौगपद्यम् points out the fault in the कार्यवाद. If it is accepted that words are produced, undesirable words will be produced by adding two or more suffixes simultaneously to one and the same form. For instance, the three suffixes तव्यत्, तव्य and अनीयर् are prescribed simultaneously in the rule तव्यत्तव्यानीयरः (P. 3. 1. 96). Since a कार्यवादिन् is not concerned with the usage, in other words, since he is a लक्षणैकचक्षुष्क, he may add all the three suffixes to a root like कृ and derive a form like *कर्तव्यतव्यानीय. Similarly, when two suffixes are stated by grouping a suffix mentioned in the previous rule, by means of च which conveys अन्वाचय (grouping), both the suffixes would be added together to a stem. For instance P. 4. 1. 119 : ढक् च मण्डूकात् prescribes ढक्, and अण् is continued from the previous rule by च. Both the suffixes added together would derive a form like *माण्डूकेय and the form माण्डूक derived by separately adding अण् alone would not be derived.

Here the author of the *Dīp.* asks a pertinent question : What is the relevance of this *Vār.* (कोऽस्य वाक्यस्य संबन्धः)? Since the definition of विभाषा is the topic under consideration, the present *Vār.* is irrelevant. The author however tries to show the relevance by arguing that although in the कार्यवाद view there is no difficulty in interpreting विभाषा, another difficulty arises while interpreting rules where many suffixes are simultaneously prescribed.

2. युगपत्कृतेषु युगपच्छब्दः ... etc. While explaining the compound युगपदन्वाचययोः the author points out that the word युगपद् has to be understood in the sense of यौगपद्य, otherwise the compound of the indeclinable युगपद् with the noun अन्वाचय cannot be explained.

3. यथा निर्मथने ... etc. The author explains the law of contiguity with the help of an illustration. When fire is produced by churning, अग्निष्टोम is performed immediately after that. Just as अग्निष्टोम invariably follows churning of the fire, in the same manner तव्य and अनीयर् invariably follow तव्यत्. This illustration is not clear. There is no evidence in sacrificial literature to explain the close contiguity between अग्निमन्थन and अग्निष्टोम. उपादत्ते of the MS is emended to उपात्ते by us.

[42]

The difficulty of simultaneous addition of the three suffixes तव्यत्, तव्य, and अनीयर् does not arise in the नित्यवाद view, because a नित्यवादिन् is of the view that grammar explains those words which are found in usage.

[43]

1. Patañjali says that the difficulty of simultaneous application of many suffixes does not arise even on the कार्यवाद view. He argues that Pāṇini's statement that a suffix is subsequent to a stem implies two things : (1) only one suffix is subsequent, and (2) there is no intervention of any other element between the stem and the suffix added after it. The use of many suffixes after a stem is thus denied by Pāṇini.

2. ननु चैकसाधनत्वात् ... etc. It is possible to argue that तव्यत्तव्यानीयर is just a single suffix just as तव्य is a single suffix. Further, there is no difficulty even when it is accepted that there are many suffixes. Pāṇini's statement that a प्रत्यय is पर does not necessarily imply that there is absence of intervention. The word पर is used also when intervention exists. For instance, when it is said that the city of Pāṭaliputra is farther than Mathurā, it does not mean that there is no intervention between Pāṭaliputra and Mathurā. In fact mountains, rivers, and forests do intervene between the two cities. In the same manner, all the three suffixes तव्यत्, तव्य and अनीयर can be added simultaneously to a stem like कृ in spite of the possibility of intervention of तव्यत् between कृ and तव्य, and of तव्यत् and तव्य between कृ and अनीयर्.

3. अनेकस्य च परत्वमुक्तम् ... etc. The objector further argues that Patañjali's statement, 'एका प्रकृतिर्बहवश्च यञः' (*Mbh.* : I. 238. 21) implies that many suffixes can be added to a single stem. P. 4. 1. 105 : गर्गादिभ्यो यञ् teaches addition of the suffix यञ् to गर्ग etc. in the sense of अपत्य 'offspring'. According to the above statement as many यञ् suffixes have to be added to गर्ग as the number of अपत्यs intended by the speaker. Kaiyaṭa explains the above sentence as follows : प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशाद् बहुष्वपत्येषु बह्वो यञ उत्पाद्याः। तत्र गर्ग ययय इति स्थिते ... etc.

4. नैष दोषः etc. The difficulty shown above is removed by arguing that तव्यत्तव्यानीयरः are three separate suffixes. The author further remarks that even the पूर्वपक्षिन् has accepted that they are separate suffixes, because otherwise the argument of simultaneous application of many suffixes cannot be put forth. Finally, the author has made it clear that Pāṇini has put all the three suffixes together for the sake of brevity. He also points out that the word निर्दिष्ट in the rule तस्मिन्निति निर्दिष्टे पूर्वस्य (P. 1. 1. 66) is continued in the rule तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य

(P. 1. 1. 67) and it implies absence of intervention between a stem and a suffix. Patañjali's statement : एका प्रकृतिर्बहवश्च यञः may hold true of यञ् suffixes, because they share the same आकृति, namely यञ्. This is, however, not true of तव्यत्, तव्य and अनीयर् since they do not share a common आकृति.

[44]

Patañjali interprets युगपद्वचनता in a different way. According to him युगपद्वचनता does not mean simultaneous application of many suffixes after a single stem; it rather means a simultaneous use of all the three forms कर्तव्यम्, कार्यम् and करणीयम् to convey the same meaning. This difficulty also is removed in the next passage.

[45]

1. Patañjali argues that since the use of a word is meant to convey some meaning there will be no simultaneous use of three words कर्तव्यम्, कार्यम् and करणीयम् to convey the same meaning, because the use of one would be sufficient.

2. प्रत्ययानाम् अभ्युपगतोऽर्थश्च ... etc. Although the use of words is meant to convey some meaning, in grammar a suffix is not meant to convey a meaning obtained in the usage. In other words, grammar has nothing to do with the meaning. Therefore, the difficulty of simultaneous use of three words to convey one and the same meaning has no basis.

3. सत्यां वार्थस्य ··· etc. Even if it is accepted that meaning is stated by grammar, the rule तव्यत्तव्यानीयरः will be understood as a collective statement which can be split into three statements : भावकर्मणोः तव्यत्। भावकर्मणोः तव्यः। and so on. It is thus possible to avoid the undesired connection of all the three suffixes together with the meaning. Since the meaning of a statement depends upon the intention of the speaker, it is possible to interpret the expression तव्यत्तव्यानीयरः the way it is shown above.

[46]

1. The *Vār.* 17 आचार्यदेशशीलने च तद्विषयता refers to yet another defect in the कार्यवाद् view. Often Pāṇini mentions grammarian teachers of specific regions in his rules. According to the कार्यवादिन् such references would imply that a particular operation is restricted to the usage of that teacher or of that region. According to the कार्यवाद, grammar precedes language. Words are first produced by grammatical rules and then used in the language. Thus the rule, इको ह्रस्वोऽङ्यो गालवस्य (P. 6. 3. 61) would mean that a long vowel at the end of a पूर्वपद is replaced by a short vowel when the उत्तरपद follows in a compound, only in the usage of गालव. Patañjali explains the defect by pointing

out that such rules containing reference to a teacher or a region would be restrictive, while they are desired to be optional. *Mbh.* : गालवा एव ह्रस्वान् प्रयुञ्जीरन्।

2. एतमेवार्थम् ... etc. Patañjali cites a statement from the ritual context to illustrate how a reference to a person in a statement implies restriction. The statement जमदग्निर्वा एतत्पञ्चममवदानमवाद्यत्तस्मान्नाजामदग्न्यः पञ्चावत्तं जुहोति means that since जमदग्नि cut the पुरोडाश into five pieces, no sacrificer other than the one belonging to the family of जमदग्नि is entitled to cut a पुरोडाश into five pieces. The act of cutting a पुरोडाश into five pieces is thus restricted to जमदग्नि family. (*ĀpŚs.* 2. 1. 8. 2 : जमदग्नीनां तु पञ्चावत्तम्।)

[47]

The statement जमदग्निर्वा ... etc. is not a विधिवाक्य 'injunction' but a mere अर्थवाद, recommendatory statement. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a restrictive statement. A restriction presupposes a विधि, a general statement to be restricted. The auther removes the difficulty by suggesting that the statement जमदग्निर्वा etc. implies a general statement चतुरवद्यन्ति, which means that an offering is generally cut into four pieces. Thus the two statements, चतुरवद्यन्ति and जमदग्निर्वा ... etc. together mean that although generally an offering is cut into four pieces, descendants of जमदग्नि cut it into five pieces since जमदग्नि did so. The statement जमदग्निर्वा ... etc. is thus a statement restricting the five-time cutting of पुरोडाश to जमदग्नि and his family. It is a restriction in two ways :

(i) जमदग्नि and his descendants cut a पुरोडाश into five and not into four pieces, and (ii) sacrificers other than जमदग्नि cut a पुरोडाश into four and not into five pieces.

[48]

1. It is said in the *Mbh.* that the difficulty shown in the *Vār.* 17 does not arise in the नित्यवादिन्'s view. According to the नित्यवाद, grammar is अन्वाख्यान, a subsequent exposition of what already exists in the language. The rule इको ह्रस्वः etc. thus implies that shortening of the final vowel of a पूर्वपद in a compound which already exists in the usage is remembered and recorded by गालव. Whereas गालव remembers a short vowel, other grammarians remember a long one. Since both the usages are already established in language, option between short and long vowels already exists. The reference to गालव in the rule इको ह्रस्वः ... etc. cannot be thus understood as meant for restricting the application of the rule to the usage of गालव.

2. गालवस्य यत्प्रमाणीकरणम् etc. The author of the *Dīp.* further points out that reference to गालव further indicates that गालव's memory is very sharp and that his rules represent an unbroken usage. गालव thus deserves respect.

3. देशग्रहणं कीर्त्यर्थम् etc. The author explains that just as reference to a teacher is meant to show respect to him, reference to a region is also meant to praise the region. It is praised because the people staying in the region are pleased.

4. संशब्द्यमानाश्च ... etc. The author further points out that praise can yield good results. Thus इन्द्रद्युम्न, being praised, attained a permanent seat in heaven. Kaiyaṭa remarks : कीर्तौ सत्यां तेषां स्वर्गव्यवस्थानं स्थिरं भवति । यथा इन्द्रद्युम्नादीनाम्. In the *Mahābhārata*, Āryaṇyakaparvan, the 191st *Adhyāya* contains the story of इन्द्रद्युम्न, who, although fallen from heaven, was restored to his position in the heaven after he was praised by a tortoise for his meritorious deeds witnessed by the tortoise. Cf. verse 21 : दिवं स्पृशति भूमिं च शब्दः पुण्यस्य कर्मणः । यावत्स शब्दो भवति तावत् पुरुष उच्यते ॥

5. ननु च यस्यापि ... etc. Pat. argues that even in the view of a कार्यवादिन् a reference to a teacher or a region can be understood as meant for respect, fame etc. Thus in this respect the नित्यवादिन् and the कार्यवादिन् are on a par.

6. तत्कीर्तने च ... etc. The *Vār.* 18 shows another fault in the view of the कार्यवादिन्. According to the Pari. आचार्यनिर्देशे विकल्पो भवति, reference to a teacher in a rule is indicative of option. If, however, it is accepted that words are produced, reference to a teacher would be meant to restrict a certain grammatical phenomenon to the usage of that particular teacher. It would not thus result in prescribing two optional forms.

The conclusion of the above discussion seems to be that the नित्यपक्ष is correct and therefore acceptable.

[49]

1. The *Vār.* 19, अशिष्यो वा विदितत्वात् rejects the rule न वेति विभाषा on the ground of redundancy. Since the meaning of the term विभाषा is well known in usage, the definition need not be stated. The author of the *Dīp.* remarks that usually in grammar a technical term is defined if it conveys a phonetic form rather than its own literal meaning, for instance the term वृद्धि. Since the term विभाषा conveys its literal meaning, it needs no definition.

2. अथ वा लौकिकाः etc. Pat. cites an illustration from a ritual context : मेध्यः पशुर्विभाषितः ' there is an option with regared to a sacrificial animal '. Here the term विभाषा conveys option. It may be argued that the ritualists have borrowed the technical term विभाषा from grammar, where it is originally stated. The author replies that borrowing of a term from a scientific discipline into ordinary usage is possible. However, one discipline cannot borrow technical terminology from another discipline since it is based an a different theory.

[50]

1. It is made clear by the author that Kāt.'s rejection of the rule न वेति विभाषा can be justified on the व्यक्तिपक्ष. On the आकृतिपक्ष, however, the rule is necessary to interpret उभयत्रविभाषा rules. This point is already discussed before. See [34] note No. 3.

2. एतमेव चार्थं ... etc. Pāṇini uses different words वा, विभाषा, अन्यतरस्याम् etc. to denote option. His use of these words to convey the same meaning indicates that he is not serious about the definition of विभाषा. It can be thus dispensed with by accepting the व्यक्तिपक्ष.

3. कथं तदुक्तं ... etc. This question has a reference to the *Mbh.* on P. 7. 2. 63. If it is accepted that a reference to a teacher is indicative of option, how can one justify Pat.'s remark : भारद्वाजः स्वस्मात् मतात् प्रच्यावितो भवति, 'भारद्वाज would deviate from his own opinion'? The remark implies that P. 7. 2. 63 : ऋतो भारद्वाजस्य records the view of भारद्वाज and not an option. Pat.'s remark thus goes contrary to the Pari. आचार्यनिर्देशे विकल्पो भवति. The author of the *Dīp.* replies that the deviation mentioned by Pat. refers to a fact of the language remembered and recorded by भारद्वाज in his rule, and not to his own view.

[51. 1]

The *Vār.*'s 20, 21, 22 enumerate the rules which prescribe अप्राप्तविभाषा, प्राप्तविभाषा, and उभयत्रविभाषा respectively. The *Vār.* अप्राप्ते त्रिसंशयाः is discussed here. The word अप्राप्ते is continued in the subsequent *Vār.* statements which are nothing but citations of Pāṇinian rules. The word अप्राप्ते is marked with स्वरित according to the author of the *Dīp.*, because then only it can be an अधिकार and it can be continued in the subsequent sentences (P. 1. 3. 11 : स्वरितेनाधिकारः)

The word त्रिसंशयाः means the विभाषा rules which contain three bases (अधिष्ठान) for doubt. Since संशय 'doubt' is always one, the word त्रिसंशयाः cannot be interpreted as those rules having three doubts. When a doubt is expressed in a sentence 'whether this is a man or a post' there is one doubt although objects on which it is based are two.

[51. 2]

1. Although Pat. cites the two rules द्वंद्वे च (P. 1. 1. 31) and विभाषा जसि (P. 1. 1. 32), the author of the *Dīp.* points out that the rule प्रथमचरमतयाल्पार्धकतिपयनेमाश्च (P. 1. 1. 33) is intended by Pat. as an example of अप्राप्तविभाषा. The rule teaches the name सर्वनाम for the words प्रथम, चरम etc. optionally before the nominative pl. ending जस्. Since the name सर्वनाम is not already applicable to

प्रथम, चरम, अल्प, अर्ध and कतिपय the rule could be regarded as an अप्राप्तविभाषा in so far as the five words are concerned. In the case of तय, however, there is a doubt. According to the Pari. प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्ता ग्राह्याः, तय stands for a word ending in the suffix तय, e. g. द्वितय, त्रितय etc. The word उभय also is derived by adding the suffix तय to उभ. According to P. 5. 2. 44 तय added to उभ is replaced by अय and the form उभय is derived. उभय is included in the सर्वादि list. Therefore the name सर्वनाम is already applicable to it by P. 1. 1. 27: सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि. Thus if the word सर्वादीनि is continued in P. 1. 1. 33, it would result in प्राप्तविभाषा. When जस् is added to उभय, the name सर्वनाम which is already applicable by P. 1. 1. 27, is made optional by the present rule. If, however, the word सर्वादीनि is not continued, and if पूर्वविप्रतिषेध is accepted, the mention of तय results in अप्राप्तविभाषा. When words ending in तय such as उभय, द्वितय and द्वय are followed by जस् the name सर्वनाम would be optionally applicable to them. In the case of उभय+जस् two rules, P. 1. 1. 27 and P. 1. 1. 33 are in conflict with each other. According to P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्, P. 1. 1. 33 should prevail over P. 1. 1. 27. However, the word पर in P. 1. 4. 2 is interpreted, following Pat., as इष्ट 'desired' and since the name सर्वनाम for उभय is desired obligatorily, P. 1. 1 27, which is a पूर्व rule, is regarded as more powerful and thus by accepting पूर्वविप्रतिषेध the name सर्वनाम is given to उभय obligatorily. The reading of तय in P. 1. 1. 33 serves a purpose in teaching optionally the name सर्वनाम for other words, द्वितय, द्वय, etc. to which it is not already applicable. It thus results in प्राप्तविभाषा.

In this connection the author cites the view of a ध्यानग्रहकार according to whom अप्राप्तविभाषा results because of one more reason, namely, अन्तरङ्गत्व. Out of the two rules, P. 1. 1. 27 and P. 1. 1. 33, P. 1. 1. 27 is अन्तरङ्ग, because the name सर्वनाम taught by P. 1. 1. 27 is conditioned by the words सर्व etc. alone, whereas it is conditioned by जस् in P. 1. 1. 33.

Nothing is known about this ध्यानग्रहकार except that he was the author of a work called ध्यानग्रह, most probably a commentary either on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or on the *Mbh.* He is mentioned in the स्वोपज्ञ *Vṛtti* of the *Vākyap.* II. 208 as well as in the *Kāvyālaṁkāra* of भामह (5. 1).

The author of the *Dīp.* remarks that Pat. has resorted to none of these reasons while establishing the rule as अप्राप्तविभाषा. He gives a different reason. According to him अयच् taught by P. 5. 2. 44 is not a substitute in the place of तयप् but a different suffix, which derives the form उभय. The word उभय thus not being included in तय, the name सर्वनाम does not apply to it by P. 1. 1. 33. The word सर्वादीनि is not continued in P. 1. 1. 33. The word तय in the rule refers to words like द्वितय, द्वय, etc. to which the name सर्वनाम is not applicable by any other rule. The rule P. 1. 1. 33 thus results in अप्राप्तविभाषा.

If the word सर्वादीनि is not continued and, also, if परविप्रतिषेध is accepted, the rule would be उभयत्रविभाषा. It is a प्राप्तविभाषा in the case of तय (and नेम) whereas it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा in the case of the rest of the words mentioned in the rule. Since तय includes उभय, the conflict between P. 1. 1. 27 and P. 1. 1. 33 at the time of the addition of जस् to उभय is resolved by declaring P. 1. 1. 33 as more powerful according to परविप्रतिषेध.

2. तत्रैव पाठः क्रियते etc. The author suggests some modification in the सूत्रपाठ in order to obtain अयच् as an independent suffix as intended by Pat. The original सूत्रपाठ reads as follows : P. 5. 2. 42 : संख्याया अवयवे तयप्। P. 5. 2. 43 : द्वित्रिभ्यां तयस्यायज् वा। P. 5. 2. 44 : उभादुदात्तो नित्यम्। It is clear from this सूत्रपाठ that Pāṇini prescribes अयच् as a substitute for तय. The author of the *Dīp.* proposes a different wording and order of rules as follows : उभादवयवेऽयच्। संख्यायास्तयप्। द्वित्रिभ्यां तयस्यायज् वा। or संख्याया अवयवे तयप्। उभादयच्। द्वित्रिभ्यां वा। Really speaking the desired result could be achieved by simply removing the word तयस्य from P. 5. 2. 43 in the original सूत्रपाठ.

3. तैलमात्रा...etc. In the *Mbh* it is argued that a difficulty will arise if अयच् is regarded as a separate suffix rather than as a substitute of तयप्. The feminine suffix ङीप् is added to a word ending in the suffix तय according to P. 4. 1. 15. If it is accepted that the word उभय is derived by adding the suffix तय to उभ, the desired feminine form उभयी can be obtained. If, however, अयच् is regarded as a separate suffix, rather than as a substitute for तय, the feminine suffix ङीप् taught by P. 4. 1. 15 cannot be added to उभय since P. 4. 1. 15 does not mention अय. Pat. offers a solution to this difficulty by proposing that मात्रच् which is mentioned in P. 4. 1. 15 is not just a reference to the suffix मात्रच्, but a प्रत्याहार including suffixes beginning with मात्रच् and ending with अयच् which are taught in rules from P. 5. 2. 37–43. This प्रत्याहार is formed by joining मात्र of मात्रच् with च् of अयच्. The suffix अयच् thus being covered by the reference मात्रच् in P. 4. 1. 15, there is no difficulty in deriving the feminine form उभयी.

However, acceptance of the *pratyāhāra* मात्रच् leads to another difficulty. If मात्रच् is not understood as a reference to the suffix मात्रच् but to the expression मात्र, then P. 4. 1. 15 would wrongly apply to मात्र in compounds like तैलमात्रा 'some quantity of oil' and an undesired form *तैलमात्री would be derived. The author explains that the word मात्र is derived by adding the उणादि suffix ष्ट्रन् to the root मा according to the उणादि rule हुयामाश्रुभसिभ्यस्ट्रन् (617). Since the feminine form मात्रा is desired, understanding of the उणादि derivative मात्रा by the expression मात्र in the प्रत्याहार 'मात्रच्' has to be avoided. Pat. solves this problem by arguing : सदृशस्याप्यसंनिविष्टस्य न भवति प्रत्याहारग्रहणेन ग्रहणम् 'An item is not understood from a प्रत्याहार if it is not included in it although it may

be similar in form.' Although the उणादि word मात्र is phonetically similar to the तद्धित suffix मात्र, it is not understood from the प्रत्याहार 'मात्रच्' since it falls outside the scope of the प्रत्याहार which is based on the rules P. 5. 2. 37-43.

The author of the *Dīp.* goes a step further and explains the difference between the तद्धित suffix मात्र and the उणादि form मात्र. Although phonetically both are identical after removing the code-letter च् of the तद्धित 'मात्रच्', they differ from each other so far as their meaning is concerned. The तद्धित suffix मात्र conveys प्रमाण 'measurement', whereas the उणादि word मात्र conveys परिमाण 'size' or 'quantity'. In order to support his argument the author cites the *Vār.* 6 on P. 1. 1. 26: लुङि सिजादिदर्शनात्. The meaning of the *Vār.* and the discussion thereupon in the *Mbh.* can be summed up as follows: Although a past participle ending in the suffix त and an aorist third person singular form ending in त are sometimes similar, the one cannot be confused for the other, because they differ in meaning. For instance, the form भित्त in an expression like प्राभित्त घटं देवदत्तः 'Devadatta broke the jar' cannot be mistaken for a past participle derived by adding the suffix त to root भिद्, because the addition of the suffix सिच् in an aorist formation which conveys, in addition to past tense, agent and singularity, distinguishes an aorist form from a past participle.

[51. 3]

1. The rule विभाषोर्णोः (P. 1. 2. 3) is cited as an example of विभाषा containing three kinds of doubt; whether it should be regarded as प्राप्तविभाषा, अप्राप्तविभाषा or उभयत्रविभाषा. Pat.'s answer is that it is अप्राप्तविभाषा. The rule states that when a suffix beginning with *it* follows the root ऊर्णु, it is regarded as *ñit* 'having the *anubandha ñ*'. This is an अतिदेश rule since it prescribes extended application of ङित् to a suffix added to ऊर्णु. Since ङित्त्व is not already applicable by any other rule, it is अप्राप्तविभाषा according to Pat. Although Pat. accepts it as अप्राप्तविभाषा, he refers to the possibility of the rule being प्राप्तविभाषा. The rule असंयोगाल्लिट् कित् (P. 1. 2. 5) teaches that if a लिट् (perfect) suffix which is not पित् (having the अनुबन्ध *p*) follows a root not ending in a conjunct consonant, it is regarded as कित् (having the अनुबन्ध *k*). Since the root ऊर्णु does not end in a conjunct consonant, a लिट् suffix other than the one having the अनुबन्ध *p* following ऊर्णु will be कित् according to the above rule. Thus कित्त्व being applicable by P. 1. 2. 5, the rule P. 1. 2. 3 prescribing optional ङित्त्व is प्राप्तविभाषा. Here a question arises: P. 1. 2. 5 prescribes कित्त्व and not ङित्त्व. ङित्त्व cannot be therefore said to be already applicable; cf. *Mbh.*: अन्यद्धि कित्त्वमन्यन् ङित्त्वम्। Pat. replies, एकं चेन्ङित्कितौ। He means that P. 1. 2. 3 can be regarded as प्राप्तविभाषा if ङित् and कित् are accepted as identical. The

author of the *Dīp.* explains this point as follows : कित् or ङित् should be understood not as a शास्त्रातिदेश 'theoretical extension' but as a कार्यातिदेश 'extension of a grammatical operation'. P. 1. 1. 5 : क्ङिति च prescribes absence of गुण and वृद्धि before कित् and ङित् suffixes. Thus as far as absence of गुण and वृद्धि, which is a कार्य, is concerned, both कित् and ङित् are identical although they are different in their verbal appearance.

Further, the author offers yet another interpretation of the rule विभाषोर्णोः in order to prove that it is प्राप्तविभाषा. It is assumed that the rule विभाषोर्णोः does not convey any meaning independently. In other words, it is an अधिकार rule, just like the rule समर्थानां प्रथमाद्वा (P. 4. 1. 82) marked with स्वरित. It is continued in the rule असंयोगाल्लिट् कित्. Thus we get two statements from the rule : (1) असंयोगात् परः अपित् लिट् कित् भवति, and (2) ऊर्णोः परः अपित् लिट् विभाषा कित् भवति. The rule विभाषोर्णोः thus can be understood as प्राप्तविभाषा. But, then, instead of making the rule an अधिकार, why is it not mentioned after the rule असंयोगाल्लिट् कित् for a simpler and an easier अनुवृत्ति ? The author replies that the rule is taught before and not after the rule असंयोगाल्लिट् कित् for obtaining the अनुवृत्ति of इट् from P. 1. 2. 2 : विज इट्।

Even if the rule is regarded as a prescriptive rule rather than as an *adhikāra*, it can still be understood as giving scope to the three kinds of doubt. It would then mean that when a suffix beginning with *iṭ* follows *ūrṇu*, it is regarded as *ṅit*. The present rule has thus scope in derivations like प्रोर्णुविता and प्रोर्णविता where optional गुणनिषेध takes place. On the other hand P. 1. 2. 5 finds scope in formations like विभिदतुः and विभिदुः where prohibition of Guṇa invariably takes place. The two rules which are thus satisfied in their respective domains come in conflict with each other in derivations like ऊर्णुनविथ and ऊर्णुनुविथ. When the suffix इथ follows ऊर्णु, an invariable prohibition of गुण is applicable by P. 1. 2. 5 whereas optional prohibition is applicable by P. 1. 2. 3. If the conflict is resolved by accepting परविप्रतिषेध which is, in fact, normal, then P. 1. 2. 3 can be accepted as अप्राप्तविभाषा. On the contrary, if by accepting पूर्वविप्रतिषेध it is regarded as overpowering P. 1. 2. 5, then it would be प्राप्तविभाषा in so far as it implies optional गुणनिषेध before a *liṭ* suffix beginning with *iṭ* and अप्राप्तविभाषा in so far as it implies optional prohibition before any other suffix beginning with *iṭ*. Thus P. 1. 2. 3 becomes उभयत्रविभाषा.

2. यद्यपि नाना etc. A reference has already been made above to the objection regarding ङित् and कित् being identical and Pat.'s reply to it. Pat. further argues that even if कित् and ङित् are regarded as different from one another, P. 1. 2. 3 still can be proved as प्राप्तविभाषा. He cites the example प्रौर्णुवीति and remarks : सार्वधातुकमपित् इति वा नित्ये प्राप्ते, अन्यत्र वाऽप्राप्ते उभयत्र वेति। The author of the *Dīp.* explains Pat.'s argument as follows : The rule विभाषोर्णोः

is continued in P. 1. 1. 4 : सार्वधातुकमपित् which thus yields two statements : (1) an अपित् सार्वधातुक suffix added to a root is regarded as ङित्, and (2) an इडादि सार्वधातुक suffix following ऊर्णु is optionally regarded as ङित्. Thus here the confrontation is between two rules prescribing ङित् suffix alone. P. 1. 2. 3 thus obviously becomes a प्राप्तविभाषा. However, if it is not continued in P. 1. 2. 4, then both the rules, namely P. 1. 2. 3 and 1. 2. 4, having independent scopes, conflict with each other in derivations like प्रौर्णुवीति. If परविप्रतिषेध is accepted, the application of P. 1. 2. 3 being restricted to suffixes other than सार्वधातुक अपित् suffixes, it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा. Pat. accepts the latter view.

[51. 4]

P. 1. 2. 16 : विभाषोपयमने teaches that the aorist marker सिच् added to the root यम् is optionally कित् if the root means उपयमन 'accepting (as a wife)'. Pat. cites this rule as an example of अप्राप्तविभाषा. However, Pat. speaks of the possibility of the three kinds of doubt in the case of this विभाषा. P. 1. 2. 15 : यमो गन्धने teaches that सिच् added to यम् is कित् if यम् means गन्धन 'hinting at the faults of another person'. Since गन्धन and उपयमन are two totally different meanings P. 1. 2. 16 has to be accepted as अप्राप्तविभाषा. Pat. however remarks : गन्धने इति वा नित्ये प्राप्ते. It is thus assumed that कित्त्व of सिच् is invariably applicable already by P. 1. 2. 15 even in the sense उपयमन. While making this point clear the author of the *Dīp.* says that when गन्धन is regarded as a part of उपयमन, the rule can be accepted as प्राप्तविभाषा. If उपयमन 'accepting (as a wife)' takes place due to गन्धन, गन्धन can be regarded as a part of उपयमन. This is indeed a far-fetched way to explain the rule as प्राप्तविभाषा. The author cites an illustration to show how गन्धन can form a part of उपयमन. He cites, in fact, a sentence quoted by Pat. while discussing the *Vār.* 15 on P. 1. 4. 23. The sentence is : बलाहकात् विद्योतते ('the lightning) flashes from the cloud'. Here the lightning which flashes in the cloud is the same as the lightning which flashes in its original place. बलाहक is just an उपाधि. In the same manner, गन्धन also is an उपाधि of उपयमन. However, this view is not acceptable. (The words preceding बलाहकात् विद्योतते are not clear in the MS. The interpretation is therefore based on guesswork.) Finally, Pat. rejects the continuation of गन्धन in P. 1. 2. 16 and accepts the rule as अप्राप्तविभाषा.

[51. 5]

P. 1. 3. 43 : अनुपसर्गाद् वा teaches that the आत्मनेपद endings are optionally added to the root क्रम् which is not preceded by an *upasarga*. Pat. tries to show, as in the preceding case, the possibility of accepting the rule as प्राप्तविभाषा. P. 1. 3. 38 : वृत्तिसर्गतायनेषु क्रमः teaches that the आत्मनेपद endings are added to the root क्रम if the meanings वृत्ति 'absence of obstructions', सर्ग 'inclination or

resolution' and तायन 'spreading' are understood. If it is accepted that the word वृत्तिसर्गतायनेषु is continued in P. 1. 3. 43, then only it can be accepted as प्राप्तविभाषा. However, after showing this possibility, Pat. himself denies the continuation of वृत्ति etc. in P. 1. 3. 43 and finally accepts the rule as an अप्राप्तविभाषा.

The author of the *Dīp.* further shows how वृत्ति etc. cannot be continued in P. 1. 3. 43. If the word वृत्तिसर्गतायनेषु क्रमः has to be continued in P. 1. 3. 43 from P. 1. 3. 38, it must be continued in the intervening rules i. e. in rules from P. 1. 3. 39 to P. 1. 3. 42. However, since these rules refer to different contexts with which the meanings cannot be associated, the word वृत्तिसर्ग ... etc. cannot be continued.

[51. 6]

P. 2. 4. 12 : विभाषा वृक्षमृगतृणधान्यव्यञ्जनपशुशकुनि ... etc. teaches that a द्वंद्व compound of names of trees, deers, grass, grains, seasoning, animals, birds etc. is used in singular. P. 2. 4. 6 : जातिरप्राणिनाम् teaches that a द्वंद्व compound of words conveying जाति 'class' is used in singular except when the class refers to animals. Since the word अप्राणिनाम् in this rule excludes animals, P. 2. 4. 12 is अप्राप्तविभाषा insofar as words referring to animals are concerned. In the rest of cases it can be regarded as प्राप्तविभाषा if the word जाति is continued in P. 2. 4. 12. The author of the *Dīp.* goes a step further and says that even in the case of animals the rule can be accepted as प्राप्तविभाषा, if the animal words refer not to living animals but to clay animals, or stuffed animals. The author further points out that due to the Pari. (15) गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्ययः 'A grammatical operation should be understood (as applicable) to the primary meaning (when both) primary and secondary meanings are understood', an animal word primarily conveys a living animal and it secondarily conveys either a clay animal or a stuffed animal. Therefore, the negative word अप्राणिनाम् would primarily exclude the words conveying living animals. Thus the rule विभाषा वृक्षमृग etc. can be regarded अप्राप्तविभाषा even without accepting पूर्वविप्रतिषेध.

[51 .7]

1. Pat. cites the rule उषविदजागृभ्योऽन्यतरस्याम् (P. 3. 1. 38) as yet another example of अप्राप्तविभाषा. The rule teaches optional addition of the suffix आम् to roots उष्, विद् and जागृ in perfect conjugation. Since the addition of आम् to the three roots is not already applicable by any other rule, the present rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा. Pat., however, tries to show, as he has done in the earlier examples, the possibility of its being a प्राप्तविभाषा. This is of course a पूर्वपक्ष view. P. 3. 1. 35 : कास्प्रत्ययादाममन्त्रे लिटि teaches that the suffix आम्

is added to the root कास् and a root ending in a suffix (i. e. a derivative root) in perfect formations except in sacred formulas of Veda. Now if the अनुवृत्ति of the word प्रत्ययाद् (which means प्रत्ययान्तात्) in P. 3. 1. 38 is accepted, it can be regarded as प्राप्तविभाषा, because then it would prescribe optional addition of आम् to उष् etc. which end in a suffix, whereas invariable addition of आम् etc. is already applicable by P. 3. 1. 35. Thus P. 3. 1. 38 is a प्राप्तविभाषा in so far as derivative roots from उष् etc. are concerned and it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा in so far as pure roots उष् etc. are concerned. It thus results in उभयत्रविभाषा. Pat. refutes this view by arguing that the derivative roots are altogether different roots; *Mbh.* : प्रत्ययान्ता धात्वन्तराणि। Therefore, derivative roots from उष्, विद् etc. such as उषिषि-, विवित्स etc. cannot be understood from उष्, विद् etc. in P. 3. 1. 38. Thus Pat. concludes that the rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा.

The author of the *Dip.* begins his discussion on the *Mbh.* on this rule with the assumption that the word प्रत्ययाद् is continued from P. 3. 1. 35 into P. 3. 1. 38. First he explains that the word प्रत्ययाद् has to be invariably continued in the intervening rules i. e. P. 3. 1. 36 and 37. However, although it is continued, it is redundant since the intended meaning is already understood from P. 3. 1. 35. Further, he raises a question : How can उष् etc. in the rule refer to the derivative roots उषिषि etc.? The Pari. : स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा (P. 1. 1. 68) would not allow such a reference. The author discusses this problem by offering four different interpretations of the rule सनाद्यन्ता धातवः (P. 3. 1. 32). The rule means that the items which end in the suffixes सन् etc. are called धातु. If, however, the rule is interpreted differently, P. 3. 1. 38 can be accepted as प्राप्तविभाषा. The different ways of interpreting the rule can be summed up as follows : 1. If the word अन्त is understood as meaning एकदेश 'part', then the rule would mean that सन् etc. are parts of roots (to which they are added). Thus when उष् is mentioned, सन् added to उष् will also be understood. Therefore, the सन्नन्त form उषिषि- also will be understood by उष् in P. 3. 1. 38. The compound बहृवृच is formed by adding the समासान्त suffix अ (P. 5. 4. 74) to बहृवृच्. The word अन्त in समासान्त also means एकदेश otherwise बहृवृच् and not बहृवृच will be called समास. Since बहृवृच including the समासान्त is called समास, अन्त means एकदेश. There is, however, one difficulty in this view. If the rule is interpreted as shown above, it ceases to be a संज्ञा rule. The Pari. : संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तग्रहणं नास्ति rejects application of तदन्तविधि in a संज्ञा rule. However, since the rule is not a संज्ञा rule, here तदन्तविधि would wrongly apply and सनाद्यन्त would signifiy सनाद्यन्तान्त. Consequently, that which is a सन्नन्त would be thus wrongly regarded as a part of a root. For instance, *पच् पिपक्ष would be wrongly regarded a root. Similarly, *वद् पिपक्ष also would be wrongly regarded a root. The author removes this difficulty by arguing that in the earlier case (पच् पिपक्ष) the meaning of पच् being already conveyed by पिपक्ष,

the redundant expression *पच् पिपक्ष cannot exist, while in the latter case the meanings of वद् and पिपक्ष being incompatible with each other the असमर्थ expression वद् पिपक्ष cannot exist. The author removes the difficulty also by arguing that तदन्तविधि applies to that which is a विशेषण 'qualifier' according P. 1. 1. 67 and if सनाद्यन्त is understood as a विशेष्य (i. e. the predicate), तदन्तविधि will not apply. Thus P. 3. 1. 38 can be regarded as प्राप्तविभाषा if अन्त means एकदेश.

2. P. 3. 1. 32 is not a संज्ञा rule but an अतिदेश rule. It teaches that the items which end in सन् etc. are treated as धातु. For instance, P. 1. 1. 23 : बहुगणवतुडति संख्या means that बहु, गण, and words ending in the suffixes वतु and डति are treated as संख्या (since they are not actually numerals). The term धातु is already defined by P. 1. 3. 1 : भूवादयो धातवः। Therefore, the term धातु in P. 3. 1. 38 means the expressions भू, etc. The अतिदेश thus means that the items ending in सन् etc. are treated as भू etc. In other words the grammatical operations applicable to roots भू etc. apply to those which end in सन् etc. Consequently, उषिषि- will be treated as उष् and the suffix आम् which invariably applies to it by P. 3. 1. 35 will be optionally applicable by P. 3. 1. 38. P. 3. 1. 38 thus is प्राप्तविभाषा.

This interpretation also suffers from a fault. If a सन्नन्त is treated as भू, etc., all grammatical operations including those which apply to roots in general as well as those which apply to individual roots like भू will be applicable to a सन्नन्त like उषिषि-. After a lengthy discussion on this point the author concludes that the general अतिदेश rule results in several individual rules such as 'the सन्नन्त derivative of भू is treated as root भू', 'the सन्नन्त derivative of एध् is treated as root एध्' and so on. Thus the सन्नन्त उषिषि- will be treated as उष् alone.

3. The rule is a definition of धातु. This is the correct interpretation of the rule. Since उष् is called धातु by P. 1. 3. 1, and उषिषि- iscalled धातु by P. 3. 1. 32 one cannot be understood by the other. There is thus no confusion between the two roots. The rule P. 3. 1. 38 is thus प्राप्तविभाषा. This is the सिद्धान्तिन्'s view.

4. Lastly, the author refers to the rejection of P. 3. 1. 35 stated by Pat. According to Pat. since a सन्नन्त can get the name धातु by स्थानिवद्भाव the rule is not required. In this view उष् stands for both, उष् and उषिषि-. Thus P. 3. 1. 38 is a प्राप्तविभाषा.

The author mentions yet another way to prove that P. 3. 1. 38 is a प्राप्तविभाषा. According to some, the term उष् in the rule does not stand merely for the pure root उष् but also for the derivative root उष् which is derived by first adding the कृत् suffix क्विप् to उष् by P. 3. 2. 76 and then adding another क्विप् to

the उष् derivative उष् in the sense of आचार 'behaviour' according to the *Mbh.* (P. 3. 1. 11. 3); सर्वप्रातिपदिकेभ्य आचारे क्विन् वक्तव्यः. This latter form is derived as follows:

उष्+क्विप्	(P. 3. 2. 76)
उष्	('one who shines')
उष्+क्विप्	(*Mbh.* on P. 3. 1. 11. 3)
उष्	('to behave as one who shines')

उष् in the rule thus conveys both, the pure root उष् and the derivative root उष्. Thus the rule can be understood as a प्राप्तविभाषा as far as the derivative root उष् is concerned.

The author rejects this view by arguing that a form of उष् derived by adding the suffix क्विप् to convey आचार 'behaviour' as stated in the *Mbh.* does not exist.

[51. 8]

P. 3. 1. 61 : दीपजनबुधपूरितायिप्यायिभ्योऽन्यतरस्याम् prescribes optional substitution of चिण् in the place of च्लि before the third person singular ending त. The rule is अप्राप्तविभाषा. However, Pat. shows all the three possibilities of विभाषा and finally declares it an अप्राप्तविभाषा. P. 3. 1. 66 : भावकर्मणोः teaches substitution of चिण् in the place of च्लि before त when भाव 'state' or कर्मन् 'object' is conveyed. Therefore, P. 3. 1. 61 would be प्राप्तविभाषा in the case of दीप्, जन् etc. when भाव् or कर्मन् is conveyed. Pat. rules out this possibility of प्राप्तविभाषा by arguing that since the word कर्तरि is continued in P. 3. 1. 61 from P. 3. 1. 48 (णिश्रिद्रुस्रुभ्यः कर्तरि चङ्), the rule is not applicable when भाव or कर्मन् is conveyed. Here the author of the *Dīp.* mentions the basic objection by the opponent. According to him, there is no connection of P. 3. 1. 61 with the meanings भाव and कर्मन् since they are mentioned by a latter rule. The author replies that the connection is possible if it is understood that the word दीपजन ... etc. is marked with स्वरित and therefore continued in P. 3. 1. 66 : भावकर्मणोः. After the अनुवृत्ति of the word दीपजन ... in the rule भावकर्मणोः, however, we obtain two separate statements rather than one single statement from the rule as follows : (1) चिण् is invariably substituted in the place of च्लि added to a root when त conveying भाव or कर्मन् follows, and (2) चिण् is optionally substituted in the place of च्लि added to दीप्, जन् ... etc. when त conveying भाव or कर्मन् follows. The rule is thus a combination of two statements. The word दीपजन ... which is continued in the rule भावकर्मणोः does not form part (अङ्ग) of the rule. Pāṇini certainly intended these two separate statements otherwise he would have made

one rule as भावकर्मणोर्दीपजनबुधपूरितायिप्यायिभ्योऽन्यतरस्याम् rather than two separate rules as they exist in the present सूत्रपाठ.

However, if the rule is understood as a separate rule without the word कर्तरि being continued, and if परविप्रतिषेध is accepted, the rule would be an अप्राप्तविभाषा when the ending त conveying कर्तृ follows च्लि added to दीप् etc. If, on the other hand, पूर्वविप्रतिषेध is accepted, the same rule would be a प्राप्तविभाषा as far as त conveying भाव or कर्मन् is concerned and an अप्राप्तविभाषा as far as त conveying the कर्तृ is concerned. The rule would be thus an उभयत्रविभाषा.

Pat. concludes that the rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा, because its application is restricted to the situations in which त conveying the कर्तृ follows. Thus according to Pat. the word कर्तरि is continued.

Pat. further shows that the rule is not free from doubt even after concluding that it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा, because it is not clear whether the word कर्तरि which is continued stands for कर्तृ or कर्मकर्तृ; *Mbh.* : एवमपि सन्देहो न्याय्ये वा कर्तरि कर्मकर्तरि वेति. P. 3. 1. 87 : कर्मवत्कर्मणा तुल्यक्रियः teaches that if a कर्तृ behaves as a कर्मन् it should be treated as कर्मन्. Such a कर्तृ is traditionally known as कर्मकर्तृ; e. g. ओदन 'rice' in the sentence ओदनः पच्यते स्वयमेव 'rice boils itself' is a कर्मकर्तृ. If the word कर्तृ continued in the rule दीपजन ... etc. is understood as कर्मकर्तृ, the rule would be प्राप्तविभाषा, because कर्मकर्तृ can be regarded as कर्मन् and च्लि् is already applicable by the rule भावकर्मणोः. If कर्तृ stands for कर्तृ alone, the rule would be अप्राप्तविभाषा as shown above. If, however, both कर्तृ and कर्मकर्तृ are understood from the word कर्तरि, the rule would naturally be उभयत्रविभाषा. Thus all the three kinds of doubt exist if the word कर्तरि is understood as conveying both, कर्तृ and कर्मकर्तृ. Pat. solves this problem by arguing that P. 3. 1. 87 is applicable to transitive roots. Since दीप् etc. are not transitive roots, there is no question of the application of P. 3. 1. 87 and hence of कर्मकर्तृ being conveyed by the ending. The author of the *Dīp.* points out that even if the root बुध् mentioned in the list दीपजन ... etc. is transitive, Pat.'s statement अकर्मकाश्च दीपादयः should be understood as a general statement. The opponent argues that even an intransitive root becomes transitive when it is preceded by a certain *upsarga*. For instance the root भू 'to be' which is originally intransitive, becomes transitive when it is preceded by the *upasarga* अनु, since अनु + भू means 'to experience'. Pat. replies that P. 3. 1. 87 applies only to those roots the action or state conveyed by which resides in the कर्मन् rather than in the कर्तृ. For instance, in the expressions like आसयति देवदत्तम् '(he) makes Devadatta sit' and कटं करोति '(he) makes a mat' the actions reside in the objects देवदत्त and कट. On the contrary, in the expression देवदत्तः ग्रामं गच्छति 'Devadatta goes to a village' the action of going resides in the कर्तृ (i. e. देवदत्त). Since the action conveyed by roots दीप्, जन्, etc. resides in the कर्तृ, P. 3. 1. 87 does not apply.

The author explains the difference between भाव and क्रिया as follows : भाव refers to a static action conveyed by roots like भू and अस्, both 'to be' whereas क्रिया denotes movement, e. g. चल् 'to walk', पत् 'to fly', etc. The author further shows that Pat.'s argument goes contrary to the rule अचः कर्तृयकि (P. 6. 1. 195). The rule teaches that a root ending in a vowel is initially accented when it is followed by the suffix यक् conveying कर्तृ. Pat. cites the sentence जायते स्वयमेव '(It) is born itself' as the illustration. P. 3. 1. 67 : सार्वधातुके यक् teaches addition of the suffix यक् to a root when कर्मन् or भाव is conveyed. When यक् is added to जन्, the final न् of जन् is replaced by आ by ये विभाषा (P. 6. 4. 43) : जन्+यक्+ते → जआ+यक्+ते → जा+य+ते. The root जन् thus ends in a vowel. Therefore, P. 6. 1. 195 applies and the expression जायते स्वयमेव is derived. Now, it can be argued that since P. 6. 1. 195 refers to कर्तृयक् 'यक् conveying कर्तृ', it does not apply to जायते since there यक् does not convey कर्मकर्तृ but भाव. P. 3. 1. 87 applies and the कर्तृ of जन् is treated as कर्मकर्तृ. Here a question arises : How can P. 3. 1. 87 apply to जन् which is कर्तृस्थभावक ? The two *Mbh.* statements are thus contradictory. The author of the *Dīp.* has raised this objection, but has not answered it.

[51. 9]

1. P. 3. 4. 24 : विभाषाग्रेप्रथमपूर्वेषु teaches addition of क्त्वा or णमुल् to a root preceded by अग्रे, प्रथम or पूर्व to convey a past action when the root is used with another root having the same agent. If the word आभीक्ष्ण्ये 'when repetition is to be conveyed' is continued in this rule from P. 3. 4. 22 : आभीक्ष्ण्ये णमुल् च, the rule becomes a प्राप्तविभाषा as far as addition of णमुल् is concerned, because invariable addition of णमुल् is already applicable by P. 3. 4. 22. Pat. concludes that the rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा since the word आभीक्ष्ण्ये is not continued. The author of the *Dīp.* further mentions पूर्वविप्रतिषेध as one more reason to accept the rule as an अप्राप्तविभाषा. As far as the meaning आभीक्ष्ण्य is concerned the rwo rules, P. 3. 4. 22 and P. 3. 4. 24 are in conflict with each other. If the conflict is resolved by accepting पूर्वविप्रतिषेध, P. 3. 4. 24 loses its force in the domain of आभीक्ष्ण्य and becomes an अप्राप्तविभाषा in the remaining cases.

2. तत्र त्विदमुक्तम् ... etc. The author refers to the *Vār.* 1 on P. 3. 4. 24 which mentions a difficulty in accepting the rule as an अप्राप्तविभाषा. The *Vār.* अग्रादिष्वप्राप्तविधेः समासप्रतिषेधः says that if the rule is accepted as an अप्राप्तविभाषा the undesirable compound of verbal forms ending in क्त्वा and णमुल् with अग्रे etc. has to be prohibited. If the rule is accepted as an अप्राप्तविभाषा, अग्रे etc would become conditions and therefore उपपद्स. Therefore the compound would wrongly apply by P. 2. 2. 19 and undesirable forms like *अग्रेभोजम् would be derived.

However if the rule is accepted as a प्राप्तविभाषा, अग्रे etc. would be conditions for the non-application rather than application of the rule. (It has been already pointed out earlier that a विभाषा rule is निषेधमुख, see note on 54.) Therefore, they do not become उपपद्स. Pat. has removed this objection raised in the *Vār.* by arguing that the compounding is restricted by Pāṇini to णमुल् by using the word एव 'alone' in the rule अमैवाव्ययेन (P. 2. 2. 20) which implies that there is a compound of an उपपद with an indeclinable ending in अम् (णमुल्) alone. Since P. 3. 4. 24 prescribes both क्त्वा and णमुल्, there is no possibility of a compound.

[51. 10]

P. 6. 2. 161 : विभाषा तृन्नन्नतीक्ष्णशुचिषु teaches that a compound of the negative particle नञ् with a word ending in तृन् and with words अन्न, तीक्ष्ण, etc. is optionally accentend on the final syllable. P. 6. 2. 158 : आक्रोशे च, and P. 6. 2. 159 : संज्ञायाम् also teach अन्तोदात्त in a compound of नञ् with a word ending in the suffix अच् and क when आक्रोश 'censure' or संज्ञा 'name' is understood. Pat. shows the possibilities of three kinds of विभाषा by assuming the अनुवृत्ति of the word आक्रोशे in P. 6. 2. 161 and finally concludes that the rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा since आक्रोशे is not continued.

The rule can be regarded as प्राप्तविभाषा only if it is understood that आक्रोशे is continued in the rule. The author of the *Dīp.* mentions also the rule संज्ञायाम् and implies its अनुवृत्ति in the rule. Further, he points out that if the word अच्कौ is not continued in P. 6. 2. 158 and P. 6. 2. 159, the two rules can be described as prescribing an invariable अन्तोदात्त in a नञ् compound and then only P. 6. 2. 161 can become a प्राप्तविभाषा. Finally, he concludes that since the word अच्कौ is continued in P. 6. 2. 158 and 159, the two rules being restricted to नञ् compounds with words ending in अच् and क, P. 6. 2. 161 is undoubtedly an अप्राप्तविभाषा as the words आक्रोशे and संज्ञायाम् are not continued in it.

[51. 11]

P. 6. 3. 59 : एकहलादौ पूरयितव्येऽन्यतरस्याम् teaches that the word उदक is replaced by उद् when it is followed by a word beginning with a single consonant and means an object to be filled. Pat. says that if the word संज्ञायाम् is continued in this rule from P. 6. 3. 57 (उदकस्योदः संज्ञायाम्), the rule becomes a प्राप्तविभाषा, since the substitute उद् is already prescribed invariably by P. 6. 3. 57. However, Pat. does not agree with this view and concludes that since the word संज्ञायाम् is not continued in P. 6. 3. 59, it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा. The author of the *Dīp.* argues that if संज्ञायाम् is continued from P. 6. 3. 57 into P. 6. 3. 59, it has to be continued also in P. 6. 3. 58 : पेषंवासवाहनधिषु च। However, its mention in P. 6. 3. 58 is redundant since the desired result is already achieved by P. 6. 3. 57. One may ask whether the अनुवृत्ति of संज्ञायाम् in P. 6. 3. 59

really serves any purpose. The author replies in the affirmative and gives उदपान as an illustration. He means that the word उदपान is a संज्ञा which can be derived by P. 6. 3. 59 with the word संज्ञायाम् continued in it. The author has not commented upon Pat.'s conclusion. However, it can be inferred from his remarks in the preceding passages that he agrees with Pat. in this case also.

[51. 12]

P. 8. 1. 26 : सपूर्वायाः प्रथमाया विभाषा teaches that the words युष्मद् and अस्मद् are not optionally replaced by वाम् नौ etc. when they are preceded by a word in the nominative which is preceded by another word. P. 8. 1. 24 : न चवाहाहैवयुक्ते teaches that the replacement of युष्मद् and अस्मद् by the substitutes वाम्, नौ etc. does not take place if they are connected with च, वा, ह, अह and एव. Pat. says that if it is accepted that the word चवाहाहैवयुक्ते is continued in P. 8. 1. 26 it becomes a प्राप्तविभाषा. However, Pat. himself does not accept the अनुवृत्ति and concludes that the rule is an अप्राप्तविभाषा.

The author explains the meaning of the expression चादिभिर्योगे 'in connection with च etc.'. He points out that the connection of च etc. is intended with युष्मद् and अस्मद् and not with other words. This he explains with the help of illustrations.

[51. 13]

P. 8. 2. 21 : अचि विभाषा prescribes substitution of ल् in place of र् of the root गृ when a suffix beginning with a vowel follows. Pat. states that the rule can be regarded as a प्राप्तविभाषा if the word यङि is continued from P. 8. 2. 20 : ग्रो यङि which means that र् of गृ is replaced by ल् when it is followed by यङ्. However, Pat. rejects the अनुवृत्ति of यङि in the rule and establishes that it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा.

If the अनुवृत्ति of यङि in the rule अचि विभाषा is accepted, the rule अचि (यङि) विभाषा would create a problem of interpretation : How to construe the two locatives, अचि and यङि together? The author of the *Dīp.* replies that अचि यङि means 'when अच् followed by यङ् immediately follows (गृ)'. He discusses the illustration निजेगिलः by offering two interpretations and one more illustration, namely, निजेगिल्यते by offering one interpretation. Thus in all three alternative interpretations of the rule अचि (यङि) विभाषा are mentioned in this passage. They can be summed up as follows :

1. The form निजेगिलः 'one who repeatedly swallows' can be derived by adding यङ् (P. 3. 1. 22) and अच् (P. 3. 1. 34) to root गृ with the prefix नि :

नि	गृ	यङ्	अच्	स्	
नि	जेगिर्	य	अ	स्	(P. 6. 1. 9; 7. 4. 62; 7. 1. 100 etc.)

नि जेगिर् अ स् (P. 2. 4. 74)
नि जेगिल् अ स् (P. 8. 2. 21)
निजेगिलः

Here although यङ् is dropped by P. 2. 4. 74 it is treated as present by P. 1. 1. 62 (प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम्). Thus the meaning 'when यङ् followed by अच्' fits in this illustration.

2. If one applies P. 6. 4. 49 (यस्य हलः) instead of P. 2. 4. 74 (यङोऽचि च), only य् of यङ् would be dropped. In that case, at the stage

नि जेगिर् अ अ

the rule अचि (यङि) विभाषा would still apply by interpreting अचि यङि as 'when अच in यङ् follows' and the form निजेगिलः can be obtained.

3. The form निजेगिल्यते is derived by adding यङ् and then शप् to गृ with prefix नि as follows :

नि+गृ+यङ्+शप्+ते
नि+जेगिर्+य+अ+ते (P. 7. 1. 100; 6. 1. 9 etc.)

Here two rules, अचि विभाषा and अतो गुणे (P. 6. 1. 97) are simultaneously applicable. According to P. 8. 2. 1 (पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्), P. 6. 1. 97 takes place first; thus :

नि जेगिर् य ते

At this stage अचि (यङि) विभाषा cannot be applied since यङ् is not followed by अच्. The author refers to the explanation offered by some grammarians that although यङ् is followed by अच्, as it is not seen at the above stage, it can be understood by accepting अन्तादिवद्भाव. P. 6. 1. 85 : अन्तादिवच्च teaches that a single substitute in the place of two items is treated as the final part of the former item and as the initial part of the latter item. Accordingly the single substitute अ in the place of अ of य and the following अ by P. 6. 1. 97 can be treated as the initial part of the following item, i. e. अच्. य् can be regarded as a part of the former item यङ्. Thus the rule अचि (यङि) विभाषा can be applied here, and the form निजेगिल्यते is derived.

The author, however, does not agree with the explanation based on अन्तादिवद्भाव and argues that according to the Pari. : उभयत आश्रयणे नान्तादिवत्, a single substitute cannot be simultaneously regarded as both, the initial and the final part of the latter and the former items respectively. He thus dismisses the second illustration.

[51. 14]

After discussing cases of अप्राप्तविभाषा Pat. now takes up cases of प्राप्तविभाषा. Three kinds of doubt in the case of an अप्राप्तविभाषा were explained on

the basis of अनुवृत्ति and विप्रतिषेध. The author tells us that since in following cases there is no doubt regarding अनुवृत्ति of certain words, they are clearcut cases of a प्राप्तविभाषा.

[51. 15]

P. 1. 3. 50 : विभाषा विप्रलापे teaches addition of आत्मनेपद endings to the root वद् when a dispute is conveyed. According to Pat., since the word व्यक्तवाचाम् is continued in this rule from P. 1. 3. 48 the rule is a प्राप्तविभाषा. P. 1. 3. 48 : व्यक्तवाचां समुच्चारणे teaches addition of आत्मनेपद endings to वद् when reference is to collective speech of व्यक्तवाच् 'those whose speech is articulate (i. e. human beings)'. आत्मनेपद thus being already invariably applicable to वद् by P. 1. 3. 48, its optional use is prescribed by P. 1. 3. 50 when the collective speech is a dispute among human beings. Due to the अनुवृत्ति of the word व्यक्तवाचाम् P. 1. 3. 50 becomes a प्राप्तविभाषा.

The author of the *Dip.* raises a question : Is the अनुवृत्ति of व्यक्तवाचाम् necessary in this rule? He replies in the affirmative. A dispute can be among व्यक्तवाच्s as well as among अव्यक्तवाच्s (i. e. birds and animals). The example of the latter is विप्रवदन्ति शकुनयः 'birds are wrangling'. Here although the language of birds is not understood, one can certainly understand from their sound that they are disputing. The very existence of conventions regarding the auspicious and inauspicious implications of the twitterring of birds indicates that such usages as विप्रवदन्ति शकुनयः exist. In order to avoid use of आत्मनेपद in such usages, the अनुवृत्ति of व्यक्तवाचाम् is necessary.

[51. 16]

P. 1. 3. 77 : विभाषोपपदेन प्रतीयमाने prescribes addition of आत्मनेपद to a root if it is understood from the उपपद (the word used near the verb) that the fruit of the action accrues to the agent. According to Pat. the rule is a प्राप्तविभाषा since the word स्वरितञितः is continued in it from P. 1. 3. 72 : स्वरितञितः कर्त्रभिप्राये क्रियाफले. P. 1. 3. 72 prescribe addition of आत्मनेपद to a root with a स्वरित mark or with a code-letter ञ् when the fruit of the action accrues to the agent. Thus since P. 1. 3. 77 prescribes optional application of आत्मनेपद which is already invariably applicable by P. 1. 3. 72, it is a प्राप्तविभाषा.

The author of the *Dip.* appears to differ from Pat. and to declare the rule as an उभयत्रविभाषा. His cryptic remark उभयत्रविभाषा can be understood as follows : The rule is a प्राप्तविभाषा as far as the स्वरितेत् and ञित् roots are concerned. However, it is an अप्राप्तविभाषा as far as other roots are concerned, since no rule has taught आत्मनेपद for them. The rule is thus an उभयत्रविभाषा. However, in order to arrive at desired results, i. e. application of the invariable आत्मनेपद in the

case of स्वरितेत् and ञित् roots, we have to accept पूर्वविप्रतिषेध so that P. 1. 3. 72 takes precedence over P. 1. 3. 77.

[51. 17]

Pat. mentions the rule हृक्रोरन्यतरस्याम् (P. 1. 4. 53) as an example of उभयत्रविभाषा. The rule teaches that the कर्तृ 'agent' of the verbs हृ and कृ in non-causative constructions is optionally called कर्मन् 'object' in the corresponding causative constructions. For instance, non-causative: हरति भारं देवदत्तः; causative: हारयति भारं देवदत्तम् देवदत्तेन वा। According to Pat. since the name कर्म is already applicable to the agent of a root conveying the meaning 'to go' or 'to eat' as well as to an intransitive root by P. 1. 4. 52: गतिबुद्धिप्रत्यवसानार्थ ... etc., the rule is a प्राप्तविभाषा when the roots हृ and कृ convey one or the other of these meanings or are used intransitively, e. g. अभ्यवहारयति सैन्धवान् सैन्धवैर्वा '(he) makes horses eat'; विकारयति सैन्धवान् सैन्धवैर्वा '(he) makes horses utter (a sound)'. The rule is, however, an अप्राप्तविभाषा when the roots हृ and कृ convey a meaning other than that mentioned in P. 1. 4. 52, e. g. हारयति भारं देवदत्तं देवदत्तेन वा '(he) makes देवदत्त carry the load'; कारयति कटं देवदत्तं देवदत्तेन वा '(he) makes देवदत्त make a mat'.

According to the author of the *Dīp.* the agent of the root हृ is called कर्मन् in a causative construction when हृ means 'to eat' or 'to go'. However, Pat. does not seem to connect the meaning 'to go' with the root हृ, since the *Mbh.* does not contain any illustration of that meaning.

ERRATA

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
3	1	व्यवहितः सर्वः सर्वस्य	व्यवहितः, सर्वस्य
3	1	विभक्तिनिमित्त°	विभक्तिर्निमित्त°
4	1	उपासंख्यानम्	उपसंख्यानम्
6	9	यत्रा	यत्रा —
7	10	°शब्दान	°शब्दान्
7	13	°मनुमानगम्यं	°मनुगम्यमानं
8	7	°मूलीत	°मूलत
8	10	पीलु°	पैलु°
11	6	°तव्यमिति	°तव्यमिति।
11	15	सिद्धं तु 'काङ°	'सिद्धं काङ°
12	23	कथमिदं विज्ञायत	कथमिदं विज्ञायत
12	25	कृन्मेज्	मेज्
13	2	[तदन्तविधिः]	[तदन्तविधिः]।
13	3	[अ]कृदन्तं	कृदन्तं
14	21	प्रताम	आसताम्
16	5	°तीतिकल्प्यते	°तीति कल्प्यते
17	2	तनौकारेण	तेनौकारेण
17	12	ऊषांचक्रतुः ऊषां°	ओषांचक्रतुः ओषां°
18	7	निमित्तम्	ऽनिमित्तम्
18	21	दीर्घं	अदीर्घं
18	23	इति	इति।
20	6	°लिङ्ग	°लिङ्ग-
20	20	°शन्निितिशब्दो	°शति शब्दो
22	6	विषय प्र°	विषयप्र°
22	6	शिसर्व°	शि सर्व°
22	7	'शिसर्व°	'शि सर्व°
22	16	भवति नासं°	भवतिना सं°
22	19	विच्छेदोपक्रमं	विच्छेदोपक्रमं (?)
24	13	योयं	योऽयं
24	21	°व्ययेतः	°व्यवेतः

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
24	27	नञोर्थो	नञोऽर्थो
25	4	वास्तवं	वस्त्वेव
26	9	°स्तु शब्दो	°स्तुशब्दो
26	16	प्रातिपदि°	ऽप्रातिपदि°
27	7	°विशेषः। इतिः	°विशेष इति
28	28	समाधि°	समानाधि°
29	28	तैत्तिरीयकाः	तैत्तिरीयकाः (?)
29	12	स	अ-
29	18	प्राधान्यात्।	प्राधान्यात्,
29	20	प्रत्याग्रार्था°	प्रत्यग्रार्था°
30	4	पत्तव्यम्।	पत्तव्यम् —
30	8	प्रतिपादयति	प्रतिपादयति —
30	21	°द्वित्वम्	°द्विकम्
31	8	संसारेति	[संसार इति]
31	17	कल्पितो	[वि] कल्पितो
36	2	छान्दसो लेट् वर्तमाने काले पञ्चमो लकारो बाहुलकात् श्यन्	छान्दसो लङ् वर्तमाने काले, 'पञ्चम[म]वाद्यत्
36	17	या तस्यास्	[स्वरूपाधिष्ठाना]यास्तस्यास्
37	24	°विधायकं	°भिधायकं
38	9	पुनर्	पुनः ?
38	10	वर्तते ?	वर्तते।
56	32	*pīlumūlītaḥ*	*pīlumūlataḥ*
63	17	fire	five
64	19	have become substantives	possess the speciality (of *mec*)
91	28	Taittirīrya	Taittirīya
97	12–13	as certaining	ascertaining
130	24	to is	is to